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Jordan's recent widely publicized resumption of contact with Hamas should be seen through the wider lens of the historic and strategic context. In the summer of 1999 King Abdullah II, shortly after his ascension to the throne, expelled the Hamas leadership from Jordan. The recent resumption of contact with Hamas was the first significant reversal of Jordan's almost decade-long confrontational stand toward the organization.

Hamas' expulsion from Jordan was a reflection of the young King Abdullah's shifting priorities in comparison to those of his late father King Hussein. For Hussein, the Hamas presence in Amman was a card to play against Yasser Arafat in Palestinian politics, from which he never really withdrew. For Abdullah, far more focused on Jordan of the East Bank, it was a political nuisance and a potential domestic security problem. But now, after nearly a decade on the throne Abdullah II is far more confident in the saddle. Moreover, in the Jordanian elections in November 2007 the Islamists were battered into virtual parliamentary insignificance by massive fraud, sanctioned if not directly orchestrated by the regime.

As usual in Jordan, the regime has immeasurably more control over its own house than it has regional influence. Jordan is not a major Middle Eastern power and has never been able to control the regional context in which it operates. It is here that Abdullah II, like his predecessors, encounters challenges that are the creations of others and are extremely difficult for Jordan to contend with effectively. In the last few years, Jordan has been wedged between two major regional zones of instability and chaos: Iraq to the east and Palestine to the west. For the Jordanians, this has been a period of prolonged and intense anxiety, constantly concerned by the potentially horrendous fallout for the Hashemite Kingdom of disintegration in Iraq or Palestine or both combined. Jordan, therefore, seeks to do all in its limited power to stabilize its immediate vicinity.

It is worthy of note that the renewed contact with Hamas came more or less in tandem with an official visit to Iraq by King Abdullah II in mid-August, the first by any Arab head of state since the overthrow of Saddam. For Jordan both moves, toward Iraq and Hamas, are apparently part of a strategic reassessment and an exercise in damage control in the wake of the dramatic changes in the regional order since the US invasion of Iraq.

The crushing of Iraq removed the gatekeeper from the Arab East who had kept Shi'ite Iran at bay for decades. The overthrow of the Baath paved the way for a Shi'ite-dominated Iraq, and with Hizballah constantly on the ascendant in Lebanon, Iran's regional influence has reached new heights unprecedented in the modern era. Not only is Iran a major Gulf power, but it now has a significant presence in the eastern Mediterranean through its proxy in Lebanon, Hizballah, and its ally, Hamas, in Gaza.

It was none other than King Abdullah II who, as early as December 2004 warned of the "Shi'ite crescent" that was emerging in the region. The Sunni Arab core of the Middle East is shrinking in the face of Iranian regional ambition and clout. Abdullah's recent visit to Iraq, for whatever it was worth, was an effort to keep Iraq as close as possible to its Arab brethren rather than have it wantonly drift entirely into the Iranian-Shi'ite orbit. The contacts with Hamas are part of the same effort, and being Sunnis and not Shi'ites, Hamas has potentially much stronger intrinsic ties to the Sunni Arab core than to Iran.

Hamas' victory in the elections in early 2006 and then its takeover of Gaza in mid-2007 are indicative of a dramatic historic shift in Palestinian politics. It is not that Abu Mazen is weak or that Fateh is in disarray, though both of these are true, but more profoundly it is that secular Palestinian nationalism is in decline, as is the case with secular nationalism in other parts of the region as well. With Arabism and secular politics in retreat and Iranian influence and Islamist politics on the rise, the Jordanians are simply reading the writing on the wall and coming to terms with reality as best they can.

Jordan is losing its faith in the capacity of the Palestinian national movement to deliver on either stability or peace with Israel. Hamas, as the "tahdiya" seems to suggest, can deliver, if not on peace with Israel then at least on some form of stability and control, more so than the Palestinian Authority has been able to do in recent years and more than it will probably be able to do for any time in the foreseeable future. As far as the Jordanians are concerned, if it is Hamas that can secure the Palestinian front then so be it.

The Jordanians, as is their wont, are making pragmatic not ideological choices. This is not about adopting the Hamas program, abandoning the two-state solution or moving away from the peace with Israel. It is all about stabilizing the immediate vicinity and the home front. Thus the feelers put out to the east, in Iraq, and the probing with Hamas to the west, are essentially two sides of the same strategic coin. Only time will tell if these maneuvers work as intended by the Jordanians.- Published 1/9/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Professor Asher Susser is a senior fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University.

 
 
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