Abir Dandis, the mother of the two girls who were murdered in the Negev town of Al-Fura’a last week, couldn't find a police officer to listen to her warnings, neither in Arad nor in Ma’ale Adumim. Both police stations operate in areas where Israel wants to gather the Bedouin into permanent communities, against their will, in order to clear more land for Jewish communities. The dismissive treatment Dandis received shows how the Bedouin are considered simply to be lawbreakers by their very nature. But as a resident of the West Bank asking for help for her daughters, whose father was Israeli, Dandis faced the legal-bureaucratic maze created by the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinian police is not allowed to arrest Israeli civilians. It must hand suspects over to the Israel Police. The Palestinian police complain that in cases of Israelis suspected of committing crimes against Palestinian residents, the Israel Police tend not to investigate or prosecute them.

In addition, the town of Al-Azaria, where Dandis lives, is in Area B, under Palestinian civilian authority and Israeli security authority. According to the testimony of Palestinian residents, neither the IDF nor the Israel Police has any interest in internal Palestinian crime even though they have both the authority and the obligation to act in Area B.

The Palestinian police are limited in what it can do in Area B. Bringing in reinforcements or carrying weapons in emergency situations requires coordination with, and obtaining permission from, the IDF. If Dandis fears that the man who murdered her daughters is going to attack her as well, she has plenty of reason to fear that she will not receive appropriate, immediate police protection from either the Israelis or the Palestinians.

Dandis told Jack Khoury of Haaretz that the Ma’ale Adumim police referred her to the Palestinian Civil Affairs Coordination and Liaison Committee. Theoretically, this committee (which is subordinate to the Civil Affairs Ministry) is the logical place to go for such matters. Its parallel agency in Israel is the Civilian Liaison Committee (which is part of the Coordination and Liaison Administration - a part of the Civil Administration under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories).

In their meetings, they are supposed to discuss matters such as settlers’ complaints about the high volume of the loudspeakers at mosques or Palestinians’ complaints about attacks by settlers. But the Palestinians see the Liaison Committee as a place to submit requests for permission to travel to Israel, and get the impression that its clerks do not have much power when faced with their Israeli counterparts. In any case, the coordination process is cumbersome and long.

The Palestinian police has a family welfare unit, and activists in Palestinian women’s organizations say that in recent years, its performance has improved. But, as stated, it has no authority over Israeli civilians and residents. Several non-governmental women’s groups also operate in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and women in similar situations approach them for help. The manager of one such organization told Haaretz that Dandis also fell victim to this confusing duplication of procedures and laws. Had Dandis approached her, she said, she would have referred her to Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, which has expertise in navigating Israel’s laws and authorities.

John Kerry revealed his long-awaited plan for peace in the Middle East on Sunday, hinging on a $4bn (£2.6bn) investment in the Palestinian private sector.

The US secretary of state, speaking at the World Economic Forum on the Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea, told an audience including Israeli president Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that an independent Palestinian economy is essential to achieving a sustainable peace.

Speaking under the conference banner "Breaking the Impasse", Kerry announced a plan that he promised would be "bigger, bolder and more ambitious" than anything since the Oslo accords, more than 20 years ago.

Tony Blair is to lead a group of private sector leaders in devising a plan to release the Palestinian economy from its dependence on international donors. The initial findings of Blair's taskforce, Kerry boasted, were "stunning", predicting a 50% increase in Palestinian GDP over three years, a cut of two-thirds in unemployment rates and almost double the Palestinian median wage. Currently, 40% of the Palestinian economy is supplied by donor aid.

Kerry assured Abbas that the economic plan was not a substitute for a political solution, which remains the US's "top priority".

Peres, who had taken the stage just minutes before, also issued a personal plea to his Palestinian counterpart to return to the negotiations.

"Let me say to my dear friend President Abbas," Peres said, "Should we really dance around the table? Lets sit together. You'll be surprised how much can be achieved in open, direct and organised meetings."

Thick locks hug the front gates of shuttered shops, now covered in graffiti and dust from lack of use. Only a handful of customers pass along the dimly lit road, sometimes stopping to check the ripeness of fruits and vegetables, or ordering meat in near-empty butcher shops.

“All the shops are closed. I’m the only one open. This used to be the best place,” said 64-year-old Mustafa Sunocret, selling vegetables out of a small storefront in the marketplace near his family’s home in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City.

Amidst the brightly coloured scarves, clothes and carpets, ceramic pottery and religious souvenirs filling the shops of Jerusalem’s historic Old City, Palestinian merchants are struggling to keep their businesses alive.

Faced with worsening health problems, Sunocret told IPS that he cannot work outside of the Old City, even as the cost of maintaining his shop, with high electricity, water and municipal tax bills to pay, weighs on him.

“I only have this shop,” he said. “There is no other work. I’m tired.”

Abed Ajloni, the owner of an antiques shop in the Old City, owes the Jerusalem municipality 250,000 Israeli shekels (68,300 U.S. dollars) in taxes. He told IPS that almost every day, the city’s tax collectors come into the Old City, accompanied by Israeli police and soldiers, to pressure people there to pay.

“It feels like they’re coming again to occupy the city, with the soldiers and police,” Ajloni, who has owned the same shop for 35 years, told IPS. “But where can I go? What can I do? All my life I was in this place.”

He added, “Does Jerusalem belong to us, or to someone else? Who’s responsible for Jerusalem? Who?”

Illegal annexation

Israel occupied East Jerusalem, including the Old City, in 1967. In July 1980, it passed a law stating that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. But Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and subsequent application of Israeli laws over the entire city remain unrecognised by the international community.

Under international law, East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory – along with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Syrian Golan Heights – and Palestinian residents of the city are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Jerusalem has historically been the economic, political and cultural centre of life for the entire Palestinian population. But after decades languishing under destructive Israeli policies meant to isolate the city from the rest of the Occupied Territories and a lack of municipal services and investment, East Jerusalem has slipped into a state of poverty and neglect.

“After some 45 years of occupation, Arab Jerusalemites suffer from political and cultural schizophrenia, simultaneously connected with and isolated from their two hinterlands: Ramallah and the West Bank to their east, West Jerusalem and Israel to the west,” the International Crisis Group recently wrote.

Israeli restrictions on planning and building, home demolitions, lack of investment in education and jobs, construction of an eight-foot-high separation barrier between and around Palestinian neighbourhoods and the creation of a permit system to enter Jerusalem have all contributed to the city’s isolation.

Formal Palestinian political groups have also been banned from the city, and between 2001-2009, Israel closed an estimated 26 organisations, including the former Palestinian Liberation Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem, the Orient House and the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce.

Extreme poverty

Israel’s policies have also led to higher prices for basic goods and services and forced many Palestinian business owners to close shop and move to Ramallah or other Palestinian neighbourhoods on the other side of the wall. Many Palestinian Jerusalemites also prefer to do their shopping in the West Bank, or in West Jerusalem, where prices are lower.

While Palestinians constitute 39 percent of the city’s population today, almost 80 percent of East Jerusalem residents, including 85 percent of children, live below the poverty line.

“How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t control your resources? How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t have any control of your borders?” said Zakaria Odeh, director of the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, of “this kind of fragmentation, checkpoints, closure”.

“Without freedom of movement of goods and human beings, how could you develop an economy?” he asked.

“You can’t talk about independent economy in Jerusalem or the West Bank or in all of Palestine without a political solution. We don’t have a Palestinian economy; we have economic activities. That’s all we have,” Odeh told IPS.

Israel’s separation barrier alone, according to a new report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), has caused a direct loss of over one billion dollars to Palestinians in Jerusalem, and continues to incur 200 million dollars per year in lost opportunities.

Israel’s severing and control over the Jerusalem-Jericho road – the historical trade route that connected Jerusalem to the rest of the West Bank and Middle East – has also contributed to the city’s economic downturn.

Separation of Jerusalem from West Bank

Before the First Intifada (Arabic for “uprising”) began in the late 1980s, East Jerusalem contributed approximately 14 to 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). By 2000, that number had dropped to less than eight percent; in 2010, the East Jerusalem economy, compared to the rest of the OPT, was estimated at only seven percent.

“Economic separation resulted in the contraction in the relative size of the East Jerusalem economy, its detachment from the remaining OPT and the gradual redirection of East Jerusalem employment towards the Israeli labour market,” the U.N. report found.

Decades ago, Israel adopted a policy to maintain a so-called “demographic balance” in Jerusalem and attempt to limit Palestinian residents of the city to 26.5 percent or less of the total population.

To maintain this composition, Israel built numerous Jewish-Israeli settlements inside and in a ring around Jerusalem and changed the municipal boundaries to encompass Jewish neighbourhoods while excluding Palestinian ones.

It is now estimated that 90,000 Palestinians holding Jerusalem residency rights live on the other side of the separation barrier and must cross through Israeli checkpoints in order to reach Jerusalem for school, medical treatment, work, and other services.

“Israel is using all kinds of tools to push the Palestinians to leave; sometimes they are visible, and sometimes invisible tools,” explained Ziad al-Hammouri, director of the Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER).

Al-Hammouri told IPS that at least 25 percent of the 1,000 Palestinian shops in the Old City were closed in recent years as a result of high municipal taxes and a lack of customers. “Taxation is an invisible tool…as dangerous as revoking ID cards and demolishing houses,” he said. “Israel will use this as pressure and as a tool in the future to confiscate these shops and properties.”

This picture is one of many murals found painted on a wall near the Beit Romano settlement in the Jewish H2 area of Hebron. The fresco is an integral part of a larger group that colorfully illustrates the history and prospective future of the Jewish people from the perspective of the 600-strong settler inhabitants in the ancient city, situated in the West Bank, and is the supposed resting place of Abraham – the father of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

This particular decoration depicts a point in time when the third temple has been built and the people are overjoyed with peace and prosperity which has subsequently led to the manifestation of the Messiah. However, the most intriguing aspect of this prophetic visual display of art is the large character at the top, proudly waving what seems to be an Israeli flag but which is in fact the orange flag representing the settler element of Jewish society, a demographic of religious Zionists intent on reclaiming their biblical lands, increasingly frustrated with the secular Israeli government and any subtle insinuation that the West Bank settlements [Judea and Samaria] may be evacuated for the sake of a lasting peace with Palestinians. Instead, the crown in the middle of the Star of David on the flag signifies the Kingdom of Judea and its restoration.

The definition of the secularist, ultra orthodox and religious Zionist sects and their place within the State of Israel’s framework has consistently been a topic of discussion as well as confusion since David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the existence of the state in 1948. Jews in Israel differ on the degree of severity inherent in their coexistence with many asserting that it is a conflict potentially more damaging than the Palestinian question and an internal confrontation between such contrasting beliefs that if addressed or exposed, could have dire ramifications for Jewish survival in the land of Israel. Others choose to view the situation in a blasé manner, discarding the theory that it is of supreme importance and an apocalyptical issue which threatens the future of Israel. In their opinion, it is a rather inconsequential obstacle, overemphasized and one that would be suppressed taking into consideration that if it were to transpire, Judaism would triumph as the unifying tool and prevent a substantial battle from ensuing.

Initially, the Zionist dream advocated by Theodor Herzl in the latter stages of the nineteenth century, was founded upon an ideology inspired by Marxist socialism where Jews would be able to cultivate land, live in a community exclusively for themselves and escape from persecution. This paradigm did not demand strict adherence to Judaism but Judaism was more a component or common denominator shared by its participants.

When the dream turned into a reality and Israel declared independence in 1948, the task of incorporating the religious element of Judaism [already established in the Holy Land] with the new Zionist-based and secularist ideology was to become a vital factor in constructing a quintessential Israeli identity.

This integration at the embryonic stages of the State of Israel attracted a mixed reaction from the ultra orthodox [haredim] element of Jewish society. Naturally, it became a question of belief and interpretation. Many thought that their arrival was in complete violation and contradiction of God’s word, attempting to reinvent themselves in their land prematurely without God’s consent quoting Psalmist 127:1 which stipulated clearly that “if the lord will not build the house, they labor in vain that build it”. This group of religious devotees scorned migration, secularism and chose a simple life of pious servitude purely to the holy sites housed in historic Palestine.

Alternatively, another branch of the haredim led by Rabbi Abraham Kook grew to view the secularist arrival as a religious right of passage where God was perceived as acting through secular Jews as an interim step to salvation and to an enlightened period which would return the secular Zionists to customary Jewish tradition. Therefore, this group embraced Zionism and sent their children to public schools and to partake in military conscription while ultra orthodox Jews continued to attend the yeshivas and dedicate themselves to religious scripture.

Then when Israel defeated the Arabs in 1967 and subsequently occupied the West Bank, this offered the followers of the latter school evidence that their hypothesis and predications had in fact been accurate – the Zionist migration was an act of divine intervention which would result in enlightenment, salvation but most importantly legitimized the repossession of Judea and Samaria. This group eventuality gathered under the banner of the political Gush Emunim movement.

Whereas David Ben-Gurion and his Labor [Alignment] successors had appeased the haredim with extraordinary positions of influence, it was not long before the Labor policy of achieving maximum land for the Jews with minimal Arab presence could not include Judea and Samaria with the Palestinians still inhabiting the area. With the formation of the Likud party in 1973, the religious Zionists had found their representatives in government. Although not entirely religious, Likud were simply adamant on securing as much land as possible.

With Labor resuming power in the mid eighties and early nineties, another split amongst the religious Zionists occurred. A section of them [Meimad] chose to align with Labor rather than associate with the increasingly assertive Gush Emunim. This break away, combined with Labor’s rejuvenated status, led the Gush Emunim to gradually become more isolated from the political spot light and created a gulf which separated the religious Zionists – the Meimad on one side and the Gush Emunim on the other.

While many rabbis spoke for the cause of coexistence with secularism, the more Gush Emunim became intransigent and discontent with the direction of the secular government, the more they became susceptible to extremist ideology, progressively employing Rabbi Meir Kahane’s philosophy which called for Arabs to be extinguished for the Jewish agenda to succeed while attacking democracy for its audacity to ultimately make decisions that should be reserved for God.

From a poll conducted in 2008 by the Israel Democracy Institute, one may be tempted to conclude that the internal mêlée is somewhat unsubstantiated and dramatically embellished. The Democracy Index reported that 51% of the Jewish Israeli population is secular while only 19% is religious or ultra orthodox. These results are reinforced by the Central Bureau of Statistics [CBS] who record that 44% of Jewish Israelis are secular whereas only 17% are religious or ultra orthodox. There are more Arabs in Israel than religious or ultra orthodox Jews in total.

However, it is not the size of the demographic that secularists are worried about, more the influence such a small religious proportion of the population wield and the power they are able to exert to ensure their requirements are respected and their opinions protected. This fear is especially evident now with the split of Ariel Sharon from Likud, the establishment of the centralist Kadima party and the resumption of peace talks with the Palestinians. The three areas of concern for secularists are accentuated by the vehement protection and influence of the religious element, their effect on the labor market and their participation in the military.

As documented by Jonathan Cook in “Blood and Religion: The unmasking of the Jewish and Democratic State”, the religious community in Israel are the sole regulatory and authoritative body for their members with regard to births, deaths and marriages. Therefore, if one wishes to be registered as a Jew in the Jewish state of Israel, they must receive the blessing of the religious sect who essentially hold the keys to one's credibility in Israel. In addition, offices, banks, institutions and public transport all close for the Jewish Sabbath; restaurants, factories and public institutions must follow the hygiene practices of Jews; only Jewish holy sites are recognized protected by law; almost the entire budget of the Religious Affairs Ministry is reserved for Jewish places of worship and the Jewish yeshivas receive resources far exceeding those of state run schools. Furthermore, for such a small percentage of the population, the religious groups are supported staunchly by influential political parties such as Likud and Shas who are continuously growing in popularity.

Secondly is their negative effect on the labor market. A report in the Economist mentioned that while only 56% of the country is employed, only 40% of the ultra orthodox groups are in the labor force while representing one of the most rapidly increasing demographics. As Israel currently boasts 3% economic growth with a thriving IT and weapons industry as well as having the most companies listed on NASDAQ stock exchange after America and Canada, a rise in religious Jews may prove immensely detrimental to the Israeli economy. With this said the richest man in Israel, Lev Leviev, is a religious Zionist.

Lastly, there is the worry amongst the secularists about the escalating number of religious Zionists conscripting to the Israeli army. Normally, ultra orthodox Jews are exempt from military service [already a contentious topic amongst secular Israelis] but maybe in response to the internal conflict and their reluctance to compromise, Rabbi Dan Be’er admits that religious Zionists “instead of moving towards Israel’s middle ground, the religious camp might try to bring the middle ground towards the settlers”. 50% of the platoon commander’s course, 40% of the officers and 30% of the company commanders are currently yarmulke donning religious Zionists.

Will a confrontation materialize? One of the problems in answering this question is the lack of a constitution to set the boundaries and limits. This is understandably a highly complex document to construct taking into account the lack of clarity over the Jewish identity in Israel. With this said, statistics show that the religious side of Israel is growing at a significant rate – but enough to threaten secular interests? When a small percentage of the population enjoys the levels of influence and power that the ultra orthodox or religious Zionists do, this is also difficult to decipher. All that can be said is the violent action expressed verbally against Prime Minister Sharon and physically on Israeli soldiers, not to mention their lack of punishment following the 2005 disengagement from Gaza, is a snippet into what they are capable of.

Although not extensively publicized or prevalent in media discourse, the internal battle between secularism and religion as the dominant or superseding feature of Israeli identity is still apparent and risks the perpetual vision of the Israeli state.

While Ha’aretz writer Tom Segev views the dichotomy as one which matches the ideologues of the State of Israel and a Jewish State against those defending the Land of Israel and the Jewish God, Professor Samuel C. Heilman goes further by comprehensively implying that the situation is more serious and could exacerbate to a showdown where the outcome will be either one or the other. The Professor of Jewish Studies and Sociology at the City of New York University poses the question, “will those who consider the unity of Jewish people the primary value prevail or will these who see sovereignty over the entire biblical land of Israel as the highest value carry the day”?

Egypt’s Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman was made to wait two weeks to present his brokered peace proposal which bound Hamas with the other 12 politically-affiliated resistance groups operating in Gaza to an initiative for a “comprehensive and reciprocal period of calm to be applied progressively, first in Gaza and then in the West Bank”. Despite the escalation in violence and the initial perception of the agreement as “not serious”, Israel extended an invitation to the Egyptian mediator to present the proposal, but only after Israel had finished celebrating the 60th anniversary of their independence.

Finally, Omar Suleiman arrived in Jerusalem to discuss the potential for a “period of calm” [tahdi’a] on May 12. As Egypt’s intelligence chief had been eclipsed by the commemoration of Israel’s independence previously, this time his meeting with Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak occurred just two days before the arrival of President G.W. Bush. The incumbent US President “will come not as somebody who demands but somebody who encourages”. Instead, the president of the world’s sole superpower will be fully focused on marking 60 years of Israeli freedom and democracy.

How can one possibly precede or open for the most powerful man in the world, especially when all those involved are preoccupied with his imminent arrival? Testament to this observation is the remarkable speed with which Suleiman was received, given a response and dismissed. Having spent weeks of deliberating with Hamas and other military wings to secure a ceasefire, Israel simply dignified their mediating efforts with a brief and almost indifferent counter offer. In all honesty, with the amount of time allocated to Suleiman on his visit to Israel, he would have had a better chance of emailing the report to Olmert and Barak as an attachment on the morning of May 8 while the ministers took care of their daily tasks rather excitedly and not necessarily diligently before rushing off to celebrate.

Nevertheless, Omar Suleiman received Israel’s opinions on the tahdi’a and succeeded in acquiring a list of prerequisites, taking the form of a phase approach, to offer Hamas on May 13.

In the first phase, Israel approved of a gradual lull in violence in Gaza which would apply to both sides and would involve a cessation of armed attacks. Meanwhile, Israel would continue to maintain operations in the West Bank. If this is achieved, Israel would then allow more food into Gaza and open the Rafah crossing into Egypt, only with the consent of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Lastly, Israel stipulated that once these conditions have been met, Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier kidnapped on 23 June 2006, would have to be released as an interim step towards allowing 450 Palestinian prisoners to be freed. Concerning the last phase, state officials in Jerusalem announced that they “hope this release will be part of the unwritten truce between the two sides”.

The same statement also viewed the chances of success with a degree of pessimism with state officials asserting that “based on our previous experience with Hamas I wouldn’t say we’re overly optimistic, but at the moment this is a viable scenario”.

Conversely, the Gaza groups constructed a three point plan. Firstly, a “tahdi’a” would be recognized on both sides with a halt to violence; second, Israel would end the blockade with the Rafah crossing opened for Palestinians to replenish supplies and lastly, the ceasefire would start in Gaza and be extended to the West Bank within six months. If this offer was ignored Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar declared that “it will be our right to defend our people in all legitimate ways”. Furthermore, in immediate reply to Israel’s condition that Gilad Shalit be released, former Foreign Minister Zahar reiterated that “the issue of prisoner exchange is completely separate from the period of calm”.

Of course, nothing that “terrorist” groups concocted would ever have been accepted on the basis of its first draft, with Israel being the dominant force in the melee, but why has Israel altered the proposal so it includes stipulations that are almost completely in contrast to the main crux of Palestinian grievances? There are two explanations and incentives behind Israel’s response to Omar Suleiman. It could be a genuine list of conditions which address Israeli concerns and insecurities regarding a viable ceasefire. Alternatively, this is a rapidly but intentionally devised ploy which produces a document that ignores the Palestinian components and replaces them with almost unacceptable conditions while choreographed in such a way that absolves them from blame if it is rejected. This would invariably excuse Israel from involvement in a ceasefire, prove Hamas as untrustworthy while portraying Israel as morally superior and mature to the international community with respect to securing a ceasefire.

Applying the first scenario, Israel has refrained from a significant reprisal in Gaza for the deaths of Jimmy Kdoshim [48] on May 9 and Shuli Katz [70] on May 12, killed by rocket attacks on Israel with Hamas and Islamic Jihad taking responsibility respectively. Although Israel has killed eight Palestinians since the incidents, this number is far lower than the 120 killed during Operation “Hot Winter” in Gaza, following the previous rocket victim, Roni Yechiah, in February 2008. On this occasion, Israel is ostensibly demonstrating to the world its self- control, implying that they are willing to pursue a ceasefire agreement but have certain reservations, such as fearing that Hamas does not possess the authority to curb rocket attacks from other resistance groups. After all, Israel did meet with Omar Suleiman to discuss arrangements and their insistence that President Abbas consents to the opening of Rafah crossing may be to monitor any smuggling of arms that might be going on. Likewise, Israel’s adamant claim to continue operations in the West Bank could be to ensure a steady climate is not compromised and the release of Gilad Shalit should occur as a token of good faith or so that signs of serious advancements can quintessentially be realized for peace to ensue. These all may be part of Israel’s blueprint to reach a successful and sustainable ceasefire. From Olmert’s perspective and in support of this notion, the prime minister has already lost the confidence of his people due to the police probe into the funding of his campaigns for Jerusalem mayor. Maybe Olmert, having nothing to lose, is attempting to establish a positive legacy and forge an agreement?

Then there is the strategic purpose of creating conditions that contradict their projected message. The lack of a massive retaliation in Gaza for the deaths of two Israeli citizens was more due to Bush’s arrival masquerading as observance and contemplation of a ceasefire accord. Israel could not afford to launch an offensive in Gaza on the eve of the US President’s arrival in Israel to celebrate their independence. If Israel strikes, it will probably do so after the president leaves as they did in January when Israel killed 36 Palestinians directly after the President had departed. The recent rocket attacks on Israel are no factor in deciphering whether Hamas can control them in the event of a ceasefire, dispelling possible Israeli insecurities, as they were fired before Omar Suleiman visited Jerusalem. Hamas spokesperson Abu Obeida did confirm that “we will continue to fire until the last moment before a truce is completed”.

Gaza is presently low on the Israeli agenda while the public believes the domestic issues over the prime minister’s most recent scandal and his subsequent self-professed unpopularity are more pressing and in need of attention. In answer to Olmert’s priorities as a deteriorating prime minister, a poll conducted by Yediot Aharonot reported that 59% of the Israeli public thinks that Olmert should step down with only 10% confident that he is best suited to serve as prime minister. If Olmert was so intent on promoting the ceasefire, why has he only offered to travel to Egypt in the next few weeks to address the issue when President Bush will gather in Sharm el Sheikh next week with his Egyptian and Palestinian counterparts?

A senior Israeli official admitted that “Israel must not come across in the international community as a naysayer regarding the truce in Gaza”. This is completely accurate. Therefore how is this situation, conveyed with such frustration and disdain, remedied? Israel purposefully adopts a policy of including mandatory conditions that Hamas will never and can never accept. Stationing PA monitors at the Rafah crossing with the current stagnant relationship between the PA and Hamas is a highly contentious subject that would take a long time to resolve, especially considering that Israel will not allow the PA to talk to Hamas independently. Furthermore, Hamas and the other groups cannot idly stand by in accordance with an Israeli initiative while Palestinians continue to be killed in the West Bank. Similarly, demanding that Gilad Shalit be released as an interim stage to Palestinian prisoners being freed [not an original clause] is simply unrealistic as the young Israeli captive is a highly lucrative bargaining chip and allows Hamas to have influence, albeit limited, in this back and forth mediation.

This ambiguous mixture of actions and message from Israel adds to the general confusion surrounding the prospects of a ceasefire. Israel portrays itself in one direction to satisfy its foreign and domestic obligations, but hidden in these gestures and supposed developments are examples of deception whereby their agenda remains as consistent and stringent as ever.

While Israel receives international recognition from world leaders over their 60th anniversary, Omar Suleiman, who was openly upset with Israel’s response, will reluctantly deliver Israel’s official response to Hamas in Gaza. While the public may sense an air of progression concerning the prospects for a ceasefire, this possibility will be tested when Israel concludes its celebrations and reverts back to daily business.

On May 8, Israel will celebrate its 60th anniversary as an independent state [in accordance with the Jewish calendar]. Crowds of Israelis will flood the streets and congregate in public squares, reveling in the collective achievement of their determined people. Fireworks will decorate the night sky accompanied by elaborate aerial displays; light shows will beam over the land; concert music will echo from all corners of the state and attest to the talent allowed to surface since their declaration of freedom; military bases demonstrating the sheer magnitude and technological prowess of Israel’s arsenal will be open to the public so that the tools which established, consolidated and maintained Israeli dominance can be lauded over. The bill for the commemoration will be approximately $28 million.

Meanwhile, the 5.25 million Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza will be unable to escape the reverberating sounds of joy bellowing from the land which once belonged to them. Instead, for every Jewish Israeli currently residing in Israel [approximately 5.5 million] and partaking in the celebrations, there is one Palestinian living as a refugee, displaced from their original homes in historic Palestine.

An example of this fact being omitted from the Israeli mindset is the Jewish Agency for Israel website, which has posted a national anthem slide show delving into its composition, symbolism and providing easy methods of learning the melody so that it can be sung on May 8 by all Jewish Israelis. The poem, written by a Jewish secular poet called Naftali Herz Imber, was originally entitled Tikvateinu [“our hope”] when it was composed in 1878 but was transformed to “Hatikvah” [the hope] as it became more popular amongst the people. The piece was written at a time when the idea of Eretz Yisra’el [a land for Israel] was exactly as the song implies, a hope – a seemingly unattainable and distant one at that. Eventually in 2004, the song was adopted by the Knesset as the Israeli national anthem.

“As long as deep in the heart the soul of a Jew yearns, And towards the East an eye looks to Zion, Our hope is not yet lost, the hope of two thousand years. To be a free people in our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem.”

Although “Hatikvah” had been endorsed by some distinguished international figures during the latter stages of the nineteenth century, the dream gradually became a reality. Following the first Zionist Congress in 1897, which worked “to create for the Jewish people a home in Eretz Israel secured by law”, the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish National Fund were initiated. The former consisted of regular gatherings of influential Jews who strived to establish the institutions by which a land for the Jews could be made more feasible. Meanwhile, the latter sought to acquire Arab land in Palestine which would become “the inalienable property of the Jewish people” and where only Jewish labor could be employed.

With these specific organizations already operational by the start of the First World War, the Zionist cause came even closer to its ultimate goal when British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour stated in a letter to Lord Rothschild in 1917 that his government would “view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people”. The British government had borrowed a lot of money from Jewish banks such as Rothschild’s during the campaign and were greatly indebted to the influential bank owner who was also a leader of the British Jewish community.

Therefore, when the League of Nations designated Britain the Mandate over Palestine in 1923 after their victory in the First World War and the subsequent breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the Jews already had the leverage with which to wield influence. In 1923, Palestinians made up 90% of the British Mandate and owned 97% of the land. Under the British Mandate, Jewish businessmen managed to strengthen their foothold in the Mandate by assuming important positions within the Palestine Electric Company, the development of minerals in the Dead Sea and the Palestine Land Development Company.

Following the Second World War, the holocaust and the termination of the British Mandate, UNCSOP passed Resolution 181 in November 1947 which called for a partition of the British Mandate into two bilateral states – Israel and Palestine. Even with a quarter of a decade of immigration and colonization, Jews still only comprised 30% of the population and owned just 7% of the land. Despite these facts, the state of Israel would be granted 55% of the former British Mandate. A war ensued firstly between Palestinians and Jews, then later between Arabs and Israelis after Israel had claimed independence on May 14, 1948.

The Arabs were defeated and by the time the armistice lines were drawn in July 1949, Israel had extended its territory to 78% of historic Palestine. 800,000 Palestinians were forced from their homes, 530 villages were destroyed and 86% of the Palestinians who now fell within the 1949 armistice lines were displaced. Of the 14% that remained, 70% of their land was confiscated or made inaccessible to them.

According to UNRWA estimates, there are presently 5.5 million refugees spread across 58 camps in the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

These have been replaced by some 5.5 million Jews living in Israel flourishing in freedom, prosperity and international acceptance in what can only be described as obstinate blindness and pure disregard for the brutality they employed and still adopt today in order to sustain their existence. They maintain that their actions are justified after being subject to worldwide contempt, suffering years of persecution and anti-Semitism. It is as if their unwavering resolve to achieve their goal supersedes Palestinian claims and relegates them to the unfortunate byproduct or obstacle standing in the way of their destiny.

Now formed and thriving, it appears that Israel will not succumb to any pressure that threatens their future. Subsequently, Israel has ignored UN General Assembly Resolution 194 and UN Security Council Resolution 237, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [8 & 13], the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Law of Nations [5 & 14], Criminal Law under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [8 & 75] and the UN Guiding Principles on Right to a Remedy and Reparation under the Law of State Responsibility.

Palestinians have not forgotten. They were promised under the Anglo French Declaration of 1918 “the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks” and were, according to the Treaty of Sevres 1920, to “be provisionally recognized as an independent state” and receive advice from the Mandate until they could stand alone. Furthermore, their cause is supported by all legal documentation released on the subject. All they ask is to be able to return to their own land, a plea already secured by law unlike the Jewish appeal of the late nineteenth century.

On May 15, 21,915 black balloons [one for every day since the expulsion] will be released by Palestinians to mark the remembrance of al-Nakba [the displacement of the 800,000] in full view of leading political figures such as US President G.W. Bush, his French counterpart Nicholas Sarkozy and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair who are in Israel to commemorate the event. What does 60 years mark for Palestinians? There are millions of refugees, Palestinians in the West Bank who are restricted from 38% of their land with roads exclusively for Israelis, a Separation Wall, a quarter of a million illegal Israeli settlers, 560 checkpoints and Jerusalem is annexed. The Palestinians hold 13.6% of the 22% allocated by the 1949 armistice lines and are in partial/full control of only 6.6% of the 22%. In Gaza, 1.5 million Palestinians are suffering from an Israeli blockade that threatens the lives of the whole population.

Reverting back to the words of “Hatikvah”, it seems Israel has all it ever desired while Palestinians have less than they have ever had. Applying the notion that as the holiest place in Judaism, Jerusalem is the “land of Zion” referred to in “Hatikvah”, [although this would be contested amongst certain branches of Judaism] Israel unilaterally annexed Jerusalem in 1967 and now has indisputable control over the city. Thus the quest has been reached, the goal achieved, the service completed and destiny fulfilled.

The Jews have triumphed in creating what they proposed by their own parameters. This realization may compel them to cast their eyes on the West Bank and Gaza during “Hatikvah” on May 8 and reflect on what their relentless ambition reduced them to – the complete brutality, indifference, inhumane treatment and disregard for the Palestinians – an innocent demographic tormented and punished simply for residing in the land coveted by Jews. The question remains, has the democracy and affluence brought by Israeli self-determination managed to dispose of their primitive behavior or does Israel’s collective conscience continue to be clouded?

This year will also mark the 60th anniversary of Judah Magnes, a leader in Jewish communal affairs, born at the same time as the composition of “Hatikvah”. The founder and president of the Hebrew University believed that Jews in both the Diaspora and Eretz Israel were of equal importance and aliyah was simply a matter of circumstance and choice. As a firm advocator of Jewish/Arab cooperation and an avid supporter of a binational state in which equal rights became the governing principle, Judah Magnes desperately attempted to halt the partition before his death, predicting that it would just lead to further bloodshed.

In 2008, it is time for a new “Hatikvah” to be recognized. In order for Israel to truly reap the benefits of their labor and if Israel is “ready to pay the price for the day of peace” as Israeli President Shimon Peres announced during Yom Hazikaron, they must accept that there is a people who were unlawfully and wrongly expelled for the Jewish dream to be fulfilled and thus rectify this accordingly by seriously constructing an agreement. After all, the position the Palestinians find themselves in now is not too dissimilar to the Jewish plight of the late nineteenth century, but the balance of power is still overwhelmingly in Israel’s favor. Palestinians have a right to the land, deserve this right and should be extended this right.

There is normally a time lag between the conception of an idea and its implementation. In the case of “Hatikvah”, it took 70 years for the dream to materialize. Sixty years have passed since Judah Magnes died with the dream of Israeli/Arab cooperation. Let’s hope for everyone’s sake that the implementation of his idea is close at hand.

“We feel great remorse for every single citizen that is hurt, but we are also saddened by the fact that Israeli citizens have been getting injured for years. We feel remorse when a boy from Sderot must have his leg amputated. We feel remorse that Israeli citizens have had to live under a ceaseless terrorist threat from numerous groups, a threat that has disrupted their lives”.

These seemingly emotion evoking words from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert came in response to the news that Miyasar Abu Muatak [40] and her children Rudeynah [6], Salah [4], Hanaa [3] and Musad [18 months] were killed as they sat down for breakfast in the northern town of Beit Hanoun on April 28.

The fact that the investigation launched by Israeli southern commander Major General Yoav Galant absolved Israel from responsibility in the incident is irrelevant. Israel conducted the attack and should be held accountable for the results and denied the luxury of shifting blame. What is abundantly clear is that the number of innocent victims, who have perished in this ongoing Palestinian/Israel confrontation, displayed at funeral processions and resided to the increasingly inundated hollow grounds of Gaza cemeteries are becoming disturbingly more frequent.

Prime Minister Olmert’s sentiments on the events in Gaza did not seem particularly genuine but merely expressed the expedients involved in extinguishing the greater evil. Olmert implied that he had been unwillingly forced into this position and offered no possible alternative, “I hope that the brutal fight of the terrorist organizations against Israel will end. But so long as their fight continues, we will be forced to fight them”. All Olmert could achieve was to highlight the complex predicament he faces while managing to maintain a moral superiority disregarded and unrecognized by his adversaries in Gaza who thrust its people into an “inseparable part of the war”.

The paradox is that Prime Minister Olmert does have another option. The prime minister is not being compelled to act this way, but rather chooses it as the best strategy available when compared to the alternative.

Last week, Hamas leader and hardliner Mahmoud Zahar, after discussing terms with Egypt’s Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, publicly offered a six month ceasefire with Israel in exchange for a lifting of the blockade on the coastal strip, opening the Rafah crossing and over time extending the agreement to the West Bank. In response, Israel dismissed the proposal as “not serious” and while the seriousness of the offer is open to debate, there are valid reasons why Israel would have reservations about signing an agreement with the group that US Secretary of State has designated “Iran’s proxy warriors”.

First, there is the nature of the proposal and Hamas’ repeated refusal to recognize Israel. The six month ceasefire is more akin to a tah’dia [period of calm] than a long term hudna [truce] but what does Israel expect? The basis of Hamas’ support revolves on their 1988 Charter which stipulates their dedication to resist occupation. By adopting a subservient gesture of a long term truce while atrocities continue in Gaza would call to question Hamas’ credibility as an “Islamic Resistance Movement”. In addition, Israel is insistent that Hamas recognize Israel as a precondition to dialogue and accept previous accords between Palestinians and Israelis. Recognition should not be a fundamental prerequisite for an agreement – an agreement implies recognition. Also, how can Israel expect Hamas to abide by previous agreements when the group was not privy to these meetings as they are not represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization?

Secondly, Israel claims that Hamas will simply use the six months to rearm and revitalize its forces. Whereas this is true, this argument essentially insinuates that Israel will never be content with any Hamas offer using the group’s rearmament as an excuse for their indifference.

Israel also maintains, rightly, that a deal with Hamas would weaken President Abbas in the West Bank. If the blockade was to end and Rafah was open, it would be a monumental victory for Hamas and their takeover at the expense of the PA President, who has been reduced to a spectator with respect to events in Gaza. Conversely, if the president was to instigate renewed dialogue with Hamas following a ceasefire with Israel, he could claim acknowledgment for his efforts. This is probably why the president has endorsed the move and even offered to mediate talks between Hamas and Israel, underlining his belief that “[Israeli] aggression does not serve the efforts being exerted to bring about a period of calm and hinder the peace process”.

Lastly, there is the ubiquitous issue of rockets. Hamas’ al-Qassam Brigades are not the only military wing launching rockets into Gaza. Quoting various spokespersons from different politically affiliated groups in Gaza, a recent International Crisis Group [ICG] report documented that some groups fire rockets into Gaza to undermine Hamas authority and oppose their new position which replaces resistance with political legitimacy. How can Israel be sure that Hamas could prevent other groups from firing rockets?

The subject of rocket fire from Gaza is the most intriguing aspect of the political impasse, taking into consideration the meeting between Palestinian resistance groups and Omar Suleiman on April 29 and 30.

After a series of deliberations amongst the twelve groups regarding the specifics of an agreement, all have ostensibly approved of Egypt’s proposal for a “comprehensive, simultaneous and reciprocal period of calm to be applied progressively, first in Gaza and then in the West Bank”.

Even Islamic Jihad, the second most prominent Islamic group and one which has long focused on armed struggle rather than political diplomacy issued their support for the motion. Their representative in Egypt, Daud Shahab, openly proclaimed Islamic Jihad’s viewpoint by announcing that “if the Palestinian factions agree on a period of calm we will not be an obstacle…we are against a political division between Gaza and the West Bank… [however] if there are attacks, nobody and no agreement will prevent us from responding”.

Although the more action inclined branch of the Muslim Brotherhood has employed an assertive tone, it nevertheless is reasonably coherent with respect to content. How can there be an agreement in Gaza which does not apply to the West Bank and vice versa? If the West Bank is amidst a peace process with Israel and there is a ceasefire in Gaza, why should there be a need for Israel to strike and therefore incur the wrath of Gaza? If anything, Islamic Jihad, which condemned the Hamas takeover, is promising not be responsible for jeopardizing the ceasefire but rather tolerating it for the sake of Palestinian unity.

Israel must now weigh up the options.

At the same time as the 12 groups in Egypt agreed to a joint proposal, Mahmoud Zahar mentioned that the six month ceasefire offered by Hamas was still on the table despite the fact it was categorically shunned by Israel earlier. Projecting a similar message than that of Olmert regarding his limited choices, the Hamas leader stated that “if Israel decides to reject a ceasefire, they will pay a heavy toll because the besieged Gaza Strip people will have no choice but to defend their lives against the siege”.

Accepting a truce with the political factions in the Gaza Strip will, to a certain degree, legitimize Hamas’ position as Israeli Public Security Minister Avi Dichter described but in reality Hamas’ standing should have been legitimized when they democratically won the elections in 2006.

Israel incessantly emphasizes that their priority is to stop Qassam rocket attacks and ensure the security of their people. For this reason Israel believes the blockade on supplies to Gaza is justified in that it will gradually weaken Hamas into submission. This collective punishment is not working and it is important to note that the other option of a full scale invasion of Gaza is plagued with problems. A truce gives Israel the chance to fulfill its duty without imposing inhumane measures on the population of Gaza. Their co-signatories in this agreement may not be the most ideal candidates [military groups whose suited presence in Egypt may instill skepticism at their ability to suitably persuade their Gaza fighters] but it gives the prospect of long term peace that much needed push forward, if in fact this is what Israel wants and is not, as Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh says, adhering to a policy which intentionally aims to “ruin any regional and international efforts to end the siege and halt aggression”.

Israeli Major General Amos Yadlin has revealed that he suspects that Hamas may attempt to disrupt Israel’s 60th anniversary celebrations on May 7 and 8 with simultaneous attacks which possibly involve the kidnapping of soldiers [the festivities coincide with the Palestinian remembrance of al-Nakba]. Instead of the 60th anniversary commemorating escalated violence and further Palestinian/Israel polarization which has never left the prospects for a solution so out of sight, the 60th anniversary could mark the quintessential moment when Hamas and Israel, two professed enemies, agreed to a temporary ceasefire which enabled a bilateral peace to be given the chance of prevailing.

Will Israel accept the proposal? It is unlikely. Their reluctance/outright refusal to lower themselves to a position of talking with a “terrorist” organization or even acquiescing to the terms of a “terrorist” organization are concessions that will certainly contradict Israel’s agenda and pride. There are three further factors that plant the seed of doubt in the process. Firstly, the Israeli co-coordinator with Egypt regarding an agreement, Major Amos Gilad, did not even return from vacation in Europe and the US following the proposal. In addition, the Israeli Prime Minister is coincidentally undergoing rather suspicious police investigations which may act to disrupt any political advancement and even lead to his political demise, proving once again that internal Israeli politics takes priority. Lastly, when an important figure such as the Interior and Deputy Prime Minster Meir Sheetrit declares that “we must break Hamas, not hold negotiations with them, because their demands are unacceptable. The armed forces must attack these terrorists night and day to break their arms and legs”, one can surely not remain optimistic.