

Public Opinion Poll on Palestinian Living Conditions, the Peace Process,
Rafah Operation and Sharon's Proposed Disengagement Plan
June 4-6, 2004

"For a whole nights there was firing in our neighborhood, they demolished homes, we did not sleep at all ... firing was continuous"

a 43 year old man

61% feel insecure

"There is no income; my father became ill after they demolished our home but nobody supports us"

a 16 year old girl

Around 40% of Palestinian households live on a monthly income of less than US\$ 160

"The United Nations Security Council Resolution on Rafah is positive but we know that it is not going to be implemented"

a 60 year old man

34% consider the international resolution concerning Rafah to be positive

"There is no peace nothing ... the Israeli government tells lies, it wants all Palestinian dead"

a woman of 52 years

53% feel that Sharon is not serious about withdrawing from Gaza

"Now you see what the negotiations did for us"

A 22 year old woman

Support for negotiations fell from 61% to 45%

"We ask God to allow us to live in dignity just like other people and for the world's problems to be solved"

a man of 43 years

45% of Gaza respondents are optimistic about the future

Date of fieldwork: 4-6/6/2004

Sample size: 1197 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip

Number of sample locations: 75

Number of field workers: 85 male and female researchers

Percentage of error: + or -3%

Publication Date: 21/6/2004

- For questions or inquiries, please contact Dr. Nader Said or Ayman Abdulmajeed at the listed numbers.
- DSP opinion polls are supervised by an independent Palestinian team of academic experts (see our website).
- All results represent the opinions of the respondents and do not represent the viewpoint of Birzeit University or the Development Studies Programme or any other related body.
- For details on our methodology, refer to our web page.
- Many thanks go to the field researchers, and to the International Republican Institute (IRI) for their support.

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General conditions in the Palestinian Territories and background to the poll (March – May 2004)

The Palestinian territories have witnessed many high profile events since March 2003, including the following: -


- The Israeli government continued the construction of the Separation Wall, confiscating in the process thousands of dunums and isolating many populated areas and agricultural lands. 250 Palestinians have been killed in the period from March to May and hundreds have been wounded. Hundreds more have been detained by the Israeli Occupation Forces.
- On 22nd March, 2004, Israel assassinated Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the Gaza Strip. A few weeks later, Israel assassinated Yassin's elected successor, Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi. Israel also carried out a failed attempt in May to assassinate Mohammad Al-Hindi, a prominent leader in the Islamic Jihad movement.
- In the meantime, militant attacks against Israeli targets continued. One of the most deadly of such attacks took place on 11th May 2004 at Gaza's Al-Zaytoun neighborhood during an Israeli incursion to that area and which resulted in the killing of 10 Israeli soldiers. This followed another militant operation which took place at the Ashdod port in Tel Aviv in March, resulting in the deaths of 8 Israelis.
- On 18th May 2004, Israel carried out a major military operation against Rafah city during which tens of Palestinian citizens were killed, and hundreds of homes demolished. Thousands more became homeless as a result of the operation.
- On 20th April 2004, the UN Security Council issued a resolution condemning Israel's actions and demanded that it immediately stop the demolition of Palestinian homes in Rafah. 14 countries voted in favor of the resolution whereas the United States abstained.
- On 21st and 22nd June, The Arab League held its summit in Tunisia amid arguments and debates among the Arab leaders regarding reform and democracy issues, as well as the Palestinian and Iraqi situation.
- Sharon's Disengagement Plan from the Palestinians started to take center stage, both at regional and international levels. Although the plan was welcomed as a good starting point by most of the international community, it was rejected by Mr Sharon's own Likud Party. However, it was eventually voted through by the Israeli government. It is thought that Israel's complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will be completed by September 2004.
- Meanwhile, The Egyptian government has suggested an initiative aimed at preparing the environment for the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. It has held several high level meetings in the end of last May with the Israeli and Palestinian sides. All parties seem to be in agreement on the way forward.

Polls Results

Part One: Palestinian Living Conditions

The survey results indicate that the economic situation of citizens is still deteriorating:

- A minority of respondents described their economic situation as 'good' or 'very good' (22%). 41% described it as 'medium', while 38% described it as 'bad' or 'very bad' (41% in Gaza and 36% in the West Bank).
- Respondent Palestinian households whose heads are unemployed account for 35%. This percentage is 6.6 points up on what it was in October 2003.
- Results also show deteriorating income levels for the vast majority of Gaza residents. 39% of respondent households reported their monthly income as being less than 700 shekels (equivalent to \$157). The income of 65% of the households is less than 1700 shekels (\$382). 6% do not have any income. It is worth noting that the poverty line for a household of six members is 1641 shekels (\$362).



Results of the poll indicate that citizens have feelings of insecurity:

- The majority (61%) of the respondents have feelings of insecurity towards their households and property whereas 17% reported that they have feelings of security.
- The results show differing levels of optimism among respondents. 39% are optimistic about the future, 23% look at the future with both optimism and pessimism and 37% are pessimistic about the future. Results show that there are differences between the respondents in the West Bank and those in the Gaza Strip: 41% of the West Bank respondents are pessimistic (this percentage is 10% higher among respondents in Gaza).

Part Two: *Evaluation of the performance of various organizations in the wake of the Israeli incursion on Rafah which started on 18th May 2004.*

- High confidence in the performance of the civil society organizations, political parties and factions and UNRWA, doubt regarding the performance of the PNA organizations and a mixed attitude towards the UN resolution concerning Rafah events.
- A good majority of Gaza residents appear to be disappointed with the PNA's performance in the wake Israel's operation in Rafah. 22% of the respondents evaluated the performance of the PNA regarding the recent events in Rafah as positive, 33% as medium and 40% of the respondents said that the PNA performance had been negative.
- Palestinian Civil Society Institutions fare much better among respondents than the PNA. 46% of respondents evaluated the performance of civil society organizations in the wake of recent events in Rafah as positive, 31% as medium and 17% as negative. Evaluation of political parties and factions has been close to the performance of civil society organizations: positive 44%, medium 29% and negative 18%.
- The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and its performance in the wake of the Israeli incursion is also seen in good light among our respondents. 47% evaluated the UNRWA performance as positive, 29% as medium and 15% as negative.
- A large majority of respondents (34%) reported that the international attitude towards the Rafah events is positive, 8% considered it as negative and 22% considered it as in between.
- All the organizations obtained higher rates of evaluation among respondents in the Gaza Strip than among the West bank respondents.

Positive rates of evaluation for the CSO regarding Rafah events

Part Three: Sharon's Proposed Disengagement Plan

- Although suspicious about the intentions of Sharon and his government, respondents believe that there is a high willingness and preparedness among the various Palestinian parties in the Gaza Strip to take part in Gaza's administration. In contrast, there is reservation towards any American role in Gaza after an Israeli withdrawal.
- The majority of respondents (53%) believe that Sharon is not serious about his withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.
- If Israel does eventually withdraw from the Gaza Strip, 50% of the respondents believe that it will be partial; only 11% believe that it will be complete. Another 38% believe that there will not be any withdrawal at all. There is a marked difference between the views of West Bank respondents and those in the Gaza Strip. While 55% of Gaza respondents believe that the withdrawal will be partial, 47% of the West Bank respondents believe the same and while 41% of the West Bank respondents believe that there is not going to be any withdrawal from Gaza Strip, 34% of Gaza Strip respondents have the same belief.


- **PNA and withdrawal from Gaza Strip**
 - 39% of the respondents believe that the PNA is fully prepared for running the Gaza Strip, 31% believe that it is prepared to a certain extent and 25% of the respondents believe that it is unprepared for the task.
 - 34% of the respondents believe that their living conditions will improve when the PNA takes over the day-to-day running of the Gaza Strip. In comparison, 29% believe that that will not improve their conditions, while 33% believe that their conditions will improve to a certain extent.

- **Background to withdrawal plan from the Gaza Strip**
 - 77% of the respondents believe that the proposed Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is to avoid more considerable losses among the Israeli occupation forces.
 - 78% of the respondents (83% in Gaza Strip compared to 73% in the West Bank) believe that the withdrawal plan from Gaza will be at the expense of worsening occupation in the West Bank.
 - 57% of the respondents believe that withdrawal from the Gaza Strip will bring chaos and internal fighting. Asked if the respondents believed that the Palestinian political parties and factions are likely to succeed in avoiding internal fighting, 64% of them reported that they will.

- **The Political future of the Gaza Strip after the proposed Israeli withdrawal**
 - 37% of the respondents believe that the PNA has a program and a comprehensive plan for the administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal while 36% believe that the PNA has a program and a plan to a certain extent and 20% believe that the PNA does not have a plan at all.
 - 42% of the respondents believe that the PNA does not have a political program for confronting Sharon's plans while 25% believe that it has this program and 25% believe that it has this program to a certain extent.
 - 28% of the respondents see that the Palestinian opposition does not have a political program for confronting Sharon's plans while 35% reported that it has and 27% believe that it has to a certain extent.
 - The majority (61%) of the respondents support the continuation of the armed resistance from Gaza strip against Israel after it withdraws whereas 35% are opposed.
 - 84% of the respondents support the necessity of unifying the security apparatuses into one security apparatus in the event of an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip.
 - Also, 84% of respondents (89% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip compared to 81% in the West Bank) believe that it is necessary to immediately conduct legislative elections in Gaza in the event of an Israeli withdrawal from it.
 - Asked about the most suitable leadership structure of the Gaza Strip after an Israeli withdrawal, 59% of the respondents believe that the most suitable would be a unified national leadership including all the parties (63% in the West Bank and 56% in Gaza strip), 23% reported that the PNA would be the most suitable. This figure was 17% for Hamas and Islamic Jihad (20% in the West Bank and 11% in Gaza strip).

- **Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip**
 - 45% of the respondents believe that the Gaza Strip is likely to be a prosperous place after an Israeli withdrawal, while 34% see this possibility to a certain extent and 18% do not see such a possibility.
 - 39% of respondents believe that the top priority after withdrawal is achievement of security and safety, whereas 28% declared that priority is for the reconstruction of the destroyed areas.

Most important priorities after Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip



Most important priorities after Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip

- Asked what should happen to the Israeli settlements after they are evacuated, 41% of the respondents believe they should be used to house returning refugees whereas 32% support their transformation for the inhabitants of the camps in Gaza Strip. It seems obvious that transforming the settlements into investment areas is a higher priority among Gaza Strip respondents than among West Bank respondents.

Table 1: Purposes to which respondents support the transformation of the settlements to in case of their evacuation

	Palestinian territories	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Allocate them for returning refugees	40.8	45.0	34.2
Housing units for Gaza Strip refugees	32.4	35.5	27.7
Investment zones (tourist and industrial)	11.0	6.1	18.6
Transform them into public buildings	4.2	4.0	4.5
Housing units for PNA employees	3.9	4.7	2.6
Others	7.7	4.7	12.4

• Financing of Gaza Strip reconstruction

- 70% of the respondents oppose any American role in the financing the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the event of an Israeli withdrawal from it, while 28% are supportive of an American role.
- The majority of the respondents support financing by different parties as follows: Arab countries (87%), Japan and other Asian countries (73%), European countries (68%) and UN financing (78%).
- Findings point out that there is higher support among respondents in Gaza Strip for financing from different sources than among respondents in the West Bank (see table 2).

Table 2: Percentages of respondents supporting financing by different parties in Gaza Strip reconstruction


	Palestinian territories	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Arab financing	87.1	84.9	90.5
Japanese and Asian countries financing	73.2	69.6	78.9
European financing	68.4	66.3	71.7
UN financing	68.3	64.2	74.7
American financing	27.8	25.0	32.3

• **Role of various parties in Gaza’s administration**

- 85% of the respondents oppose any provisional role for the United States in the administration of the Gaza Strip after the Israeli withdrawal while 13% support such a role.
- In the same context, the majority of the respondents support an effective role for each of the World Bank (57%), Arab league (56%), and UN (55%) in a provisional administration for Gaza strip after the Israeli withdrawal. In addition, 45% support a role for Egypt and 40% support a role for the European Union.

Rates of supporters for efficient roles for different parties in the administration of the Gaza Strip for a provisional period after withdrawal

Rates of supporters for efficient roles for different parties in the administration of the Gaza Strip for a provisional period after




Part Four: Peace process and the Arab Summit

- General frustration among the Palestinians towards the possibilities of achieving Palestinian-Israeli peace accompanied by high suspicion about the intentions of Israel and the United States concerning achieving peace for the Palestinians. The Palestinian street is still betting on the importance of demonstrations carried out by Israeli peace movements against the occupation policy of Israel in comparison with the negative attitude of the Arab street and Summit towards the Palestinian cause. Nevertheless, respondents generally support the sponsorship of the Arab League for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
1. **Absence of confidence in the American role in the peace process:** 87% of respondents said that they do not believe that the United States is serious about achieving peace in the Middle East. Only 7% of respondents believe otherwise.
 2. **Low support for negotiations:** The majority of respondents (52%) expressed their opposition for a return to negotiations with Israel, whereas 45% indicated their support for such a move. It is worth noting here that support rates for a return to negotiations with the Israelis have dropped by 16 percentage points in comparison with October 2003 polls (61%).
 3. **Israel is not willing to achieve peace with the Palestinians:** The poll's findings indicate that 88% of the Palestinian public believe that Israel has no real willingness to achieve peace with the Palestinians.
 4. **Solving the refugee issue is the foundation of any peace agreement:** The majority (84%) expressed that peace is impossible between Palestinians and Israelis if Israel does not recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return, whereas only 13% believe that there is possibility for peace between the two sides even in the event that Israel does not recognize the right of refugees to return to their homes.
 5. **Difficulties in co-existence between Palestinians and Israelis:** The majority of respondents (54%) doubt the possibility of co-existence, side by side, between Palestinians and Israelis within the framework of a peace treaty. 38% believe otherwise.
 6. **The Arab League is the most acceptable party to sponsor the peace process:** The extent to which the Palestinian public prefers various parties to sponsor the peace process is as follows: Arab League (51%), United Nations (25%), United States (5%) and other parties (14%).
 7. **Reliance on the Israeli peace movement:** The survey findings show that the Palestinians still believe in the importance of demonstrations carried out by Israeli peace movement; 52% of the respondents believe in their importance, 23% consider them important to a certain extent, whereas 22% do not see any importance for such demonstrations.
 8. **A negative attitude to the official Arab role:** While the majority (79%) of the respondents negatively evaluated the Arab Summit results, 24% of the Palestinians evaluated the role of the Arab people as positive, 32% as in between and 41% as negative.

Part Five: Political trends

- **Unprecedented support for the Islamic movements in comparison with other national factions; while support for the Islamic movements reached 37%, the support for PLO factions together reached 31%.**
 - 42% of the respondents expressed their non-support for any of the political factions on the Palestinian arena.
 - 22.6% of the respondents expressed their support for Fateh, 4.1% of the respondents expressed their support for the Palestinian leftist factions, 24.8% support Hamas and 4.9% of the respondents support the Islamic Jihad.
 - Asking the independents (42%) about their tendencies for any of the above- mentioned political trends, 7.6% of them expressed their tendency towards the Islamic movements compared to 3.1% for Fateh.
 - The Palestinian street, at the time of the poll, was divided as follows: 37.0% for Islamic movements, 25.7% for Fateh, 4.3% for the leftist factions and 31.3% do not support any of the political groups.

Support rates for the political movements



- **Arafat is the most popular Palestinian personality**
 - Asked about the person they believe is best placed to lead the Palestinian people in the period after the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the results are as follows: Yasser Arafat (33%), Marwan Barghouthi (3.6%), Mohammad Dahlan (2.6%), Ahmad Qurei (2.3%). 11% of the respondents nominated prominent leaders in the Islamic movements for that role. Among such personalities are Ismail Hania (Hamas, 4.5%), Mahmoud Al-Zahar (Hamas, 3.7%). 5% of the respondents nominated leftist and independent personalities such as Haidar Abdel Shafi (2.5%).
 - 37% of the respondents have not identified any Palestinian personality they trust to lead the Palestinian people in the period after the proposed Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip.
 - The question in popularity was an open-ended question. This is not the same as saying “who would you elect?”.

Annex 1

Results of Opinion Poll # 16

	Total %	West Bank %	Gaza Strip %
Section One: Living Conditions			
1. At the present time, how do you evaluate your family's economic conditions?			
1) Very good	4.0	3.3	5.2
2) Good	17.5	17.2	17.9
3) Fair	40.7	43.5	36.3
4) Bad	21.6	21.9	21.1
5) Very bad	16.3	14.1	19.5
2. Does the family have a working breadwinner?			
1) Yes	65.4	66.1	64.3
2) No	34.6	33.9	35.7
3. At present, do you feel secure about yourself, your family, and your property?			
1) Yes	17.4	17.2	17.7
2) To an extent	21.7	21.7	21.7
3) No	60.5	60.6	60.4
4) No opinion	0.4	0.5	0.3
4. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?			
1) Optimistic	39.2	35.5	44.9
2) In between	23.2	23.5	22.6
3) Pessimistic	36.8	40.5	31.0
4) Do not know	0.9	0.5	1.5
Section Two: The Peace Process			
5. Do you believe that the United States is serious about achieving peace in the Middle East?			
1) Yes	7.2	5.4	10.1
2) No	88.8	90.1	86.8
3) No opinion	3.9	4.5	3.1
6. Do you support return to negotiations with the Israelis?			
1) Yes	44.7	44.2	45.4
2) No	53.2	53.1	53.3
3) No opinion	2.1	2.7	1.3
7. Do you think that Israel has a genuine desire to achieve peace with the Palestinians?			
1) Yes	8.8	8.1	9.8
2) No	88.2	88.5	87.8
3) No opinion	3.0	3.3	2.4
8. Do you believe that peace is possible between Palestinians and Israelis if Israel does not recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return?			

1) Yes	12.9	11.6	15.0
2) No	84.3	84.8	83.6
3) No opinion	2.8	3.6	1.4

9. Do you think that there is a chance for peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis on the basis of justice (according to UN resolutions)?			
1) Yes	37.7	39.6	34.6
2) No	54.3	53.0	56.2
3) No opinion	8.1	7.4	9.2
10. In the case that negotiations continue, under what auspices should they be under?			
1) Arab League	51.2	54.3	46.3
2) UN	25.4	27.7	21.8
3) others	13.5	13.0	14.3
4) USA	4.7	4.9	4.2
5) Not sure	5.2	0.0	13.3
11. Do you feel that the rallies organized by the Israeli peace movement are important in opposing Prime Minister Sharon's policies?			
1) Yes, Important	51.9	47.1	59.4
2) Important to some extent	22.8	25.4	18.7
3) Not Important	22.3	24.1	19.5
4) No opinion	3.0	3.5	2.4
12. How do you evaluate the results of the Arab Summit held in Tunis (21-22/5/2004)?			
1) Positive	3.7	3.1	4.6
2) Fair	17.3	15.8	19.7
3) Negative	68.9	68.9	68.9
4) No opinion	10.1	12.3	6.7
13. How do you evaluate the role of the Arab people in supporting Palestinians?			
1) Positive	23.8	22.0	26.5
2) Fair	31.5	31.6	31.4
3) Negative	41.3	43.0	38.6
4) No opinion	3.4	3.4	3.5
Section Three: The Role of Institutions in Rafah			
14. How do you evaluate the performance of PNA institutions in dealing with the latest attack on Rafah 18/05/2004?			
1) Positive	21.6	18.9	25.7
2) Fair	32.9	33.2	32.5
3) Negative	39.8	40.4	39.0
4) No opinion	5.7	7.5	2.7
15. How do you evaluate the performance of Palestinian NGOs in dealing with the latest attack on Rafah?			
1) Positive	45.8	35.5	61.8
2) Fair	30.9	32.8	28.0
3) Negative	17.3	23.1	8.2
4) No opinion	5.9	8.5	1.9

16. How do you evaluate the performance of Palestinian political parties in dealing with the latest attack on Rafah?			
1) Positive	43.8	34.9	57.7
2) Fair	28.5	30.6	25.1
3) Negative	18.3	22.2	12.2
4) No opinion	9.4	12.2	5.0
17. How do you evaluate the performance of UNRWA in dealing with the latest attack on Rafah?			
1) Positive	46.6	36.8	61.9
2) Fair	28.7	31.6	24.1
3) Negative	14.8	18.5	8.9
4) No opinion	10.0	13.1	5.1
18. How do you evaluate the international position as represented by the Security Council decision (20/05/2004) condemning Israeli attacks on Rafah?			
1) Positive	33.7	26.0	45.9
2) Fair	21.7	22.2	20.9
3) Negative	38.3	43.8	29.6
4) No opinion	6.3	8.0	3.6
Section For: Sharon Withdrawal Plan from Gaza			
19. Do you believe that the Israeli Government is serious about withdrawing from Gaza?			
1) Yes	19.6	19.3	20.2
2) To some extent	25.2	23.4	28.0
3) No	52.8	54.3	50.5
4) Don't know/No opinion	2.4	3.0	1.4
20. Do you believe that the withdrawal will be:			
1) Full withdrawal	11.3	11.2	11.4
2) A partial withdrawal	50.0	46.9	54.7
3) There will be no withdrawal	38.4	41.4	33.7
4) No opinion	0.4	0.4	0.2
21. Do you believe that the PNA is qualified to take over authority in Gaza?			
1) Yes	39.3	38.7	40.3
2) To some extent	30.7	29.5	32.5
3) No	24.7	25.4	23.8
4) Don't know/No opinion	5.3	6.5	3.4
22. Will the PNA be able to improve living conditions in Gaza after the Israeli withdrawal?			
1) Yes	34.3	34.8	33.5
2) To some extent	33.2	33.3	33.1
3) No	28.9	27.8	30.8
4) Don't know/No opinion	3.5	4.1	2.6
23. Will the Israeli withdrawal lead to a more secure situation in Gaza?			
1) Yes	46.6	46.3	47.1
2) To some extent	29.7	29.2	30.5
3) No	20.5	20.6	20.2
4) Don't know/No opinion	3.2	3.6	2.1

24. Will the Gaza withdrawal reinforce the Israeli occupation in the West Bank?			
1) Yes	76.7	72.5	83.3
2) No	14.9	16.9	11.7
3) No opinion	8.4	10.5	5.0
25. Did the Israeli withdrawal come to avoid more Israeli casualties among Israeli military forces?			
1) Yes	75.0	72.6	78.6
2) No	19.7	20.3	18.8
3) No opinion	5.3	7.1	2.6
26. Do you believe that the Gaza withdrawal is aimed at causing chaos and infighting among the various Palestinian factions?			
1) Yes	57.0	57.6	56.0
2) No	36.1	33.8	39.6
3) No opinion	7.0	8.7	4.3
27. Do you believe that the Palestinian political groups will be able to avoid such a possibility?			
1) Yes	64.2	63.6	65.2
2) No	27.5	26.3	29.4
3) No opinion	8.3	10.1	5.4
28. Do you believe that Gaza might become an economically prosperous place?			
1) Yes	44.8	44.0	46.1
2) To some extent	33.7	33.1	34.5
3) No	18.0	18.0	18.1
4) Don't know/No opinion	3.5	4.8	1.4
29. In the event that Israel withdrew from settlements in Gaza, what would be the best option in dealing with them in your opinion?			
1) Turn them into investment areas (tourism and industrial areas)	40.8	45.0	34.2
2) Housing for Gaza camp residents	32.4	35.5	27.7
3) Turn them into public institutions	11.0	6.1	18.6
4) Housing for PNA employees	4.2	4.0	4.5
5) Housing for returning refugees from the Diaspora	3.9	4.7	2.6
6) Others	7.7	4.7	12.4
30. In the event of an Israeli withdrawal, which one of the following is the most important priority?			
1) Bringing security and personal safety	38.6	40.7	35.5
2) Rebuilding areas destroyed by the Israeli occupation	27.9	29.1	26.0
3) Improving economic conditions	15.5	13.3	19.0
4) Rebuilding infrastructure	12.8	12.0	14.1
5) Rebuilding PNA institutions	3.9	3.3	4.8
6) Others	1.2	1.5	0.6
31. In the event of an Israeli withdrawal do you support or oppose the following:			

Continuation of armed resistance against Israel coming from Gaza			
1) Support	61.2	59.2	64.5
2) Oppose	35.2	35.7	34.4
3) Don't know/No opinion	3.6	5.2	1.1

Unification of security agencies into one body			
1) Support	84.3	83.1	86.2
2) Oppose	13.1	13.6	12.4
3) Don't know/No opinion	2.6	3.3	1.5

Conducting an immediate legislative election in Gaza			
1) Support	84.1	80.8	89.2
2) Oppose	10.7	11.8	9.0
3) Don't know/No opinion	5.3	7.5	1.8

32. Do you believe that the PNA has a comprehensive plan of action to administer Gaza after Israel withdraws?			
1) Yes	37.4	36.2	39.4
2) To some extent	35.7	37.9	32.1
3) No	19.9	17.8	23.2
4) Don't know/No opinion	7.0	8.1	5.3

33. Do you believe that the PNA has a political program to combat the Sharon political plan?			
1) Yes	24.6	21.8	28.8
2) To some extent	25.4	26.8	23.3
3) No	42.1	41.2	43.4
4) Don't know/No opinion	8.0	10.2	4.6

34. Do you believe that the Palestinian opposition has a political program to combat the Sharon political plan?			
1) Yes	35.3	31.8	40.7
2) To some extent	27.1	30.6	21.6
3) No	28.4	26.8	30.9
4) Don't know/No opinion	9.2	10.8	6.7

35. In general, who would be the most qualified to lead in Gaza after Israel withdraws?			
1) a unified national leadership	59.0	56.3	63.3
2) PNA	22.9	21.9	24.5
3) Hamas & Islamic Jihad	16.7	20.1	11.3
4) Leftist groups	0.5	0.5	0.5
5) others	0.9	1.2	0.4

36. Do you support or oppose a significant role for the following entities in administering Gaza for a transitional period after an Israeli withdrawal?

The World Bank			
1) Support	57.1	52.9	63.6
2) Oppose	36.4	39.0	32.2
3) Don't know/No opinion	6.5	8.1	4.1

Arab League			
1) Support	56.4	53.9	60.3
2) Oppose	40.1	41.1	38.6

3) Don't know/No opinion	3.5	5.0	1.1
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United Nations			
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1) Support	54.5	51.1	59.8
2) Oppose	41.4	43.3	38.3
3) Don't know/No opinion	4.1	5.6	1.8

Egypt			
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1) Support	44.8	43.8	46.3
2) Oppose	52.0	51.3	52.9
3) Don't know/No opinion	3.3	4.9	0.7

The European Union			
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1) Support	40.0	33.7	49.8
2) Oppose	55.5	60.3	48.0
3) Don't know/No opinion	4.4	5.9	2.1

The United States			
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1) Support	12.5	10.2	16.1
2) Oppose	85.0	86.0	83.4
3) Don't know/No opinion	2.5	3.8	0.5

37. To re-build Gaza, should we accept funding from the following sources?			
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Arab Countries			
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1) Support	87.1	84.9	90.5
2) Oppose	11.7	13.0	9.5
3) Don't know/No opinion	1.3	2.1	0.0

Japan and Asia			
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1) Support	73.2	69.6	78.9
2) Oppose	23.2	25.2	19.9
3) Don't know/No opinion	3.6	5.2	1.2

The EU			
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1) Support	68.4	66.3	71.7
2) Oppose	28.8	29.9	26.9
3) Don't know/No opinion	2.9	3.8	1.4

United Nations			
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1) Support	68.3	64.2	74.7
2) Oppose	29.7	33.0	24.7
3) Don't know/No opinion	2.0	2.8	0.6

The United States			
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1) Support	27.8	25.0	32.3
2) Oppose	70.2	72.1	67.3
3) Don't know/No opinion	1.9	2.9	0.4

38. Which of the following political groups do support?			
1) Hamas	24.8	24.0	26.1
2) Fateh	22.6	21.4	24.4
3) Independent, with Islamic leaning	7.6	8.0	6.9
4) Islamic Jihad	4.9	5.8	3.6
5) Independent, with Fateh leaning	3.1	3.4	2.7
6) PFLP	2.0	1.0	3.5
7) PPP	0.8	1.0	0.6
8) Feda	0.7	1.1	0.0
9) Other Islamic Factions	0.7	0.9	0.4
10) Other National Factions	0.6	1.1	0.0
11) DFLP	0.5	0.5	0.5
12) Independent, with Leftist leaning	0.3	0.3	0.2
13) None	31.3	31.4	31.1

Annex 2: Sample distribution

Region	%	Type of locality	%	Refugee Status	%
West Bank	60.9	City	38.9	Refugee	47.4
Gaza Strip	39.1	Village- town	37.4	Non-refugee	52.6
Governorate	%	Camp	23.7	Sector	%
Jenin	6.7	Gender	%	Private sector	71.0
Tubas	1.3	Male	50.3	N.G.O.'s	4.4
Tulkarm	3.4	Female	49.7	Public Sector	24.7
Nablus	10.2			Education	%
Qalqilya	2.8	Marital status	%	Illiterate	20.3
Salfit	1.2	Single	28.3	Preparatory	21.2
Jericho	1.1	Married	67.1	Elementary	31.1
Ramallah	7.8	Others	4.5	Secondary	16.7
Jerusalem	9.9	Age	%	Diploma	4.9
Bethlehem	4.4	16-17	8.2	B.A. or more	5.7
Hebron	12.2	18-22	17.7	Place of Residence prior to 1994	%
North Gaza	7.9	23-27	15.1		
Gaza City	13.5	28-32	12.6		
Deir al-Balah	4.8	33-37	10.9	West Bank & Gaza	92.5
Khan Younis	8.5	38-42	8.8	Abroad	7.5
Rafah	4.3	43-47	6.4	Income (NIS)*	%
Occupation	%	48-52	4.9	No Income	6.3
Laborers	7.1	> 52	15.5	Less than 700	33.1
Craftsman	3.5	Occupation	%	700-1000	18.2
Housewives	41.3	Professional	0.6	1001-1700	18.0
Unemployed	16.9	Employees	8.5	1701-2500	13.1
Merchants	3.4	Retired	1.2	2501-3000	5.1
Students	16.0	Farmers	1.6	More than 3000	6.3
*1\$= 4.45NIS					