At the close of the Annapolis conference, PM Ehud Olmert made a statement that few Israeli leftists would dare to mouth. In an interview with Haaretz he declared that without an agreement with the Palestinians for a two-state solution, the future of the state of Israel would be in doubt. He threatened that if we don't make haste, Israel would become an apartheid state. An experienced politician and crafty lawyer like Olmert undoubtedly understands that an agreement is dependent on the good will of both sides. In other words, according to Olmert the fate of Zionism is dependent on the desire and the capacity of the Palestinian side to reach a compromise with Israel regarding the heavy issues that are up for negotiation: borders, Jerusalem, refugees, water and security.

In order to ensure the realization of an agreement that preserves Zionism, Israel must have an interest in quickly neutralizing the many minefields embedded in each and every one of these topics. So why is it laying yet another landmine under the negotiating table in the form of a demand that the Palestinians recognize it as a "Jewish state"? Had Olmert taken the trouble to hold a serious discussion of this issue in advance, the experts would have reminded him that 19 years ago the most senior institution of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian National Council, recognized UN General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947, that declared the establishment of two states, one Jewish and one Arab. In an interview in Haaretz on June 18, 2004, Yasser Arafat stated that he understands perfectly that Israel must continue to be a Jewish state, and declared that the PLO had recognized this "openly and officially".

True, words spoken in reply to a journalist's query have an entirely different significance than a declaration delivered in response to an official demand from the other side in a negotiation. The demand that the Palestinians officially recognize a Jewish state in the context of a diplomatic agreement with Israel is legitimate. The logic that informs this demand is a readiness on the part of Israel to recognize Palestine as the state of the Palestinians. Yet nothing could be more asymmetric than the current relationship between a sovereign, strong and occupier state of Israel on the one hand, and a weak, occupied and non-sovereign Palestine on the other. The peace process is currently jeopardized; any attempt to compel the Palestinians to put the cart before the horse could bring about collapse.

Sources close to Olmert explain that he played the card of recognition of a Jewish state because of internal coalition constraints. Didn't he take into account that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) labors under similar constraints? Olmert should have known that Abbas would not give him in 2007 what Arafat refused to give Ehud Barak seven years and thousands of dead Palestinians ago.

Olmert misses no opportunity to speak of Abu Mazen's political weakness and the need to strengthen his status vis-a-vis Hamas and militant elements within Fateh. He should have known that for Abbas to freely give up a trump card in the form of a Palestinian declaration recognizing a Jewish state would in fact strengthen his rivals. What would Abu Mazen reply to their request to know what the Jewish state had given him in return for a declaration that should be part of the consequences of negotiations rather than a condition for holding them? What incentive did Olmert give Abbas for opening a confrontation with Israeli Arabs who are struggling to change the definition of Israel from the state of the Jews to a state of all its citizens? Apropos the new Har Homa construction, has Israel commenced dismantling outposts, removing checkpoints and freezing construction in the settlements? Nor have we mentioned concessions on core issues that Olmert is careful to leave deep in his pockets.

Even without the Jewish state issue, more and more Palestinians are demanding to abandon the problematic two-state solution in favor of the old one-state solution--the very model Olmert is so apprehensive about. The prime minister's behavior in this affair is reminiscent of his demand that Syria commit in advance to cut its ties with Iran and expel Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal from Damascus, all in return for Israel agreeing to speak with it, but without ceasing Jewish settlement activities on the Golan Heights.

Assuming Olmert really is interested in solving the conflict and not in inventing new problems, his decision to turn recognition of Israel as a Jewish state into a point of controversy appears to show that he has not drawn the necessary lessons from his mistakes in the Second Lebanon War. Once again he has abruptly plunged the Jewish state and himself into a dire predicament that he has no idea how to get out of.- Published 17/12/2007 © bitterlemons.org

Akiva Eldar is senior columnist for Haaretz and co-author of Lords of the Land, the war over the Israeli settlements, 1967-2007 (Nation Books).