1_March 2019, Ramallah – On the occasion of the International Women’s Day (8 March), a week-long joint campaign “My Rights, Our Power” was launched today in Palestine to raise awareness on women’s fundamental human rights. The joint effort, with participation from over 30 national and international partners from civil society organizations, media outlets, and international development agencies, targets youth, women, and men in various geographic areas in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza to promote women’s human rights in Palestine.

The campaign comes at a crucial moment when the anticipated adoption of the Family Protection Bill is at a standstill, raising concerns among national and international stakeholders about the consequences of such delay on safeguarding women’s fundamental human rights in Palestine. According to the Palestine report of the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (IMAGES), nearly one in five Palestinian men (17 percent) surveyed said they had perpetrated act of physical intimate partner violence against female partners, while 21 per cent of women surveyed reported having experienced such violence.

“Family violence, usually committed by a family member who has social or economic power over others in the family, causes enormous pain and suffering to all members of the family, especially the women and children,” said a spokesperson from civil society, which has vigorously initiated the development of the Family Protection Bill (FPB), and has strongly pushed its adoption since 2004.

“The violation of women’s human rights manifests in various levels and should be also understood from economic, cultural, and social aspects,” the spokesperson added, highlighting the lack of opportunities and freedom of choice, as well as limited access to justice and services that women in Palestine still experience.

The joint campaign aims to raise awareness of the general public, especially youth, women, and men on women’s fundamental rights in line with international standards and embedded in the Family Protection Bill draft endorsed by the previous Cabinet at the end of December 2018. Five key messages, addressing women’s right to a life free of violence, right to achieve justice and seek help in case of violation of such life, as well as the right to equal opportunities and right to make one’s own choices, will be distributed through various channels such as radio, social media, helpline (121), outreach activities, and on-site events. The closing event of the joint campaign will take place on 8 March in Jerusalem and will celebrate women’s achievements using TED-style talks, followed by art performances.

“My Rights, Our Power” joint campaign is part of the global International Women’s Day 2019 campaign under the theme of “Think equal, build smart, innovate for change”. The theme focuses on innovative ways in which we can advance gender equality and the empowerment of women, particularly in the areas of social protection systems, access to public services and sustainable infrastructure, echoing the theme of the 63rd session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW 63) taking place in New York on 11-22 March 2019.

The participating organizations of the “My Rights, Our Power” are (in alphabetical order): 17 Palestinian women’s organizations represented by Al-Muntada (coalition), British Consulate-General, Business Women Forum, CARE International, Consulate General of Sweden, Consulate General of Belgium, EUPOL COPPS, EU Representative Office, FAO, General Union of Palestinian Women, Government of Japan, CowaterSogema/GROW Project, International Labour Organization, Italian Agency for Development Cooperation, Ma’an TV, MIFTAH, Netherlands Representative Office, Nisaa FM, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development, Palestinian Family Planning and Protection Association, Representative Office of Canada, Representative Office of Denmark, SAWA, Sawasya II, Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation, Sports for Life, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, Representative Office of Norway, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, UN Women, Women's Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling, Women’s Studies Center.

For more information, please contact Eunjin Jeong at UN Women via eunjin.jeong@unwomen.org or 059 2321 308, Majd Beltaji at UNESCO via m.beltaji@unesco.org or 059 4501 506.

Mr. President,

We thank France for organizing this important meeting and extend our appreciation to the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary General, the Executive Director of UN Women, the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security and the Secretary-General of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie for their efforts and important briefings.

The issue before us is of relevance not only for half the planet, but to all, given the role and contribution of women in the fields of peace and security and the untapped potential that could be unleashed by mainstreaming their participation. Since the adoption by consensus of resolution 1325 by this Council, a lot has happened, and yet we are still far from the goal of full and equal participation, including in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and from ensuring the protection and empowerment of women. Gender equality and non-discrimination remain prerequisites for the fulfilment of the purposes and principles of this organization and all of our lofty, collective commitments, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The State of Palestine welcomes the Secretary General’s report and his commitment to implementing the women and peace and security agenda, including by placing gender at the centre of his prevention platform and surge in diplomacy. We appreciate all efforts by the UN in this regard, including by UN Women, OHCHR and UNDP, notably in the field of human rights, capacity building, employment and rule of law. We urge UN bodies, notably those operating in Palestine, including the Special Representative, to intensify their engagement and collaboration with women organizations.

Mr. President,

I wish to highlight some of Palestine’s own important efforts in this regard. The Palestinian women’s movement is one of the oldest and strongest in the region and beyond, with institutional and representative structures established as early as the 19th century. Within the PLO, the General Union of Palestinian Women was among the first unions to be established. A coordination of women frameworks within PLO political parties and other organizations has also been established as the “Women’s Affairs Technical Committee” in the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.

There have been many achievements thereafter. Among them: In 2012, Palestine inaugurated a High-Level National Committee for the implementation of resolution 1325, led by the Ministry of Women Affairs in partnership with relevant Ministries and NGOs. In 2016, the State of Palestine was among the 68 countries and areas that adopted a National Action Plan on women, peace and security.

This Action Plan (2017-2019), adopted by both the Government and civil society organizations, identifies three primary objectives: 1. ensuring protection for women and girls both domestically and in the face of the Israeli occupation; 2. ensuring accountability through national and international mechanisms, with a particular focus on crimes and violations committed by the occupation; and 3. furthering women’s political participation in decision making at the national and international level. The State of Palestine also joined core IHL and human rights instruments, including CEDAW, without reservations. Women’s participation and empowerment are also important and cross-cutting objectives in the context of the National Policy Agenda (2017-2022).

We are, however, conscious that, despite all these efforts, much more work remains to be done. Only in 2009 was a women elected to the highest executive body of the PLO. Quotas are still decisive in allowing women’s election to Parliament and local councils. And while women organizations were among the strongest advocates of national reconciliation, they have been unfairly absent from reconciliation talks. The relevant legislative framework applicable in Palestine is also outdated and must be revised to ensure consistency with Palestine’s international commitments and obligations and avail women the protection and rights they are entitled to and the opportunities they deserve.

Mr. President,

The Palestinian women’s movement since its establishment over a century ago pursued the struggle on two fronts – the struggle for the independence of Palestine and the struggle for women’s rights and empowerment – a dual struggle the movement continues to pursue to this day. The Israeli occupation remains the main source of the violations of our women’s rights and their vulnerability and violence against their person. We have repeatedly called for protection of the Palestinian people, especially women and children. We have also called for accountability, a key element of resolution 1325, the first resolution to address the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women, as the only way to put an end to violations and crimes.

While Palestine stands ready to do its part to advance women rights and the role of women in the fields of peace and security, it is clear that the enjoyment of these rights in our country necessitates ending the Israeli occupation. We will thus continue to work for an end of the occupation and true progress on the path to independence, justice and peace, with the equal and full involvement of women, leading to an independent State of Palestine ensuring human rights for all its citizens without discrimination.

On the occasion of the ICC Prosecutor’s Office to Palestine, the Palestinian Women Coalition of UNSCR 1325, which consists of twelve different Palestinian women’s organisations, is urging the Prosecutor’s Office to take concrete actions towards investigating war crimes committed against Palestinians. The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom remains deeply concerned with the complete impunity of Israeli war crimes and firmly supports the Coalition’s call for a just accountability mechanism for Palestinian victims. WILPF also calls on the international community to recognise and fully support Palestinian women’s organisations substantial role in paving the paths to justice, accountability and peace. Read the statement of the Palestinian Women Coalition of UNSCR 1325 below.

We, the Palestinian Women Coalition of UNSCR 1325,welcome the visit of the delegation of the ICC Prosecutor’s Office as a step in the right direction. But we are deeply disappointed that the purpose of this visit was restricted to preliminary examination, while Palestinian victims of Israeli war crimes, including women, continue to suffer and urgently await justice and an end to Israel impunity.

We do not understand the decision to exclude the Gaza Strip from this visit, when Gaza has been the site of the most war crimes and where women have been most systematically impacted by Israeli collective punishment policies; a prolonged imposed siege and a severe humanitarian deterioration resulting from Israeli military aggressions .

We are further disappointed that women who have been systematically impacted, and their women’s organisations, have been excluded from the delegation’s agenda.

We call upon all future delegations of the ICC Prosecutor’s Office to include on their agenda meetings with women’s organisations and women who have experienced direct and indirect impacts of Israeli crimes.

We, the Palestinian Women Coalition of UNSCR 1325, have seen in UNSCR 1325, 2242, and other UN Resolutions a commitment to hold the Israeli perpetrators accountable for their war crimes.

We look to the ICC as the most important mechanism to end impunity for all war crimes committed, finally bringing justice for the Palestinian people. Yet, we are very concerned that the preliminary examinations will be an endless process.

Therefore, we urge, Ms. Fatou Bensouda, the Prosecutor of the ICC, to conclude the preliminary examination and move to investigations into Israeli war crimes, bringing justice to Palestinians.

We have paid the price of non-accountability and impunity of Israeli war crimes for too long. “Delaying justice is justice denied.”

Palestinian Women Coalition of UNSCR 1325: The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), the Women’s Affairs Technical Committee (WATC), Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD), MIFTAH, Filastinyat, Women Media and Development (TAM), Women Stu Dies Center, Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WACLAC), the National, YWCA of Palestine, Center for Women’s Legal Research and Consulting (CWLRC), the Culture and Free thought Association(CWLRC) and Women’s Affairs Center (GWAC).

Occupied Palestine

October 11, 2016

Two-thirds of the public expect Israel to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the West Bank and the majority expresses support for the PA policy of ceasing to implement the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with Israel. But large majorities express worry about the likely consequences of the PA policy on them and on their daily lives. Findings also show that despite a decrease in the popularity of president Abbas and Fatah movement in this poll, large majorities of the pubic are satisfied with the performance of the government in managing the Corona crisis.

17-20 June 2020

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 17-20 June 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the spread of the Corona virus throughout the world and in the Palestinian territories leading the Palestinian Authority to impose a lockdown throughout the Palestinian territories which brought to a standstill many economic activities. It also witnessed the formation of a new Israeli government lead by prime minister Netanyahu and the announcement of the government intentions to annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank. In response, the PA announced ending its commitment to the Oslo agreement and severed relations with Israel in security and civil realms. This was followed by ending Palestinian-Israeli security coordination and Israel stopped the transfer of Palestinian clearance funds thereby negatively affecting the PA’s ability to pay salaries for the month of May 2020. This press release addresses these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This quarterly poll was conducted during a period in which the spread of the Corona virus was believed to have been brought under control thereby allowing us to conduct face-to-face interviews throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The poll covered various

Issues, most importantly the intention of the Israeli government to annex Palestinian territories and the Palestinian response to the Israeli plans which amounted to a decision to stop implementation of the Oslo agreement and to sever relations with the Israeli government. We also focused on public perception of the PA government and its performance during the Coronavirus pandemic.

Findings show that two-thirds of the public believe that the new Israeli government led by prime minister Netanyahu will indeed annex Palestinian territories. This realization created a great deal of public concern and worry about the future. Public worry focused on the salary payment to the public sector, access to medical treatment, shortages in water and electricity supplies, eruption of armed clashes, return of security chaos and anarchy, PA collapse, and inability to travel to Jordan.

A large majority supports a Palestinian response to annexation that involves stopping the implementation of the agreements with Israel and severing all relations with it. But the public has doubts about the sincerity of the PA in stopping security coordination with Israel. Despite the fact that a slim majority supports responding to the plan by returning to armed struggle, the findings of this poll in fact show a decrease in supporting armed struggle compared to the findings of our last poll which was conducted four months ago. Moreover, despite the fact that two-thirds are worried about the likely collapse of the PA, only one third thinks that Israel will bring back its military rule and civil administration to the Palestinian territories; three quarters express rejection of such return, if it were to happen.

With regard to the government performance in managing the Coronavirus pandemic, a large majority expresses satisfaction with the performance of the PA and with the various measures taken by the PA government. More than three quarters indicate that they trust that the government has been working to protect the interests of public. But two-thirds say that their income or salary has been reduced and a majority indicates that it has stopped working or has become unemployed during that period. Moreover, more than three quarters express the view that the PA government did not do its best to compensate those who suffered the most due to the closure and lockdown. It is interesting that despite the tense relations between the PA and Israel, two-thirds of the public express agreement with Palestinian-Israeli cooperation and coordination in the health sector that took place during the period of the pandemic.

Findings show a rise in favor of the two-state solution but half of the public remains opposed to this solution. Findings also show a consensus against the Trump plan, or the deal of the century, with a prevailing perception that the plan does not end the Israeli occupation and does not lead to the creation of a Palestinian state. Indeed, most of the public believe now that the plan has returned the conflict to its original existential roots. For all of this, a large majority is opposed to a resumption of dialogue with the US.

Finally, despite a decline in the demand for the resignation of president Abbas, findings indicate that he would lose a presidential election in which he competes against Ismail Haniyyeh. Findings also show that the gap between Fatah and Hamas, which stood at 6 points four months ago in Fatah’s favor, has now narrowed to 2 points in its favor.

(1) Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories and its potential consequences:

• Two-thirds (66%) believe that the new Israeli government will indeed annex the Jordan Valley and the settlement areas in the occupied West Bank while 28% think it will not do so.
• However, the majority (59%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach a prisoners’ exchange deal with Hamas; in fact, 56% expect Israel to wage war against the Gaza Strip while 36% do not expect it to do so.
• Similarly, the majority (57%) does not expect the new Israeli government to reach peace arrangements with the PA in the West Bank while the largest percentage (48%) expects, and 43% do not expect, Israel to wage war against the PA to force it to collapse.
• However, a large majority of 73% expects the new Israeli government to deepen the normalization steps with some of the Arab Gulf countries but 53% do not expect, and only 30% expect, Israel to wage war against Iran.
• When asked what the PA should do in response to an Israeli annexation of Palestinian territories: (1) the largest majority (71%) said it should, and 21% said it should not, stop implementing the Oslo agreement and should sever all relations with Israel; (2) 61% said Palestinians should resort to peaceful resistance and 35% disagreed with that; (3) 52% said they support and 42% oppose a return to armed struggle; (4) 37% said they support the abandonment of the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution; and (5) 36% said they support, and 53% said they oppose, a return to the negotiation with Israel and the US based on a detailed Palestinian peace plan that can serve as a counter proposal to the Trump plan.
• When forced to choose only one of these five possible responses, the largest percentage (31%) says that it prefers a return to armed struggle, 23% prefer resumption of negotiations based on a detailed Palestinian counter proposal, 18% prefer non-violent resistance, 15% prefer abandoning the Oslo agreement and the severing of relations with Israel, and 6% prefer to abandon the two-state solution in favor of a one-state solution.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the likely responses of external actors to an Israeli annexation, if one is to actually take place. A majority expresses pessimism with 63% indicating that they do not expect Jordan to abandon its peace agreement with Israel; 70% do not expect Jordan or Egypt to recall their ambassadors from Israel; 78% do not expect European countries to impose sanctions on Israel; and another 78% do not expect Arab countries in the Gulf, or some of them, to end normalization measures with Israel.
• Twice we asked the public about its support for the PA leadership’s declared policy of stopping the implementation of the Oslo agreement, stopping security coordination, and severing relations with Israel, once before detailing possible consequences of such a policy and once again after going over these details. The initial response showed that a majority of 59% support and 31% oppose the leadership’s decision.
• When the questions turns to the details and possible consequences, the public indicates great worries about the future. For example, 81% say they are worried that Israel will stop transfer of clearance revenues, which would mean that the PA would not be able to pay the public sector. 73% say they are worried that patients would not be able to travel from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank or Israel for medical treatment.
• 70% are worried that they would soon witness shortages or complete cut-off in supplies of water and electricity from Israel. 65% are worried that armed clashes would erupt with Israel. Another 65% are worried that the PA would collapse or fail to deliver services. 63% are worried that security chaos and anarchy would return to Palestinian life. Finally, 62% say they are worried that they would not be able to travel abroad via Jordan.
• Despite all these concerns, in answer to the second question about support/opposition to the PA leadership decision to sever relations with Israel, a larger majority of 63% says it supports the decision and only 29% say they oppose it. Yet, the level of support for the PA decision in response to both questions is lower than the support the public is willing to grant to the policy itself, which, as we indicated above, stood at 71%.
• It is interesting to note that despite the great worry, a majority of the public (57%) does not believe that the PA has in fact ended security coordination with Israel and only 32% believe it indeed did.
• A majority of 55% does not expect Israel to resume its military rule and that of its civil administration now after Abbas’ decision to sever relations with Israel and his invitation to Israel to assume full responsibility for the occupied territories. One third (33%) expects Israel to do so.
• A large majority of 74% says it does not prefer the return of Israeli military rule or civil administration while only 18% say they do prefer that.
• 50% of the public believe that the PA will back down and resume relations with Israel if the latter declares its intention to resume its direct military rule over the Palestinian territories while 37% believe the PA will not back down.

(2) PA performance during the COVID-19 pandemic:

• Large majorities are satisfied with the measures taken by the PA to contain the Coronavirus pandemic.
• But the level of satisfaction differs from one measure to the other. For example, 88% are satisfied with the closure of areas that witnessed the spread of the virus; 80% are satisfied with the closure of schools and universities; 77% are satisfied with the cessation of transportation between the various governorates; 73% are satisfied with the ban on laborers working in Israeli settlements; 60% are satisfied with the closure of mosques and churches; and 57% are satisfied with the ban on Friday prayers and Sunday mass.
• Similarly, the findings show that the majority is satisfied with the performance of the various entities and individuals involved in the management of the Coronavirus crisis. For example, 82% express satisfaction with the ministry of health; 75% are satisfied with the performance of the security services deployed in their areas; 67% are satisfied with the performance of the “emergency committee” in their area; 65% are satisfied with the performance of the government spokesperson, Mr. Ibrahim Milhem; 64% are satisfied with the performance of the local municipalities or councils; 62% are satisfied with the performance of the prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh; and 61% are satisfied with the performance of the governor in their area.
• Similarly, 76% say they have trust, and 22% say they have no trust, that the government, in taking the measures it took, has been working for the interest of the people.
• We asked about the amount of donations made to the “dignity fund:” 48% are satisfied and 44% are dissatisfied. But an overwhelming majority of 77% says that it is not certain that the donation would reach those who truly need it.
• Public trust in the government is also evident in the fact that 56% believe the announcements regarding the number of infections and deaths while 36% believe that the government has not been transparent.
• Similarly, 57% express the belief that the measures taken by the PA have been adequate, while 23% believe them to be inadequate, and 18% believe they were exaggerated.
• The majority indicates that it has been harmed economically as a result of the pandemic: 67% say their income or salary has been reduced; 61% say their income or salary has been stopped; and 55% say they stopped working or became unemployed.
• When asked about its impression about of people’s implementation of social distancing, the largest percentage (45%) say it believes the implementation was medium, 18% say it was high, and 36% say it was low.
• A majority of 69% indicates that the closure and lockdown did not cause domestic problems within their own families while 29% indicates that they did have such problems.
• 57% think that remote education has not been useful while 37% think it has been.
• 65% believe that it was not appropriate to allow laborers to continue to work in Israel during the closure and lockdown while 31% think it was appropriate.
• A small majority of 54% believes the pandemic is a divine punishment for people and states for their corruption and injustice while 37% believe it is not.
• However, the largest percentage (45%) thinsk the virus is manmade and not natural while a similar percentage of 43% thinks it is a product of nature.
• A two-third majority (67%) agrees with the cooperation and coordination in the health sector which took place between the PA and Israel during the period in which the Coronavirus was spreading while 25% say they disagreed with that.
• 44% say popular social solidarity, such as debt forgiveness, increased during the pandemic while 31% say the level of solidarity did not change and 23% think it decreased.
• More than three quarters of the public (77%) believe that the government has not done all it could to compensate those who suffered the most from the closure and lockdown, such as laborers, farmers, cattle breeders, and others, and only 16% believe it did all it could.

(3) The Peace process and the US “Deal of the Century”:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution rises to 45% and opposition stands at 50%. No description or details were provided for the concept.
• Four months ago, support for the concept stood at 39%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 51% believe that the majority opposes it.
• A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 27% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 77% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 28% of the public while 38% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.”
• Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 13% prefer to keep the status quo. Four months ago, 22% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 45% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, 45% chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Four months ago, 50% chose armed struggle and 21% chose negotiations.
• We asked the public about the Trump plan, known as the “deal of the century:” 88% say they oppose it and 5% say they support it. Four months ago, 94% expressed opposition to the plan when presented to them in its full details.
• Similarly, 87% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 8% believe a majority supports it. By contrast, 66% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews supports the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.
• In light of the terms of the US plan, a majority of 70% believes the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 5% think the plan makes peace more attainable.
• If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 57% think the chances are zero; 22% think the chances are less than 50%; and only 16% think that the chances are 50% or more.
• A majority of 69% is opposed and 16% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration.
• Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Four months ago 76% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
• A majority of 68% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 24% expect him to win it.

(4) Legislative and presidential election

• 58% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Four months ago, 62% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 48% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 36% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 44% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. Four months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 42% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 44% for Abbas and 49% for Haniyeh four months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 32% four months ago) and Haniyeh receives 61% (compared to 63% four months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 51% (compared to 54% four months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 38% four months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 36%. If the competition is between prime minister Mohammad Shtayyeh and Haniyyeh, the former receives 48% and the latter 45%.
• We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 35% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 22% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 13% in the Gaza Strip), Khalid Mishal by 4%, and Mustafa Barghouti and Salam Fayyad by 2% each.
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 34% say they will vote for Hamas and 36% say they will vote for Fatah, 8% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided. Four months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 47% (compared to 43% four months ago) and for Fatah at 28% (compared to 30% four months ago).
• In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 23% (compared to 22% four months ago) and Fatah at 42% (compared to 45% four months ago).

(5) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 20%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 65%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 34% and declines in the West Bank to 18%.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 81%. Four months ago, 85% expressed a similar view.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: a majority of 52% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 44% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• With more than a year passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate persistent pessimism. Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 56% expect failure; only 33% expect success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 52% expects failure and 34% expect success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 57% expects failure and 34% expects success.
• We asked the public about its reaction to the PA decision not to accept medical supplies sent by the UAE via two planes that landed at Ben Gurion airport. About half (49%) of the public indicated approval of the decision but 41% expressed disapproval.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last four months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Palestine TV (15%), Al Aqsa TV (14%), Maan TV at 13%, Palestine Today TV at 10%, Al Arabiya at 4%, and finally al Mayadeen at 3%.

(6) Reconciliation:

• Only 29% are optimistic and 64% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Four months ago, optimism stood at 40%.
• Similarly, 41% believe that unity will not be resumed and that two separate entities will evolve in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while 40% believe unity will eventually return but only after a long time and only 12% believe unity will return soon.
• While waiting for reunification, we asked the public if it would meanwhile support some form of confederation between the two areas. A majority of 60% expressed opposition while 31% supported this type of relationship.

(7) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 31% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 12% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians, and 11% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 33% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 27%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (27%); 6% say see lack of national unity as the most serious problem and 5% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

94% of the Palestinians reject the “Deal of the Century;” large majorities support various responses to the plan including ending the WBGS split, the withdrawal of PA recognition of Israel, the ending of security coordination with Israel, the ending of the implementation of the Oslo agreement, and the resort to armed struggle; more than 80% believe the plan returns the conflict to its existential roots; support for the two-state solution drops to its lowest level since the signing of the Oslo agreement; and while about two-thirds endorse president Abbas’s policy against the plan, about 70% believe that he will not keep his word or follow through

5-8 February 2020

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5-8 February 2020. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the release of the Trump’s “Deal of the Century” and its immediate rejection by the Palestinian leadership. The Arab foreign ministers met in Cairo few days later and unanimously rejected the plan. A similar rejection followed by representatives of the Islamic countries. Despite the consensus, some Arab countries expressed timid welcome of US efforts and three Arab countries sent their ambassadors to the event in the White House in which the plan was announced. Internally, Fatah and Hamas issued conciliatory statements calling for reconciliation but this was not followed by any concrete measures and efforts to hold Palestinian elections witnessed some serious setbacks. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, tensions rose significantly during the fieldwork period as popular confrontations developed in various cities and signs of an emerging trade crisis were visible. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

This quarterly poll was conducted one month earlier than planned in order to measure, in a timely manner, the immediate public response to the American plan known as the “Deal of the Century.” Findings show a Palestinian consensus against the plan as a package and against each of its components, including the economic part if linked to acceptance of the political section of the plan. Moreover, more than 80% of the public believe that the plan has returned the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to its existential roots. The majority speculates that the Trump plan has been deliberately designed to ensure a Palestinian rejection in order for the US to allow Israel to unilaterally annex the Jordan valley and the Jewish settlements.

Findings also show that two-thirds of the public support president Abbas’ policy against the plan. But the majority, ranging between two-thirds and three quarters, does not trust the president’s word, as it believes he will not implement his own decision to end relations with Israel and the US. In response to the Trump plan, the overwhelming majority wants the president to end the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to withdraw PA recognition of Israel, to end security coordination, to stop the implementation of the Oslo agreement, and to even resort to armed struggle.

Findings also show unprecedented decline in support for the two-state solution to less than 40%, the lowest reported by PSR since the signing of the Oslo agreement. They also show a rise in the percentage of those who think that the most effective means of ending the occupation is armed struggle; they also show a decline in the percentage of those who think negotiation is the most effective means.

In domestic matters, finding show a decline in Abbas’ popularity and that of Fatah compared to our findings two-months ago. They also show a rise in the popularity of Hamas’ Ismael Haniyyeh during the same period. If presidential elections were to take place today, 50% would vote for Haniyyeh. Findings also show a drop in the level of optimism regarding the prospects of holding of parliamentary elections soon. But optimism about the prospects for reconciliation increases a little compared to two months ago and about half of the public indicates that if elections were to take place today, they would contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

(1) US “Deal of the Century”:

• We presented to the respondents the various components of the American plan, known as the “Deal of the Century,” one component after the other, and asked them if they support or oppose each. We then asked the public about the entire plan as one package. Opposition to the package stood at 94% and support at 4%.
• Opposition to the components ranged between 91%, for the item on the billions in economic support conditioned on accepting the political plan, and 95%, for the item on Jerusalem and the Palestinian capital and the one on holy places.
• Similarly, 94% believe that a majority of Palestinians is opposed to the plan and 3% believe a majority supports it.
• By contrast, 70% believe that a majority of Israeli Jews support the American plan while 23% think a Jewish majority is opposed to it.
• A majority of 65% expresses support and 27% express opposition for the policy outlined by president Abbas against the Trump plan in which he stated that he is ending relations with Israel and the US including security relations. But a majority of 68% believes that the PA president will not implement his decision to end security coordination with Israel and 73% believe that he will not actually turn conditions to where they were before the Oslo agreement. This seems to be the reason why despite supporting his policy, a majority of 58% is dissatisfied with the actual response of the PA leadership to the American plan; 38% are satisfied.
• In light of the terms of the US plan, an overwhelming majority of 82% believe the plan brings the conflict with Israel to where it originally was, as an existential conflict, while 7% think the plan makes peace more attainable.
• If the Palestinians accept the Deal of the Century, what are the chances that such acceptance would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation and to the building of a Palestinian state? 58% think the chances are zero; 21% think the chances are less than 50%; and 7% think that the chances are more than 50%.
• We proposed to the public 10 possible responses to the American plan and asked it about its support and opposition to each response; expectation regarding what the PA will adopt or allow as a response; and its expectations regarding what will actually happen on the ground:
  • Public support is highest (90%) to the response of ending the split and reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, followed by waging a diplomatic warfare against Israel in international organizations (85%); withdrawing Palestinian recognition of Israel (84%); waging non-violent popular demonstrations (78%); ending security coordination (77%); ending the implementation of the Oslo Agreement (69%); waging an armed struggle or return to an armed intifada (64%). We found that a large majority (59%) is opposed and 37% are not opposed to the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of a one-state solution; 56% are opposed and 40% are not opposed to a response in which the status quo is essentially maintained with no major changes introduced; and a 52% are opposed and 45% are not opposed to dissolving the PA.
  • An overwhelming majority of 83% anticipates that the PA leadership will not allow the dissolution of the PA; 73% anticipate that the PA leadership will not allow a resumption of armed struggle or an armed intifada; 67% anticipate that the PA leadership will not allow the abandonment of the two-state solution and the adoption of the one-state solution; 66% anticipate that the PA leadership will not stop security coordination with Israel; 60% anticipate that the PA leadership will not stop the implementation of the Oslo agreement; 55% anticipate that the PA leadership will not allow the withdrawal of the Palestinian recognition of the state of Israel. By contrast, a majority of 67% anticipates that the PA leadership will allow popular non-violent demonstrations; 65% anticipate that the PA leadership will allow waging a diplomatic campaign against Israel in international organizations;58% anticipate that the PA leadership will maintain the status quo without any major changes; and 52% anticipate that the PA leadership will seek to end the split and reunify the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
  • With regard to expectations of what will actually happen on the ground as a Palestinian response to the American plan, 74% expect to see organized popular and peaceful demonstrations; 66% expect that the PA will wage a diplomatic campaign against Israel in international organizations; 61% expect to see a return to armed struggle or armed intifada; and, yet, 51% expect the status quo to continue without major change. By contrast, 69% expect the PA to remain committed to the two-state solution; 62% expect to see continued security coordination with Israel; 61% expect to see no ending of the Oslo agreement; and 54% expect to see no withdrawal of PA recognition of Israel. With regarding to ending the split and reunifying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the public is divided: 48% expect it will happen and 46% expect it will not.
• Nonetheless, a majority of 69% believes the “Deal of the Century” will fail due to Palestinian opposition while 26% think it will succeed despite that opposition.
• We asked the public about its view on why the Trump Administration designed this its plan in the manner it did: a majority of 60% said the Administration deliberately wanted the Palestinians to reject the plan so that Israel can annex the Jordan Valley and the settlements while 34% thought the US actually expected the Palestinian weakness to force them to accept the plan.
• We asked the public to speculate about the motivation of the three Arab countries (UAE, Bahrain, and Oman) that participated in the event in the White House in which the Trump plan was revealed: 83% said they wanted to demonstrate their support for Israel; 6% said they wanted to demonstrate support to Israel and the Palestinians, and only 3% said they wanted to demonstrate support for the Palestinians alone. The Arab League’s unanimous decision to reject the Trump plan notwithstanding, 83% of the Palestinians believe that the Palestinians must nonetheless rely only on themselves while 14% believe they can rely on the Arab countries.
• A majority of 76% is opposed and 11% are not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Two months ago 69% said they were opposed to the resumption of dialogue with the US.
• A majority of 59% expects president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 35% expect him to win it. Similarly, a majority of 53% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to lead to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 41% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment. Two months ago, 58% expected Netanyahu to be removed from power.

(2) The peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 39% and opposition at 59%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Two months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 36% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 57% believe that the majority opposes it.
• A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 33% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 76% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 22% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 22% of the public while 45% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 15% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 14% prefer to keep the status quo. Two months ago, 29% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 39% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, half of the public (50%) chose armed struggle, 21% negotiations, and 23% popular resistance. Two months ago, 47% chose armed struggle and 26% chose negotiations.

(3) Legislative and presidential election

• 62% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 33% want him to remain in office. Two months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 78% in the Gaza Strip. Two months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 47% in the West Bank and 22% in the Gaza Strip. Two months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip).
• Only 33% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 43% think that Fatah has better candidates; 25% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 44% and the latter 49% of the vote (compared to 49% for Abbas and 44% for Haniyeh two months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 32% of the vote (compared to 37% two months ago) and Haniyeh receives 63% (compared to 56% two months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 54% (compared to 58% two months ago) and Haniyeh 38% (compared to 34% two months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 57% and Haniyeh 38%.
• We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 24% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (1% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 3% each.
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 38% say they will vote for Fatah, 12% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 18% are undecided. Two months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 32% and Fatah at 40%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 43% (compared to 41% two months ago) and for Fatah at 30% (compared to 32% two months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 22% (compared to 24% two months ago) and Fatah at 45% (compared to 46% wo months ago).
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 39% (44% in the West Bank and 31% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 26% (19% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win.
• A plurality of 45% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 43% believe no elections will take place. Two months ago, a majority of 52% expected elections to take place soon.
• 43% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 20% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 23% prefer simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months.
• 46% (51% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) say that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the Jerusalem governorate or in the West Bank; 46% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem. Two months ago, a majority of 56% said that if Israel prevented East Jerusalemites from voting in the city, they should be allowed to vote in any polling station in the Jerusalem governorate or in the West Bank.
• 51% trust and 42% do not trust the integrity of the Palestinian Election Commission in managing the election process. Similarly, only 45% believe, and 45% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.
• Moreover, only 47% trust, and 47% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 49% trust, and 40% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias.
• A majority of 63% say that it will not be possible, and 32% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services. Similarly, a majority of 55% says that it will not be possible, and 39% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services.
• 70% believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 24% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so. Similarly, 60% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.

(4) Domestic conditions:

• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 5% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 21%.
• Nonetheless, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 74% and in the West Bank at 58%.
• 23% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 28% and declines in the West Bank to 19%.
• Only 42% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 54% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 55% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 42% say they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 85% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 47% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• With more than ten months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (50%), the economy (41%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (50%), the preparation to hold general elections (49%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 26% and 42% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 13% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight decline in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings two months ago.
• Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 55% expects failure; only 35% expects success. In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 41% expect success. In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 35% expects success.
• Half of the public (50%: 58% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 42% (33% in the West Bank and 55% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 54% (64% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary rules according to whims and interests; 41% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 20%, followed by Al Aqsa TV and Palestine TV (14% each), Maan TV at 13% each, Palestine Today TV at 10%, al Mayadeen at 5%, and Al Arabiya at 4%.

(5) Reconciliation:

• 40% are optimistic and 56% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Two months ago, optimism stood at only 36%.
• 49% are optimistic, and 45% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• A majority of 58% believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 30% believe the chances are medium and only 8% believe the chances are high.

(6) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 49% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 30% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 10% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 10% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 29% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment in the eyes of 28%, and the spread of corruption in public institutions (25%); 14% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

While optimism about the prospects for holding elections rises and a majority thinks that they should be held regardless of the Israeli position on East Jerusalem’s participation, half of the public thinks elections, if they were to take place, will neither be free nor fair; indeed, a majority does not have faith in the integrity or neutrality of the police forces, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in protecting the election process and a large majority believes that whoever loses the elections will reject the results. On the peace process, two thirds view the US announcement about the legality of Israeli settlements as destructive to the two-state solution and will lead to an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank

11-14 December 2019

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 December 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including the announcement by the Palestinian Election Commission and President Abbas that all factions have agreed to the holding of legislative elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But no decree was issued by Abbas during the period of the data collection. The period also witnessed a debate among Palestinians over the decision of the PA Attorney General to ask the court to block public access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites. Hamas allowed the construction of an American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel. Power was cut by the Israeli Electric Corporation to central West Bank for two hours every day in many locations served by the Jerusalem District Electricity Company due to unpaid bills. On the Israeli side, prime minister Netanyahu was indicted for corruption and Israeli political parties failed to form a government coalition leading to a decision to hold a third parliamentary election in a single year. The US government declared a new position regarding Israeli settlements in which it disputed the illegality of these settlements from an international law standpoint. In the meanwhile, the US Congress started an on-going effort to impeach president Trump for the use of the presidency to attain personal gains. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the fourth quarter of 2019 show a small majority indicating optimism about the holding of legislative elections in the near future. Moreover, the poll shows that majority is in favor of holding these elections even if Israel does not allow them in East Jerusalem; in case of Israeli opposition, the public says that East Jerusalemites should vote wherever they can, in Jerusalem and outside it. The bad news however, is that half of the public believes that these upcoming elections will not be free or fair. Furthermore, only half of the public trusts the ability of the Palestinian Election Commission (PEC) to manage the election process with integrity and less than half has confidence in the ability of the police, whether in West Bank and the PA or in the Gaza Strip under Hamas, to provide protection to the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Indeed, a majority believes that Hamas will not be able to conduct its election campaign in the West Bank, and Fatah in the Gaza Strip, without restrictions and interference. These findings indicate a diminished public trust in the entire election process, due probably in part to a distrust in PEC, as indeed supported by the findings, and in the PA public institutions in both areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Worst of all, a large majority believes that if Hamas wins the elections, Fatah, in the West Bank, will not accept the outcome and if Fatah wins the elections, Hamas, in the Gaza Strip, will not accept the outcome. This finding demonstrates beyond any doubt the absence of public confidence in the democratic credentials of the two major political parties, Fatah and Hamas, and raise a big question about the extent of the damage and political corruption that have been generated by the absence of democratic life and by the split between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2007.

On the ability of a newly elected legitimate government to dissolve the armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms, a large majority indicates opposition to such measure. Indeed, the majority believes that protecting or keeping the arms of the armed groups has greater legitimacy than that of the electoral legitimacy of the government. These findings reveal that the public does not take the election and its legitimacy seriously (which might be an outcome of the problems identified above) and that in the absence of a viable peace process, the public puts its trust, first and foremost, in armed struggle.

Findings show that if elections take place today, Fatah would receive the biggest share of the vote, followed by Hamas, existing third parties, newly created third parties, and finally an electoral list loyal to Mohammad Dahlan. With this range of options, only a small percentage of participating votes remains undecided. Needless to say, the formation of an electoral list loyal to Dahlan will significantly weaken the size of Fatah’s share of the vote and might threaten its ability to emerge as the biggest party. This problem, unique to Fatah, can be exacerbated by its persistent lack of discipline, as demonstrated by the elections of 1996 and 2006, if, for example, other unofficial Fatah lists were formed by disgruntled senior party members who fail to make it to a realistic spot in the party’s election list. This means that Fatah might find itself competing against itself thereby ending up with greater fragmentation and great many lost votes. But the greatest threat to a Fatah electoral victory would be its failure to integrate Marwan Barghouti and his supporters in its electoral list. In such a case, as temporarily happened in the 2006 elections, he might form his own electoral list thereby splitting Fatah’s vote and insuring that Hamas would receive the greatest share of the vote.

On other domestic political issues, findings indicate that a plurality in the West Bank thinks that Hamas should have participated in the recent exchange of rocket fire between Israel and Islamic Jihad. But the situation in the Gaza Strip is different as a greater plurality thinks that Hamas’ decision of refraining from participation has been the correct decision. We also found a large majority views the decision of the PA Attorney General to seek court authorization to block Palestinian media websites as an attack on freedom of speech and therefore he should not stay in his office because he apparently does not believe in free speech. We also found an overwhelming majority supporting the PA government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years.

Two thirds of the public view the US decision recognizing the legality of Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as destructive the two-state solution. A majority views the decision as destructive also to the one-state solution and that one of its outcomes will be to push Israel to annex parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley. This American position led to a significant increase in the percentage of Palestinians, standing today at three quarters, who demand that the Palestinian leadership reject the American peace plan, or the Deal of the Century, out of hand, without even looking at its substance while 70% indicate opposition to a restoration of PA dialogue with the Trump Administration.

Finally, findings show that a majority is opposed to the two-state solution, but support for it remains higher than the support for the one-state solution. They also indicate a slight increase in support for armed struggle or a return to armed intifada. It is noticeable however that a majority of the public thinks that the indictment of Israeli prime minister Netanyahu will soon lead to his removal from power. Similarly, a majority is optimistic about the ability of the US Congress to impeach President Trump and a similar majority is optimistic that he will lose the upcoming US presidential elections. This public betting on the dynamics of domestic Israeli politics and on the workings of the US Congress might be one of the reasons why we still find more public support for the two-state solution compared to other alternative solutions to the conflict with Israel.

(1) A new legislative election?

• A majority of 52% of the public expects general elections to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 37% believe no elections will take place. Three months ago, only 38% expected that elections will take place soon.
• 44% support the holding of simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections and oppose a separation between the two, while 23% say they support the holding of parliamentary elections to be followed few months later by presidential elections, and 22% want simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections but do not oppose separating them by few months.
• A majority of 56% (65% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) says that if Israel prevented Palestinian legislative elections in East Jerusalem, voting should be made possible for the residents in any polling station in the West Bank; 35% disagree and say that no election should take place if Israel prevents it in East Jerusalem.
• Only 50% trust and 44% do not trust the integrity and capacity of the Palestinian Election Commission to successfully manage the election process.
• Moreover, only 48% trust, and 46% do not trust, the ability of the West Bank Palestinian police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias. Similarly, only 47% trust, and 41% do not trust, the ability of the Gaza Strip police to protect the election process and the ballot boxes with integrity and without bias.
• A majority of 64% say that it will not be possible, and 29% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Hamas’, to conduct their election campaigns in the West Bank without restrictions or interference from the Palestinian security services.
• Similarly, a majority of 56% says that it will not be possible, and 37% say it will be possible, for all candidate lists, especially Fatah’s, to conduct their election campaigns in the Gaza Strip without restrictions or interference from the Gaza security services.
• Only 42% believe, and 50% do not believe, that the upcoming parliamentary elections will be free and fair.
• The public is divided into two equal halves (43% each) in calling for taking away the jurisdiction of Palestinian courts, especially the Constitutional Court, in annulling the outcome of the legislative elections because of the fear that these courts might do so if the opposition to Abbas and Fatah were to win the elections.
• We asked the public about its expectations regarding the outcome of the upcoming elections: 40% (47% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip) expect Fatah to win the upcoming legislative elections while only 25% (19% in the West Bank and 35% in the Gaza Strip) expect Hamas to win.
• We also asked the public about its willingness to participate in the upcoming elections and if so, to whom it will vote. If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 68% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 32% say they will vote for Hamas and 40% say they will vote for Fatah, 10% will vote for all other third parties combined, and 20% are undecided. Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 29% and Fatah at 38%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 41% (compared to 39% three months ago) and for Fatah at 32% (compared to 31% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 24% (compared to 20% three months ago) and Fatah at 46% (compared to 43% three months ago). It should be noted that among Fatah voters, as we see in another question, some are loyalists to Mohammad Dahlan, a former senior Fatah official. If these Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 35%.
• We asked again about the voting intentions, but this time with the assumption that other newly created electoral lists, ones that have not participated in the previous elections in 2006, added to the list of candidates. In this case, the participation rate would increase from 68% to 72% and the share of the undecided would drop from 20% to only 6%; Fatah share would rise from 40% to 44% (including Dahlan loyalists); Hamas share (32%) would remain unchanged; share of third parties (10%) would also remain unchanged; and 8% would vote for the newly created electoral lists. If Dahlan loyalists are removed from Fatah’s share, it would drop to 39%.
• More than two thirds (68%) believe that if Hamas wins the upcoming elections, Fatah will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 25% think Fatah will indeed allow Hamas to do so.
• Similarly, 59% believe that if Fatah wins the upcoming elections, Hamas will not accept the results and will not allow it to form a government with full jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; 34% think Hamas will indeed allow Fatah to do so.
• A majority of 59% say that after the upcoming elections and the formation of a new government, such a government does not have the right to dissolve existing armed groups in the Gaza Strip and collect their arms because maintain the arms of these groups is more important than electoral legitimacy; 33% say that the newly elected government does indeed have the legitimacy to do so. Regardless of the policy of a newly elected government on the armed groups, two-thirds (67%) say that it would be wrong, and 26% say it would correct, to dissolve Gaza’s armed groups and collect their arms.
• If new parties or movements were to be created to take part in the upcoming elections, 13% of the participants say that while they have not yet made up their mind, they will be willing to consider supporting a new party or movement. Also, 12% of committed voters are willing to shift support to a new party or movement. Nonetheless, the largest percentage of participating voters says they will not shift vote to a new party or movement.
• The overwhelming majority (79%) encourages, and 18% discourage, the participation of independent youth lists in the upcoming elections.
• The top priority that should be the aim of the upcoming elections is the unification the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the eyes of 36% of the public while 18% think it is the improvement of economic conditions, 17% say the ending of Gazan blockade and siege, 13% say fighting corruption, 7% say creating a democratic political system, and 6% say strengthening the resistance to occupation and settlements.
• The largest percentage (32%) believes that Fatah is the most able of all factions to succeed in realizing the top priority it has selected; 24% say Hamas is the most able, and 20% believe that none of the existing or newly created factions will be able to succeed in achieving the top priority they have selected.

(2) Presidential elections:

• 61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 34% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 61% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 52% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 74% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 59%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 37% (43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip).
• Only 31% think president Abbas is the best Fatah candidate for the presidency while 41% think that Fatah has better candidates; 29% say they do not know or have no opinion on the matter.
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 49% and the latter 44% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 46% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 37% of the vote (compared to 39% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 56% (compared to 57% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 58% (compared to 56% three months ago) and Haniyeh 34% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%.
• We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 37% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 21% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 6% (2% in the West Bank and 12% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 5%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 4% each.

(3) Blocking websites, the justice system, the electricity crisis, the American field hospital, the Shtayyeh government, and other domestic conditions:

• 60% of the public view the decision by the attorney general to ask the court to block access to more than 50 Palestinian media websites as imposing restrictions on free speech, a right guaranteed by the Basic Law; but 33% think the decision to do so is correct as it seeks to implement the law.
• In light of his decision to block more than 50 media websites, 53% think the attorney general should not stay in his position because he apparently does not believe in free speech. But 38% think that he should stay in his position because he simply implemented the law.
• A majority of 54% (59% in the West Bank and 45% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 39% (34% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 55% (60% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is rules according to whims and interests; 42% disagree and believe that it rules according to the law.
• In light of the current electricity crisis in central West Bank, 61% think that refugee camps should be exempted from paying their electricity bill and the PA should cover the cost; 35% disagree and think that refugee camps should pay their bills like everybody else.
• If refugee camps are indeed exempted from paying for their electricity, 89% want the PA to cover the cost while only 5% think that other paying customers should cover the cost.
• The largest percentage (36%) says that it supports, and 32% say they oppose, the construction of the American field hospital on the borders of the Gaza Strip with Israel; 28% say they have not heard about it.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 6% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 25%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 70% and in the West Bank at 60%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 65% and in the West Bank at 52%.
• 24% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 31% and declines in the West Bank to 20%.
• Only 35% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 62% say that they cannot. In the Gaza Strip, 51% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 46% say they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 82% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 67%.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 50% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 45% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• With more than eight months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (49%), the economy (39%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (53%), the preparation to hold general elections (47%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (51%). But a percentage ranging between 24% and 45% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 12% and 24% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a slight improvement in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago.
• Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 58% expects failure; only 33% expects success.
• In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a plurality of 48% expects failure and 44% expect success.
• In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 55% expects failure and 37% expects success.
• An overwhelming majority of 77% supports, and 22% oppose, the government decision to raise the marriage age to 18 years.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV (15%), Palestine TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine Today TV (9%), al Al Arabiya and al Mayadeen (4% each).

(4) Reconciliation, Hamas and Islamic Jihad:

• 36% are optimistic and 59% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at only 30%.
• 44% are optimistic, and 51% are not optimistic, that the upcoming legislative elections will contribute to the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
• An overwhelming majority (78%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 20% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.
• A majority of 52% (down to 44% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 10% believe the chances are high.
• Given Hamas’ position during the latest round of fire exchange in the Gaza Strip between Israel and Islamic Jihad, the largest percentage, standing at 39% (43% in the West Bank and 34% in the Gaza Strip), believes that Hamas should have participated in the exchange of rocket fire against Israel while 32% (22% in the West Bank and 46% in the Gaza Strip) think Hamas made the correct decision by not participating, and 16% think that Hamas did in fact participate.

(5) US declaration of settlements’ legality, the Trump peace plan, and Trump impeachment:

• 66% view the US declaration of the legality of Israeli settlements according to international law as destructive to the two-state solution while 18% think it will have no impact and 10% think that it will in fact strengthen the two-state solution.
• Similarly, 57% view the same decision as have a weakening impact on the one-state solution while 23% think it will have no impact and 9% think it will in fact strengthen the one-state solution.
• Almost three quarters (74%) think the US decision will lead to an Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank, such as the Jordan Valley, while 20% think it will have no such impact
• We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 85% say no; only 10% say yes it would.
• When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 75% of the public says it does and only 21% say it does not.
• We asked the public what should the Palestinian leadership do about the US peace plan: 74% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 16% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 6% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. Three months ago, 69% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand.
• A majority of 69% is opposed and 19% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
• A majority of 60% expects US president Trump to lose the next US presidential election and 53% expect the US Congress to succeed in impeaching him.

(6) The peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 55%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 42%. 38% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 54% believe that the majority opposes it.
• A majority of 61% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 35% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 75% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 24% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 29% of the public while 39% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 14% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 15% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 32% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 37% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (47%) chose armed struggle, 26% negotiations, and 20% popular resistance. Three months ago, 44% chose armed struggle and 24% chose negotiations.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 60% support popular non-violent resistance; 52% support a return to an armed intifada; 42% support dissolving the PA; and 28% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 50% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 40% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• A majority of 58% expects the indictment of Netanyahu in corruption charges to his ouster from leadership in Israel soon while 34% expect him to succeed in staying in power despite the indictment.

(7) Arab uprisings, Turkish incursion into Syria, and visit of Saudi football team:

• 57% of the public are in favor and 37% are not in favor of the current uprisings in the Arab world, in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
• But 65% do not expect, and only 31% expect, these uprisings to spread to Palestine.
• Similarly, 65% do not wish to see these uprisings spreading to the West Bank and a little more (70%) do not wish to see them spreading to the Gaza Strip.
• Nonetheless, 63% reject, and 26% accept, Hizbollah’s position which is opposed to the Lebanese uprising.
• A majority of 51% (60% in the West Bank and 38% in the Gaza Strip) views the Turkish incursion into the northern border area of Syria as unacceptable aggression while 40% (31% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) view it as a legitimate temporary incursion.
• A majority of 63% say that visits from Arab countries, such as that of the Saudi football team, should be encouraged while 34% say such visits should not be encouraged.

(8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities followed by poverty and unemployment and the spread of corruption in public institutions (26% each); 17% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.

While a majority is dissatisfied with the behavior of the PA and Palestinian factions in response to the Israeli demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos, a greater majority believes that Abbas’ response, to stop implementation of agreements with Israel, is merely a media stunt and will not be implemented; and while support for two-state solution declines, support for armed attacks rises and an overwhelming majority rejects the US “deal of the century” and believes it will not end the occupation. In domestic matters, an overwhelming majority views “honor killing” as a heinous crime, a majority has no trust in the Palestinian judiciary, and more than 60% demand the resignation of president Abbas

11-14 September 2019

This poll has been conducted in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Ramallah

These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 11-14 September 2019. The period before the conduct of the poll witnessed several developments including a presidential termination of the work of the Supreme Judicial Council and the formation of a transitional one, a presidential statement requiring former ministers, who illegally received salary increases, to return these funds, and a widespread internal debate over “honor killing” in the context of the death of a woman from Bethlehem in suspicious circumstances. In relations with Israel, five main developments occurred during this period: an Israeli demolition of a large built up area in Wadi Hommos which is located in an area under PA zoning control, responding to this incident, Abbas announced his intention to suspend the implementation of agreements with Israel, an explosive device was detonated in an area near the settlement of Dolev, west of Ramallah, killing an Israeli woman, Israeli prime minister Netanyahu announced his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley if he wins the Israeli elections scheduled for 17 September 2019, and finally, Israel transferred to the PA about two billion Shekels from the Palestinian custom revenues which the PA had previously announced it will not accept if it was not transferred in full. On Palestinian-American relations, US ambassador David Friedman stated that the US peace plan does not call for the creation of a Palestinian state but that it allows for Palestinian autonomy. This press release addresses many of these issues and covers other matters such as Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections, general conditions in the Palestinian territories, the peace process and the future possible directions for Palestinians in the absence of a viable peace process. Total size of the sample is 1200 adults interviewed face to face in 120 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is +/-3%.

For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel. 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org.

Main Findings:

Findings of the third quarter of 2019 show an overwhelming majority, reaching about three quarters, dissatisfied with the performance of the PA and the political factions in their response to the Israeli demolition of Palestinian homes in Wadi al Hommos, near Jerusalem. The majority views the response of president Abbas to the demolition—by declaring that the PA is stopping its implementation of the agreements with Israel— as inappropriate. Indeed, an overwhelming majority, exceeding three quarters of the public, believes that Abbas’ decision is merely a media stunt aiming at absorbing public anger with the PA leadership over its failure to prevent Israel from carrying out that demolition. Furthermore, public anger with the PA is probably driven by the belief of more than 80% that the Palestinian leadership will not implement the decision to stop implementing the agreements with Israel.

In domestic matters, findings show that the overwhelming majority of the public views “honor killing” of women as a heinous crime that must be punished severely. Only 10% think that this type of crimes is understandable and punishment should thereby be reduced. By contrast, findings show that almost half of the public, much more in the Gaza Strip, believes human beings can be possessed by Jinn or demons while a slightly smaller percentage believes this to be a superstition.

Findings also show that Shtayyeh’s government has failed so far in winning the trust of the public. Indeed, public trust in the ability of the government to perform better than the previous government has declined compared to the findings three months ago. Similarly, the public is dissatisfied with the performance of the judiciary, particularly the courts, with about two-thirds believing that its functioning is marred by corruption, lack of independence, or that it rules not according to the law but in accordance with whims and personal interests. But the public is evenly divided in its satisfaction with the decisions made by Abbas regarding the judiciary. Moreover, the largest percentage believes that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary. Furthermore, trust in the presidency is also low as more than 60% demand the resignation of president Abbas; slightly more than a third wants him to stay in office. If Abbas runs in a presidential election against Ismail Haniyyeh, the votes would be very close.

In foreign affairs, findings show that the largest percentage of the Palestinians, particularly in the West Bank, does not view Iran as a friend or an ally of the Palestinians. Yet, a majority, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, believes that if war breaks out between Iran and Israel, the former would be able to defeat the latter, as Iran is believed to have a stronger military force.

In light of prime minister Netanyahu’s statement announcing his intentions to annex the Jordan Valley, findings show a significant increase in the percentage of those who believe that the two-state solution is no longer feasible or practical. As in the past, feasibility is linked to support for the two-state solution. Findings show a significant decline in support for that solution accompanied by an increased support for armed attacks against Israelis. Moreover, public perception of the Trump peace plan continues to worsen, compared to attitudes two years ago, with two-thirds of the public demanding the Palestinian leadership to reject the plan out of hand even before reading the plan’s content, because it must be bad. More than 80% reject the idea presented by the US ambassador to Israel offering self-rule, rather than sovereign and independent statehood, to the Palestinians. More than 70% oppose resumption of the dialogue with the Trump Administration.

(1) Home demolition in Wadi al Hommos and Abbas’ response by suspending implementation of agreements with Israel:

• An overwhelming majority of 74% thinks that the PA and the political factions have not done all they could to prevent the Israeli demolition of buildings and homes in Wadi al Hommos near Jerusalem and 19% think they have done their best.
• Two thirds of the public (66%) believe that it was the duty of the PA and its security services and the police to protect the homes in Wadi al Hommos by serving as a buffer between the buildings and the Israeli bulldozers.
• 61% say that Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel was not the most appropriate response to the demolition of homes in Wadi al Hommos while 32% think it was the appropriate response.
• A large majority of 71% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean dissolving the PA and 18% think he does mean that.
• Similarly, a majority of 67% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending security coordination with Israel and 24% think he does mean that.
• A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending civil coordination with Israel and 19% think he does mean that.
• A large majority of 69% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean annulling the PLO recognition of Israel and 20% think he does mean that.
• A large majority of 76% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean ending negotiations with Israel and returning to armed struggle and 15% think he does mean that.
• A large majority of 65% thinks that by suspending agreements with Israel, Abbas does not mean returning to Israel those VIP cards issued to senior PA officials and 22% think he does mean that.
• We asked the public if it thinks the PA is serious about implementing Abbas’ decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. An overwhelming majority of 78% says the PA will not do that and only 16% say it will.
• Similarly, we asked the public about Abbas’ motivation behind making the decision to suspend implementation of agreements with Israel. A similar overwhelming majority (76%) indicates that the president’s decision is a media stunt or ploy and it will not be implemented while only 16% say the decision is serious and will be implemented.

(2) “Honor killing,” Jinn possession, economic conditions, the performance of the Shtayyeh government, and others:

• An overwhelming majority of 81% (90% in the West Bank and 66% in the Gaza Strip) say that “honor killing” is an dreadful crime that should be punished severely while 7% say that it is a normal crime that should be punished like any other crime. Only 10% (5% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip) say that it is an understandable act that should be punished lightly.
• The public is divided on the issue of humans being possessed by Jinn or demons: 48% (37% in the West Bank and 67% in the Gaza Strip) say they believe it is real while 44% (56% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip) believe it is superstition.
• 59% of the public say that their income has declined during the past six months due to the inability of the PA to pay the salary of the public sector in full; 35% say their income did not change and 4% say it has increased.
• A majority of 54% supports and 37% oppose the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues. However, 43% say that they are worried that this decision could lead to the collapse of the PA while 50% indicate that it could not. Three months ago, 62% said they supported the PA decision to refuse to accept a partial transfer of custom revenues and 52% said they were worried that this decision could lead to PA collapse.
• Positive evaluation of conditions in the Gaza Strip stands at 8% and positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank stands at 22%.
• Perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stands at 63% and in the West Bank at 52%. Three months ago, perception of safety and security in the Gaza Strip stood at 67% and in the West Bank at 59%.
• 31% of the public say they want to emigrate due to political, security, and economic conditions. The percentage rises in the Gaza Strip to 41% and declines in the West Bank to 24%.
• Only 36% of the West Bankers say that people can criticize the authority in their area without fear and 59% say that they cannot. Three months ago, 57% of West Bankers said they could not criticize the PA in the West Bank without fear. In the Gaza Strip, 43% say that people in the Gaza Strip can criticize Hamas authority without fear and 53% say they cannot.
• Perception of corruption in PA institutions stands at 80% while perception of corruption in the institutions controlled by Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands at 65%. When asked about Abbas decision mandating that ministers of the previous government return illegal pay raise they received, 80% said this measure was not sufficient.
• The public is divided over its assessment of the PA: 49% view it as a burden on the Palestinian people while 46% view it as an asset for the Palestinian people.
• With more than five months passing since the formation of the Shtayyeh government, findings indicate that a majority, or a plurality, of the public views its performance as similar to that of the previous government in matters of security (44%), the economy (37%), the reunification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (50%), the preparation to hold general elections (49%), and the protection of liberties and human rights (47%). But a percentage ranging between 50% and 32% indicates that it believes the performance to be worse than that of the previous government while a percentage ranging between 16% and 8% indicates that the performance of the Shtayyeh government is better than that of the previous government. These findings indicate a drop in public’s positive evaluation of the of the Shtayyeh government compared to our findings three months ago.
• Responding to a question about expectations regarding the ability of the Shtayyeh government to make progress in reconciliation and reunification, 61% expects failure; only 27% expects success.
• In a similar question about the ability of the new government to organize legislative or legislative and presidential elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a majority of 58% expects failure and 30% expects success.
• In another question about the ability of the new government to improve economic conditions, a majority of 60% expects failure and 28% expects success.
• We asked the public about its viewership habits in the last two months. Findings indicate that Al Jazeera TV viewership remains the highest, standing at 19%, followed by Al Aqsa TV and Maan TV (13% each), Palestine TV (12%), Palestine Today TV (11%), al Al Arabiya (5%), and al Mayadeen (4%).

3) Public evaluation of the judiciary and views on the president’s decisions regarding the judiciary:

• A majority of 60% (65% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) believes that it will not receive a fair trial if it finds itself in a Palestinian court while 32% (26% in the West Bank and 41% in the Gaza Strip) believe that will receive a fair trial.
• A majority of 63% (72% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) thinks that the Palestinian judiciary is marred by corruption, lacks independence, or rules according to whims and interests; 29% disagree and believe that it is has integrity, independence, or rules according to the law.
• The public makes a similar assessment of Palestinian layers: 66% (74% in the West Bank and 53% in the Gaza Strip) think lawyers’ work is marred by corruption and incompetence and that lawyers are untruthful with clients; 25% think lawyers’ work has integrity, competent, and lawyers are truthful with the clients.
• The public is divided in its view of Abbas’ decision to lower the retirement age for judges, to dismiss the Supreme Judicial Council, and to appoint a Transition Supreme Judicial Council: 42% are in favor, 42% are not in favor, and 16% are uncertain.
• 49% believe that the Transitional Judicial Council will not succeed in the next year or two in reforming the judiciary while 36% believe it will succeed.
• A plurality of 47% does not agree and 39% agree, with the view that the judicial matters are not part of jurisdiction of the PA president or that his decisions regarding the judiciary constitute an interference in the affairs of the judiciary.
• The public is divided on the view that Abbas’ decision regarding the judiciary was necessary in light of the fact that it has failed to reform itself: 43% agree and an identical percentage disagree with this statement.

(4) Presidential and parliamentary elections:

• Only 38% of the public expect elections, parliamentary or parliamentary and presidential, to take place in the Palestinian territories in the near future; 49% believe no elections will take place.
• An overwhelming majority (72%) wants elections to be for both, a parliament and a president, while only 12% want parliamentary elections only. 12% do not want any elections.
• If elections were held for a parliament and a president, 69% want Hamas to participate and to allow them in the Gaza Strip while 21% say they do not want Hamas to participate or allow elections in the Gaza Strip.
• 61% of the public want president Abbas to resign while 35% want him to remain in office. Three months ago, 57% said they want Abbas to resign. Demand for Abbas’ resignation stands at 55% in the West Bank and 73% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, demand for Abbas resignation stood at 49% in the West Bank and 71% in the Gaza Strip.
• Level of satisfaction with the performance of president Abbas stands at 37% and dissatisfaction at 60%. Level of satisfaction with Abbas stands at 43% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip. Three months ago, satisfaction with Abbas stood at 38% (42% in the West Bank and 27% in the Gaza Strip).
• If new presidential elections were held today and only two were nominated, Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the former would receive 48% and the latter 46% of the vote (compared to 48% for Abbas and 42% for Haniyeh three months ago). In the Gaza Strip, Abbas receives 39% of the vote (compared to 43% three months ago) and Haniyeh receives 57% (compared to 52% three months ago). In the West Bank, Abbas receives 56% (compared to 52% three months ago) and Haniyeh 36% (compared to 36% three months ago). If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Ismail Haniyeh, Barghouti receives 62% and Haniyeh 34%.
• We asked about potential Abbas successors: If president Abbas does not nominate himself in a new election, 36% prefer to see Marwan Barghouti replacing him, while 19% prefer Ismail Haniyeh. Mohammad Dahlan is preferred by 8% (2% in the West Bank and 19% in the Gaza Strip), Mustafa Barghouti by 4%, and Khalid Mishal and Salam Fayyad by 3% each.
• If new legislative elections were held today with the participation of all factions, 66% say they would participate in such elections. Of those who would participate, 29% say they would vote for Hamas and 38% say they would vote for Fatah, 11% would vote for all other third parties combined, and 23% are undecided.
• Three months ago, vote for Hamas stood at 30% and Fatah at 39%. Vote for Hamas in the Gaza Strip stands today at 39% (compared to 38% three months ago) and for Fatah at 31% (compared to 33% three months ago). In the West Bank, vote for Hamas stands at 20% (compared to 25% three months ago) and Fatah at 43% (compared to 43% three months ago).

(5) Reconciliation, Hamas and Iran:

• 30% are optimistic and 67% are pessimistic about the success of reconciliation. Three months ago, optimism stood at 33%.
• Moreover, the overwhelming majority (72%) demands that the PA immediately lift all the measures taken against the Gaza Strip, such as public sector’s salary deductions and the reduction in access to electricity; only 23% say that such measures should be removed only after Hamas fully hands over control over the Strip to the PA government.
• A majority of 52% (down to 37% in the Gaza Strip) believes that the chances for a Hamas-Israel agreement on a long term hudna or cessation of violence are slim while 36% believe the chances are medium and only 9% believe the chances are high.
• In the context of the visit of a senior Hamas delegation to Iran, we asked the public to tell us how it views Iran: a plurality of 48% says Iran is not a friend or ally to the Palestinians and 40% (36% in the West Bank and 48% in the Gaza Strip) say it is a friend and ally.
• In the context of statements by Iran and its allies indicating that the Islamic republic has a military capacity to defeat Israel in war, we asked the public if it believes this to be true: 55% say they believe this to be true and 32% believe it to be untrue.

(6) The Trump peace plan:

• We asked the public if Palestinian acceptance of the Trump peace plan would lead to the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank: 83% say no; only 9% say yes it would.
• When asked if the Trump peace plan permits Israel to annex a large part of the West Bank, a large majority of 65% of the public says it does and only 27% say it does not.
• Two thirds (67%) believe that in response to a Palestinian rejection of the Trump peace plan, the US will impose further sanctions on the Palestinians; 23% say it will amend its plan in case of Palestinian rejection.
• A large majority of 69% believes that the Palestinian leadership should reject the US plan; 19% say it should accept it with reservations; and 5% believe it should accept it without reservation. Three months ago, 75% said the PA leadership should reject the plan.
• We asked this same question with a slightly different options: 64% indicate that the Palestinian leadership should reject out of hand the US “deal of the century” if the US presents its plan because it must be bad for the Palestinians; 21% want the PA to examine the substance of the plan before accepting or rejecting it; and 9% believe the leadership should accept the plan out of hand because it will certainly be better than the status quo. A year ago, only 50% said the PA should reject the plan out of hand.
• An overwhelming majority of 81% reject the proposed self-rule idea that deny Palestinian statehood that was proposed by US ambassador to Israel David Friedman while 9% say they accept it and 10% are uncertain.
• Similarly, 72% say that they are against, and 22% for, American ideas proposed to solve the refugee problem in which Palestinian refugees are offered full citizenship and rights in the host countries and in which the host countries receive billions of US dollars in assistance and investments.
• A majority of 68% is opposed and 20% is not opposed to a resumption of dialogue between the Palestinian leadership and the Trump Administration. Official contacts between the PA and the US government were suspended by the PA after the US, in December 2017, recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

7) The peace process:

• Support for the concept of the two-state solution stands at 42% and opposition at 56%. No description or details were provided for the concept. Three months ago, support for the concept stood at 47%. 37% of the public believe that a majority of the Palestinians supports this solution and 56% believe that the majority opposes it.
• A majority of 63% believes that the two-state solution is no longer practical or feasible due to the expansion of Israeli settlements while 34% believe that the solution remains practical. Moreover, 78% believe that the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel in the next five years are slim or nonexistence while 21% believe the chances to be medium or high.
• The most preferred way out of the current status quo is “reaching a peace agreement with Israel” according to 32% of the public while 37% prefer waging “an armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.” Only 10% prefer “waging a non-violent resistance” and 17% prefer to keep the status quo. Three months ago, 36% said that they prefer reaching a peace agreement with Israel and 34% said they prefer waging an armed struggle.
• When asked about the most effective means of ending the Israeli occupation, the largest group (44%) chose armed struggle, 24% negotiations, and 22% popular resistance. Three months ago, 38% chose armed struggle and 31% chose negotiaitons.
• In light of the suspension of peace negotiations, Palestinians support various alternative directions: 62% support popular non-violent resistance; 50% support a return to an armed intifada; 40% support dissolving the PA; and 32% support abandoning the two-state solution and demanding the establishment of one state for Palestinians and Israelis. Three months ago, 47% said they prefer a return to armed intifada and 38% said they prefer to dissolve the PA.
• We asked about the armed attack that took place few weeks ago in an area west of Ramallah, near the settlement of Dolve, in which one Israeli woman was killed: 61% (49% in the West Bank and 80% in the Gaza Strip) supported it and 33% opposed it. A majority of 54% views the attack as a one-time, lone wolf, event while 39% think it is the beginning of the return to armed struggle.
• An overwhelming majority of 83% supports the local and international boycott movement against Israel while 15% are opposed to it. A majority of 52% say that they are currently boycotting non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes while 33% say they are not. 57% say the boycott of non-essential Israeli products and those that have non-Israeli substitutes will be effective in contributing to the end of occupation and 42% say it will not.
• About two-thirds of the public believe that the European countries will not boycott Israel or impose sanctions on it while 26% believe they will.
• An overwhelming majority of 74% says that Palestinians should condemn visits of Arab journalists to Israel while 7% say the visits should be encouraged.
• A majority of 52% expects the Israeli right wing led by Netanyahu to win the upcoming Israeli elections and 19% expect the center-left led by Gantz to win the elections; 29% do not know who is likely to win.
• About half of the public (48%) does not encourage the participation of the Joint Arab List in an Israeli government coalition led by the center and the left while 37% encourage such participation and 15% have no opinion.
• The public is divided in its position regarding the participation of the Palestinian citizens of Israel in the Knesset elections: 46% support and 42% oppose such participation.

8) Most vital Palestinian goals and the main problems confronting Palestinians today:

• 44% believe that the first most vital Palestinian goal should be to end Israeli occupation in the areas occupied in 1967 and build a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. By contrast, 33% believe the first most vital goal should be to obtain the right of return of refugees to their 1948 towns and villages, 13% believe that it should be to build a pious or moral individual and a religious society, one that applies all Islamic teachings, and 9% believe that the first and most vital goal should be to establish a democratic political system that respects freedoms and rights of Palestinians.
• The most serious problem confronting Palestinian society today in the eyes of 28% of the public is poverty and unemployment while 25% say it is the continuation of occupation and settlement activities; another 25% say it is the spread of corruption in public institutions; and 15% say it is the siege of the Gaza Strip and the closure of its crossings.