On February 18, 16 countries including the US and European states
such as the UK and France, officially recognized the declaration of
independence announced by Kosovo’s provisional government just a
day earlier.
While Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaci jubilantly stated that “we
have waited for this day for a very long time…from today, we are
proud, independent and free”, permanent UN Security Council member
Russia, boasting the backing of fellow veto-wielding member China,
has called for an emergency session of the Council, emphasizing that
the declaration is illegal and that Kosovo should remain a province of
Serbia. Meanwhile, thousands of Serbians are taking to the streets
opposing this declaration of independence and other regional nations
like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Croatia and Greece have rejected
Kosovo’s independence fearing that it may damage relations with
Serbia.
All this pandemonium regarding Kosovo and the possible
consequences of its declaration has attracted the attention of many
separatist movements striving for self-determination around the
globe. Discontented ethnic minorities which may include Kurds in Iraq,
the Basques in Spain or the Turkish in Cyprus may be casting an eye
towards Kosovo, formulating parallels, analyzing the facts on the
ground, evaluating the feasibility of a similar action in their respective
areas and pondering how their situations are different to Kosovo.
These disenfranchised groups may confusingly reiterate why Kosovo
has been extended this luxury of international endorsement for
independence over them? If Kosovo has been granted sovereign status,
does this insinuate that it will act as a precedent which will gradually
lead to their specific issues being addressed and considered in the
same manner? Still, no other people have been meticulously assessing
the events in Kosovo with more disbelief and bewilderment than the
Palestinians.
Last week, Palestinian negotiator Yasser Abed Rabbo claimed that as
the peace process with Israel was reaping no results and “going
nowhere”, Palestinians should seek “another option”, asserting that
“Kosovo is not better than Palestine”. In response to these comments,
Abed Rabbo’s superiors were swift to neutralize his enthusiastic and
seemingly simple solution. Chief Palestinian negotiator Ahmad Qurei
agreed with his colleague by affirming that there had been no progress
in the peace process with Israel but warned that it is imperative for
Palestine to be thorough and not declare terms before certain decisions
have been made first. President Abbas also confirmed that there would
be no unilateral declaration of independence and that they would
persevere with the peace process until the set deadline at the end of
2008. The president mentioned, however, that even if the deadline
approaches without significant developments, Palestine would still not
declare independence but “return to our Arab brothers to take the
appropriate decision”.
When asked to contextualize Abed Rabbo’s strategy of declaring
independence as well as to explain how Palestine is different from
Kosovo, Sean McCormack, speaking on behalf of the US State
Department rather unconvincingly said that Kosovo was simply a
“unique” circumstance where the situation “had run its course, in terms
of finding a solution, a negotiated political solution”. On the contrary,
McCormack stressed how there was still hope in the Occupied
Territories of achieving an agreement and that the process had not yet
“run its course”. Conversely, Kremlin official Dmitry Pestov highlighted
that Kosovo was “not distinct” from other separatist cases around the
globe but would be highly “damaging to the Mideast peace process”
and capable of stiffening the resolve of separatist groups to pursue
their causes with more vigor and dedication. Hence, who is more
accurate in their assessment of the potential ramifications of a
sovereign state of Kosovo? Is Kosovo to be viewed as a precedent or an
unparalleled unique case?
On the surface, there are a lot of similarities between Kosovo and
Palestine. Firstly and most evidently, both are areas with a very violent
and complicated history which are fraught with the occupation of
different powers depending on the political climate of the era. This
makes the task of defining a set identity or right to the place extremely
contentious with all the types of people holding tenancy over the land
throughout the years. Then there is the emotive aspect. Serbia believes
that Kosovo is the base of their culture and the source of their
inspiration as a nation. Similarly, Israel views sites in pre-1967
Palestine, such as Jerusalem and Hebron, integral to their people’s
heritage, possessing the cornerstones of their traditions and therefore
indisputably strengthening their claim to administer them.
Both parties have experienced intimidation and mass immigration at
the hands of their aggressors and resorted to similar means to combat
their plight. During the Kosovo War [1996-1999], nearly one million
ethnic Albanians left or were forcefully removed from Kosovo with
around 10,000 killed. Furthermore, the Serbs began relocating their
people to areas such as Kosovo, expelling Albanians from their homes
to make sufficient space for the influx of their people. If one harks
back to 1948, 800,000 Palestinians were expelled from their homes in
order to accommodate the new Jewish population of Israel while over
four and a half thousand Palestinians have been killed by Israel since
2000, with the number increasing by the day.
Following the Dayton Agreement in 1995, a group of Albanians
established the Kosovo Liberation Army [KLA], which adopted guerilla
style tactics in retaliation to Serbian presence and were responsible for
a great deal of devastation. The nature of this group and their strategy
is similar to the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] before it was
recognized by Israel as the sole representative authority for
Palestinians during the Oslo Accords in 1993. The PLO was previously
referred to as a “terrorist” group that targeted prominent Israelis.
Furthermore, the declaration of independence is not an unfamiliar
concept for either Kosovo or Palestine as both have attempted to
ensure their sovereignty in the past. In 1990 and again in 1992 Kosovo
proclaimed independence but was only supported by their ethnic allies
in Albania and was not recognized internationally. Palestine, however,
declared independence on November 15, 1988. Unlike Kosovo, 120
countries around the world accepted this proclamation except the US
[strangely enough, the US has already condoned Palestinian
independence under the League of Nations Covenant Article 22(4) of
1919 and 1922].
With respect to demographics, the two areas also have a lot in
common. 90% of Kosovo consists of ethnic Albanians while 10% of the
newly declared state comprises of Serbs, Bosniaks and Turks. In
addition the population of Kosovo is just over two million. Excluding
east Jerusalem, there are just over two million people in the West Bank
also. 87% of these are Palestinians while 13% are Israeli settlers. The UN
has trusted the Kosovo government with protecting the minority within
their new state while the existence of such a minority is a major issue
in the Israel/Palestinian peace process with the Palestinians deemed
incapable of assuming responsibility for the minority on their land.
Sean McCormack announced that the diplomatic process regarding
Kosovo had “run its course”. International negotiations on the future of
Kosovo only started after a seven year presence of UN troops in the
area following UNSC resolution 1244. The process lasted two years,
mainly due to Russian reservations, but was still approved last week
without reaching an agreement with Russia. If the Palestinians were to
take the US paradigm of peace processes running their course, then
they have labored through 15 more years of negotiations than Kosovo.
This factor is bound to raise questions in Palestine. Why is Kosovo so
different?
The feeling amongst commentators and the public focuses around two
fundamental differences – international involvement and “purpose”.
Concerning the former, there has been a UN force on the ground in
Kosovo since 1999 helping to create conditions for Kosovo’s
prospective autonomy. Although a proposal suggested by the
Palestinians, there has never been an international presence on the
ground in Palestine at the request of the Israelis. Israel may now be
contemplating the possibility of an interim international force in
Palestine, but there are still many areas of contention which are far
from being resolved, namely Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders,
Palestinian refugees, Israeli security and water.
Then there is the theory that Palestine does not serve the same
“purpose” that an independent Kosovo would. Whereas the US uses its
veto power within the Security Council to combat any resolution that is
supposedly against Israel as it is a solid US ally in a region where the
US is deeply embedded, Russia utilizes this same privilege in the
Council with respect to upholding their interests in eastern Europe and
the Balkans. Whether it is the installation of missile defense systems in
eastern Europe, the victory of the pro-Western Boris Tadic over the
Russian-endorsed Tomislav Nikolic [this election coincidently took
place just weeks before the declaration of independence by Kosovo] or
any move to confront Russia on the pressing issue of EU energy
security and therefore diminish Russian influence in eastern Europe, all
are seen as a victory for the US and the EU. Palestine has no such
“friend” on the Council and cannot compete or serve these interests.
It is no surprise that Islamic fundamentalism is also a major worry for
the US and EU with a ubiquitous and ever expanding presence around
the world. In 1992, President of Albania Sali Berisha claimed that the
war in Kosovo should be perceived as a Muslim Albanian Jihad against
Serbia. Shaul Shay wrote in his book “Islamic Terror and the Balkans”
that there were more than 15 Islamic charitable funds distributing
Saudi Arabian and Iranian money to mujahideen in the Balkans,
including Kosovo. Osama Bin Laden is thought to have visited the area
and two of the 9/11 bombers had been stationed in the Balkans. A
disenfranchised Kosovo could have fuelled Islamic fundamentalism in
the area and placed an al-Qaeda base on Europe’s doorstep, therefore
greatly threatening US and EU security. An independent Kosovo could
suppress the movement and take away the impetus for joining.
Another factor Palestine must consider is that one can always find
comparisons if looking intently enough, but no two instances are ever
the same, especially when attempting to compare two peoples
geographically detached, surrounded by different circumstances and
with internal complexities exclusive to their region.
McCormack may be criticized for his vagueness and tone but the
message was accurate. Kosovo is “unique” – to the US anyway. If
Palestine wants self-determination in its purest and most incorruptible
form, they must vehemently refuse the comparison with Kosovo. As
highlighted in a succinct article by Sara Flounders, Kosovo is not
receiving independence but assuming the role of a US colony which will
not just be administered with US and NATO supervision but will be
entirely controlled by them. To begin with, the motion is illegal. UNSC
resolution 1244 stipulated the “commitment of all member states to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity” of Serbia, a republic of
Yugoslavia. Further, the High Representative bodies, who will
essentially control domestic and foreign policy, will be appointed by
the US and EU. In addition, these bodies will have superseding
authority over law, taxation and the economics of Kosovo. The NATO
presence will also remain and be in charge of foreign policy, the police,
security, the judiciary and the prisons.
Luckily, Palestine does not serve the interests of the US. Peace may be
desperately coveted and may be viewed as equally, if not more
deserving than Kosovo, but this is no reason to rush the issue and
adopt the Kosovo model. The situation in Palestine is also “unique” and
thus requires an alternative paradigm, which is currently under
construction. Kosovo is merely another example of the imperialistic
superpower of the age asserting its influence and dominance over an
area by making medieval-esque arrangements with allies in the region,
creating instability and distributing propaganda in order to gradually
execute their scrupulous plan, which will ultimately serve their own
interests. Just as in previous periods of history, Kosovo’s influence on
its own future will be minimal and operate under extremely strict
parameters while the “foreign” presence will be as encompassing and
intrusive as ever before. However, in the twenty-first century this
degree of external involvement is legitimized by the claim that it is
granted in the name of “democracy”.