The strangest claim for justifying the disengagement plan incorporates an interesting metaphor from the world of tow-trucking. Those who employ it describe the plan as a unilateral towing effort to retrieve a broken vehicle, known as "the Palestinian Authority," from the "mud of violence" and move it "in the direction of dialogue."

The metaphor could be dismissed as an unsuccessful attempt to camouflage the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza because of Palestinian violence and to present the evacuation as a so-called unilateral initiative. The unilateral aspect, however, is not a matter of camouflage or an excuse; rather, it goes back to the roots of the effort to return to the tried-and-true route taken by Israel (and the Jewish yishuv before the establishment of the state) for almost 90 years, from which it deviated for a short and tragic period - that of the Oslo era and its aftermath.

It is clear why Ariel Sharon (and his yes-men) stress the "unilateral" aspect, for in this way he destroys the last vestige of the Olso process, which is based on recognition of the Palestinians as a legitimate entity that represents a collective with the right to determine its own needs and aspirations and the ways of obtaining them. The "unilateralism" is an attempt to turn back the wheel to the period when Israel tried to rob the Palestinians of the ability to decide their future on the grounds that they were not a legitimate collective entity but rather "terrorists."

But why is it that groupings that are not partner to Sharon's attitude toward the Palestinians agree to this unilateralism, which denies any effort to conduct normal dialogue between the sides to the conflict? The accepted explanation is that the collapse of the peace process, the rejection of the outstretched hand and the war on terror have proven that there is no partner, or at least that the Palestinian leadership is not yet ripe for such a role. But this approach is too simplistic. After all, if indeed the Palestinians are unready, how will the "towing" succeed? And in general, it is clear that there are no "unilateral" moves but what was once known as "a dialogue of deeds:" Each side answers a move by the other side with a move of its own, and this duel continues with bloodshed, until one or both of the sides is exhausted.

It appears that the slogan of "unilateralism" based on the "lack of a partner" is meant to free them of the need to wrestle with the legitimate claims of the other side and to justify the use of - immeasurably greater - force by the Israeli side.

This is not the first time that moderate circles professing support for dialogue and peace have surrendered to the aggressive concept of Zionism that rejected the necessity to hold a dialogue with the Palestinians and promoted "unilateral" steps that reflected the gap in power (and perhaps even Israeli arrogance).

The best-known example of a supporter of compromise who reached despondency and ideological breakdown because of violence, was Arthur Ruppin, one of the leaders of Brit Shalom who supported Jewish-Arab rapprochement and abhorred Ze'ev Jabotinsky's belligerency. The Arab rebellion in the late 1930s led him to despair of any negotiations with the Arabs and to adopt a "unilateral" policy. "What we can get is not what we need, and what we need we cannot get," he said.

Moshe Dayan liked to quote Ruppin since his remarks fitted in with Dayan's worldview - without being partner to the ideological crisis they represented - and would paraphrase them in his own style: "I am against concessions in any field and if the Arabs want a war because of that, I don't object."

And after much soul-searching, Dayan's great patron, David Ben-Gurion, reached the conclusion that negotiations with the Arabs were not important since obviously it was military might that would decide things. That was why he did not attach importance to negotiating with the Arabs but rather directed his efforts toward influencing the Mandatory government to act favorably to the Jews or toward getting it to mediate. In 1949, he did not hesitate to state that "peace is vital but not at any price," and "if we chase peace, the Arabs will demand a price of us - borders, or refugees, or both. We'll wait a few years."

Sharon represents classic "unilateralism" and he draws upon the long history of aggressive Zionism for the legitimacy that permits him to enjoy the support of the peace camp that lost faith and returned to the warm bosom of the old Zionist consensus. The direct link between unilateralism and aggressiveness leading to violence does not deter Sharon. On the contrary, he is not inventing anything new here either since, as the historian Motti Golani wrote: "It was convenient for the Israeli leadership to take the route of war and it was the way of peace that caused it great difficulties ... In many senses, it is easier to go to war than the alternative of restraint and concessions of various kinds."

It is always possible to blame the other side for violence because of which "there is no one to talk to," but when the Palestinian violence turns into an alibi for "unilateralism," the excuse is exposed and the hypocrisy becomes clear. The evacuation of the Gaza Strip is not an act of towing a vehicle out of the mud but rather a reaction to the mire into which the initiator and instigator has fallen, and it is but one link in the chain of challenges and aggressive reactions on the part of both sides over a period of more than 100 years of conflict.

What is even more disheartening than the continuation of violence is the fact that unilateralism can still serve as a unifying factor and an excuse for the uncontrolled use of force, some 100 years after it was invented.