The latest poll on the Palestinian public opinion prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali revealed the following:

• (81 %) of the Palestinians do not – to various degrees – trust the commitments of Israel and its obligations to the agreements signed with the Palestinian Authority.
• (59%) oppose the return of the relations with Israel, (38 %) agree to it.
• (55 %) oppose the resumption of the security coordination with Israel, (40 %) agree to it.
• (52 %) oppose the resumption of the peace negotiations with Israel, (43 %) agree to it.

Beit Sahour –Public Relations’ Section:

The latest poll prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali and conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (www.pcpo.org) during the period 19 – 22 November 2020 covered a random sample of (516) Palestinian respondents representing the various demographic specimens of Palestinians (18 years and above) living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. It revealed that the Palestinians are almost split between agreeing to and opposing the return of the relations with Israel and the resumption of the security coordination with it, albeit the opposition scale outweighs a little.

This poll, Dr. Kukali said, focuses mainly on the decision of the Palestinian Authority to resume the relations with Israel that are terminated since 5/9/2020

in response to the intention of the Israeli government to annex about 30 % of the area of the West Bank with full support of the US administration under President Donald Trump.

Dr. Kukali further noted that the motivation to take this courageous step by the Palestinian Authority was a letter from the Israeli government addressed to the PA confirming its willingness to abide by all the agreements signed with the PA.

Dr. Kukali added that the majority of the Palestinian people, in this poll, expressed however their mistrust of Israel’s intentions, as its actions on the ground speak another language. Nevertheless, the Palestinian people are still hopeful that they will have one day their own independent and sovereign State of Palestine with East Jerusalem it’s capital.

Dr. N. Kukali, President and founder of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, said the details of the key results of this poll are as follows:

Trusting Israel

Responding to the question: “What is the extent of your trust to Israel’s commitments and its obligations to the agreements previously signed with the Palestinian Authority?” (71 %) said “I’m not so sure”, (10 %) said “I’m not sure at all”, (9 %) “somewhat sure”, (6 %) “quite sure” and (4 %) said “I don’t know”.

Return of the relations with Israel

With regard to the question: “Do you agree to the return of the relations with Israel to their former status as they have been before 5/19/2020, or not?” (59 %) said “I oppose”, (38 %) “agree”, and (3 %) said “I don’t know”.

Reasons of agreeing to the return of the relations with Israel

In respect of the question: “What are the reasons that let you agree to the return of the relations with Israel?”, (5.6 %) said “crisis of the salary payment of employees”, (4.4 %) said “security stability and calm”, (26.9 %) said “improvement of the economic situation”, (9.4 %) “peace and stability”, (16.9 %) “permits and work in Israel”, (2.5 %) “the clearance funds”, (3.8 %) “permits to the hospitals and admission of patients for treatment”, (3.8 %) “facilitation of livelihood”, (8.8 %) said “lifting the siege from Gaza and opening the border-crossings”, (6.9 %) “due to the life connected with Israel”, (7.5 %) “for serving the citizens” and (3.5 %) “no reason”.

Security coordination with Israel

(55 %) of the Palestinians oppose the resumption of the security coordination with Israel, whilst (40 %) agree to it, and (5 %) declined to respond.

Resumption of the peace negotiations

(52 %) of the Palestinian public oppose the resumption of the peace negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel at present, whilst (43 %) of them agree to it and (5 %) declined to respond.

The economic situation

(61 %) of the Palestinian public assessed their economic situation at present as “bad”, (32 %) as “fair” (middle) and only (7 %) as “good”.

Survey overview

Dr. Nabil Kukali, said that the data for this survey has been collected by using CATI, an effective method for data collection in quantitative researches conducted by phone. By this method, questions are addressed to respondents from a previously designed questionnaire. The survey sample is randomly taken in accordance with a long experienced methodology applied by PCPO covering (516) respondents, (311) are from the West Bank and (205) from Gaza Strip.

Dr. Kukali has further indicated that the margin of error was (±4.38 %) at a significance level of (95.0%). The sample allotment with respect to the residential areas was as follows: (60.3 %) in the West Bank, incl. Eastern Jerusalem and (39.7 %) in Gaza Strip. The average age of the respondents was (32.4) years.

The overwhelming majority of the Palestinians views the decision of the UAE to normalize relations with Israel as a betrayal or abandonment of the Palestinian cause, one that serves only the interests of Israel. A similar majority thinks that Saudi Arabia and Egypt, by endorsing that normalization, have in effect abandoned the Palestinian leadership. But most Palestinians also place the blame on themselves because they are divided and have normalized relations with Israel long before others

9-12 September 2020

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 9-12 September 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a US announcement about an agreement between the UAE and Israel to normalize relations between the two countries. This normalization agreement stipulated an Israeli suspension or delay of the planned annexation of parts of the West Bank. The period also witnessed a rise in the daily number of coronavirus infections and continued stalemate in Palestinian-Israeli relations that followed a PA decision to sever all security and civil links with Israel which led during the past months to a significant financial loss to the PA. This PA decision came in response to an Israeli announcement about the intention to annex about 30% of the West Bank. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Finding of the September 2020 poll show a great Palestinian public anger with the UAE decision to normalize relations with Israel viewing it as serving only the interests of Israel and as a betrayal or an abandonment of the Palestinian cause and at the same time as a big failure of Palestinian diplomacy. Additionally, the overwhelming majority estimates that the Palestinian leadership has lost its Arab allies as Saudi Arabia will soon follow the UAE in normalizing relations and that Egypt, by endorsing the deal, has in effect abandoned PA president Mahmoud Abbas. Nonetheless, most believe that the majority of the Arab public is opposed to the normalization deal. Findings show that the public blames the Palestinians

themselves for this development: the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the fact that they had normalized relations with Israel before many others may have hastened the arrival of this day.

The public does not show an appreciation of the fact that the UAE-Israel deal requires the suspension of the annexation plan. The reason for this is the fact that three quarters think that the suspension is only temporary and will soon take place, the normalization deal notwithstanding. Moreover, based on this assessment, the public is opposed to the restoration of PA-Israel security coordination despite the fact that half of the public wishes to restore civil and fiscal relations between the two sides.

Findings also show a significant decline in support for the two-state solution compared to the situation three months ago. They also show that the consensus in rejecting the Trump plan, the deal of the century, first documented in PSR’s February 2020 poll, remains unchanged. Similarly, the overwhelming majority remains opposed to a resumption of contacts with the Trump administration. Despite the majority expectation that Trump will lose the upcoming US presidential elections, only one fifth expects positive policy change if the Democratic candidate Joe Biden wins.

Domestically, findings show continued satisfaction with the PA measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus pandemic despite significant decline in the level of satisfaction, especially with the prime minister’s performance. Moreover, a majority is opposed to the severing of coordination and cooperation with Israel in the fight against the spread of the coronavirus.

Demand for the resignation of president Abbas rises in this poll. Parallel to this, satisfaction with the performance of the president has declined. As a result, if elections were held today, Hamas’ Haniyyeh would win a majority of the public vote. This development might have been boosted by the current economic difficulties in the West Bank resulting from the severing of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel and the resulting inability of the PA to pay the public sector in full. Findings also show a drop in the perception of safety and security in the West Bank and an increase in the desire to emigrate. Despite these developments, the popularity of Fatah in the West Bank is not negatively affected; to the contrary, the findings show a little improvement in its popularity.

(1) UAE-Israel normalization agreement:

• A majority of 63% view the normalization agreement between the UAE and Israel as a major event that represents a significant regional shift while 32% view as minor development.
• Findings show a consensus (86%) that the agreement serves only the interests of Israel while 8% think it serves the interests of both the Palestinians and the Israelis and only 1% think it serves the interests of the Palestinians only.
• We asked the public to pick one word that represents its sentiments toward the normalization agreement: the majority (53%) picked “betrayal,” 17% picked “abandonment” 13% “insult,” 9% “indifference,” 6% “sadness,” while only 1% picked words like “satisfaction,” “pride,” and “joy.”
• Most Palestinians (57%) believe that the majority among the Arab public is opposed to the normalization agreement while 20% believe an Arab majority supports it.
• A large majority (70%) believes that other Arab countries, such as Bahrain, Oman, Sudan, and Morocco, will sign similar agreements with Israel while 24% believe they will not do that.
• An overwhelming majority (80%) believes that Saudi Arabia has given the green light to the UAE to sign the normalization agreement and a similar majority (82%) believes that Saudi Arabia too will sign a similar public agreement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of the public (78%) believes that the Egyptian position welcoming the agreement represents an abandonment of the Palestinian leadership led by Abbas while 18% do not share this view.
• A majority of 55% believes that Mohammad Dahlan was one of the participants in the making of the UAE-Israel normalization agreement while 24% do not share this view.
• Nonetheless, a majority of 53% believes that the blame for the normalization deal falls on the shoulders of the Palestinians themselves due to their division and due to the fact that they have recognized Israel and normalized relations with it long before the others; 42% disagree with this view.
• Also, a majority of 62% views the UAE defection from the previous declared Arab consensus on Palestine as a great failure for Palestinian diplomacy; 31% do not share this view.

(2) Annexation and the severing of relations with Israel in post UAE-Israel normalization:

• Three quarters of the public (75%) believe that the normalization agreement forces Israel to merely postpone annexation while 19% think it forces it to put an end to it.
• Now, after the normalization agreement, a majority of 62% is opposed to the restoration of security coordination with Israel while 32% are in favor of restoring it.
• But half of the public (50%) supports, and 45% oppose, the restoration of civil and fiscal coordination with Israel.
• If Israel conditioned resumption of civil and fiscal coordination with a resumption of security coordination, a majority of 59% will oppose, and 35% will support, the resumption of relations.
• In response to an actual Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories, the public is divided on how to respond. When asked to choose one of five possible responses, 28% favored resumption of armed struggle, 20% selected stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, another 20% favored return to negotiations with Israel and the US on the basis of a Palestinian peace plan, 19% preferred waging nonviolent resistance, and 6% selected the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• The public indicates great worries about the future in case of continued severing of relations with Israel.
• For example, 74% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 75% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment. 77% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel.
• 59% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 59% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 70% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 60% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
• It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (63%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 30% believe it indeed did.
• A majority of 61% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (32%) expects Israel to do so.
• A large majority of 75% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 21% say they do prefer that.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution declines to 39% and opposition stands at 58%. No description or details were provided for the concept.
• Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 45%.
• A majority of 62% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 31% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 20% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 27% of the public while 36% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 28% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 38% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 41% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 26% popular resistance. Three months ago, 45% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 92% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Three months ago, 88% expressed opposition to the plan.
• If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 55% think the chances are zero; 26% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
• A majority of 71% is opposed and 19% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration.
• Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Three months ago, 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
• A majority of 61% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 30% expect him to win it. Nonetheless, only 21% expect a positive change if Biden wins while 34% believe US policy will not change and 35% expect it to become worse.

(4) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• A two-third majority (68%) is satisfied with the measure taken by the PA to prevent travel between the various governorates in order to contain the Coronavirus pandemic.
• Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 64% express satisfaction with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas and 57% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area. On the other hand, satisfaction with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stands at 48% today compared to 62% three months ago.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 70% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 52% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
• A majority of 55% say that are dissatisfied with the PA decision during the past several months to stop cooperation and coordination with Israel in the health sector with the aim of combating the coronavirus, 42% are satisfied with that decision.

(5) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 31% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 58% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 54% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 31% and dissatisfaction at 63%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 36% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 36% (44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 39% and the latter 52% of the vote (compared to 42% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh threw months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 62% (compared to 61% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 46% (compared to 51% three months ago) and Haniyeh 42% (compared to 38% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 55% and Haniyeh 39%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 41% and the latter 51%.
• We asked in an open-ended question about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 22% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 18% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 7% (1% in the West Bank and 15% in the Gaza Strip), Mohammad Shtayyeh is preferred by 5%, Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, Khalid Mishal by 3%, and Salam Fayyad by 2%.
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 61% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 34% and Fatah at 36%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 45% (compared to 47% three months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 28% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 23% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 42% three months ago).

(6) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 16%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 71% and in the West Bank at 57%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage in the Gaza Strip stands at 25% and in the West Bank at 24%. Three months ago, only 18% of West Bankers expressed a desire to emigrate.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80%. Three months ago, 81% expressed a similar view.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 62% views it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 33% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people. Three months ago, only 52% viewed the PA as a burden.
• A year and a half since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 60% expect failure; only 31% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 33% expect success.
• In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 61% expects failure and 32% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of the public (80%) is opposed to the arrest by the PA security services of activists who were planning to demonstrate or were demonstrating against corruption in the PA while 17% support these arrests.
• 56% (66% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 36% (23% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial. Six month ago, 42% said it believes it will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 64% (75% in the West Bank and 49% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 31% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law. Six month ago, 41% said the judiciary and courts rule according to the law.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last three months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (13%), Maan TV at 12%, Palestine Today TV at 11%, Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen at 4% each, and finally al Manar at 2%.

(7) Reconciliation:

• 37% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. three months ago, optimism stood at 29%.
• Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 45% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 11% believe unity will return soon.

(8) Muslims in China:

• 80% of the Palestinians believe that if press reports about the treatment of the Uighur Muslims in China are true, Palestinians should condemn the Chines policy towards its Muslim community and 15% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 79% indicates that it does not believe the statement of the Chinese government that the camps built by China to allegedly detain the Uighur Muslims are in fact teaching centers aiming at eradicating extremism; 10% believe the Chinese statement.
• Similarly, an overwhelming majority of 83% believes that world Muslims should express solidarity with the Uighur Muslims against the Chinese government while 10% disagree with that.
• An overwhelming majority of 80% approves of the Turkish president Erdogan’s decision to transform the Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque; 16% disapprove.

(9) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 42% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 29% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 15% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings; 13% believe it should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today is poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, the spread of corruption in public institutions in the eyes of 25%, the continuation of occupation and settlement activities in the eyes of 24%, the continued siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings in the eyes of 13%, and the lack of national unity in the eyes of 10%.

The latest poll on the Palestinian public opinion prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali revealed the following:

• (55.5%) believe that the decision of the Palestinian Authority to end the security and civil coordination with Israel was a right decision, (49.1 %) are among the residents of the West Bank, and (65 %) residents of Gaza Strip.

• (52.3%) believe that the cessation of the security and civil coordination with Israel will negatively affect the economic and living conditions of the Palestinian people.

• (48.7%) believe that ending the security and civil coordination will negatively affect the restriction of the spread of corona epidemic (Covid-19). .

The latest poll prepared by Dr. Nabil Kukali and conducted by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion (www.pcpo.org) during the period from June 14-22, 2020 covered a random sample of (1250) Palestinian respondents representing the various demographic specimens of Palestinians (18 years and above) living in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip. It revealed that (55.5 %) of the Palestinian public believe that the decision of the Palestinian Authority to end the security and civil coordination with Israel was a right decision.

Dr. Nabil Kukali, President and founder of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, said that the suspension of the security and civil coordination came as response to the Israeli position, that is supported by President Tramp to annex vast regions of the West Bank that makes up around (30 %) of the area of the West Bank, including the Jordan Valley region, the region north of the Dead Sea and the settlements to its sovereignty, the matter that the Palestinians consider as ultimate undermining of the opportunity to establish their own independent state.

Dr. Kukali further added that the poll results unveil that there is a fear of deterioration of the economic and living conditions in the Palestinian Territories as well as the mutual cooperation in restricting the spread of the corona-virus (COVID-19).

Dr. Kukali said the details of the key results of this poll are as follows:

Cessation of the Coordination as a Right Decision

(55.5 %) of the Palestinian public believe that the decision of the Palestinian Authority to end the security and civil coordination with Israel was a right decision; (49.1 %) of them are residents of the West Bank, and (65 %) residents of Gaza Strip, whilst (44.5 %) of the Palestinians, (50.9 %) of them in the West Bank and (35 %) in Gaza Strip, believe that the decision was wrong.

The results in detail further reveal that the governorates with the positive attitude towards the decision are in the West Bank in the following order: Al-Bireh & Ramallah (81.8 %), Jerusalem (62.8 %), Jericho (55.6 %), Hebron (52.9 %), Salfit (52.2 %), Nablus (43.3 %), Toubas (37.5 %), Toulkarem (37.3 %), Jenin (34 %), Qalqilia (27.8 %) and Bethlehem with (15.9 %) the least positive attitude.

On the other hand, the governorates with the negative attitude towards the decision are in the West Bank in the following order: Bethlehem (84.1 %), followed by Qalqilia (72.2 %), Jenin (66 %), Toulkarem (62.7 %), Toubas (62.5 %), Salfit (47.8 %), Nablus (56.6 %), Hebron (47.1 %), Jericho (44.4 %), Jerusalem (37.2 %) and Ramallah (18.8 %).

In Gaza Strip, the governorates with the positive attitude towards the PA decision are in the following order: Rafah (78.1 %), followed by Deir al-Balah (75.9 %), Gaza City (63.9 %), Khan Younis (61.1 %) and North Gaza (54.9 %).

Cessation of the Coordination and the Economic Situation

Responding to the question:” Do you think that the cessation of the security and civil coordination with Israel will improve the economic and living conditions of the Palestinian people or rather worsen them ?, (18.7 %) said “will improve them”, (52.3 %) “will worsen them”, (15.8 %) “will have no effect” and (13.2 %) said “I don’t know”.

Cessation of the Coordination and the Restriction of Corona-virus (COVID-19)

With regard to the question:” In view of the coordination between the Palestinian Authority and Israel on restricting COVID-19, do you think that ending the security and civil coordination between them would negatively affect this COVID-19 coordination, or not ?, (48.7 %) said “will negatively affect”, (21.7 %) said “will remain unchanged” and (29.6 %) have no opinion.

Will the Cessation of the Coordination impede the Annexation of Jordan Valley and the Settlements ? In respect of the question:” Some people in the Palestinian Territories believe that ending the security and civil coordination between the PA and Israel will impede the Israeli annexation of vast areas of the West Bank (Jordan Valley and the settlements) by Israel, while others believe that it will boost the annexation of these areas by Israel. Which of these two opinions is closer to yours ?, “(28.1 %) said “it will impede Israel”, (35.1 %) “it will encourage Israel to annex these areas”, (26.5 %) “the decision of the PA will have no effect on the annexation” and (10.3 %) said “I don’t know”.

Seriousness of the Palestinian Authority

Responding to the question:”Up to which extent do you believe that the PA will adhere to its decision of terminating the security and civil coordination with Israel ?”, (12.5 %) said “to a great extent”, (37 %) “to a fair extent”, (35.3 %) “to a little extent” and (15.2 %) have no opinion.

The Need for Civil Coordination

With respect of the question addressed to the West Bank respondents:”If you were in need for a coordination or for getting a job, or going to a hospital in Israel, would you go to the bureaus of the Israeli civil administration or to the Palestinian liaison bureaus “, (22 %) said “I would go to the bureaus of the Israeli civil administration”, whilst (56.6 %) said they “would go to the Palestinian liaison bureaus”, and (21.4 %) said “ I don’t know”.

Methodology of the Survey Study in the Palestinian Territories

Dr. Nabil Kukali, said that all interviews of this survey were conducted inside the respondents' homes. The choices were randomly taken in accordance with a long experienced methodology applied by PCPO from a total of (180) sites, (135) are from the West Bank and (45) from Gaza Strip.

Dr. Kukali has further indicated that the margin of error was (±2.77 %) at a significance level of (95.0%). He added that the rate of the female respondents in this survey was (49.6%) against (50.4%) male respondents. The sample allotment with respect to the residential areas was as follows: (63.0 %) in the West Bank, incl. Eastern Jerusalem and (37.0 %) in Gaza Strip. The average age of the respondents was (31.5) years.

For following up the most recent polls of the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, please revert to our website: www.pcpo.org

Led by last week’s naming of Tony Blair as special envoy to the Middle East, a string of personnel changes in capitals across the continent has Europe poised to play a greater role in Israeli-Palestinian affairs.

In Brussels last month, the European Union agreed to grant more power to its foreign policy chief, who has traditionally led Europe’s peacemaking efforts. Both London and Paris, meanwhile, saw the naming of foreign ministers of Jewish descent. David Miliband, son of Holocaust survivors, last week became Britain’s second-youngest foreign secretary. And last month, Bernard Kouchner, whose Russian grandparents perished in Auschwitz, was tapped for the same position across the Channel.

But it was the appointment of Blair, who stepped down last week as British prime minister after 10 years in office, that gave greatest fuel to the speculation that the continent is ready to step into the diplomatic vacuum left by Washington.

A number of European countries want to pursue a more “activist” agenda, former top Clinton official Steven Simon said, and “if they can do this with Blair, European policy in the region might have some legs.”

Blair, who was appointed last week by the so-called Madrid Quartet — composed of the United States, United Nations, E.U. and Russia — will oversee efforts to rebuild the Palestinian economy and Palestinian institutions. Most experts believe, however, that he will eventually expand his mandate and delve into the core diplomatic issues that are supposedly under the purview of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

“It is hard to believe that Blair will focus only on nation building and the like,” said Daniel Kurtzer, a former American ambassador to Israel. “He’s an activist, and it may prove very challenging for Washington to constrain his impulse toward expanding his mission.”

Given the worsening situation in Gaza and the tepid involvement of the Bush administration to date, even a limited mandate may prove challenging for the former British prime minister. While his appointment was welcomed by Israel, Blair’s alignment with President Bush on Iraq has caused lasting damage to his image among Palestinians, according to Rashid Khalidi, head of the Middle East Institute at Columbia University. In addition, Blair’s predecessor as the quartet’s special envoy to the Middle East, former World Bank president James Wolfensohn, left the post in frustration at the lack of momentum behind his peacemaking efforts.

“It is hard to see how he will succeed where Wolfensohn failed, unless — and this is the key — Washington ratchets up its own diplomacy and pursues a parallel track of serious diplomacy,” Kurtzer said.

While all eyes in Washington were on Blair, back in London the spotlight was on the picks of Gordon Brown, the new prime minister, to head Britain’s foreign policy. Miliband, a rising Labor Party star, was given the helm at the Foreign Office, while Simon McDonald, a former British ambassador to Israel who is fondly remembered in Jerusalem, was named Brown’s top foreign policy adviser.

In France, meanwhile, newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed Kouchner, who is half-Jewish and supported the American-led invasion of Iraq, as his foreign minister. In addition, the French president created the new position of national security adviser to coordinate foreign policy. He tapped for the job Jean-David Levitte, who until recently was France’s ambassador to Washington and whose father was the first director of the American Jewish Committee in France.

The new Jewish face of European diplomacy, however, may not necessarily translate into a dramatic shift in Middle East policy. While Kouchner has so far treaded carefully on Israeli-Palestinian matters, the French government has called a meeting in Paris later this month of all Lebanese political factions, including Hezbollah, prompting a swift condemnation by CRIF, the official Jewish umbrella organization.

Lebanon is also the only publicly known Middle East stance on which the new British foreign secretary has taken a position, and it is far from a staunchly pro-Israel one. Last summer, Miliband, who had just become environment secretary, expressed criticism of London and Washington’s hesitancy in calling for an immediate cease-fire, reportedly asking at a Cabinet meeting, “Where is this all going to end?”

In an interview with Britain’s New Statesman magazine last September, he did not deny making the remarks.

“I felt very worried, because, put it this way, I don’t think that Israel is safer and stronger now than it was two months ago. I don’t think the prospects of a secure and just two-state settlement in the Middle East are closer than they were two months ago,” he was quoted as saying.

The son of a prominent Marxist historian whose family fled Poland and arrived in England in 1940, Miliband, who was educated at Oxford and at the Massachusetts Instutitute of Technology, was recruited by then-opposition leader Blair in 1994 and became his head of policy after Labor’s 1997 electoral triumph. He became a member of parliament in 2001, entered the government the following year and was appointed environment secretary in 2006.

Miliband, to judge by an interview with the Forward in May, is not one to paper over differences with Washington. During a recent visit to the United States to advocate stronger engagement in fighting climate change, Miliband brushed aside the suggestion that Britain was spearheading efforts on the issue as way to recoup some of the international standing it lost by supporting the American-led war in Iraq.

“We have been clear,” Miliband told the Forward, “about our disagreement with the U.S. on this issue.”

Earlier this month, a Chicago jury acquitted Mohammed Salah and Abdelhalim Ashqar of being part of a racketeering conspiracy to finance and support Hamas. The two men faced life sentences after being charged with laundering funds and providing recruits for the group. In the end, however, they were convicted on lesser charges of obstruction of justice and criminal contempt.

The verdict followed two other setbacks for federal prosecutors in high-profile cases involving Palestinian suspects.

Late last month, a federal immigration judge dismissed the government’s long-running attempt to deport two men who were arrested along with six other American residents 20 years ago because of their alleged ties to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Calling the prosecution’s conduct “an embarrassment to the rule of law,” Judge Bruce Einhorn ruled that the government had violated the constitutional rights of Khader Hamide and Michel Shehadeh by its “gross failure” to comply with his instructions to produce “potentially exculpatory and other relevant information.” In December 2005, a jury in Florida acquitted former South Florida University professor Sami Al-Arian of eight terrorism charges and deadlocked on nine others. Arian eventually pleaded guilty to supporting members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and is serving a 57-month prison term.

The indictments in Chicago and in Florida were initially trumpeted by then-attorney general John Ashcroft as major accomplishments in the prosecutorial side of the war on terror after the attacks on September 11, 2001. But defense lawyers in the cases say that the actual verdicts were products of the government’s overreaching, most notably its frequent use of the “material support” criminal charge, which encompasses a wide variety of activities from actual operational support to advocacy. “Today, the prohibition to provide any support to a blacklisted group has become the functional equivalent of the guilt-by-association charge that was put aside years ago,” said David Cole, professor of constitutional law at Georgetown University. Cole represents several plaintiffs in cases challenging government terrorist charges.

Matthew Levitt, a former FBI and Treasury official who was an expert witness for the prosecution in the Chicago trial, cautioned against drawing hasty conclusions from the verdicts. Still, he expressed disappointment over the fact that the two Hamas supporters were able to beat the terrorism-related charges.

In this case, prosecutors faced the additional challenge of trying to punish activities that occurred before Hamas was declared a terrorist organization by the American government in 1995.

Salah, an American citizen, was accused of helping funnel hundreds of thousands of dollars to militant groups in the West Bank and Gaza. He was captured by the Israelis with $100,000 cash in 1993, and reportedly confessed to being a Hamas military commander. Ashqar was alleged to have helped launder money and facilitate communications for Hamas.

Neither man denied helping move money for Palestinian causes, but both insisted that they did not aim to promote terrorism. In addition, Salah said that his confession was the result of torture on the part of Israeli officials. In an unusual move, the prosecution brought two Israeli interrogators to testify under aliases that Salah was treated well. Former New York Times reporter Judith Miller, who had attended an interrogation session in Israel in the early 1990s, also testified for the prosecution.

In the end, Salah was convicted of obstruction of justice for providing false answers to questions in a civil suit filed by parents of an American teenager who was shot and killed by Hamas terrorists at an Israeli bus stop.

Ashqar was convicted of obstruction of justice and criminal contempt for refusing to testify before a federal grand jury after receiving immunity from prosecution.

One other defendant remains under indictment in the case: Mousa Abu Marzook, Hamas’s deputy political bureau chief, who was deported from the United States in 1997 and is now in Damascus. Prosecutors have charged that Marzook sent Salah on his mission to Israel and supplied him with money to give to Hamas leaders. In the PFLP case, Hamide and Shehadeh, both longtime legal residents of the United States, were part of a group that was dubbed “the L.A. 8” after the government launched attempts to deport them in January 1987.

All have steadfastly maintained that they were being persecuted even though their political activities — distributing newspapers; participating in demonstrations; assisting Palestinians with human rights and medical needs; raising money for hospitals, youth clubs and day-care centers — were lawful.

In the latest twist in the case of former Florida professor Arian, he is currently on a hunger strike to protest his jail conditions. He began his strike after learning that he will have to serve the remaining 18 months of his jail sentence for his refusal to testify before a grand jury in another terrorism case. His attorneys claim that an earlier plea agreement freed him from further cooperation with the government and that he expected to be deported. But the government claims that no such commitment had been made in a plea agreement reached last May, in which Arian admitted that he was conspiring to provide services to Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The jury did not convict him on the more serious charges that he was actively involved in terrorist activity.

Efraim 'Effi' Eitam, a leader of Israelيs right-wing Orthodox Zionist camp, is criticizing President Bushيs Iraq policy, saying it could end up undermining efforts to confront Iran.

Eitam, who sits on the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and is the leader of the Renewed National Religious Zionist party, spent three days last week in Washington briefing the administration, Congress and think tanks about the Iranian threat. Eitam told the Forward that, during his trip, he criticized Bushيs decision to send more troops to Baghdad and the emphasis that his administration is putting on spreading democracy.

The main concern, Eitam said, is that the continuing presence of American troops in Iraq would make it hard to build support for an American strike against Iran. 'The most important commodity we have is the U.S. support for war against Iran, so we need to build on this,' he said. 'The administration is unpopular but can still take a strategic decision on Iran. Still, I'm concerned Bush is so committed to Iraq that he will loose the possibility of dealing with Iran.' Eitam said that Bushيs message to the American public should be that although Iraq was the wrong war, the principle of depriving a rogue state from acquiring nuclear weapons is still a good one. 'The wrong target has been shot,' he said. 'You get a second chance to shoot the right one. The original goal of the war in Iraq was WMDs, not democracy, and I tell them this is still true.' Eitam presents an unusual blend of security and religious credentials. He pursued a military carrier, retiring as a brigadier-general in 2000 after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, where he commanded the troops in the south. As head of the National Religious Party, he was minister in several government coalitions between 2002 and 2004.

His outright opposition to concessions to the Palestinians, his attacks on the loyalty of Israeli Arabs and a well-publicized scuffle with the police in the West Bank last year have made him a polarizing figure.

During his trip to Washington, Eitam advised his 'Iraq-obsessed' interlocutors to redeploy to pro-American countries in the region, reaffirm their commitment to stay in the Middle East and make it clear that they will prevent Tehran from going nuclear. In doing so, he effectively brushed aside the democracy-spreading agenda backed by the administration, and the recent plan to put more American troops into Baghdad to quell the sectarian violence.

Despite tepid public support in America for another military venture in the Middle East, Eitam asserted that he sensed strong bipartisan support in Washington for using all available means to stop Iranيs nuclear program.

Eitam noted that while American intelligence disagreed a year ago with Israelيs assessment that Iran was three to four years away from reaching a critical point, Washington now endorses Jerusalemيs estimates. 'Everybody now agrees that we have three to four years before we reach a point where the Iranian project canيt be reversed,' he said. 'We are not talking about the time when they will have the knowledge, but when they will have a bomb and the missile to deliver it.' While he did not openly call for military action, Eitam noted that the Iranian program was currently at a stage where 'it is big enough to be understood but small enough to be destroyed.' Asked about the danger of Iran retaliating against Jerusalem and Washington in the event of a military strike by Israel or the United States, Eitam struck a confident tone. 'We have the Arrows system to stop missiles, we are now better prepared to deal with Hezbollah and if the U.S. redeploys in Iraq, it will make the troops safer,' he said. 'So what's the risk of three months of systematic strikes against nuclear facilities, which will end up delaying their program?' Eitam said that even if Israel were to carry out strikes on its own, it would need American support for refueling, as well as authorization to fly over Iraq and intelligence cooperation. 'This is why I tell the Americans that they will be seen as being part of it anyway, which is why they should prepare accordingly,' he said.

The Israeli lawmaker dismissed the claims by pro-American Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan that progress on the Palestinian track would help produce a robust unified front against Tehran. 'This is just propaganda,' he said. 'They want us to stop the Iranian nuclear program, we don't need progress on the Palestinian issue. The Saudis should salute us for taking care of this, so this idea that we have to give something to the Palestinians is just rubbish.' He went on to claim that the Palestinian question was marginal in those countries, and he dismissed the notion that Israeli occupation of the West Bank was inflaming the Arab public throughout the region.

Eitam, who quit the Sharon government in 2004 because of Israelيs decision to withdraw from Gaza, said that the violent aftermath and chaos of the disengagement from there, as well as from Lebanon, had discredited the land-for-peace paradigm. 'No one will want to try this again unless there is a very fundamental change on the Palestinian side, which may take decades,' Eitam said. In the meantime, he added, Israel has proved that it could contain the terrorist threat by erecting the security fence.

Eitam said that he expected to play a prominent role in any future government headed by Israeli opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who leads the Likud party and is a former prime minister.

During his first stint as prime minister, Netanyahu upset many settler leaders by agreeing to Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank. But this time, Eitam said, 'I will be nearby him.' Eitam added, 'He has wounds, and he has matured.'

While the release of the long-awaited Baker-Hamilton report on Iraq policy has produced an outpouring of protest from Jewish groups opposing its calls for talks with Iran, Syria and the Palestinians, insiders say that the real target of Israel’s anxiety is neither Syria nor the Palestinians, but Iran and its nuclear program.

Earlier this week, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert publicly expressed guarded willingness to engage Damascus. While Olmert’s gesture was hedged with conditions, a government adviser told the Forward this week that Jerusalem was in fact open to holding discussions with Syria, but was constrained by the Bush administration’s flat opposition to any dealings with the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

As for a new opening toward the Palestinians, Olmert recently declared his willingness to move in that direction, even softening his terms for a renewal of diplomacy. Jerusalem is unhappy seeing any linkage between America’s problems in Iraq and Israel’s dealings with the Palestinians, viewing such linkage as a form of pressure on Israel to move faster than it might choose. At the same time, Israel seeks progress for its own reasons.

On the Iranian front, however, Jerusalem is deeply fearful, seeing any U.S. appeal for Iranian help in Iraq as implying a quid pro quo that can only be damaging to Israel’s essential interests.

The administration is currently reviewing its options in Iraq and in the region following the December 6 release of the report by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group. The report calls for direct engagement with Syria and Iran in order to secure their help in stabilizing Iraq. It also calls for a sustained effort to jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as a key to improving the atmosphere in the region and easing the way for moderate Arab regimes to cooperate with Washington.

Bush has indicated an unwillingness to pursue the recommendations on engaging Iran and Syria unless Tehran verifiably abandons its nuclear ambitions and Damascus stops destabilizing Lebanon and halts support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

In a December 12 interview with Agence-France Presse, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice openly rejected the study group’s appeal to deal directly with Damascus and Tehran in order to end the crisis in Iraq.

Moreover, administration officials who have briefed Jewish community officials in recent days have indicated that the president rejects the report’s linkage of Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

James Baker, the Republican stalwart who co-chaired the study group, said after the report’s release that Syrian officials had indicated to the commission that they would be willing to meet two key American and Israel demands: to decrease their support for Hezbollah and to pressure Hamas to recognize Israel’s right to exist.

“Talking to Syria gives us an excellent opportunity to revitalize the Arab-Israeli peace process,” Baker said. “The Syrians are the transit point for arms shipments to Hezbollah, and if you can flip the Syrians, you will cure Israel’s Hezbollah problem…. The Syrians will tell you, as they told us, that they do have the ability to convince Hamas to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist…. If we accomplished that, that would give Ehud Olmert a negotiating partner on the Palestinian track.”

Just hours after the report was released last week, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee issued a press release warning against unconditional talks with Iran and Syria. “While engagement can be a useful diplomatic tool, both Iran and Syria have used past talks with the United States and Europeans as a time-buying exercise to continue their destructive policies and stave off serious consequences,” Aipac said.

Israeli officials dismissed the report’s assertion that solving the crisis in Iraq implied a renewed effort on the Israeli-Palestinian track.

But the real concern of Israeli policymakers, several knowledgeable sources argued, is Iran. Israel and its allies have been extremely active in recent weeks, depicting Iran as a global threat. The latest round of protests was sparked by this week’s international Holocaust conference in Tehran, a gathering of Holocaust deniers and neo-Nazis from around the world.

Behind the rhetoric, Jerusalem worries that Washington will ease its pressure on Tehran to suspend nuclear enrichment in exchange for Iranian help in stabilizing Iraq.

Israeli concerns are compounded by the fact that talk of military action against Tehran has receded in recent months, even as negotiations over U.N. sanctions against Iran remain stalled, leaving Iran in an increasingly strong bargaining position over the nuclear issue. In his confirmation hearings last week, incoming Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that a military option against Iran should be an “absolute last resort.”

“I think that the consequences of a conflict — a military conflict with Iran — could be quite dramatic,” Gates told the senators. “And therefore, I would counsel against military action, except as a last resort and if we felt that our vital interests were threatened.” Gates pointed to Iran’s ability to cut oil supplies, launch terror attacks worldwide and fuel more chaos in Iraq and in Lebanon.

Gates also referred to Israel as a nuclear power, the first American official to do so publicly, fueling concerns in some pro-Israel circles that he was laying groundwork for a new form of pressure on Israel, perhaps involving a trade of Israel’s nukes for Iran’s.

In contrast to its fears on the Iran front, Jerusalem has made several noteworthy gestures towards the Palestinians and the Syrians in recent days. The moves toward the Palestinians are at least partly in anticipation of increased U.S. pressure to show progress. On the Syrian front, by contrast, the moves come, despite U.S. wishes, in hopes of separating Damascus from Tehran.

Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel has been one of the main stumbling blocks preventing the formation of a Palestinian national unity government over the past months. The Fatah party of Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas takes the position that it will not join a government that cannot negotiate peace with Israel. Israel’s position has been that it will not talk to a Palestinian unity government in which Hamas plays a major role unless Hamas itself recognizes Israel. In recent days, however, Israel has shifted its stance, with spokesmen now saying it could deal with a Palestinian unity government that recognizes Israel, implying that the individual components of that government can have different policies.

On Syria, Olmert took a step toward lowering tensions this week, saying in a German television interview that he did not see a war looming in the coming months. His statement appeared to bolster the view of Israel’s military intelligence branch over that of the Northern Command, which has warned of a military buildup that could lead to open warfare by next summer.

Assad has offered on several occasions in recent years to open a dialogue with Israel over the Golan Heights, proclaiming that Syria — in sharp contrast to Iran — is willing to make peace with Israel. Up to now Assad has been rebuffed by Jerusalem, with the support of Washington, out of the belief that the Syrian regime was weak and isolated following its forced withdrawal from Lebanon last year. However, the continuing chaos in Iraq, the inconclusive war in Lebanon and the stalemate with Hamas have changed the equation in recent months and prompted a growing chorus of Israeli and American officials and pundits to advocate a more positive response to Damascus’s overtures.

Olmert, however, reiterated to reporters in Germany this week that Syria first had to cease its support for Hamas and Hezbollah before any serious talks could start.

An adviser to Israel’s intelligence services, speaking to the Forward this week, said that the hedging was partly a result of Washington’s opposition to such discussions until now.