The Peace Now Settlement Watch Team latest report discloses that a number of new land seizure orders were issued during the Gaza operation, a number of these orders were related to the route of the separation fence. In most cases they were irregular orders signed by a brigadier general, commander of the Judea and Samaria Division (as opposed to the Officer in Command of the Central Command who usually signs seizure orders), and are limited to only 60 days. Peace Now sees these seizure of orders as an attempt to establish quick facts on the ground and to bypass High Court provisions. 1. Seizure orders number t/03/09 and t/02/09 - Refencing between the Palestinian villages of Hussan and Jaba' and some of their lands Order No. t/03/09 was signed by Judea and Samaria Division Commander on January 8, 2009, referring to the construction of a fence along road no. 375, the length of 2 km, south of the village of Hussan. Construction of this fence will separate the residents of Hussan from parts of their land. An objection submitted by the residents to the Civil Administration was rejected, due to the claim that gates within in the fence will provide passage and access to the lands in question and that this fence is necessary to prevent the infiltration of people into Israel from that area. On the same day, Judea and Samaria Division Commander also signed order no. t/02/09, seizing lands for the construction of a 400 meter fence, west of the Palestinian village of Jaba', near the Green Line. 2. Seizure order number t/29/08 - paving a security road between the settlements of Beitar Illit and Gva'ot On January 1, 2009 the Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, signed a seizure order to pave a new road, 2.2 km long, between the settlements of Beitar Illit and Gva'ot running north to south. The order refers to a permanent road for the use of the security forces. The intention is a to build a “patrol road”, in order to supervise the movement of people in the area and prevent infiltrations into Israel through the area south of the settlement of Beitar Illit. Construction of this patrol road in the heart of the Palestinian territories will be a real obstacle for Palestinian residents trying to reach their lands lying west of this road (especially some 4,000 dunams belonging to the village of Nahhalin). Peace Now has learned that this road is seemingly alike to an initial, yet shelved plan, to build a road between Gva'ot and Beitar Illit for the use of the settlers (road no. 374), thus allowing them to travel westward, as an alternative to the southern road from Gva'ot running west which is likely to be closed should the village of Jaba' be handed over to Palestinian control. Opportunism under the cover of temporary orders? The map of the new orders shows that these planned roads create a continuous line, along with the existing roads, blocking access westwards. There are also hints that that there is a plan to construct an additional fence also along road no. 367. Even if there is a true need for a physical barrier and/or a patrol road to prevent infiltration into Israel, it can also be built along the Green Line instead of in the heart of the Palestinian territory, without harming the freedom of movement of the Palestinians in the area. 3. Seizure order number t/78/06 (extension and modification) - Updating the fence surrounding the village of Azzoun Atme During the operation in Gaza, IDF forces updated a fence built in recent years around the village of Azzoun Atme. The IDF added barbed wire on the fence and erected a new inspection point. Residents of the village received in recent weeks a seizure order for the “renewal and modification of the fence” around their village. The order is missing the signature of the Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, and is also missing a date. The effect of the order, like the previous orders is only 60 days. The village of Azzoun Atme is surrounded by the settlements of Elkana, Sha'arei Tikva and the outpost of Magen Dan in the south and east, the settlement of Oranit in the west and the separation fence in the north. The only viable access to the village is from the north, through an IDF checkpoint at the separation fence. The southern entrance is by foot only, through an IDF checkpoint that allows only bearers of entry permits into Israel to leave the village. Since the past weeks work on the fence, entry into the village has been denied to anyone who is not a resident of Azzoun Atme, increasing the village's isolation. According to the planned route of the separation barrier, a fence from every side should surround the village but most of the village's land and agricultural fields should remain inside the fenced area. The temporary fence built around the village allows its residents access to a more limited area. 4. Seizure order number t/76/04 (extension) - extending effect of temporary fence near Beit Surik The original seizure order issued in 2004 allowed the construction of a temporary route of the separation fence in the area west of Beit Surik and Biddu, until the government decides on the continuation of the route in the area of Beit Iksa. No new order for the continued construction of the separation barrier in the area has been issued. Instead this new order refers to further land seizure for the temporary route, to be in place until December 2009 (this order also arrived unsigned and without a date). In addition, at the same area, about two months ago the security forces erected a new checkpoint on the road to Beit Iksa, preventing anyone who is not a resident of the village from entering it. Meanwhile in the last two months the entry of farmers from the village of Biddu to their land beyond the separation fence has been prevented. Until now the farmers could enter for a limited time a number of times a week in coordination with the Army but in the last two months their entry has stopped. 5. Order number t/01/09 - change in the route of the separation barrier in the area of Ma'ale Adumim The residents of Abu Dis and Sawahrah a-Sharqiya petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court against the route of the fence in the area of Ma'ale Adumim. The residents claimed that the route confiscates huge areas of their land without any real security needs. Most of the argument centers on the question of whether the settlement of Keidar will be included within the route of the fence or not. The Court reviewed the petition and asked the State to reconsider the route. This new order was issued in the beginning of January 2009, more than a year after the court request, and although it does reduce by 4,000 dunams the area that is supposed to be on the "Israeli" side of the fence, it still includes the settlement of Keidar in the route.
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By: Amira Hass
Date: 27/05/2013
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Slain Bedouin girls' mother, a victim of Israeli-Palestinian bureaucracy
Abir Dandis, the mother of the two girls who were murdered in the Negev town of Al-Fura’a last week, couldn't find a police officer to listen to her warnings, neither in Arad nor in Ma’ale Adumim. Both police stations operate in areas where Israel wants to gather the Bedouin into permanent communities, against their will, in order to clear more land for Jewish communities. The dismissive treatment Dandis received shows how the Bedouin are considered simply to be lawbreakers by their very nature. But as a resident of the West Bank asking for help for her daughters, whose father was Israeli, Dandis faced the legal-bureaucratic maze created by the Oslo Accords. The Palestinian police is not allowed to arrest Israeli civilians. It must hand suspects over to the Israel Police. The Palestinian police complain that in cases of Israelis suspected of committing crimes against Palestinian residents, the Israel Police tend not to investigate or prosecute them. In addition, the town of Al-Azaria, where Dandis lives, is in Area B, under Palestinian civilian authority and Israeli security authority. According to the testimony of Palestinian residents, neither the IDF nor the Israel Police has any interest in internal Palestinian crime even though they have both the authority and the obligation to act in Area B. The Palestinian police are limited in what it can do in Area B. Bringing in reinforcements or carrying weapons in emergency situations requires coordination with, and obtaining permission from, the IDF. If Dandis fears that the man who murdered her daughters is going to attack her as well, she has plenty of reason to fear that she will not receive appropriate, immediate police protection from either the Israelis or the Palestinians. Dandis told Jack Khoury of Haaretz that the Ma’ale Adumim police referred her to the Palestinian Civil Affairs Coordination and Liaison Committee. Theoretically, this committee (which is subordinate to the Civil Affairs Ministry) is the logical place to go for such matters. Its parallel agency in Israel is the Civilian Liaison Committee (which is part of the Coordination and Liaison Administration - a part of the Civil Administration under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories). In their meetings, they are supposed to discuss matters such as settlers’ complaints about the high volume of the loudspeakers at mosques or Palestinians’ complaints about attacks by settlers. But the Palestinians see the Liaison Committee as a place to submit requests for permission to travel to Israel, and get the impression that its clerks do not have much power when faced with their Israeli counterparts. In any case, the coordination process is cumbersome and long. The Palestinian police has a family welfare unit, and activists in Palestinian women’s organizations say that in recent years, its performance has improved. But, as stated, it has no authority over Israeli civilians and residents. Several non-governmental women’s groups also operate in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and women in similar situations approach them for help. The manager of one such organization told Haaretz that Dandis also fell victim to this confusing duplication of procedures and laws. Had Dandis approached her, she said, she would have referred her to Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, which has expertise in navigating Israel’s laws and authorities.
By: Phoebe Greenwood
Date: 27/05/2013
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John Kerry unveils plan to boost Palestinian economy
John Kerry revealed his long-awaited plan for peace in the Middle East on Sunday, hinging on a $4bn (£2.6bn) investment in the Palestinian private sector. The US secretary of state, speaking at the World Economic Forum on the Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea, told an audience including Israeli president Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that an independent Palestinian economy is essential to achieving a sustainable peace. Speaking under the conference banner "Breaking the Impasse", Kerry announced a plan that he promised would be "bigger, bolder and more ambitious" than anything since the Oslo accords, more than 20 years ago. Tony Blair is to lead a group of private sector leaders in devising a plan to release the Palestinian economy from its dependence on international donors. The initial findings of Blair's taskforce, Kerry boasted, were "stunning", predicting a 50% increase in Palestinian GDP over three years, a cut of two-thirds in unemployment rates and almost double the Palestinian median wage. Currently, 40% of the Palestinian economy is supplied by donor aid. Kerry assured Abbas that the economic plan was not a substitute for a political solution, which remains the US's "top priority". Peres, who had taken the stage just minutes before, also issued a personal plea to his Palestinian counterpart to return to the negotiations. "Let me say to my dear friend President Abbas," Peres said, "Should we really dance around the table? Lets sit together. You'll be surprised how much can be achieved in open, direct and organised meetings."
By: Jillian Kestler-D'Amours
Date: 27/05/2013
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Isolation Devastates East Jerusalem Economy
Thick locks hug the front gates of shuttered shops, now covered in graffiti and dust from lack of use. Only a handful of customers pass along the dimly lit road, sometimes stopping to check the ripeness of fruits and vegetables, or ordering meat in near-empty butcher shops. “All the shops are closed. I’m the only one open. This used to be the best place,” said 64-year-old Mustafa Sunocret, selling vegetables out of a small storefront in the marketplace near his family’s home in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City. Amidst the brightly coloured scarves, clothes and carpets, ceramic pottery and religious souvenirs filling the shops of Jerusalem’s historic Old City, Palestinian merchants are struggling to keep their businesses alive. Faced with worsening health problems, Sunocret told IPS that he cannot work outside of the Old City, even as the cost of maintaining his shop, with high electricity, water and municipal tax bills to pay, weighs on him. “I only have this shop,” he said. “There is no other work. I’m tired.” Abed Ajloni, the owner of an antiques shop in the Old City, owes the Jerusalem municipality 250,000 Israeli shekels (68,300 U.S. dollars) in taxes. He told IPS that almost every day, the city’s tax collectors come into the Old City, accompanied by Israeli police and soldiers, to pressure people there to pay. “It feels like they’re coming again to occupy the city, with the soldiers and police,” Ajloni, who has owned the same shop for 35 years, told IPS. “But where can I go? What can I do? All my life I was in this place.” He added, “Does Jerusalem belong to us, or to someone else? Who’s responsible for Jerusalem? Who?” Illegal annexation Israel occupied East Jerusalem, including the Old City, in 1967. In July 1980, it passed a law stating that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. But Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and subsequent application of Israeli laws over the entire city remain unrecognised by the international community. Under international law, East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory – along with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Syrian Golan Heights – and Palestinian residents of the city are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Jerusalem has historically been the economic, political and cultural centre of life for the entire Palestinian population. But after decades languishing under destructive Israeli policies meant to isolate the city from the rest of the Occupied Territories and a lack of municipal services and investment, East Jerusalem has slipped into a state of poverty and neglect. “After some 45 years of occupation, Arab Jerusalemites suffer from political and cultural schizophrenia, simultaneously connected with and isolated from their two hinterlands: Ramallah and the West Bank to their east, West Jerusalem and Israel to the west,” the International Crisis Group recently wrote. Israeli restrictions on planning and building, home demolitions, lack of investment in education and jobs, construction of an eight-foot-high separation barrier between and around Palestinian neighbourhoods and the creation of a permit system to enter Jerusalem have all contributed to the city’s isolation. Formal Palestinian political groups have also been banned from the city, and between 2001-2009, Israel closed an estimated 26 organisations, including the former Palestinian Liberation Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem, the Orient House and the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce. Extreme poverty Israel’s policies have also led to higher prices for basic goods and services and forced many Palestinian business owners to close shop and move to Ramallah or other Palestinian neighbourhoods on the other side of the wall. Many Palestinian Jerusalemites also prefer to do their shopping in the West Bank, or in West Jerusalem, where prices are lower. While Palestinians constitute 39 percent of the city’s population today, almost 80 percent of East Jerusalem residents, including 85 percent of children, live below the poverty line. “How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t control your resources? How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t have any control of your borders?” said Zakaria Odeh, director of the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, of “this kind of fragmentation, checkpoints, closure”. “Without freedom of movement of goods and human beings, how could you develop an economy?” he asked. “You can’t talk about independent economy in Jerusalem or the West Bank or in all of Palestine without a political solution. We don’t have a Palestinian economy; we have economic activities. That’s all we have,” Odeh told IPS. Israel’s separation barrier alone, according to a new report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), has caused a direct loss of over one billion dollars to Palestinians in Jerusalem, and continues to incur 200 million dollars per year in lost opportunities. Israel’s severing and control over the Jerusalem-Jericho road – the historical trade route that connected Jerusalem to the rest of the West Bank and Middle East – has also contributed to the city’s economic downturn. Separation of Jerusalem from West Bank Before the First Intifada (Arabic for “uprising”) began in the late 1980s, East Jerusalem contributed approximately 14 to 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). By 2000, that number had dropped to less than eight percent; in 2010, the East Jerusalem economy, compared to the rest of the OPT, was estimated at only seven percent. “Economic separation resulted in the contraction in the relative size of the East Jerusalem economy, its detachment from the remaining OPT and the gradual redirection of East Jerusalem employment towards the Israeli labour market,” the U.N. report found. Decades ago, Israel adopted a policy to maintain a so-called “demographic balance” in Jerusalem and attempt to limit Palestinian residents of the city to 26.5 percent or less of the total population. To maintain this composition, Israel built numerous Jewish-Israeli settlements inside and in a ring around Jerusalem and changed the municipal boundaries to encompass Jewish neighbourhoods while excluding Palestinian ones. It is now estimated that 90,000 Palestinians holding Jerusalem residency rights live on the other side of the separation barrier and must cross through Israeli checkpoints in order to reach Jerusalem for school, medical treatment, work, and other services. “Israel is using all kinds of tools to push the Palestinians to leave; sometimes they are visible, and sometimes invisible tools,” explained Ziad al-Hammouri, director of the Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER). Al-Hammouri told IPS that at least 25 percent of the 1,000 Palestinian shops in the Old City were closed in recent years as a result of high municipal taxes and a lack of customers. “Taxation is an invisible tool…as dangerous as revoking ID cards and demolishing houses,” he said. “Israel will use this as pressure and as a tool in the future to confiscate these shops and properties.”
By the Same Author
Date: 26/02/2009
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New Land Seizure Orders Issued During the Gaza Operation - February 2009
The Peace Now Settlement Watch Team latest report discloses that a number of new land seizure orders were issued during the Gaza operation, a number of these orders were related to the route of the separation fence. In most cases they were irregular orders signed by a brigadier general, commander of the Judea and Samaria Division (as opposed to the Officer in Command of the Central Command who usually signs seizure orders), and are limited to only 60 days. Peace Now sees these seizure of orders as an attempt to establish quick facts on the ground and to bypass High Court provisions. 1. Seizure orders number t/03/09 and t/02/09 - Refencing between the Palestinian villages of Hussan and Jaba' and some of their lands Order No. t/03/09 was signed by Judea and Samaria Division Commander on January 8, 2009, referring to the construction of a fence along road no. 375, the length of 2 km, south of the village of Hussan. Construction of this fence will separate the residents of Hussan from parts of their land. An objection submitted by the residents to the Civil Administration was rejected, due to the claim that gates within in the fence will provide passage and access to the lands in question and that this fence is necessary to prevent the infiltration of people into Israel from that area. On the same day, Judea and Samaria Division Commander also signed order no. t/02/09, seizing lands for the construction of a 400 meter fence, west of the Palestinian village of Jaba', near the Green Line. 2. Seizure order number t/29/08 - paving a security road between the settlements of Beitar Illit and Gva'ot On January 1, 2009 the Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, signed a seizure order to pave a new road, 2.2 km long, between the settlements of Beitar Illit and Gva'ot running north to south. The order refers to a permanent road for the use of the security forces. The intention is a to build a “patrol road”, in order to supervise the movement of people in the area and prevent infiltrations into Israel through the area south of the settlement of Beitar Illit. Construction of this patrol road in the heart of the Palestinian territories will be a real obstacle for Palestinian residents trying to reach their lands lying west of this road (especially some 4,000 dunams belonging to the village of Nahhalin). Peace Now has learned that this road is seemingly alike to an initial, yet shelved plan, to build a road between Gva'ot and Beitar Illit for the use of the settlers (road no. 374), thus allowing them to travel westward, as an alternative to the southern road from Gva'ot running west which is likely to be closed should the village of Jaba' be handed over to Palestinian control. Opportunism under the cover of temporary orders? The map of the new orders shows that these planned roads create a continuous line, along with the existing roads, blocking access westwards. There are also hints that that there is a plan to construct an additional fence also along road no. 367. Even if there is a true need for a physical barrier and/or a patrol road to prevent infiltration into Israel, it can also be built along the Green Line instead of in the heart of the Palestinian territory, without harming the freedom of movement of the Palestinians in the area. 3. Seizure order number t/78/06 (extension and modification) - Updating the fence surrounding the village of Azzoun Atme During the operation in Gaza, IDF forces updated a fence built in recent years around the village of Azzoun Atme. The IDF added barbed wire on the fence and erected a new inspection point. Residents of the village received in recent weeks a seizure order for the “renewal and modification of the fence” around their village. The order is missing the signature of the Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division, and is also missing a date. The effect of the order, like the previous orders is only 60 days. The village of Azzoun Atme is surrounded by the settlements of Elkana, Sha'arei Tikva and the outpost of Magen Dan in the south and east, the settlement of Oranit in the west and the separation fence in the north. The only viable access to the village is from the north, through an IDF checkpoint at the separation fence. The southern entrance is by foot only, through an IDF checkpoint that allows only bearers of entry permits into Israel to leave the village. Since the past weeks work on the fence, entry into the village has been denied to anyone who is not a resident of Azzoun Atme, increasing the village's isolation. According to the planned route of the separation barrier, a fence from every side should surround the village but most of the village's land and agricultural fields should remain inside the fenced area. The temporary fence built around the village allows its residents access to a more limited area. 4. Seizure order number t/76/04 (extension) - extending effect of temporary fence near Beit Surik The original seizure order issued in 2004 allowed the construction of a temporary route of the separation fence in the area west of Beit Surik and Biddu, until the government decides on the continuation of the route in the area of Beit Iksa. No new order for the continued construction of the separation barrier in the area has been issued. Instead this new order refers to further land seizure for the temporary route, to be in place until December 2009 (this order also arrived unsigned and without a date). In addition, at the same area, about two months ago the security forces erected a new checkpoint on the road to Beit Iksa, preventing anyone who is not a resident of the village from entering it. Meanwhile in the last two months the entry of farmers from the village of Biddu to their land beyond the separation fence has been prevented. Until now the farmers could enter for a limited time a number of times a week in coordination with the Army but in the last two months their entry has stopped. 5. Order number t/01/09 - change in the route of the separation barrier in the area of Ma'ale Adumim The residents of Abu Dis and Sawahrah a-Sharqiya petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court against the route of the fence in the area of Ma'ale Adumim. The residents claimed that the route confiscates huge areas of their land without any real security needs. Most of the argument centers on the question of whether the settlement of Keidar will be included within the route of the fence or not. The Court reviewed the petition and asked the State to reconsider the route. This new order was issued in the beginning of January 2009, more than a year after the court request, and although it does reduce by 4,000 dunams the area that is supposed to be on the "Israeli" side of the fence, it still includes the settlement of Keidar in the route.
Date: 08/03/2008
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The Recent Gaza Escalation
Over the past few days Israelis, Palestinians, and the world have witnessed the unfolding of a serious and dangerous military escalation between Israel and Hamas. This crisis is a symptom of failed policies, irresponsible actions, and a lack of strategic thinking. Further escalating the violence in Gaza may deal a fatal blow to the credibility and viability of the peace process, and would erode support for the peace process among both Israelis and Palestinians. Many would argue that this is precisely what Hamas wants; we would argue that this is yet another important reason to avoid such an escalation. Hamas knows that while its rockets can sow fear and suffering in Sderot and now Ashkelon, they cannot destroy Israel and will not break the economic blockade. Israel's military leaders know that while the IDF can achieve short-term tactical gains in Gaza, it cannot destroy popular support for Hamas or stop future rockets from falling. Americans for Peace Now (APN) and its Israeli sister organisation, Peace Now, have repeatedly expressed solidarity with the residents of Israeli communities near Gaza, residents who have suffered a campaign of Qassam rockets attacks since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005. The government of Israel has the right – indeed, the obligation – to bring these attacks to a halt, and to try to free its captured soldier, Gilad Shalit. APN has also consistently held that Israel should avoid actions that constitute collective punishment or cause disproportionate suffering or casualties among civilians. Such actions are fundamentally wrong and ultimately counterproductive. Lessons of the 2006 Lebanon War should not be lost here. Any realistic, sustainable resolution to this crisis will require Israel and Hamas to engage, directly or indirectly, to achieve a ceasefire or hudna. The only questions then are: how many more Israelis and Palestinians will die or be wounded in the interim; how much less international sympathy Israel will have when the ceasefire is being negotiated; how much bigger will the disaster on the ground be, both in Israel and Gaza, once a ceasefire is achieved; and how much damage will have been done to the credibility and viability of the peace process and the Israeli and Palestinian peace camps? Such an approach has been embraced to various degrees by key Israeli security figures, including former national security advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Giora Eiland, former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, and former defence minister Shaul Mofaz. In the context of the current crisis, this approach has been strongly advocated by former Shin Bet head Ami Ayalon, a Minister-without-portfolio in the Olmert government. It is especially imperative for the Bush Administration, as the main shepherd of the Annapolis peace process, to support – or at least not block – efforts to reach a ceasefire, stabilise Gaza, and re-build Palestinian national unity. It is time to at last recognise the failure of the dogmatic policy of boycotting Hamas and blockading Gaza, and replace it with a pragmatic policy incorporating support for strategic, self-interested engagement between Israel and Hamas, either through direct contacts or via third parties, including President Abbas. The United States, and all those who support Israel and Israeli-Palestinian peace, must recognise that the current situation in Gaza, including the recent escalation, is a threat to the newly-launched peace process. In the present context, both Israeli leaders and Palestinian Authority President Abbas have little credibility with their publics as they pursue peace talks, and the peace talks themselves are widely viewed with scepticism or disdain. As we have said often in the past, a hudna, or ceasefire cannot be an end in itself. A ceasefire or hudna is desirable as a means to halt violence and chaos in the immediate term, creating the space to facilitate improvements in the humanitarian situation, stabilise the political situation, and get the process back on track to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this way, it can allow the sides to avoid the re-emergence of violence in the longer term. Absent improvements in the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the re-emergence of a serious, productive political process, any ceasefire or hudna risks becoming merely an intermission to allow those attacking Israel to re-arm, re-trench, and enhance their military capability.
Date: 11/12/2007
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Middle East Peace Report - Vol. 9, Issue 14
ADDING A WALL IN JERUSALEM: Israel issued a tender Tuesday for the construction of 307 new homes in Har Homa, an East Jerusalem neighborhood near Bethlehem. Har Homa, where about 4,000 Israelis now live, lies in territory that Israel de facto annexed in 1967 in an act that also expanded Jerusalem’s municipal boundaries. In Israel, the construction announcement drew criticism. Peace Now issued a statement explaining that “Har Homa is not an integral part of urban structure of the city. It is an isolated quarter in the middle of Palestinian villages and is an obstacle to achieving a peace agreement on the issue of Jerusalem.” The announcement of the tender drew international criticism as well. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a press conference on Friday that “we’re in a time when the goal is to build maximum confidence between the parties and this doesn’t help to build confidence… there just shouldn’t be anything that might try and judge final status, the outcomes of final status negotiations. It’s even more important now that we are really on the eve of the beginning of those negotiations.” Secretary Rice added, “I’ve made that position clear to the Israeli Government.” UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon characterized the move as “not helpful.” Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said that he was “astounded” by the report. Jordanian Minister for Information Nasser Judeh also criticized the construction. Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat said plainly that construction at Har Homa “is undermining Annapolis.” He added that “Israel’s ever-expanding settlement enterprise in the occupied Palestinian territory poses the single greatest threat to the establishment of an independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian state, and hence, to a just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians.” However, Israel contends that construction within East Jerusalem does not violate its commitments, including the Road Map’s call for a settlement freeze. “Israel makes a clear distinction between the West Bank and Jerusalem,” said Mark Regev, spokesman for Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. “Israel has never made a commitment to limit our sovereignty in Jerusalem. Implementation of the first phase of the Road Map does not apply to Jerusalem.” Regev’s comments were backed by Vice Premier Haim Ramon, who told Israel Radio that “We must come today and say, friends, the Jewish neighborhoods [in Jerusalem], including Har Homa, will remain under Israeli sovereignty, and the Arab neighborhoods will be the Palestinian capital, which they will call Jerusalem or whatever they want." Ramon added that such a clear statement would prevent the current tension: “Then we won’t get embroiled, as is happening now, in an uncalled-for and badly timed debate with the United States, at a time when we need its support.” Ha’aretz columnist Akiva Eldar takes the long view in his analysis of this diplomatic crisis, recalling that this is the second crisis involving Har Homa: “Har Homa Crisis No. 1 also broke out a short while after an American attempt to revive the peace process. In February, 1997, a few weeks after it signed the Hebron agreement, the Netanyahu government decided to erect 6,500 housing units on the southern border of East Jerusalem, about one-third of them on private land owned by Palestinians. In the Palestinian Authority (and the Israeli peace camp) this plan was seen as another step in a scheme to cut off their capital from the West Bank. Yasser Arafat threatened to declare the establishment of an independent state and the Palestinian Legislative Council announced a general strike in the territories.” Eldar recalls that this “crisis was the focus of Arafat’s visit to the White House the following month. Clinton asked the Palestinian leader to be sensitive to Netanyahu’s ‘coalition pressures.’ Arafat explained that he, too, had troubles at home and begged the president to at least demand that Israel delay the implementation of the decision to establish the neighborhood. The president sent envoy Dennis Ross to Netanyahu with a letter in which he demanded that the establishment of the neighborhood be postponed. On the other side were the settlers and the activists from the right. They were flanked by then-mayor Olmert… who declared that Har Homa was ‘the most substantive test of the government’s ability to withstand pressure and demonstrate leadership.’ Work at the site began four days later. The U.S. secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, called U.S. Ambassador Martin Indyk at 5:30 A.M. and instructed him to go to Netanyahu with a firm message stating that the United States saw the establishment of the new neighborhood as ‘a step that undermines everything that we are trying to do.’ The ambassador made his protest, the Arabs demonstrated, the UN Security Council met, the United States cast a veto - and Har Homa was taken off the international agenda. Arafat licked another wound and Hamas threw more salt on it.” Eldar identifies this failure as a turning point in the Oslo peace process and wonders if Prime Minister Olmert will learn from those events: “The new neighborhood - or, from one point of view, the ‘settlement’ - which arose on the southern hills of Jerusalem became a mark of Cain on the forehead of the Oslo camp in Ramallah… Netanyahu identified the weakness of the international community and continued to nurture the settlers. The response today of spokesmen for the Olmert government gives rise to the fear that the Annapolis conference did not change the situation on the Israeli side… We have already forgotten that the prime minister agreed that everything would be open to negotiation, including Jerusalem. Is this the way to build a wall to fortify the status of PA President Mahmoud Abbas? And what will ‘the world’ do - all those people who were in attendance at Annapolis - if Olmert decides to hide behind ‘pressures from the coalition’ and approves the new construction?” (AP, 12/5/07; Ha’aretz 12/6, 12/7, 12/9 & 12/10/07; State.gov, 12/7/07; AFP, 12/8/07) MOUNDS OF PAPER: Israel’s Defense Ministry has done little to enforce the law against violations of Israeli building codes in settlements, carrying out only 3% of demolition orders, according to a report released Tuesday by Israel’s Peace Now movement. The report is based on data provided to Peace Now by the Civil Administration, an Israeli government agency. The report found that from 1997 to March 2007, at least 3449 demolition orders were issued for structures in the settlements, yet only 107 of them were demolished by the Civil Administration. Another 171 were taken down by the offenders, but many of these were simply moved illegally to another site in the West Bank. Included in the 3,449 reports of unauthorized construction are 1,934 caravans, 606 permanent buildings, 325 building starts, 133 roads and 451 other structures, including nine cellular antennas. While there has been a great deal of media attention to unauthorized construction in proto-settlements known as outposts, most of the offenses found in the Civil Administration’s data took place within established settlements. Peace Now added that the numbers made available by the Civil Administration likely understate the problem of illegal construction within settlements because of an IDF decision in 1998 that effectively suspended inspections within established settlements. The Peace Now report did not surprise attorney Talia Sasson, who was charged by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to examine outpost construction in the West Bank. She warned in her March 2005 report that thousands of demolition orders had not been acted upon. “All this information was given to the government two-and-a-half years ago, and it is a shame that until today nothing has been done,” Sasson told the Jerusalem Post. (PeaceNow.org.il, 12/4/07; Jerusalem Post, 12/4/07; Ha’aretz, 12/5/07) SEEKING CHANGE AND REFORM IN PALESTINE: Hamas leader and former Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh renewed his call for dialogue with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ rival Fatah faction on Wednesday. “We believe it is necessary to immediately begin a non-conditional dialogue that will work to heal the Palestinian wounds,” Haniyeh told Reuters. Also on Wednesday, a senior Abbas aide confirmed that Saudi Arabia had relayed a message from Hamas offering talks. The Palestinian president has repeatedly rebuffed these invitations, saying that Hamas must first give up control of the Gaza Strip. Abbas reportedly repeated that condition to the Saudis. Saudi Arabia also reportedly hosted a Hamas delegation headed by Khaled Mashal this weekend as part of an effort to resolve the Fatah-Hamas rift, as well as to reduce tensions between Syria and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is not the only Arab power seeking to renew contacts between Fatah and Hamas. Egyptian Intelligence Director Omar Suleiman plans to host Hamas and Fatah representatives soon in Cairo, according to a report by the London-based Asharq al-Awsat newspaper on Sunday. Palestinian sources told the newspaper that Egypt was pressuring Hamas to take the first step towards Fatah as a way of renewing dialogue between the two parties. As part of a bridging proposal the Egyptians reportedly intend to ask Hamas to evacuate the security buildings they seized in their takeover of the Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia and Egypt may have been signaling to Abbas their displeasure with the continued lack of Hamas-Fatah dialogue by working with Hamas to allow Gazans to travel to Mecca for the Muslim pilgrimage known as the Hajj. PA leaders in Ramallah had invested extraordinary efforts to arrange with Israel for 2000 Gazans to travel through Israel and the West Bank. But the Egyptians allowed the pilgrims to travel through Egypt, where the Saudi embassy quickly issued visas, while the Saudi embassy in Jordan reportedly delayed all of the visa applications submitted by the Palestinian Authority (PA). “The Egyptians stabbed us in the back,” was the reaction of one senior PA official. Ha’aretz columnist Avi Issacharoff wrote that “PA officials have difficulty understanding why Egypt and Saudi Arabia acted against Abbas’ interests in this way. Only a week earlier Abbas met Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Now they assume that Cairo and Riyadh wanted to protest Abbas’ persistent refusal to resume the dialogue with Hamas. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have recently given Abbas hints that he should resume the talks, but a senior Palestinian official said that “all told it’s a continuation of the Egyptian game and the dual policy regarding Hamas.” Indeed, it seems that despite Egypt’s repeated assertions of its uncompromising war on Hamas and Gaza terror organizations, Cairo and especially Egyptian intelligence officials prefer to keep normal relations with Hamas, even at Abbas’ expense.” There are also indications that Hamas is looking for a ceasefire. The London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi reported Saturday that Hamas is seeking a truce with Israel. According to the report, senior Hamas officials have been trying recently to persuade its military wing to stop firing Qassams at Israel to prevent a large-scale Israeli military strike on the Gaza Strip. The paper also reported that the Meshal met recently with the secretary-general of Islamic Jihad in Lebanon to discuss the matter. Islamic Jihad reportedly agreed in principle to join Hamas in a ceasefire only if Israel agrees that the ceasefire be mutual. Senior officials in Egypt reportedly offered to mediate the deal. Palestinian sources told Ha’aretz that the intention was to unilaterally initiate a month-long ceasefire as a test. “Hamas has tried in the past to reach a cease-fire with Israel,” said Salah al-Bardawil, a Hamas parliamentarian, “but we reached a dead end in light of Israel’s actions and the killing of dozens of Palestinians.” Al-Bardawil added that without an Israeli pledge to observe the ceasefire, “there is no point.” (Ynet, 12/5/07; Nana10.co.il, 12/9/07; Ha’aretz, 12/7 & 12/9/07)
Date: 21/08/2007
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Middle East Peace Reports
FLEDGLING ENDGAME?: Yedioth Ahronoth’s veteran diplomatic correspondent Shimon Schiffer on Thursday published one of his signature explosive scoops. According to the report, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu-Mazen) are secretly drafting a memorandum of understanding regarding the resolution of core issues of dispute between Israelis and Palestinians – e.g. permanent borders, Jerusalem and refugees. The two, Schiffer reported, are planning to unveil their set of agreed principles at the U.S.-sponsored international conference, which is scheduled for November in Washington. According to the report, Olmert disclosed the details of his secret negotiations with Abbas at a meeting with a large American delegation of House Democrats, headed by House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) last week. According to notes taken by someone who attended the meeting, the objective of the Olmert-Abbas talks is to reach “agreed upon principles on the fundamental issues that will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel: borders, Jerusalem, refugees, exchange of territories, passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the essence of relations between Israel and the Palestinian state.” According to Yedioth, the two are still far from an agreement. Here is how the newspaper described the differences in positions between the two: “Borders: Abu Mazen: Israel will return to the 1967 borders. A Palestinian state will be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and its capital will be Jerusalem. Olmert: Israel will withdraw from more than 90 percent of the West Bank. The settlement blocs will remain under Israeli sovereignty. Israel will give the Palestinians alternative territory in the Negev, around the Gaza Strip. Right of Return: Abu Mazen: Israel will recognize the right of the refugees to return to their homes, in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council. Implementation of the right of return will be by agreement between the sides. Olmert: The Palestinian refugees will be permitted to return only to the territory of the Palestinian state which will be established in the future, and not into the borders of the State of Israel. Territorial Contiguity: Abu Mazen: A safe passage, entirely under Palestinian control, between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Olmert: The West Bank will be joined to the Gaza Strip by bridges or tunnels. The ground will remain under Israeli sovereignty. Jerusalem: Abu Mazen: East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state. The Temple Mount will be under full Palestinian control. Olmert: Neighborhoods on the edge of East Jerusalem will be handed over to Palestinian sovereignty. There will be joint control of the Temple Mount with international participation.” Abbas denied that the talks were held secretly, but his prime minister, Salam Fayyad, confirmed that the two leaders were discussing core issues. “"I can't say that we are now negotiating final status issues. But there are beginnings of talks about the fundamental issues that need to be agreed upon to end this conflict,'' he told the Associated Press. Israel’s Ha’aretz confirmed Schiffer’s scoop. Based on reports attributed to “government sources in Jerusalem,” the paper added that talks between the two are stuck over the question of Palestinian refugees. It also added that the talks are a component of a broader Israeli diplomatic strategy that includes bilateral talks with the Palestinians over “local issues” with the aim of bolstering Abbas and weakening Hamas; Engagement with Arab governments on regional issues in pursuit of a rapprochement with the League of Arab States; Engagement with international players such as the U.S. and the European Union to secure financial support for Abbas and his people. The notion that Abbas and Olmert are trying to agree on final status issues generated little excitement among both Israelis and Palestinians. Yedioth’s Nahum Barnea, Israel’s top commentator, explained why: “Olmert is a prime minister for all intents and purposes, and yet, he is a prime minister on probation. He is waging a desperate holding battle against an investigative committee that he appointed, for fear that the committee is cooking up his removal.” Contrary to Ariel Sharon in the days of the Gaza disengagement, Olmert “does not have automatic public backing. He is overdrawn in terms of public opinion. Under such conditions, he might be expected to display his agreement of principles to the Israeli public before displaying it to members of Congress from the United States […] Not to mention Abu Mazen, whose only strength lies in his weakness. If Olmert wants to help Abu Mazen, let him first take Ehud Barak aside for a heart-to-heart talk. It is time for the prime minister and the defense minister to form a political kitchen cabinet, a partnership for times of trouble. Together they can give the West Bank population, whose support is hoped for by Abu Mazen, a great deal. There are roadblocks that can be opened. Settlement outposts that need to be dismantled. The Americans are still waiting for 27 outposts that Sharon promised to evacuate. Until today, not a single outpost has been evacuated. In order to reach a historical agreement between Israel and Palestine, someone has to believe in it with all his heart, push towards it with all his strength. The negotiations between Olmert and Abu Mazen are being conducted, unfortunately, between two non-believers.” (Yedioth Ahronoth 8/16/07, 8/17/07; AP 8/17/07; Israel Radio 8/16/07; Ha’aretz 8/17/07) BIBI’S BACK: Binyamin Netanyahu last week won the Likud primary by a large margin. Some 37,000 of approximately 95,000 registered Likud members (around 40%) turned out to vote, following an intense campaign by Netanyahu to get out the vote. Although the former prime minister won 74% of the vote, his achievement was called a pyrrhic victory by the leading political commentators of Israel’s largest circulation dailies. Not so much because of the relatively low turnout but because Netanyahu’s hasty effort to force early primary elections in his party damaged his image and that of his party, according to the Israeli pundits. The early primary prompted Netanyahu’s chief challenger, former Foreign Minister Sylvan Shalom, to pull out of the race, charging that Netanyahu abused his power and violated the party’s bylaws. Shalom was on a U.S. coast-to-coast trip when his fellow party members went to the polls last week. Instead of Shalom, Netanyahu faced off against Moshe Feiglin, an ultra-nationalist who advocates annexing the entire West Bank to Israel, without giving its Palestinian residents civil rights. Feiglin was convicted in 1997 of inciting mutiny by advocating a violent rebellion against Israeli security forces. During the mid-1990s he led the popular movement, mainly comprised of settlers, seeking to block the implementation of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO. Feiglin, who has been working for years to drive Likud further to the right, won 24% of the vote, much more than ever before [he received 4% of the vote when he ran for the leadership of Likud in 2003 and 13% in 2005]. Celebrating his flattering defeat, Feiglin issued a press release on Wednesday, declaring: “This will be remembered as an emotional day in which Israel started to return to the people, so that it will no longer be controlled by a leftist minority and by politicians on the Right who do their bidding." He added, “We are on a journey toward victory, and this was a big step along the way.” Yedioth Ahronoth’s chief political analyst Nahum Barnea wrote on Wednesday: “This was Shalom’s revenge on Netanyahu: he deprived him of the joy of victory. Victory in a party primary is almost always the beginning of a surge in public support. Not this time. Netanyahu prayed yesterday that the results would be stricken from the voters’ memories within a week, if not in a day.” Netanyahu, however, is interested in striking Feiglin and his “Jewish Leadership” faction from Likud. He said that Feiglin does not belong in Likud and that the party ought to oust him. Ha’aretz, in an editorial, expressed hope “that this popular rightist party really will disgorge insufferable extremism.” If Likud members “do not take steps to prove to the public that Feiglin, his people and his ideas do not belong to them - not even on the pretext and coincidence of some political conjuncture or other - they will be responsible for a dangerous radicalization of their movement,” Ha’aretz asserted. A poll published by Israel Radio two days after his victory showed that despite the possible backlash resulting from the primary elections, Netanyahu is still the leading candidate for prime minister, with a slight lead over Labor’s Ehud Barak and a more significant lead over potential Kadima candidates for premiership. (Yedioth Ahronoth, 8/14, 8/15 & 8/16/07; Ma’ariv, 8/15 & 8/16/07; Jewish Leadership web site, 8/15/07; Ha’aretz, 8/16/07; Israel Radio 8/16/07) Self-fulfilling ALERT?: Israel and Syria are still exchanging both non-belligerence reassurances and bellicose threats of retaliation in case the other side missteps toward war. Speaking at a press conference in Damascus, Syria’s Vice President Farouk al-Shara said Tuesday: “Syria is not interested in war, and Israel knows this. Nonetheless, Syria is in a state of readiness, since it has learned that Israel looks for any excuse to start a war, as it did in July 2006. Thus we must be ready for any eventuality.” He added, “When we say that peace is Syria's strategic choice, we are not ruling out other possibilities.” On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told officers during a heavily televised visit to Northern Command headquarters: “Israel is not interested in war with Syria, but we are preparing for any eventuality.” On Wednesday, Defense Minister Ehud Barak watched tank exercises on the Golan Heights and told reporters: “Israel does not want war today and, according to our assessments, nor do the Syrians, so there does not need to be a war.” Olmert added that he was seeking “cracks” of opportunity to talk peace with Syria. “It is important that we know how to create momentum that will bring about a change of the political situation. I believe in political initiatives. Where there is a crack of opportunity, I will not forgive myself if I don’t use it,” he said. “Had I seen a crack of opportunity with the Syrians, I wouldn’t have missed it […] we have no interest in war with the Syrians, but we also have no interest in giving absurd assurances in advance. I believe that a dynamic would be created, which would change the situation in the North.” Commenting on the confusing exchanges between Israel and Syria, Maariv’s Ofer Shelah wrote: “everyone who is trying to figure out the signs in what is happening between Israel and Syria should be careful: there is so much contradictory information, so many things said and their opposite, including statements uttered in closed rooms. Whoever claims to know something now, should speak softly, or hold their peace. In simple words: we don’t know. Israel’s official version is that we do not want war, nor do the Syrians. All in all, the IDF carried out its rehabilitation exercises following the Second Lebanon War to meet a scenario of fighting against Syria, since the army needs an operative plan on which to train. But it does not see a real threat of attack from Syria, and certainly Israel has no intention of attacking first. This sounds logical, war would only cause huge damage to both sides without achieving anything, but since when does logic decide anything. And besides, these statements are accompanied by a series of various contradictory and confusing warning signs. For example, the army’s sense of urgency, as projected to mid-rank officers. The army’s operational echelon is not getting the feeling from above that we are only conducting training exercises. The big clock that Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi drew over the training, the discussions and the formulation of operative plans, does not look to unit commanders like a theoretical exercise meant only to return atrophied muscles to an active state. Some of them come out of meeting rooms with the feeling that their superiors see a real threat, which they perhaps do not wish to come to fruition, but believe that is certainly possible.” Israeli Military Intelligence’s assessments that Syria is not seeking military confrontation conflict with apprehensions about Syria’s growing arsenal and its ever increasing capability to severely harm Israel, mainly with missiles, Shelah observed. “It seems that what is going on here, first and foremost, is the old paralysis relating to the enemy’s ability. Syria is indeed arming, mainly with offensive and defensive weapons for the kind of war that it envisions—rockets and missiles against the Israeli home front, and surface-to-air missiles in order to make it hard for an IAF counterstrike. Israel has always been afflicted by an obsession about the enemy’s ability, based on the basic belief that in the Middle East, a gun hanging on the wall in the first act will be fired in the third. If our weapon counters decide that Syria has reached a critical mass of destruction, their hearts conclude that Assad is headed for war, no matter what their head and their senses tell them.” (SANA, 8/14/07; MEMRI, 8/17/07; Jerusalem Post, 8/14/07; Ha’aretz, 8/15/07; Ynet, 8/15/07; Ma’ariv, 8/17/07) Haredi settlement growth: For the past several years, official Israeli data has been shown a higher rate of growth among Jewish settlers in the West Bank than the growth rate among Jews in Israel- proper. An investigative piece published last week by Ha’aretz shows that this higher growth rate – almost double the growth rate in Israel - is almost exclusively due to the relatively recent influx of ultra-Orthodox Jews to West Bank settlements. 2006 Israeli government data show that “the settler population has grown by 5.45 percent, from 260,932 to 275,156,” reported Ha’aretz’s Nadav Shragai. However, if you don’t figure in the ultra-Orthodox community, “the West Bank settlements' growth is 3.7 percent, only a little more than the natural growth the settlements would see, which stands at 3.5 percent.” For example, Beitar Ilit's population [which is almost exclusively ultra-Orthodox], some 35,000, grows annually by some 10 percent - five to six times more than Jerusalem and Tel Aviv's population growth respectively and twice as much as the growth of many other settlements.” According to the report, “by the end of June, 72,106 people - more than a quarter of the West Bank settlers - were concentrated in Beitar Ilit, Modi'in Ilit and Kochav Yaakov, another ultra-Orthodox settlement, according to Interior Ministry figures… The growth rate in the ultra-Orthodox Beitar Ilit and Modi'in Ilit is higher than most places in Israel. Modi'in Ilit's population, some 40,000, grows annually by about 11 percent (this year it has grown by 12.5 percent). Beitar Ilit's population, some 35,000, grows annually by some 10 percent - five to six times more than Jerusalem and Tel Aviv's population growth respectively and twice as much as the growth of many other settlements. By the end of June, 72,106 people - more than a quarter of the West Bank settlers - were concentrated in Beitar Ilit, Modi'in Ilit and Kochav Yaakov, another ultra-Orthodox settlement, according to Interior Ministry figures.” Shragai notes: “Most of the ultra-Orthodox settlers - young couples or young families with numerous children - do not live in the West Bank for ideological reasons. They moved to the settlements due to the soaring real estate prices in the ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods of Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, which created an acute housing shortage.” (Ha’aretz, 8/14/07) TAKING THE LAND. AND THE WATER TOO: The following refreshing summer tale, published Sunday in Israel’s largest circulation daily newspaper, gives a new meaning to the term chutzpah. According to Yedioth Ahronoth’s Roni Shaked and Zvi Singer, residents of Elon Moreh, a veteran settlement on the outskirts of Nablus recently built a quaint picnic area with benches and some nice landscaping. There is even a small pool. However, the land for the picnic area is not Elon Moreh’s land but rather land belonging to the neighboring Palestinian village of Dir el-Khatab. That’s not news. But what about the water for the pool? Well, it turns out that the settlers simply cut the pipe that brings water to Dir el-Khatab, diverted it to their pool, and connected the drainage back to the pipe that goes down to the Palestinian village. “Not only are they using water that does not belong to them, but they are polluting the drinking water of some of the village residents,” Yoel Maharshak, director of the operations department of the United Kibbutz Movement told Yedioth. “The small children relieve themselves in the water, which flows directly to the water fountains of the Palestinian school.” The newspaper reported that complaints were submitted to Israel’s military government of the West Bank, which established that the picnic area is in fact built on land that does not belong to the settlement. The Civil Administration even issued a demolition order for the picnic area. No one seems to be in a hurry to enforce it, the newspaper reported, but a spokesman for the Civil Administration reassured that “The demolition order will be carried out over the next several days.” Benny Katzover, one of the leaders of Elon Moreh, insisted that the body of water at the picnic area is not a pool but rather a small cistern that attracts hikers. “This is spring water that flows near Elon Moreh and flows to the village. The spring water is not the village’s main source of water because the village has been connected to Mekorot [Israel’s water company] for years. The spring water serves flocks and is a backup in case of an interruption in the water supply, and no one has blocked the flow of the spring water to the village,” Katzover said. (Yedioth Ahronoth, 8/19/07)
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