The roadmap was one of the most central and important diplomatic achievements of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. It was intended to delineate the stages of entering into a peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, up to and including a permanent status peace agreement between them.

At the time, some optimists undoubtedly hoped to see the roadmap usher in a process that would lead us to peace. Ariel Sharon, on the other hand, saw in the roadmap and the international imprimatur that rendered it official the ultimate diplomatic maneuver. It would free him and Israel from pressures to offer concessions and to enter into a dangerous peace process that contradicted his determined strategy of anchoring Israel's grip on Judea and Samaria.

Sharon's great achievement was phase I of the roadmap: as a precondition to initiating final status negotiations between the two sides, the Palestinian Authority was required to condemn all violent activity and dismantle and eliminate the terrorist infrastructure. True, Israel too was required to take action in phase I as a precondition for negotiations: to cease all new construction in the territories and remove all illegal outposts. But Sharon was confident the Palestinian side would not deliver on its obligations. Since there was in any case no Israeli intention to negotiate, Israel too ignored its obligations under the roadmap.

Several years have passed since then. Now, in the course of the past year, the Olmert government has engineered an 180-degree about-face in Sharon's policy. Determined to exploit the remainder of the term of an involved and friendly president in the White House, Israel initiated talks and negotiations. Without saying so explicitly, Jerusalem transformed phase I of the roadmap from a precondition for beginning final status negotiations to a precondition for beginning to implement the negotiated final status agreement. Amazingly, this policy shift was accepted by public opinion and the political system in Israel without opposition.

The Six-Day War produced the Khartoum Arab summit known for its three "nos": no to recognition, no to negotiations and no to peace with Israel. Forty years elapsed before the leaders of the same Arab states again convened in Saudi Arabia and produced three "yeses": yes to recognition, yes to negotiations and yes to peace with Israel. They did not reverse themselves out of love for Israel. What motivated them was the urgent need to focus on domestic and external problems that weigh heavily on them but cannot be dealt with until they are relieved of the burden of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The Annapolis conference will apparently be the last opportunity to energize the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the coming two years. If a breakthrough is not achieved now, another attempt is doubtful so close to the end of President George W. Bush's tenure in the White House, while the next administration will require a period of learning and organization before it can be expected to produce new initiatives.

We are currently in the midst of negotiations. The media carry the two sides' positions on the core issues: permanent borders, the future of Jerusalem and of course a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. The course of the Annapolis conference will be influenced by the views and status of Israel's three leading ministers (PM Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni) who make up its delegation, while the political right--both those parties inside the coalition and those in the parliamentary opposition--seeks to tie their hands before they even arrive in Annapolis. In the Knesset, the opposition is trying to pass a law that would prevent territorial concessions in Jerusalem without an 80 member of Knesset majority, while inside the government Minister Avigdor Lieberman wants to pose a precondition for the Palestinians: recognizing Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state.

Meanwhile, on the Palestinian side President Mahmoud Abbas recognizes that his Hamas rivals are waiting to ambush him and portray him as a collaborator with Israel. Hence he is bound to adhere to tough Palestinian demands.

At the head of the pyramid of leaders at Annapolis is President Bush. Under the circumstances, all eyes are focused on him. The chances of success at Annapolis will to a large degree be determined by the degree of involvement, initiative and creativity displayed by the American hosts during the discussions and their involvement in implementing the agreement. The American positions and the president's personal involvement and dedication will determine whether the conference ends up with yet another lukewarm diplomatic declaration that cannot be translated into political progress--or produces a launching pad for real, energetic and promising negotiations.

It would be a pity to miss this opportunity.- Published 19/11/2007 © bitterlemons.org

Major General (ret.) Shlomo Gazit was head of IDF Intelligence Analysis and Assessment in June 1967. He was the first coordinator of Israeli government operations in the occupied territories.