The Bush initiative to convene an international meeting on the Middle East has caused contradicting reactions in the region.

Some politicians and analysts, particularly in Israel and Palestine, have greeted the initiative with optimism. They believe that as a result, a political process may be reactivated along with the American engagement that the conflict has long been waiting for. They see in this plan an attempt to reverse American support for former Israeli PM Ariel Sharon's unilateral approach and a return to the bilateral process that the US has traditionally supported.

But others have been very skeptical about the real American motives and the ability of this administration to deliver anything positive on the Middle East. The skepticism stems from the absence of any reflection of a new American attitude in American-Israeli relations of a kind that can significantly affect ongoing Israeli policies and practices that consolidate the occupation. Such a change is seen by many as the most important criteria in judging the seriousness of any US initiative.

On the regional level, the exclusion of Syria from the meeting and thus discussion about Syrian-Israeli relations also casts a cloud over the initiative. Without Syria there is already a lack of Arab harmony, which is necessary to reach comprehensive peace as outlined by the Arab initiative. A comprehensive peace promises normalization across the board in exchange for a full withdrawal from occupied territory including the Golan Heights, but it needs broad Arab support and without Syria, this support is already weakened.

With regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, two factors mitigate against optimistic scenarios regarding an historic breakthrough before the end of US President George W. Bush' term. The first is the internal Israeli political scene and the second is internal Palestinian divisions.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who along with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas appears to be going along with the US initiative, is facing significant political difficulties in the near future with the publication of the Winograd commission's final report into the Israeli government's handling of last year's war in Lebanon. As a result, an atmosphere of electoral politics is already apparent in Israel, with Labor leader Ehud Barak and Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu training their sights on each other. The recent prominent statement by Barak dismissing the possibility of significant political progress between Israel and the Palestinians in the near future would appear to be the opening salvo in this battle.

In such an atmosphere, the internal Israeli political scene will not be conducive to the kind of change in Israeli policies and practices that would be needed for real political progress. More importantly, however, and regardless of the atmosphere, Israeli policies on the ground are completely incompatible with a fruitful political process. In spite of promises to the contrary, Olmert has been unable to remove settlement outposts, while settlement expansion continues apace. In addition, the system of restrictions on Palestinian movement continues unabated and the illegal wall in Palestinian territory only grows longer with each passing day.

As experience has shown, to allow settlement expansion to continue in tandem with a political process is to condemn the latter.

On the Palestinian side, the situation also is not conducive to real political progress. Isolating Hamas in the Gaza Strip does not reduce the movement's influence. In complete control of part of occupied Palestinian territory, Hamas still enjoys support from a majority of Palestinians in every single district across occupied Palestinian land. And although Hamas is unable to take over militarily in the West Bank as it did in Gaza, this is only a result of Israeli military control there. Hamas will thus be able to play the spoiler of any process if it so desires and if it continues to be neglected.

There are two prerequisites on the Palestinian side before a critical stage in any political process can be reached. One is to shift the balance of power between Fateh and Hamas, something that requires a little bit more than just paying the salaries of PA employees and includes the reform and unification of Fateh. The second is to launch an internal dialogue with Hamas that will give the movement an agreed-upon role in internal Palestinian arrangements in return for allowing a process to proceed. This is similar to the arrangement that was established by the Mecca agreement in which Hamas formed part of the government and Abbas was mandated by a national unity government and a Hamas-led parliament to proceed with a political process. As long as Hamas is a significant power and in fact enjoys majority support, it's impossible to ignore the movement when it comes to strategic developments like the process that is being suggested by this autumn meeting.

While renewed American diplomatic involvement is a good sign, success also requires American efforts in influencing positively internal Israeli politics while taking into consideration the internal Palestinian political reality.

Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications. He is vice-president of Birzeit University and a former Palestinian Authority minister of planning.