The political culture in Palestine, and in the rest of the Arab world, was defined and shaped in the 20th century by the unifying principle of Arab nationalism, which was anti-Western, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist.

Palestinian culture was Islamic without being very religious, adhering mostly to pragmatic and secular principles.

By mid-century, Palestinian and Arab political culture, which in essence was anti-Western, also became clearly anti-Zionist and anti-Arab regimes. These attributes defined the three pillars of patriotism (al wataniyyah).

These pillars, with a heavy dose of anti-capitalism and a quest for national unity, have defined the parameters of political correctness in the Arab world for decades. This political culture holds as true today as it did half a century ago.

The crushing military defeat of 1967 at the hands of Israel, the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of political Islam, have virtually decimated Arab nationalism but have made little change in the political culture that identified the West and its surrogates as its principal adversaries.

The realities of the nation states, their legitimacy and interest have faced serious identity crises and practical problems as they confronted a political culture that resisted acceptance and legitimacy to the regimes.

Although the nation states and their authoritarian regimes have won the fight for identity, the political culture of opposition to the West remains well entrenched.

Palestinian nationalism is no exception.

The past 20 years have seen the rise of a new political and social force in the Arab and Islamic world, and that is militant political Islam. Generally a less sophisticated unifying principle than Arab nationalism, it is deeply rooted in Islamic history as a source of legitimacy. It has gradually gained clout, with its extreme elements emboldened by engaging in acts of violence against Western, as well as Arab and Muslim targets. It offered itself as the genuine unifying principle to replace Arab nationalism with which it shared the same political culture of opposition to the West, to Zionism and to Arab regimes.

The new Islamic militants differ from the nationalists in their lack of respect for the principles of secularism and the-less-than-equal status they afford to women and minorities. Despite their stated aim to defend the dignity of "the nation", which gained them political power and influence, they have yet to achieve the same status of legitimacy and respectability that Arab nationalism enjoyed amongst the cultural and intellectual elite.

There are certain characteristics of what we might call "the Arab regime" which do not define all regimes but can be identified in monarchies as well as revolutionary republics.

The generic regime is led by an autocrat presiding over a leading family, heading a pyramid of a connected official entourage in charge of the bureaucracy.

The political elite is in partnership with a business and military elite based on a simple contract: bribes in lieu of taxes.

It is a win-win proposition, with the only loser being the public that is denied the services of a functioning government and the stability generated by the presence of a broad-based middle class.

The fundamental tools for this bargain are the denial of freedom and the suppression of opposition. The crying injustice and the conspicuous consumption of the kleptocracy are resented by a public that is denied political rights, basic economic opportunities and benefits of the rule of law.

Absence of freedom of expression has left the mosques as the only public venues left open for opposition. In time, and with political skills honed over decades, this opening was fully utilised to generate a hardened, militant, uncompromising and absolutist Islamist opposition.

The survival of some regimes may depend on the extent they allow for, or deny, economic freedom and prosperity to fend off the attack of the new challengers.

For decades, autocratic Arab regimes, with the tacit or overt support from the United States who shared their interest in stability, have denied political participation to their people and have reaped a cauldron of instability with expanding global implications.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has acknowledged the shortcomings of past policy as she compared it to the new Bush policy of restoring a stability based on the consent and the participation of the governed, a bold policy in support of democracy in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The success of this policy will depend on the ability to change the political culture and not just the operational political forces.

The plan to change this culture is a grand and ambitious project that needs to be thought out fully before it is implemented. Forces of moderation and stability have to mature and be given a fair opportunity to garner political clout under regimes that have reflexively and ruthlessly stifled them in the past.

Palestinians, who have been at the forefront of Arab nationalism, have, in the main, been late in accepting and supporting the emerging Islamist movement. In addition to the overwhelming burdens of the Israeli occupation, they suffered from the generic problems of "the Arab regime".

Over the past decade, the emergence of a simple message of defiance and promise of delivery from all ills by the slogan "Islam is the answer" has resonated with a widening audience originating in mosques and prayer groups and has spilled over to the streets in opposition to a corrupt and inept regime.

The regime was unable to deliver on its stated goals of ending the occupation and providing freedom, security or prosperity and has gradually lost ground to an opposition that promises a simple return to past days of glory by militancy, discipline, sacrifice and more piety.

These two forces dominated the political scene while the space between nationalist rejectionists and Islamist rejectionsts has been effectively unfilled until recently. The liberal, democratic, humanist and secular political forces, which represent the interest and the values of the middle class, have for decades been politically marginalised and economically disadvantaged. These forces, resentful of occupation, corruption and militancy, have been silenced but not entirely vanquished. Their success and empowerment is the best guard against extremism and militancy, because they have a long tradition of religious tolerance.

The absence of an absolute dictatorship together with an emerging freedom of expression, a vibrant civil society and an educated entrepreneurial class present an opportunity for the empowerment of these forces and for a pragmatic political transformation.

A significant lesson can be drawn from the Palestinian elections held in January 2005. In those elections, Mahmoud Abbas won by 62 per cent of the vote, even though his party, Fateh, represents at most only 25 per cent of the population. Abbas campaigned on a platform based on ending the Intifada, establishing the rule of law and conducting peaceful negotiations. It is clear that the majority of Palestinians, as evidenced by their vote, have supported his platform.

This majority of people who have so far avoided active organised political participation, as well as those who participated within the organisations out of a sense of national service, can be retrieved, organised and empowered in order to effect a change in the political culture of Palestine. This underrepresented segment of society, of educated and politically aware members of the middle class, is traditionally Western-oriented in its way of life if not in its political orientation.

It is ready for a liberal and democratic transformation that expands its political and economic rewards by curbing corruption and by allowing the emergence of fair and free competition under the rule of law.

The Palestinians who see their future in waging a fight for freedom and independence as citizens, as members of the human race and the global community, need to be encouraged as they create a new political culture that continually struggles to be respectful of its own history and tradition, as it adapts to life in modern times; a culture that views all other people of the world as equals as it shuns the xenophobic view of false superiority and refuses to succumb to a sense of abject inferiority; a culture that accepts the reality of globalisation and its attendant political, cultural and economic consequences, and takes on the challenge of dealing with these consequences; a culture that balances the glories and burdens of its history with realities of its present and the promise of its future; a culture that believes in the rule of law, respects the basic rights of each and every man and woman, as it demands and fights for accountability of the system and of all its public officials.

In short, a culture that looks to a future of an independent, prosperous Palestine rather than to the past glories of faded empires.

A political vehicle that embodies this culture would be a secular, humanist, liberal and democratic party. Its human, institutional and material ingredients have a fragmented presence amongst the Palestinians now. Only Palestinian democrats can create such a party by pulling all its needed ingredients together. Outsiders should keep a distance and provide assistance only if requested in order to bring this project into fruition.

The upcoming elections for the Legislative Council, whether they take place on schedule or not, are uncovering the unbridgeable fault lines in the present political structures. The ferment of this political season could provide the impetus for the birth of such a party depending on the sophistication, integrity, courage and competence of the emerging leadership.

Ziad Asali is president of the American Task Force on Palestine.