Abir Dandis, the mother of the two girls who were murdered in the Negev town of Al-Fura’a last week, couldn't find a police officer to listen to her warnings, neither in Arad nor in Ma’ale Adumim. Both police stations operate in areas where Israel wants to gather the Bedouin into permanent communities, against their will, in order to clear more land for Jewish communities. The dismissive treatment Dandis received shows how the Bedouin are considered simply to be lawbreakers by their very nature. But as a resident of the West Bank asking for help for her daughters, whose father was Israeli, Dandis faced the legal-bureaucratic maze created by the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinian police is not allowed to arrest Israeli civilians. It must hand suspects over to the Israel Police. The Palestinian police complain that in cases of Israelis suspected of committing crimes against Palestinian residents, the Israel Police tend not to investigate or prosecute them.

In addition, the town of Al-Azaria, where Dandis lives, is in Area B, under Palestinian civilian authority and Israeli security authority. According to the testimony of Palestinian residents, neither the IDF nor the Israel Police has any interest in internal Palestinian crime even though they have both the authority and the obligation to act in Area B.

The Palestinian police are limited in what it can do in Area B. Bringing in reinforcements or carrying weapons in emergency situations requires coordination with, and obtaining permission from, the IDF. If Dandis fears that the man who murdered her daughters is going to attack her as well, she has plenty of reason to fear that she will not receive appropriate, immediate police protection from either the Israelis or the Palestinians.

Dandis told Jack Khoury of Haaretz that the Ma’ale Adumim police referred her to the Palestinian Civil Affairs Coordination and Liaison Committee. Theoretically, this committee (which is subordinate to the Civil Affairs Ministry) is the logical place to go for such matters. Its parallel agency in Israel is the Civilian Liaison Committee (which is part of the Coordination and Liaison Administration - a part of the Civil Administration under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories).

In their meetings, they are supposed to discuss matters such as settlers’ complaints about the high volume of the loudspeakers at mosques or Palestinians’ complaints about attacks by settlers. But the Palestinians see the Liaison Committee as a place to submit requests for permission to travel to Israel, and get the impression that its clerks do not have much power when faced with their Israeli counterparts. In any case, the coordination process is cumbersome and long.

The Palestinian police has a family welfare unit, and activists in Palestinian women’s organizations say that in recent years, its performance has improved. But, as stated, it has no authority over Israeli civilians and residents. Several non-governmental women’s groups also operate in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and women in similar situations approach them for help. The manager of one such organization told Haaretz that Dandis also fell victim to this confusing duplication of procedures and laws. Had Dandis approached her, she said, she would have referred her to Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, which has expertise in navigating Israel’s laws and authorities.

John Kerry revealed his long-awaited plan for peace in the Middle East on Sunday, hinging on a $4bn (£2.6bn) investment in the Palestinian private sector.

The US secretary of state, speaking at the World Economic Forum on the Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea, told an audience including Israeli president Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that an independent Palestinian economy is essential to achieving a sustainable peace.

Speaking under the conference banner "Breaking the Impasse", Kerry announced a plan that he promised would be "bigger, bolder and more ambitious" than anything since the Oslo accords, more than 20 years ago.

Tony Blair is to lead a group of private sector leaders in devising a plan to release the Palestinian economy from its dependence on international donors. The initial findings of Blair's taskforce, Kerry boasted, were "stunning", predicting a 50% increase in Palestinian GDP over three years, a cut of two-thirds in unemployment rates and almost double the Palestinian median wage. Currently, 40% of the Palestinian economy is supplied by donor aid.

Kerry assured Abbas that the economic plan was not a substitute for a political solution, which remains the US's "top priority".

Peres, who had taken the stage just minutes before, also issued a personal plea to his Palestinian counterpart to return to the negotiations.

"Let me say to my dear friend President Abbas," Peres said, "Should we really dance around the table? Lets sit together. You'll be surprised how much can be achieved in open, direct and organised meetings."

Thick locks hug the front gates of shuttered shops, now covered in graffiti and dust from lack of use. Only a handful of customers pass along the dimly lit road, sometimes stopping to check the ripeness of fruits and vegetables, or ordering meat in near-empty butcher shops.

“All the shops are closed. I’m the only one open. This used to be the best place,” said 64-year-old Mustafa Sunocret, selling vegetables out of a small storefront in the marketplace near his family’s home in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City.

Amidst the brightly coloured scarves, clothes and carpets, ceramic pottery and religious souvenirs filling the shops of Jerusalem’s historic Old City, Palestinian merchants are struggling to keep their businesses alive.

Faced with worsening health problems, Sunocret told IPS that he cannot work outside of the Old City, even as the cost of maintaining his shop, with high electricity, water and municipal tax bills to pay, weighs on him.

“I only have this shop,” he said. “There is no other work. I’m tired.”

Abed Ajloni, the owner of an antiques shop in the Old City, owes the Jerusalem municipality 250,000 Israeli shekels (68,300 U.S. dollars) in taxes. He told IPS that almost every day, the city’s tax collectors come into the Old City, accompanied by Israeli police and soldiers, to pressure people there to pay.

“It feels like they’re coming again to occupy the city, with the soldiers and police,” Ajloni, who has owned the same shop for 35 years, told IPS. “But where can I go? What can I do? All my life I was in this place.”

He added, “Does Jerusalem belong to us, or to someone else? Who’s responsible for Jerusalem? Who?”

Illegal annexation

Israel occupied East Jerusalem, including the Old City, in 1967. In July 1980, it passed a law stating that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. But Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and subsequent application of Israeli laws over the entire city remain unrecognised by the international community.

Under international law, East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory – along with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Syrian Golan Heights – and Palestinian residents of the city are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Jerusalem has historically been the economic, political and cultural centre of life for the entire Palestinian population. But after decades languishing under destructive Israeli policies meant to isolate the city from the rest of the Occupied Territories and a lack of municipal services and investment, East Jerusalem has slipped into a state of poverty and neglect.

“After some 45 years of occupation, Arab Jerusalemites suffer from political and cultural schizophrenia, simultaneously connected with and isolated from their two hinterlands: Ramallah and the West Bank to their east, West Jerusalem and Israel to the west,” the International Crisis Group recently wrote.

Israeli restrictions on planning and building, home demolitions, lack of investment in education and jobs, construction of an eight-foot-high separation barrier between and around Palestinian neighbourhoods and the creation of a permit system to enter Jerusalem have all contributed to the city’s isolation.

Formal Palestinian political groups have also been banned from the city, and between 2001-2009, Israel closed an estimated 26 organisations, including the former Palestinian Liberation Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem, the Orient House and the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce.

Extreme poverty

Israel’s policies have also led to higher prices for basic goods and services and forced many Palestinian business owners to close shop and move to Ramallah or other Palestinian neighbourhoods on the other side of the wall. Many Palestinian Jerusalemites also prefer to do their shopping in the West Bank, or in West Jerusalem, where prices are lower.

While Palestinians constitute 39 percent of the city’s population today, almost 80 percent of East Jerusalem residents, including 85 percent of children, live below the poverty line.

“How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t control your resources? How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t have any control of your borders?” said Zakaria Odeh, director of the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, of “this kind of fragmentation, checkpoints, closure”.

“Without freedom of movement of goods and human beings, how could you develop an economy?” he asked.

“You can’t talk about independent economy in Jerusalem or the West Bank or in all of Palestine without a political solution. We don’t have a Palestinian economy; we have economic activities. That’s all we have,” Odeh told IPS.

Israel’s separation barrier alone, according to a new report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), has caused a direct loss of over one billion dollars to Palestinians in Jerusalem, and continues to incur 200 million dollars per year in lost opportunities.

Israel’s severing and control over the Jerusalem-Jericho road – the historical trade route that connected Jerusalem to the rest of the West Bank and Middle East – has also contributed to the city’s economic downturn.

Separation of Jerusalem from West Bank

Before the First Intifada (Arabic for “uprising”) began in the late 1980s, East Jerusalem contributed approximately 14 to 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). By 2000, that number had dropped to less than eight percent; in 2010, the East Jerusalem economy, compared to the rest of the OPT, was estimated at only seven percent.

“Economic separation resulted in the contraction in the relative size of the East Jerusalem economy, its detachment from the remaining OPT and the gradual redirection of East Jerusalem employment towards the Israeli labour market,” the U.N. report found.

Decades ago, Israel adopted a policy to maintain a so-called “demographic balance” in Jerusalem and attempt to limit Palestinian residents of the city to 26.5 percent or less of the total population.

To maintain this composition, Israel built numerous Jewish-Israeli settlements inside and in a ring around Jerusalem and changed the municipal boundaries to encompass Jewish neighbourhoods while excluding Palestinian ones.

It is now estimated that 90,000 Palestinians holding Jerusalem residency rights live on the other side of the separation barrier and must cross through Israeli checkpoints in order to reach Jerusalem for school, medical treatment, work, and other services.

“Israel is using all kinds of tools to push the Palestinians to leave; sometimes they are visible, and sometimes invisible tools,” explained Ziad al-Hammouri, director of the Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER).

Al-Hammouri told IPS that at least 25 percent of the 1,000 Palestinian shops in the Old City were closed in recent years as a result of high municipal taxes and a lack of customers. “Taxation is an invisible tool…as dangerous as revoking ID cards and demolishing houses,” he said. “Israel will use this as pressure and as a tool in the future to confiscate these shops and properties.”

bitterlemons: As things stand, what are the chances of a two-state solution?

Sarraj: First we must understand the strategy of Zionist leaders and institutions. I think there is general agreement on the Zionist side not to allow for the creation of a sovereign, independent and contiguous Palestinian state. This is seen as too dangerous to Israel.

Once you recognize a sovereign state, this state could have alliances with enemies of Israel, and this is a risk Israel does not want to take. And since the Americans have decided that the question of Palestine is a domestic Israeli issue, Israel will allow partial or full autonomy, but not sovereignty.

bitterlemons: It's a no-state solution then?

Sarraj: This is the thinking. Israel, with the encroachment of its army and settlers on land that is supposed to form the basis of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, is in effect decreasing the practical likelihood of a Palestinian state emerging.

So what is left for us? Because of Palestinian divisions, we are left with Israel, a mini-state in Gaza under Hamas and a mini-state in the West Bank under Fateh. Both of these mini-states are managed by Israel, one way or another and with or without the agreement of Palestinian leaders.

This is now a serious possibility. The plan today is to work toward this kind of three-entity solution whereby Egypt and Jordan are re-introduced into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively, even if security is managed, and will always be managed, solely by Israel.

bitterlemons: Are the Egyptians and Jordanians interested in such roles?

Sarraj: Both countries are in very weak positions. The Palestinian situation is an intensely emotional issue in both countries and both governments are struggling with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. They are also under pressure from Washington, pressure the US is lubricating with money, to work out some arrangement with Israel.

Both countries rely on moral and political American support so they will find it hard to go against Washington's wishes. Hence they are trying to find a role for themselves that will not appear to contradict Palestinian and Arab aims but will at the same time play out the US and Israeli game, with the help of Palestinians if possible. This is why we now see both countries engage all Palestinians, Fateh and Hamas, to see what kind of arrangements might be acceptable.

bitterlemons: What about the Palestinians in all of this?

Sarraj: The Palestinians are the last to decide on the fate of Palestine. The reality is that Israel, the neighboring countries and the US decide this question. Because of their divisions and their failures in peace and war and because of the serious structural damage that has now been incurred, Palestinians are the last to be considered to decide on the question of Palestine. Furthermore, Palestinian leaders are not taken seriously by anyone. There is of course room for them at the table, as long as they are not too obstinate.

bitterlemons: So, Palestinian aspirations for independence are dead?

Sarraj: At this moment in time, Palestinian aspirations for a sovereign state in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza are non-achievable. But this will not last forever. Israel worships power, because Israelis are paranoid about security. Power, however, is for now and tomorrow.

Israel does not consider moral power important. Israel is a state that is built on brutal power, not moral power, and as such has no future. Jimmy Carter is a moral person. He, along with many outside observers, believes that Israel's security can only be guaranteed in the long term by the creation of a Palestinian state and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights. Israel, paranoid as it is, sees the words of Carter as the words of an enemy.

So what is happening is this: the West Bank, because of Israeli violations and the theft of Palestinian land, has seen the germs of a new form of Palestinian resistance, that started in Biliin, emerge. This could really galvanize a new non-violent Palestinian movement of resistance, helped by some Israelis and internationals, to campaign for a one-state solution.

Israel has realized the danger from the demographic situation and this is why it opted to withdraw from Gaza. This also explains the Israeli policy of separation in the West Bank. If Palestinians stop using violence in favor of non-violent tactics against the occupation and campaign for a one-state solution with the help of Israelis, Jews everywhere and internationals, we can start to paint Israel as an apartheid state. Today, the world sees only an Israel threatened by terrorists. We need to correct that image, but that can only be done through no-violent means. Palestinians have historically always used the gun. But this is the last weapon we can win with.- Published 18/8/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Eyad Sarraj is a political commentator and the chairman of the board of the Gaza Community Mental Health Program.

bitterlemons: Will the Hizballah prisoner exchange have consequences for how Hamas deals with its own prisoner exchange with Israel?

Hamad: I think it may give people encouragement that they can achieve better progress because they see that for two bodies, Israel paid a heavy price. Now, people here think that if we stand off, stay strong and remain patient we will get more from Israel. This may be the main message of the Hizballah-Israel prisoner exchange.

On the other hand, Hizballah succeeded in keeping every detail secret and involved a mediator that was active daily on all fronts. I think Hamas needs to find a new mechanism to ensure there is a good exchange.

bitterlemons: There has been some talk that Hamas is not very happy with Egypt's mediation on this issue...

Hamad: Hamas wants Egypt to be more active and to find a new mechanism in order to accelerate progress on a swap. Some people say Egypt should not simply take messages from one side to the other, but should generate its own ideas.

bitterlemons: Has the Hizballah exchange already had an effect? Not long after, Hamas announced that talks on a prisoner swap for Gilad Shalit had been suspended.

Hamad: This has more to do with the lack of benefits Gazans have felt from the ceasefire. People are disappointed with the outcome of the truce. Israel is committed to opening the crossings and yet nothing has changed on the ground in terms of the kinds of goods coming into Gaza. So people are saying Israel can't expect negotiations over Shalit while people are still suffering from the embargo and there continues to be a lack of everything. People want to see proof that Israel is committed to the ceasefire agreement before they will talk about Shalit.

bitterlemons: Will the prisoner exchange raise Hamas' demands for Gilad Shalit?

Hamad: Until now there is no change in position with regards to the numbers or the sort of prisoners Hamas wants released. Maybe after what is seen as the victory of Hizballah this will simply strengthen Hamas' resolve not to change that position.

But, in a way, the Hizballah exchange has made the situation with Shalit more complicated. This is partly because Shalit is in the Palestinian territories and Israel feels it is more dangerous to accept the demands of Palestinian groups. I hear Israeli leaders, both political and military, talk of the Hizballah exchange as a defeat for Israel and blame [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert's government for a deal they see as shameful. So, potentially, Israel will be much more careful now in dealing with Palestinian demands.

It is then the job of the Palestinians and Egyptians to put more pressure on Israel and look for a more creative mechanism to accelerate the negotiations.

bitterlemons: Do you think an exchange will happen any time soon?

Hamad: No. I think this is a very complicated file and I don't see much progress.

bitterlemons: Hizballah appears very good at getting concessions from Israel. Meanwhile in the West Bank, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who has been negotiating with Israel for years, has yet to secure any prisoner concessions. What lessons are being drawn from this?

Hamad: That if you have a strong will and are supported by your people you can get more from your enemy. I think President Abbas--after 15 years of negotiations between the PLO and Israel and with things only getting worse, with no sign of progress or breakthrough or agreement--has to find a new mechanism. I think President Abbas should realize that the marriage between resistance and politics is necessary. Without power and without strength, Israel will give you nothing.

Palestinians have to understand that cooperation between Hamas and President Abbas will provide a stronger background to demand a release of prisoners or a lifting of checkpoints and so on. The division among Palestinians and this large gap between Hamas and Fateh make it much harder for Palestinians to achieve anything.- Published 21/7/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Ghazi Hamad is a Hamas official from Rafah.

bitterlemons: Is the Gaza ceasefire a wise move from Israel's standpoint?

Arens: I think it's very unwise, not only from Israel's standpoint but that of everyone opposed to terrorism. This is a ceasefire with terrorists, an unprecedented event in recent history.

bitterlemons: What alternative course of action do you favor?

Arens: I believe terrorism has to be defeated and even destroyed if possible. The IDF has the capability in the Gaza Strip. It should have done so long ago.

bitterlemons: Egypt reportedly pressured Israel to take advantage of Cairo's good offices and accept a ceasefire.

Arens: I can understand that Egypt is not eager to have a large Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip. That portends uncertainties from their point of view. The Egyptians naturally prefer the present situation, even though Hamas as a terrorist organization constitutes, under certain circumstances, even a threat to Egypt.

bitterlemons: The need to negotiate the release of captured IDF soldier Gilad Shalit also appears to have weighed in favor of a ceasefire as opposed to a military offensive.

Arens: In southern Israel, people have been living in danger for many, many months. While Shalit can be focused on personally, those in Sderot have been suffering anonymously. In a military operation in Gaza, many of our soldiers will be in danger, not just Shalit. I would hope that Hamas would not hurt Shalit, but nobody can guarantee that.

bitterlemons: How do you assess the ramifications of the ceasefire for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and the PLO?

Arens: The ceasefire is not a wise move for anyone opposed to terrorism. Abu Mazen rejects terrorism as a bad strategy for Palestinians. The ceasefire is seen as a victory for Hamas and thus for terrorism; it weakens the Abu Mazen school of thought that opposes terrorism.

bitterlemons: The ceasefire, like peace talks with Syria, appears to have developed completely independently of US policy. As a former ambassador to Washington, does this concern you?

Arens: Israel's relationship with the United States rests on very strong foundations. Differences of opinion here and there won't endanger that relationship. We can understand why the US opposes negotiations with Syria and considers it a terrorist country. I assume that for the same reasons the US is not eager to support a ceasefire with Hamas. But they have apparently decided not to make an issue of it. The US itself would not make a ceasefire with terrorists anywhere.

bitterlemons: The Gaza ceasefire is one event in a multiplicity of parallel Israeli conflict resolution initiatives undertaken by PM Olmert. How does this approach strike you?

Arens: I think that you could view this as a man on a tightrope who feels he has to continue walking or he'll fall off. This is Olmert's survival tactic. It's bad for Israel. If these developments were in Israel's interest, okay. But announcing that Israel will turn the Golan Heights over to Syria, the ceasefire with Hamas, negotiations with Abu Mazen over a shelf framework agreement based on Israeli concessions--are all not good for Israel. In other words, I don't' think Olmert is good for Israel.

bitterlemons: Is it possible that this peace activity on multiple fronts has something to do with an assessment that a military clash with Iran is imminent, hence it is in Israel's interest to generate calm in order to avoid the conflict spreading to additional fronts?

Arens: This is a specious argument. If the US attacks Iran, then as Mohammad ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency has said, the whole Middle East becomes a ball of fire, with a series of aftershocks emanating from Iran. It doesn't make much difference what Hamas and the PLO think. Besides, public statements regarding the danger from Iran are also part of Olmert's survival tactics.- Published 23/2/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Moshe Arens is a former defense minister and foreign minister of Israel in Likud-led governments.

bitterlemons: It is said there is a crisis of leadership on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides that means no agreement can be reached by the end of the year. Do you agree?

Shuaibi: On the Palestinian side there is no argument about who should be negotiating. Mahmoud Abbas, like Yasser Arafat before him, as the head of the PLO, the body that represents the Palestinian people, is empowered to negotiate with Israel. There was a problem between Hamas and Arafat over this representation, since Hamas is not a part of the PLO. But after the parliamentary elections in 2006, Hamas issued a statement agreeing that Abbas can negotiate in the name of the Palestinian people as long as he takes any agreement back to the people in a referendum.

But although Abbas has the green light from the Palestinian factions, as well as from Arab countries and internationally, his weakness is the weakness of Fateh. Fateh has not held internal elections yet and lost parliamentary elections in 2006. Having lost its position as the leading Palestinian faction, Fateh's defeat also weakened Abbas' position in the eyes of his people.

bitterlemons: And on the Israeli side?

Shuaibi: The defection of Ariel Sharon from the party he helped created, the Likud, and the creation of a new party, Kadima, shook Israeli politics. Being the powerful leader that he was, his subsequent illness left this new party weakened even if it managed to win elections.

Sharon had created a party of personalities drawn from other political parties but not a real party. It was left to Ehud Olmert to bring these people together. Now, with corruption allegations hanging over his head and other domestic problems, including a troublesome coalition and the rocky relationship with Ehud Barak, there is a real problem of leadership in Israel.

Both the Palestinian and Israeli leaderships face domestic difficulties of such a nature that it will render them unable to reach agreement, because these constraints make it harder for both Abbas and Olmert to make what people call the "painful" concessions. Even if they did, they would still need either public or parliamentary approval, unlikely to be forthcoming. With both Arafat and Sharon, we had leaders able to take decisions that their own people might have disagreed with.

bitterlemons: How much of the problem of leadership is down to weak institutions?

Shuaibi: The elections of 2006 were the first time there was real democratic competition between the major Palestinian factions. This caused a situation in which the Palestinian Legislative Council constituted a majority that did not agree with Abbas' political platform even if it agreed to let him negotiate. Today, after the split between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, the PLC is paralyzed, as are the Palestinian Authority institutions in general. There are effectively two governments: one in Gaza and one in the West Bank.

Although Salam Fayyad has been trying to create greater transparency, especially in the financial workings of the PA, and improve the performance of the PA's institutions especially in the fields of health, education and in fighting unemployment, there are still inherent weaknesses in the institutions.

bitterlemons: Will there be a crisis in 2009 if Abbas steps down, since there is no quorum in parliament and Israel says it won't allow new elections?

Shuaibi: This was an important question raised at the time of Arafat when his absence threatened to affect the very infrastructure of the PA. But the aftermath of Arafat's death was a test that was passed without trouble. Today, however, it's harder because there is no unified PLC and there is this division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

When Arafat passed away, there was a consolidation of support around Abbas and there was no argument within Fateh. But now there is an internal struggle in Fateh. The movement is unable to find a new leadership, having been unable to agree to convene the general conference. It is the duty of the new generation in Fateh to elect a new leadership but this can only be done at the conference. Since there is a split within Fateh on how things should be there is a question mark over whether the conference will be held. If it is not, it poses great danger to the credibility of Fateh. In all cases, it is obvious that Marwan Barghouti will play a big role, but I don't think Israel will release him. Israel wants a weak Palestinian leadership. It provides the Israeli government an excuse not to reach agreement.- Published 19/5/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Azmi Shuaibi is the head of Aman, Transparency Palestine.