MIFTAH
Friday, 19 April. 2024
 
Your Key to Palestine
The Palestinian Initiatives for The Promotoion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
 
 
 

Benjamin Netanyahu has been in this scenario before. The last time an American president reminded an Israeli prime minister who's in charge, 18 years ago, the ending was not bad at all: President George H.W. Bush and his secretary of state James Baker knocked out Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir, and paved the way for Netanyahu, a former deputy foreign minister, to take over Likud. Four years later, Netanyahu evicted Shimon Peres from the Prime Minister's Office.

Now honorary chair of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University in Houston, Texas, Baker is closely following the peace initiative he launched at the Madrid Conference in October 1991. In an interview published last month in the National Journal, Baker gave President Barack Obama a lesson in how to fight a settlement-loving Israeli government. He suggested the president go beyond making reprimands. (Tom Pickering, U.S. ambassador to Israel in the 1980s, once said to me, "The problem with you Israelis is that you don't understand nuances.")

Baker also mentioned the story of the guarantees, the first and last time the U.S. administration set a price for Israel's settlement policy: $10 billion in guarantees for funds to absorb Soviet immigrants, or construction in the settlements.

Baker told the interviewer that he doesn't regret the decision to use "the leverage of U.S. aid" to pressure Israel to freeze the settlements.

"I would also stress that United States taxpayers are giving Israel roughly $3 billion each year, which amounts to something like $1,000 for every Israeli citizen, at a time when our own economy is in bad shape and a lot of Americans would appreciate that kind of helping hand from their own government. Given that fact, it is not unreasonable to ask the Israeli leadership to respect U.S. policy on settlements," said Baker.

Back in the day, Washington was a more comfortable political arena for fights against a "hostile administration": There was a Republican president, versus a Democratic Congress and the Jewish community. Meanwhile, there was the Christian right, which finances quite a few conservative congressmen. Netanyahu and several of his friends at the embassy in Washington convinced Shamir that he could receive the guarantees while welcoming Baker to the region with new settlements.

"Israeli leaders told us they would just get the money from the U.S. Congress," recalled Baker. "Our reply was, 'We'll see you on Capitol Hill.' And we eventually won the vote on that bill."

The crisis with the U.S. paved Yitzhak Rabin's path to power, and from there to the Oslo Accords.

Baker is convinced today that without this, the Madrid Conference would not have taken place. "I don't fault President Obama for making settlements an issue, but I do fault him for caving in. You can't take a position that is consistent with U.S. policy going back many years, and the minute you get push-back you soften your position," he said. "When you are dealing with foreign leaders, they can smell that kind of weakness a thousand miles away."

High stakes

Edward Djerejian, the director of the Baker Institute, was Baker's assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Before that he was ambassador to Syria, and afterward, ambassador to Israel.

"When faced with a similar situation concerning Israeli settlement activity in 1991, President George H.W. Bush and secretary James A. Baker III stopped an additional $10 billion in housing loan guarantees to the Israeli government headed by Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. The stakes are equally high today," he told Haaretz by phone.

"If the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are stalemated, the prospects for violence and instability in the region will be enhanced. The Obama administration should urge both the Israelis and the Palestinians to live up to their obligations in facilitating the onset of direct negotiations on the substantive issues. The sooner, the better.

"Our Baker Institute report shows that with strong United States leadership in an effective honest broker role, the parties can be brought together to narrow their differences on the territorial component of peace," he added.

"Obama cannot remove himself from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because this issue affects the United States' core national security interests," continued Djerejian. "The Arab-Israeli conflict, and especially the Palestinian issue, remains one of the most contentious and sensitive issues in the entire Muslim world. Osama bin Laden exploits the plight of the Palestinians, as does [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad ... This has a direct influence on the United States, which is expending its blood and treasure fighting insurgencies in overwhelmingly Muslim Iraq and Afghanistan.

"We would be naive to think that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will eliminate the problems of terrorism and radicalization in the Islamic world, but it will go a long way toward draining the swamp of issues that extremists exploit for their own ends."

Djerejian said that Obama's decision to appoint George Mitchell as a special presidential envoy within his first few days in the White House proves that he has placed the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians at the top of his agenda.

"Obama drew the lessons of engaging too late in a presidential term from the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Unfortunately, the discussions got mired in the secondary issue of an Israeli settlements freeze, and much political capital and time was expended on that issue rather than addressing the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations," he noted.

In any event, Djerejian refuses to lose hope: A paper prepared by a task force he headed, which included former ministers and Israeli, Palestinian and American experts, proposes solutions for the territorial issue. The paper was sent a few weeks ago to special envoy Mitchell, to the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem and to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. It recommends that Obama choose among three options for an exchange of territory between the West Bank and Israel (based on a one-to-one ratio). The first option gives Israel 4 percent of the West Bank (251 square kilometers); the second, 3.4 percent (212 square kilometers); the third, 4.4 percent (274 square kilometers). Under the various proposals, there are currently between 100,000 and 200,000 settlers living on land that would be transferred to the Palestinians.

Djerejian said their position paper demonstrates that with the help of determined American leadership and mediation, the sides can bridge the gaps on the territorial issue. But he added that without active American involvement, direct negotiations will not solve the problem. The Netanyahu government is based on a narrow right-wing coalition, whereas the Palestinians are split between the PA government in the West Bank and the Hamas government in Gaza. Obama will have to invest a great deal of political capital in order for them to reject the internal pressures and to advance to an agreement, Djerejian stressed.

Baker also maintains a degree of optimism. "I've dealt with Bibi Netanyahu personally [Netanyahu was a senior member of the Israeli delegation at the Madrid Conference], and I think underneath it all he would like to be the prime minister who brings peace to his people. He's more pragmatic than a lot of people think. Remember, in the run-up to the Madrid Conference, I was dealing with a very hard-line Israeli leader in [former Prime Minister Yitzhak] Shamir, who used to say that Bibi was too soft," he said.

"I actually wouldn't be surprised to see Netanyahu negotiate a peace deal with Syria, though that will be easier to accomplish than a deal with the Palestinians ... The reason I mentioned a possible peace deal with Syria, however, is because the headquarters for Hamas is in Damascus, and Syria has great influence over the group.

"If you reach a peace deal between Israel and Syria, you will probably find a negotiating partner on the Palestinian issue. We confronted a similar situation in the 1980s and 1990s with the [Palestine Liberation Organization], which was considered a terrorist organization. To get around the problem, we found Palestinians in the occupied territories who were not PLO officials, and we used them as interlocutors. That cutout allowed us to have indirect discussions with the people calling the shots in the PLO."

Baker and Djerejian seemed to agree that, as in the case of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, the Madrid Conference, and the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, the key to the two-state solution is a proper diplomatic initiative from Washington, but first and foremost strong political will in Jerusalem and Ramallah.

"Before the Madrid Conference," recalled Baker, "there was a point where our peacemaking efforts just collapsed. And I told both the Arabs and the Israelis at the time, 'When you get serious about peace, give us a call. Here is our number.' And guess what? They got the message. Both sides called, and after that they were more willing to compromise for peace."

 
 
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