Sultan Abu al-Ghneim, who represents Fatah in the refugee camps of Lebanon, gave a speech last week at a Ramallah rally and called on Fatah to resume suicide bombings against Israel, according to the report in the London-based Al-Quds al-Arabi. But how reliable the report is remains unclear.

Abu al-Ghneim reportedly called on Fatah to use the "doom's day weapon" that the group used at the peak of the second intifada and has not employed for the past three years.

Palestinian sources in the West Bank could not confirm it. The statement being attributed to Abu al-Ghneim is just the latest of a series of statements by Fatah members, some more important than others, who threaten to resume the armed struggle. Similar ideas were heard during the sixth Fatah conference in Bethlehem in August, and also in recent talks between Fatah and Hamas. Such talk is certainly a subject of concern for Israelis.

The threat of a third intifada, which was discussed at length during the Sukkot holiday and the troubles at the Temple Mount, incited by third-rate activists of the Palestinian Authority and the Islamic Movement in Israel, apparently died down as the clashes ebbed. There are still plenty of reasons for concern, mainly because of the dead end in which the two sides have found themselves.

From this viewpoint, the situation between Israel and the Palestinians, specifically in the West Bank, may be ready to explode, despite the improvement in the economy there, the relatively effective governance of Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad and the improved security coordination between the Israeli Defense Forces and the PA's organs. The relations between all the sides - Israel and the U.S., Israel and the PA, Fatah and Hamas and the various other groups in the PA - are characterized now by seriously bad blood. Herein are some of the more obvious trends:

1. Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are stuck. The PA has climbed up too high a tree; when American pressure managed to force Israel to contain its building in the West Bank, it demanded a complete freeze in settlements as a precondition for resuming the negotiations with the Netanyahu government.

The rushed (and quick) about-face on the Goldstone Commission report caused Abbas confusion and embarrassment, and he fears any concession to Israel on this matter will cost him further attacks from Hamas, which will charge he is adding further betrayal to his original "selling-out."

2. A dead end between Fatah and Hamas. Even the Egyptian mediators are now refusing to name a new date for a meeting of the Palestinian factions so a reconciliation agreement can be signed. Hamas' list of excuses for refusing is bordering on the absurd. First, it opposed the principles of the agreement, and then based its opposition on the fact that the PA had delayed appealing to the UN on the Goldstone report, and now it's bringing up reservations on points in the agreement. Hamas apparently fears parliamentary and presidential elections, and notwithstanding its declarations to the contrary, it is not convinced it can defeat Fatah at the polls.

3. An internal crisis in Fatah. The situation in Fatah is not necessarily better. A survey published yesterday by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center shows that only 12.1 percent of those asked trust Abbas. The Hamas prime minister in the Gaza Strip, Ismail Haniyeh, received 14.2 percent support. Many Fatah members are troubled and angered by Abbas' handling of the Goldstone report. The internal criticism may create instability in Fatah and affect Abbas' ties with Israel.

Fatah members are, therefore, going to great efforts to distinguish themselves from the PA and Abbas. According to the survey, their efforts are paying off: 34.6 percent of those asked expressed support for Fatah, compared to only 17.9 percent for Hamas. However, their pronouncements may come at a price: Grassroots operatives may take their words literally as justification for violent attacks - first and foremost, for carrying out sporadic shootings in the West Bank.

4. Israeli hesitation. The behavior of the PA on the issues mentioned, along with the improved capabilities of its security forces and the fear this could turn, one day, against Israelis, have raised questions among the political and IDF leadership on the wisdom of further efforts to bolster the PA. So Israel is not eager to authorize the transfer of further security control to the PA, allowing more units to be trained by the Americans in Jordan or the equipping of PA security forces with more sophisticated means.

5. Jerusalem. "It's true those were French tourists," said a Fatah activist this week, in a belated acknowledgment on the Temple Mount incident that sparked riots earlier this month. But he immediately played dumb: "But how could we have known?" The issue of Jerusalem, and the Temple Mount specifically, remains quite sensitive. In Israel, there are concerns the accumulation of pressures from various sources may entice the PA to "break ahead" and heat up the discourse by ignoring troublemakers in Jerusalem. The ground is far from calm, indicated by the clear increase in stone-throwing incidents aimed at Israeli drivers in the West Bank.