Abir Dandis, the mother of the two girls who were murdered in the Negev town of Al-Fura’a last week, couldn't find a police officer to listen to her warnings, neither in Arad nor in Ma’ale Adumim. Both police stations operate in areas where Israel wants to gather the Bedouin into permanent communities, against their will, in order to clear more land for Jewish communities. The dismissive treatment Dandis received shows how the Bedouin are considered simply to be lawbreakers by their very nature. But as a resident of the West Bank asking for help for her daughters, whose father was Israeli, Dandis faced the legal-bureaucratic maze created by the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinian police is not allowed to arrest Israeli civilians. It must hand suspects over to the Israel Police. The Palestinian police complain that in cases of Israelis suspected of committing crimes against Palestinian residents, the Israel Police tend not to investigate or prosecute them.

In addition, the town of Al-Azaria, where Dandis lives, is in Area B, under Palestinian civilian authority and Israeli security authority. According to the testimony of Palestinian residents, neither the IDF nor the Israel Police has any interest in internal Palestinian crime even though they have both the authority and the obligation to act in Area B.

The Palestinian police are limited in what it can do in Area B. Bringing in reinforcements or carrying weapons in emergency situations requires coordination with, and obtaining permission from, the IDF. If Dandis fears that the man who murdered her daughters is going to attack her as well, she has plenty of reason to fear that she will not receive appropriate, immediate police protection from either the Israelis or the Palestinians.

Dandis told Jack Khoury of Haaretz that the Ma’ale Adumim police referred her to the Palestinian Civil Affairs Coordination and Liaison Committee. Theoretically, this committee (which is subordinate to the Civil Affairs Ministry) is the logical place to go for such matters. Its parallel agency in Israel is the Civilian Liaison Committee (which is part of the Coordination and Liaison Administration - a part of the Civil Administration under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories).

In their meetings, they are supposed to discuss matters such as settlers’ complaints about the high volume of the loudspeakers at mosques or Palestinians’ complaints about attacks by settlers. But the Palestinians see the Liaison Committee as a place to submit requests for permission to travel to Israel, and get the impression that its clerks do not have much power when faced with their Israeli counterparts. In any case, the coordination process is cumbersome and long.

The Palestinian police has a family welfare unit, and activists in Palestinian women’s organizations say that in recent years, its performance has improved. But, as stated, it has no authority over Israeli civilians and residents. Several non-governmental women’s groups also operate in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and women in similar situations approach them for help. The manager of one such organization told Haaretz that Dandis also fell victim to this confusing duplication of procedures and laws. Had Dandis approached her, she said, she would have referred her to Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, which has expertise in navigating Israel’s laws and authorities.

John Kerry revealed his long-awaited plan for peace in the Middle East on Sunday, hinging on a $4bn (£2.6bn) investment in the Palestinian private sector.

The US secretary of state, speaking at the World Economic Forum on the Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea, told an audience including Israeli president Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that an independent Palestinian economy is essential to achieving a sustainable peace.

Speaking under the conference banner "Breaking the Impasse", Kerry announced a plan that he promised would be "bigger, bolder and more ambitious" than anything since the Oslo accords, more than 20 years ago.

Tony Blair is to lead a group of private sector leaders in devising a plan to release the Palestinian economy from its dependence on international donors. The initial findings of Blair's taskforce, Kerry boasted, were "stunning", predicting a 50% increase in Palestinian GDP over three years, a cut of two-thirds in unemployment rates and almost double the Palestinian median wage. Currently, 40% of the Palestinian economy is supplied by donor aid.

Kerry assured Abbas that the economic plan was not a substitute for a political solution, which remains the US's "top priority".

Peres, who had taken the stage just minutes before, also issued a personal plea to his Palestinian counterpart to return to the negotiations.

"Let me say to my dear friend President Abbas," Peres said, "Should we really dance around the table? Lets sit together. You'll be surprised how much can be achieved in open, direct and organised meetings."

Thick locks hug the front gates of shuttered shops, now covered in graffiti and dust from lack of use. Only a handful of customers pass along the dimly lit road, sometimes stopping to check the ripeness of fruits and vegetables, or ordering meat in near-empty butcher shops.

“All the shops are closed. I’m the only one open. This used to be the best place,” said 64-year-old Mustafa Sunocret, selling vegetables out of a small storefront in the marketplace near his family’s home in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City.

Amidst the brightly coloured scarves, clothes and carpets, ceramic pottery and religious souvenirs filling the shops of Jerusalem’s historic Old City, Palestinian merchants are struggling to keep their businesses alive.

Faced with worsening health problems, Sunocret told IPS that he cannot work outside of the Old City, even as the cost of maintaining his shop, with high electricity, water and municipal tax bills to pay, weighs on him.

“I only have this shop,” he said. “There is no other work. I’m tired.”

Abed Ajloni, the owner of an antiques shop in the Old City, owes the Jerusalem municipality 250,000 Israeli shekels (68,300 U.S. dollars) in taxes. He told IPS that almost every day, the city’s tax collectors come into the Old City, accompanied by Israeli police and soldiers, to pressure people there to pay.

“It feels like they’re coming again to occupy the city, with the soldiers and police,” Ajloni, who has owned the same shop for 35 years, told IPS. “But where can I go? What can I do? All my life I was in this place.”

He added, “Does Jerusalem belong to us, or to someone else? Who’s responsible for Jerusalem? Who?”

Illegal annexation

Israel occupied East Jerusalem, including the Old City, in 1967. In July 1980, it passed a law stating that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. But Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and subsequent application of Israeli laws over the entire city remain unrecognised by the international community.

Under international law, East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory – along with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Syrian Golan Heights – and Palestinian residents of the city are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Jerusalem has historically been the economic, political and cultural centre of life for the entire Palestinian population. But after decades languishing under destructive Israeli policies meant to isolate the city from the rest of the Occupied Territories and a lack of municipal services and investment, East Jerusalem has slipped into a state of poverty and neglect.

“After some 45 years of occupation, Arab Jerusalemites suffer from political and cultural schizophrenia, simultaneously connected with and isolated from their two hinterlands: Ramallah and the West Bank to their east, West Jerusalem and Israel to the west,” the International Crisis Group recently wrote.

Israeli restrictions on planning and building, home demolitions, lack of investment in education and jobs, construction of an eight-foot-high separation barrier between and around Palestinian neighbourhoods and the creation of a permit system to enter Jerusalem have all contributed to the city’s isolation.

Formal Palestinian political groups have also been banned from the city, and between 2001-2009, Israel closed an estimated 26 organisations, including the former Palestinian Liberation Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem, the Orient House and the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce.

Extreme poverty

Israel’s policies have also led to higher prices for basic goods and services and forced many Palestinian business owners to close shop and move to Ramallah or other Palestinian neighbourhoods on the other side of the wall. Many Palestinian Jerusalemites also prefer to do their shopping in the West Bank, or in West Jerusalem, where prices are lower.

While Palestinians constitute 39 percent of the city’s population today, almost 80 percent of East Jerusalem residents, including 85 percent of children, live below the poverty line.

“How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t control your resources? How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t have any control of your borders?” said Zakaria Odeh, director of the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, of “this kind of fragmentation, checkpoints, closure”.

“Without freedom of movement of goods and human beings, how could you develop an economy?” he asked.

“You can’t talk about independent economy in Jerusalem or the West Bank or in all of Palestine without a political solution. We don’t have a Palestinian economy; we have economic activities. That’s all we have,” Odeh told IPS.

Israel’s separation barrier alone, according to a new report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), has caused a direct loss of over one billion dollars to Palestinians in Jerusalem, and continues to incur 200 million dollars per year in lost opportunities.

Israel’s severing and control over the Jerusalem-Jericho road – the historical trade route that connected Jerusalem to the rest of the West Bank and Middle East – has also contributed to the city’s economic downturn.

Separation of Jerusalem from West Bank

Before the First Intifada (Arabic for “uprising”) began in the late 1980s, East Jerusalem contributed approximately 14 to 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). By 2000, that number had dropped to less than eight percent; in 2010, the East Jerusalem economy, compared to the rest of the OPT, was estimated at only seven percent.

“Economic separation resulted in the contraction in the relative size of the East Jerusalem economy, its detachment from the remaining OPT and the gradual redirection of East Jerusalem employment towards the Israeli labour market,” the U.N. report found.

Decades ago, Israel adopted a policy to maintain a so-called “demographic balance” in Jerusalem and attempt to limit Palestinian residents of the city to 26.5 percent or less of the total population.

To maintain this composition, Israel built numerous Jewish-Israeli settlements inside and in a ring around Jerusalem and changed the municipal boundaries to encompass Jewish neighbourhoods while excluding Palestinian ones.

It is now estimated that 90,000 Palestinians holding Jerusalem residency rights live on the other side of the separation barrier and must cross through Israeli checkpoints in order to reach Jerusalem for school, medical treatment, work, and other services.

“Israel is using all kinds of tools to push the Palestinians to leave; sometimes they are visible, and sometimes invisible tools,” explained Ziad al-Hammouri, director of the Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER).

Al-Hammouri told IPS that at least 25 percent of the 1,000 Palestinian shops in the Old City were closed in recent years as a result of high municipal taxes and a lack of customers. “Taxation is an invisible tool…as dangerous as revoking ID cards and demolishing houses,” he said. “Israel will use this as pressure and as a tool in the future to confiscate these shops and properties.”

Syria and Israel negotiated directly in the United States in 2000 and indirectly in 2008. The Palestine Liberation Organization and Israel negotiated indirectly first in the late 1980s and directly since the start of the Oslo process. Negotiations so far have not led to a comprehensive peace on either track. What moral can be drawn about the modus operandi, direct or indirect?

None. The problem lies elsewhere.

The interest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in direct talks appears to be motivated by two considerations: first, generating the appearance of “normal” relations with the Palestinian Authority, given the relative international isolation of his government; and second, keeping his coalition afloat. The latter factor requires that no credible progress be achieved in such talks. That is, unless the PLO accepts a “state” in 50 to 60 percent of the West Bank, in isolated cantons, lacking in sovereignty, with possibly the village of Abu Dis being called “Jerusalem,” or whatever other area is outside the wall adjoining Jerusalem that Israel is eager to get rid of for demographic reasons. No Palestinian leadership can accept such terms and survive politically.

For the Palestinians, the predicament is that after 19 years of negotiations, since the Madrid conference began in October 1991, it is not possible to have another 19 years of negotiations and retain whatever credibility and legitimacy the Palestinian Authority still maintains among Palestinians. This is why President Mahmoud Abbas insisted on going directly to so-called final-status issues such as borders, Jerusalem, refugees and sovereignty in the context of the “Annapolis process” that folded at the end of 2008 with no agreement.

After the election of US President Barack Obama, the PLO decided to go along with another final round of negotiations. Following Obama’s lead, talks were conditioned on a settlement freeze. After Obama backed down, accepting a partial and temporary freeze rather than a complete one, “indirect negotiations” or “proximity talks” as they came to be called, were a way to save face for the Palestinian side. Following the lead of the Arab League, the PLO insisted that there must be progress in indirect talks and agreement about the borders existing before the June 1967 war as a starting point for any direct negotiations before direct negotiations could start. None of this has happened.

Now the Palestinian leadership is under pressure from the Obama administration to enter into direct negotiations as Netanyahu demands. This may just be the straw that will break the camel’s back. But even if it doesn’t and the PLO is prevailed upon by the United States, with the backing of Arab regimes, time is indeed running out. Barely a day passed after the Netanyahu-Obama meeting in early July when there were already calls in opinion columns in Palestinian newspapers on Abbas to resign and refuse to proceed any further with “negotiations” that most Palestinians see simply as a charade. The internet is full of vituperative condemnation of the Palestinian Authority by Palestinians and Arabs, and the Palestinian Authority is well aware of this.

Whatever political “movement” is generated in the near future as a result of the Netanyahu-Obama meeting, for now and at least until the end of the year everything is short-term crisis management.

Obama wants his Democratic party to pass through the mid-term November elections as successfully as possible given the role of the pro-Israel lobby in domestic American politics. Netanyahu needs to gain as much time as possible to keep his coalition intact; and the Palestinian leadership is at the mercy of more powerful actors and is hesitant to use its main source of leverage, in other words by putting the Palestinian Authority’s existence on the line.

For, from a Palestinian point of view, it was never envisioned that the Palestinian Authority would function permanently as a large municipality to administer the affairs of Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Thus, without a clear end in sight to “negotiations,” the Palestinian Authority’s future is doomed. Mahmoud Abbas understands this quite well. This is what was behind his declaration earlier this year that he will not run again for elections. He also said that he might take other steps, but then did not elaborate. It is widely assumed that his resigning from office remains a strong possibility.

But even if Abbas is prevailed upon to give the Obama administration another lease of life on the current crisis management, the future of the Palestinian Authority is very insecure. And there is no partner in government on the Israeli side.

George Giacaman is a faculty member at Bir Zeit University and teaches in the MA program in Democracy and Human Rights and in the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter that publishes contending views of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Palestinian leadership continues to resist ever-growing pressure to return to the negotiating table with Israel. And unless the international community, and especially the United States, is ready to underwrite serious and substantial talks, embarking on a negotiations process that will likely fail could have dramatic consequences.

Last year, Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, quickly followed the administration of President Barack Obama in demanding a complete cessation of Israeli settlement building in occupied territories, including in East Jerusalem. The Obama administration, however, proved unable to deliver, except in a limited way. This has left Abbas in a difficult position, especially given his many public pronouncements on the subject in the past several months. After all, he has a Palestinian public to worry about whose opinion it has become more difficult to ignore, particularly in light of the disagreements surrounding the Goldstone Report on the war in the Gaza Strip a year ago.

Hence we are now witnessing an attempt to enter indirect negotiations as a way to prepare for direct talks. According to the Israeli media, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, wants such indirect talks to last only a few weeks and merely to provide a “ladder” for Abbas to climb down and resume direct negotiations. Indeed, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, was in the Gulf in recent days partly to convince Arab states to pressure Abbas to restart talks. It is therefore not impossible that such negotiations will indeed start.

But what we are really witnessing is an attempt by Netanyahu to go back to the formula revealed by his predecessor, Yitzhak Shamir, after he lost power following the opening of peace talks in Madrid in October 1991. Shamir declared that he would have allowed negotiations to drag on for 20 years. The objective of the present Israeli government is, similarly, to stretch out negotiations long enough to make it impossible for the Obama administration to put any pressure on Israel – in other words at least until just before the next US presidential election.

This, in the meantime, will allow Israel to continue the process of building and expanding settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as indeed it is continuing to do even under the current so-called freeze, which is in any case temporary. Certainly there is no reason to believe that such negotiations will lead anywhere in the absence of concrete and concerted pressure on the Israeli government.

Abbas and his advisers understand well that 18 years after the Madrid conference in 1991 we are nowhere near a solution. The problem with the Oslo Accords was that bilateral negotiations, meaning only those between Palestinians and Israelis, were regarded as the sole mechanism for progress. But this mechanism has led nowhere. It should be obvious that unless there is also direct American pressure on the Israeli government as a way to redress the imbalance of power – military, political or otherwise – between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, there can be no agreement.

Continued negotiations without result, furthermore, are a high-stakes game for the Palestinian Authority. They will engender even further loss of credibility and it is not impossible that if such negotiations are entered into and then go nowhere, Mahmoud Abbas will resign. Then we will likely see the beginning of a process in which the Palestinian Authority as a whole is undermined and will gradually disintegrate.

Should this happen I doubt there will be any more rounds of negotiations. A different formula will have to be devised, perhaps an imposed solution from the United Nations Security Council. This is a scenario Israel fears. But Israel also fears the only alternative in the event of failure: the Palestinian Authority’s dismantlement. The Netanyahu Israeli government is not interested in re-occupying all the West Bank and assuming the burden of occupation. But once the security situation deteriorates, it will be forced to do so, and with the gradual dismantlement of the Palestinian Authority, Israel will also be forced to take on the responsibility of governing of these recaptured areas.

The question is not whether to return to negotiations, but what are the requirements for success. Here the Palestinians have been very clear. First, there can be no return to square one. Second, there has to be a time frame. And third, there have to be certain points of reference for the talks, such as international decisions regarding the conflict, including the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, as well as the Arab Peace Initiative.

These provide a necessary framework for negotiations, because negotiating in a vacuum, as we have seen, leads nowhere. But even with such a framework, there is no guarantee of success. In addition to pushing for such a framework, the United States must bring pressure to bear on the Israeli government. Without such pressure, as even US officials and analysts concede, there will be no progress.

George Giacaman is a professor at Bir Zeit University and regularly contributes to Arab and international media. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons.org, an online newsletter.

The Palestinian leadership continues to resist ever-growing pressure to return to negotiations with Israel. And unless the international community, and especially the US, is ready to underwrite serious and substantial negotiations, embarking on a negotiations process that will likely fail could have dramatic consequences.

Last year, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the Palestinian Authority president, quickly followed the US administration in demanding a complete cessation of Israeli settlement building in occupied territory, including in East Jerusalem. The Obama administration, however, proved unable to deliver, except in a limited way. This has left Abu Mazen in a difficult position, especially given his many public pronouncements on the subject in the past several months. After all, he has a Palestinian public to worry about whose opinion, especially after the Goldstone affair, it has become more difficult to ignore.

Hence we are now witnessing an attempt to enter indirect negotiations as a way to prepare for direct talks. According to the Israeli media, Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, wants such indirect talks to last only a few weeks and merely to provide a "ladder" for Abu Mazen to climb down and begin direct negotiations. Indeed, Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, is in the Gulf partly to convince Arab states to pressure Abu Mazen to restart talks. It is therefore not impossible that such negotiations will start.

But what we are really witnessing is an attempt by Netanyahu to go back to the formula revealed by Yitzak Shamir after he lost power following the first peace talks in Madrid in 1991, when he said he would have let negotiations drag on for 20 years. The objective of the present Israeli government is similarly to flesh out any negotiations long enough to make it impossible for the US administration to put any pressure on Israel, i.e., at least until just before the next US presidential elections.

This, in the meantime, will allow Israel to continue the process of settling the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as indeed it is continuing to do even under the current so-called freeze, which is in any case temporary. Certainly there is no reason to believe that such negotiations will lead anywhere in the absence of concrete and concerted pressure on the Israeli government.

Abu Mazen and his advisors understand well that 18 years since the Madrid conference in 1991 we are not anywhere near a solution. The problem with the Oslo accords was that bilateral negotiations, meaning only between Palestinians and Israelis, were posited as the sole mechanism for progress. But this mechanism has led nowhere. It should be obvious that unless there is also direct American pressure on the Israeli government as a way to redress the imbalance of power--military, political or otherwise--between the two sides, there can be no agreement.

Continued negotiations without result, furthermore, are a high-stakes game for the PA. They will engender even further loss of credibility and it is not impossible that if such negotiations are entered into and then go nowhere, Abu Mazen will resign. Then we will likely see the beginning of a process in which the PA as a whole is undermined and will gradually disintegrate.

Should this happen I doubt there will be any more rounds of negotiations. A different formula will have to be devised, perhaps an imposed solution from the United Nations Security Council. This is a scenario Israel fears. But Israel also fears the only alternative in the event of failed negotiations, the dismantlement of the PA. The present Israeli government is not interested in re-occupying all the West Bank and assuming the burden of occupation. But once the security situation deteriorates, it will be forced to do so, and with the gradual dismantlement of the PA, Israel will also be forced to take on responsibility for governing.

The question is not whether to return to negotiations, but what are the requirements for success. Here the Palestinians have been very clear. First, there can be no return to square one. Second, there has to be a timeframe. Third, there have to be certain points of reference for the talks, such as international decisions regarding the conflict, including UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 as well as the Arab Peace Initiative.

These provide a necessary framework for negotiations, because negotiating in a vacuum, as we have seen, leads nowhere. But even with such a framework, there is no guarantee of success. In addition to pushing for such a framework, the US must bring pressure to bear on the Israeli government. Without such pressure, as even US officials and analysts concede, there will be no progress.- Published 15/2/2010 © bitterlemons.org

George Giacaman is a professor at Birzeit University and contributes on a regular basis political analysis for Arab and international media.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is no political rookie. Nor is US President Barack Obama bereft of a battery of advisers with experience on how to deal with Israel. One expects that both will try to avoid a showdown as much as possible even if for different reasons.

Netanyahu is due to visit the United States in May and the outlines of his

approach are not yet clear. But according to Israeli press reports he will offer a multi-tier set of conditions for "progress" on the political track with the Palestinians. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reported recently before the US Congress that progress is a condition equally placed by Arab governments for cooperation on the Iranian "nuclear threat," a message that was also meant for the new Israel government.

One can therefore expect Netanyahu's approach to be "yes, but." Several conditions will be placed, including linking Iran to Palestine. Progress on one front will have to precede progress on the other front. This will be the first spanner thrown in the path of political progress.

There are two other Israeli conditions one can foresee: a gradual normalization with Arab countries, thus inverting the Arab initiative that tied normalization to the resolution of the conflict; and "economic" negotiations with Palestinians

to "prepare" the ground for political progress. Progress on the political front

is therefore the last stage in a long drawn-out process that is not likely to see the light of day.

It should be obvious that such conditions will not be acceptable to Arab governments and the Palestinian Authority. But will they be acceptable to the Obama administration? The issue here obviously is not one of preference but rather one contingent upon the relative strengths of each side. Netanyahu is banking on two sources of strength: internally, the attempt to set conditions that resonate with a majority of Israelis; externally, what the pro-Israel lobby in the US can successfully advocate.

In Washington, Netanyahu's focus is obviously on the US Congress - which Newt Gingrich famously described as Israeli-occupied territory - and what Congress can do, especially the Republicans who in any case are in the opposition and have already begun attacking the Obama administration for domestic reasons even before his first 100 days were over. "Israel's security" - now an ultimate justification for policies that requires no argumentation, rationalization or discussion beyond what the Israel lobby says - is another "trump card" that Netanyahu will seek to provide a majority in Congress with.

The question then becomes to what degree the Obama administration can overcome such obstacles. This is contingent upon its ability to neutralize the pressure of the pro-Israel lobby and that of Congress and generate support in influential circles in the US for US national interests as against those of the special interests of Netanyahu's right-wing government.

It has been argued that the internal Palestinian division between Ramallah and Gaza is an impediment to a political settlement. This is actually a false argument for two reasons. First, Hamas leaders have said on more than one occasion that they will accept a two-state solution predicated on a 20 or even 30-year truce. Effectively, the Palestinian Authority's political program is no different from that of Hamas, given what a "30-year truce" means in the regional and international context. It should be obvious that a fait accompli could be established that is unlikely to be reversed.

Second, the political "weakness" of the Palestinian Authority is the result of a lack of accomplishments in progress toward the two-state solution. The Palestinian Authority's strength vis-ˆ-vis Hamas, and the balance of power between the two, hinges on such accomplishments. If the Palestinian Authority succeeds in its endeavor and reaches an agreement that establishes a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza along lines accepted by a majority of Palestinians, it will regain the upper hand over Hamas and can put such an agreement to a plebiscite. With Arab and international support for such an agreement, Palestinians will most likely be supportive.

The problem is that the Palestinian Authority has not been an effective political actor so far. Nor have Arab governments. Therefore, we have to watch the drama that is beginning to unfold in the test of wills between the new Israeli Cabinet and the Obama administration. All bets are open.