Abstract

Violence against women in Palestine at the hands of Israeli occupation forces and settlers is part and parcel of the wider framework of violence against the Palestinian people. Violence by occupation forces takes many different forms, some are evident and clear such as targeted killing and injury, as well as imprisonment. Other forms of violence are less pronounced but equally important as they pertain to the forcible displacement of Palestinians; these include house demolitions, house evictions, revocation of residency, land and property confiscation and imposition of restrictions on the registration of newborns.

While this violence is targeted against the entirety of the Palestinian people, including women, children and the elderly, it has a disproportionate impact on women due to reinforcement of patriarchy, traditional gender roles and stereotypes, as well as the reproduction of the cycle of violence by the stronger social group against the weaker social group, and signifying diminishing acceptance and tolerance to diversity and difference.

Violence against the Palestinian people as a whole has persisted for over fifty years despite the multitude of instruments and mechanisms to protect from violence in times of armed conflict. This includes instruments within the framework of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international criminal law, as well as the women, peace and security agenda. Notwithstanding the multitude of instruments and mechanisms, their effectiveness remains constricted by a large number of factors including the absence of enforcement mechanisms due to the alleged primacy of state sovereignty, provided that this does not contravene the economic and geopolitical interests of a few select states. Another important factor is that these instruments are not designed to appreciate the impact of protracted occupation, and are instead tailored to armed conflicts that do not give rise to protracted military occupation and that are time-bound even if they persist for a long period of time, such as the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This paper seeks to highlight forms of Israeli violence against the Palestinian people, describe their disproportionate impact on women, analyse why violence persists against women in times of armed conflict, and identify stakeholders and recommendations to increase protection of women from violence in times of armed conflict.

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The following report illustrates Israeli violations during the Coronavirus pandemic sweeping the world. Since the beginning of the pandemic, Israeli occupation forces continued their violations against the Palestinian people in every part of Palestine and in Jerusalem in particular. They did not halt raids into cities, villages and camps, conducting arrests, confiscating land, closing institutions and targeting official Palestinian figures.

It is clear that the violations Israel perpetrated in Jerusalem stem from a permanent and systematic policy based on two focal points:

First: resistance and rejection of any show of Palestinian national sovereignty in occupied Jerusalem through every means possible, under the pretext of ”breaching Israeli sovereignty”. Israeli authorities also accuse Palestinians of violating the so-called “interim agreement” in reference to the Oslo Accords, which prohibits the PA from holding any activity in the city without an Israeli permit.

Second: the Israelization and Judaization of every aspect of life in Jerusalem through disrupting the demographic balance in order to impose a new reality on the ground.

Throughout the Coronavirus pandemic, Israel escalated these policies and the following measures taken against Jerusalemites.

Arrests:

During this period, arrests were focused on curtailing any efforts in Jerusalem aimed at protecting Palestinian residents from the dangers of the epidemic. Israel considers such efforts a violation of Israeli law, which culminated in the arrest of over 20 activists from various parts of Jerusalem. Some were put under house arrest and prohibited from contacting Palestinian officials in the city. Arrests included Palestinian Minister of Jerusalem Affairs, Fadi Hidmi and Jerusalem Governor Adnan Ghaith. These are two of the most prominent national Palestinian symbols in Jerusalem, which prompted Israel to use an iron fist with them, humiliating and mistreating them during their arrest. Hidmi, for example mistreated during his arrest and later said he had been violently assaulted at the detention facility. The two officials were arrested on charges of being responsible for aid distribution to needy Jerusalemite families.

According to the Wadi Helwa Information Center, throughout March until the date of this report (April 9) a total of 193 arrests were made by Israeli authorities, including four women and 33 minors. A total of 73 arrests were made in the Old City and inside and around the Aqsa Mosque Compound; 57 Palestinians were arrested in Essawiyeh, 35 in Silwan and several others in various parts of the city.

Furthermore, Israeli intelligence services summoned Jerusalem governor Adnan Ghaith, Aqsa Mosque Director Sheikh Omar Kiswani and Deputy Director Sheikh Najeh Bkeirat for questioning. They also summoned and arrested several Fatah members under the pretext of ”violating Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem” and arrested three Jerusalemite activists at the Allenby Bridge en route to Jordan.

Attorney Mohammed Mahmoud, who is handling the detentions in Israeli courts, says there has been a noticeable escalation in Israeli measures against youth in Jerusalem during the pandemic. “Several preventative measures have been taken in courts since mid-March against the virus. Courts are conducted via Skype where the prisoner is connected by a phone and monitor in a special room in the prisons. There are some prisons that do not have television monitors and the sessions are conducted only by phone. This makes communication difficult between the prisoner and defense team. It is hard to fully explain what is going on in the session to the prisoner. These sessions also lack the confidentiality and immunity between lawyer and client. However, the lawyers try as much as possible to clarify certain rights and points to the prisoner. What more, the glass partition in front of the judge is another impediment in terms of hearing what he is saying,” Mahmoud said.

He also mentioned how difficult these procedures were for the families waiting outside the courtroom since only one person is allowed in and the families are barred from speaking to their imprisoned children. He accused Israeli authorities of taking advantage of the Coronavirus crisis and their preventative measures to further oppress Palestinians, maintaining that several cases of abuse and arrest were recorded for supposedly violating these measures. A number of fines were also imposed, ranging from NIS500-NIS5000.

Confiscation of food packages and relief assistance:

Another aspect of Israel’s policy against Palestinians is focusing on measures against them instead of measures to combat the virus. Israeli authorities have actively pursued Palestinians, including volunteers and institutions which provide relief aid and food packages to poor families. They assaulted many of the volunteers, arrested them and confiscated the aid. In Sur Baher at the end of March, Israeli soldiers assaulted six volunteers, beating them and throwing teargas at them before confiscating a truckload of relief and food assistance.

Prior to this, Israeli forces arrested three teams disinfecting Silwan, Suwwana and the Old City and confiscated the cleaning products being used to disinfect public and vital facilities in these areas. They also arrested four others for distributing and hanging up posters to raise awareness about the coronavirus, barring them entry into the Old City.

Violation and desecration of places of worship This was apparent from the closure of the Aqsa Mosque Compound and barring entry to Muslim worshippers, including its guards and caretakers. At the same time, it assumed a much more relaxed policy with Jews in synagogues. They were able to move freely in their places of residence contrary to the policy imposed against Jerusalemites whose movement was much more limited. What’s more, Palestinians were heavily fined, ranging from NIS500 to NIS5000.

By targeting the Aqsa Mosque, Islamic Waqf officials say Israeli occupation authorities are attempting to interfere and impose Israeli sovereignty under the pretext of preventing the spread of the virus. In this regard, Israeli authorities closed the doors to Al Aqsa with the exception of “Hutta” and “Chain” Gates and kept “Dung Gate” open, the keys to which Israel has held since its occupation of Jerusalem in 1967, and which allows in settlers to the compound.

On March 20, Israeli authorities closed the gates to Al Aqsa and prevented anyone from entering both the mosque and the Old City just before Friday prayers. They claimed this was a preventative measure against the coronavirus. That day, according to Waqf estimates, only 500 Muslim worshippers prayed at the mosque even though Waqf authorities had taken the necessary measures and precautions against the epidemic. They had fully sanitized and disinfected the grounds and mosques and distributed instructions to worshippers before Friday. In addition, there were employees sanitizing worshippers’ hands inside the compound.

Meanwhile, Israeli occupation forces cracked down on worshippers who tried to pray in the streets and allies of the Old City, firing stun grenades, striking them with nightsticks and pushing them away from the Aqsa gates. Similar incidents occurred in other areas of the city, especially Wadi Joz, Musrara, Ras Al Amoud/Silwan and outside of Dung Gate.

Israeli police also issued penalties to worshippers for praying outside of the Aqsa’s gates and to youths as they walked in the city on claims they ”were not abiding by preventative measures.”

Israeli authorities took their policies up a notch when they raided the home of President of the Islamic Waqf Council, Sheikh Abdel Atheem Salham and issued him a penalty of NIS5000 on claims he ”did not abide by police orders and allowed more than the permitted number of people to enter the Aqsa grounds.” They also summoned Aqsa Mosque Director Sheikh Omar Kiswani and Aqsa Mosque Imam Amer Abdeen for questioning.

Furthermore, Israeli forces stormed the Bab Al Rahmeh prayer site and threatened to impose fines on the worshippers for ”not adhering to health ministry instructions”, also threatening worshippers that they would be fined if they gathered in the Aqsa courtyard for prayer.

Israeli authorities continued to issue orders banning Palestinians from entering the Old City and the Aqsa Mosque Compound. Eight Palestinian youths were banned from the Aqsa and seven from the Old City and travel ban orders were issued against four other Jerusalemites.

In order to avoid any further interference into Aqsa affairs by Israeli authorities, the Islamic Waqf , which is the caretaker of the Aqsa Mosque, closed the compound until further notice as a protective measure against the novel coronavirus. The same was applied to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher with only members of the clergy allowed entry.

Isolating the Old City:

Under the pretext of responding to the coronavirus pandemic, Israeli occupation authorities isolated the Old City from its surroundings. Approximately 40,000 Jerusalemites live in the Old City of Jerusalem and were suddenly cut off from the rest of East Jerusalem, whose Palestinian population is around 360,000. Only those who live within the Old City walls were allowed entrance while Jewish settlers living in settlement enclaves inside or outside it were allowed to enter and exit freely. This policy of isolation led to huge losses for shops owned by Jerusalemites many of whom could not reach their stores.

Figures provided by the Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights and the Jerusalem Merchants Committee indicate that this constrictive Israeli policy, which has been implemented for the past three years, has led to the closure of an increasing number of shops in the Old City. Today around 300 shops are shuttered, a number which is likely to grow with this recent isolation.

Expansion and acceleration of settlements

It is clear that Israeli authorities have been exploiting this pandemic to continue settlement projects in Jerusalem and in the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories. This includes approval for the construction of tens of thousands of housing units in the settlement of “Atarot, north of Jerusalem, approval to start construction in the “E1” settlement project in Tur, Zaayem, Essawiyeh and Ezzariyeh where over 10,000 housing units will be built, approval for the construction of hundreds of thousands of settlement units in “Givat Hamatos” south of Jerusalem and the establishment of a new settlement neighborhood in Beit Hanina. Plans have also been put in place to build a wall separating the village of Sheikh Saad from Jabal Mukkaber. Meanwhile, Israeli authorities are floating a plan to push Shufat camp and Kufr Aqab out of Jerusalem’s municipal borders as a means of dealing with the concerning ”demographic problem” in the city.

Impeding the work of health centers

While Israel rushed to stymie coronavirus outbreaks in its own residential and settlement centers in Jerusalem, it assumed a policy of discrimination when it came to Palestinian Jerusalemites. Israeli forces purposely delayed the opening of Covid-19 testing centers in Palestinian areas. Furthermore, the majority of Jerusalemites do not speak Hebrew, the language spoken in the various Israeli health insurance funds, not to mention that over 40,000 Jerusalemites do not have access to Israeli health care services under the pretext that they live outside of the unilaterally-designated Jerusalem municipal borders.

This policy came in tandem with the crisis already felt by the Palestinian health sector in Jerusalem, reflected in the lack of necessary equipment and medical supplies in the six East Jerusalem hospitals, making them incapable of accommodating dozens of potential Covid-19 patients. The current patients have been distributed in nearby hotels for monitoring while hospitals only have 60 beds available, not to mention the lack in medicines and medical staff they suffer from.

Discriminatory measures against the prisoner movement The medical negligence towards Palestinian prisoners during the pandemic is evident by how prison services failed to take the necessary precautionary measures in response to the coronavirus. What’s more, they continued to prohibit anyone from being informed about the conditions of quarantined prisoners in the Megiddo Prison. Israeli prisoner services also banned the entry of over 140 products from the prison commissary, including basic food products such as meat, vegetables, fruit and spices. Cleaning products and disinfectants necessary for prisoners to protect themselves from Covid-19 infection were also banned.

Mistreatment of Palestinian laborers

There have been several testimonies about Israel’s mistreatment of Palestinian workers inside the Green Line, including returning workers to the Palestinian territories after suspecting they contracted Covid-19. Last month, Israeli soldiers dumped a Palestinian laborer showing symptoms of Covid-19 at the Beit Sira checkpoint without providing him with any treatment. This behavior was repeated at the Hizma military checkpoint, north of Jerusalem. Laborers are returned to the Palestinian territories on an almost daily basis without being tested, which has resulted in the spread of the virus in Palestine. At the same time, Israel unofficially opened its crossings to workers as a way to circumvent Palestinian preventative measures. They offered laborers incentives such as higher daily wages, thus exploiting their difficult living conditions and avoiding any legal obligations towards them.

Uprooting residents from their land and homes

At the height of the Coronavirus crisis, the Israeli ”civil administration” continued with its policy of confiscating Palestinian land, homes and tents. Some of these facilities were being used as emergency clinics to meet the needs of locals. On March 26, Israeli occupation forces raided Khirbet Ibzeiq in the northern Jordan Valley, confiscating steel rods and canopies designed for setting up eight tents, two equipped as clinics and four as emergency shelters for residents who were forced out of their homes. Two other tents were to be used as a mosque. Israeli forces also confiscated a corrugated-iron trailer that had been in the area for over two years, an electric generator, sand and cement bags and four loads of brick to lay the ground inside the tents.

In Ein Diyouk, west of Jericho, Israeli forces demolished three buildings which Jerusalemite farmers use as seasonal residences.

In Hebron, Israeli forces tore down a wall separating Wadi Haseen from Wadi Nasara in preparation for closing the entire area and in Deir Ballout in the Salfeet area, they demolished a farm room and water well.

It should be noted that in contrast to its measures taken in the occupied Palestinian territories, the Israeli government suspended all demolitions inside Israel during the state of emergency.

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With the support from the Arab Regional Network on Women, Peace, and Security- El Karama, the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) has collaborated with the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC), the Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD), and Women Media and Development (TAM) in preparing the evidence based report “Palestinian Women: the Disproportionate Impact of the Israeli Occupation.” The report aims to draw on Israeli human rights violations under international law and highlight the effects these violations have on Palestinian women. The report was discussed in a “side event” of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) 62nd session in New York during March 2018. The purpose of the side event was to engage regional and international human rights networks and human rights defenders and women movements in advocating for the implementation of human rights provisions through the enforcement of international ratified conventions and agreements.

The report includes personal testimonies and quantitative research of four categories of Palestinian women: women refugees, female Jerusalemites subjected to residency revocation/family reunification refusal; female prisoners subjected to gender-based violence and Gazan women, focusing on denial of their access to healthcare.

The main findings of the report shed light on the direct discrimination that Palestinian women are subjected to and their effects that are particularly damaging to women. The findings reflect the results of an armed occupation coupled with a patriarchal society and can be contextualized by broader Israeli motives: “to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinians”.

Women Refugees (MIFTAH)

The report uncovers how Palestinian women living in refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza live under high levels of violence. Many Palestinian refugee women experience a “triangle of oppression” according to MIFTAH, this is due to a combination of violence committed by the Israeli occupation, the daily life and traditional attitudes towards women and they bear the brunt of Israeli abuses while forced to endure in already suppressive and patriarchal environment.

MIFTAH found that 33 percent of the interviewed women had been directly exposed to physical assault by Israeli Occupation Forces. As many as 21 percent had been exposed to beatings or tear gas at Israeli checkpoints while they were pregnant, and 4 percent reported that they aborted or gave birth at Israeli checkpoints. Moreover, 24 percent were forced to live in shelters or with extended family and 37 percent had been exposed to detention or interrogation. The physical violence women experience while living in the refugee camps is alarming and the number of psychological violence is even higher. Moreover, 72 percent of Palestinian women feel panicked when they hear the sounds of Israeli bullets, war jets, bombs or Palestinian ambulances, and 88 percent confirm that they feel terrified when Occupation Forces storm the camp. These women live in a mentally stressed environment where it is hard to feel safe because they have experienced or know that physical violence is a part of their everyday life.

Recommendations include:

• Recognize the Palestinian right of return, as contained in United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 194 and 513. It is also necessary to confirm United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, pertaining to the rights of women and peace, along with Security Council Resolution 237 of 1967, calling on Israel to respect human rights in the regions affected by the Middle East conflict of 1967, to ensure safety and security for their residents and facilitate the return of the displaced.

• Confirm the importance of implementing United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 3236 of 1974.

• Donor states and organizations should fulfill their obligations towards UNRWA so that the Agency can continue providing services to Palestinian refugees.

• Provide psycho-social support for individuals exposed to traumatic experiences as a result of violations committed by the Israeli Occupation. This should include a heightened role for international bodies (governmental and non-governmental organizations) in Palestinian refugee camps.

Jerusalem: Residency Revocation and Family Reunification (PWWSD)

Palestinian Jerusalemites are facing the challenge of resisting the Israeli forces of removing Palestinians from the region and reshaping east Jerusalem toward a majority of Israelis. Between 1967 and 2016, 14,595 Palestinians from east Jerusalem had their residency status revoked. Israel targets the Palestinian Jerusalemites with their policies of residency revocation and family reunification by making it very difficult to stay in Jerusalem. Palestinian Jerusalemites have to live in Jerusalem to have the residency permit, but if they marry a non-Jerusalemite they cannot live together in Jerusalem without going through the process of family reunification, which is a demanding process with an average waiting period of ten years, it is costly and the Israelis may refuse the application without giving any reason. PWWSD has documented a number of cases of attempted family reunification one of these is Afaf A who explains how she after almost ten years of applying still are denied residence permit: “To this day, we are denied the right to know the true reason as to why I am unable to receive a Jerusalem ID. All in all, this entire case cost me up to nearly 70,000 NIS.” Afaf’s story is a typical example of the burden that reunification places on women’s family life and social relations.

The policy of residency revocation forces Palestinian Jerusalemites to leave their homes and it divides families, which can lead to a traumatic fear of separation form children and homes for the women living in Jerusalem. This creates an enormous psychological stain and stress upon women. Israel is denying Palestinians fundamental liberties such as the right to movement and work. This policy also has a negative impact for female victims of domestic violence because they fear going to authorities in case they are forcibly transferred away from their children.

Recommendations include:

• Reinstate the residencies of all Palestinians who wish to reinstate their Jerusalem residency status and give all current residents of Jerusalem indefinite right-to-remain.

• Immediately repeal the “temporary order” to the Law of Citizenship and Entry into Israel (2003) related to family unification. Grant Palestinian spouses of Jerusalem I.D holders Jerusalem residency status.

• Take positive steps to facilitate family reunification; compensate those who have lost large amounts of money due to the costly procedures.

Female Prisoners (TAM)

TAM has contributed with evidence of Israeli violations against female ex-prisoners. Through the testimonies of female ex-prisoners TAM found that violations concerned four themes: “ (1) Physical and psychological torture at the moment of imprisonment; (2) Physical and psychological torture during investigation; (3) Prison conditions and family visits prohibition and (4) Medical Negligence/Denial of Access to Services.” The female ex-prisoners recounts of being kept in solitary confinement for long periods of time without being given a reason, they are treated inhumane by being denied access to sanitation, denied sleep, being beaten and sexually harassed. The family of the female prisoners rarely permitted to visit, which is yet another method to punish the Palestinian women prisoners. Soldiers will deny them to see their family or cut the family visits short

In a testimonies conducted by TAM, Yasmine J a female ex-prisoner describes one of her prison cells like this
“The cells were very small, filled with bugs, dirt and rats, rats were coming out from the toilet and other holes in the wall, the atmosphere was always humid, and in winter, very cold with no enough covers or even warm Air conditioning. In summer, there was no ventilation or fans, it was too hot.”

The Palestinian female prisoners experienced unhygienic prisons cells that are overcrowded and flooding with sewage. The women prisoners describe the food as inedible and the cells as filthy. The conditions in the prisons are very critical and they are not equipped for female prisoners. Often in the prisons there is no awareness for cultural or gender-based sensitivities and invasive bodily searches are a popular method for Israeli soldiers to humiliate the prisoners. Palestinian women are frequently labeled security prisoners and are placed with Israeli criminals that in some cases will extend the assaults and humiliation.

Recommendations include:

• Demand that Israel cease its practice of transferring Palestinian female prisoners out of Palestine, a practice illegal under international law.

• Grant all Palestinian detainees access to legal services and to their family during family visits. Accommodate such access with complementary practices at all relevant checkpoints.

• Demand that Israel treats all Palestinian female detainees with dignity and respect, and with an acknowledgement of their gender-specific requirements;

• Assert, without qualification, the absoluteness of the prohibition of torture. Put an end to any torture, inhuman or degrading treatment in Israeli prisons.

Access to Health in Gaza (WCLAC)

The blockade of Gaza has been going on for 11 years and Israel is not letting go of its grip, actually it seems that Israel is tightening its grip. On the basis of testimonies gathered from women in Gaza has WCLAC highlighted three areas of concern: Israeli border polices health rights and access to health, and the effects of the Israeli blockade on Gaza.

The approval rate of patient permits to exit Gaza to be treated has declined rapidly during the recent years. In 2012, 92 percent of patients’ permits were approved while in 2017, the approval rate had declined to 54 percent. In 2016, 31.4 percent of these applications were delayed for months or even years beyond medical appointments the consequence of this is that diseased people get sicker and in some cases this results in death. Israelis are also very observant of what goes into Gaza even when it concerns essential health care, medicine, fuel and adequate nutrition. The approval rate for health related access was 48 percent in 2016. These numbers show clearly how Israel is failing to facilitate humanitarian access and therefore is preventing the development and functioning of human life inside Gaza.

The lack of rights to health care is detrimental to pregnant women who are subjected to dangerous risks due to a lack of services and equipment. Abortions, premature births and labor complications are at an increasing rate. The fact that women are not given access to pregnancy related healthcare is gender based discrimination. It is vital for women that the gap in access to maternal and reproductive health care is addressed. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza is forcing women, who often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression and even permanent disabilities, to neglect their own needs to take care of their families.

Recommendations include:

• Ensure Israeli compliance with border procedures, not only facilitating access, but showing Palestinians the respect to respond to applications in a timely manner consistent with medical requests.

• Put an end to aggressive and invasive interrogation practices at the border. Where women are concerned, allow access in all but the most pressing cases.

• Provide meaningful and adequate reparations for women that have been unjustly searched, interrogated, or subjected to inhuman, degrading or similar treatment at border crossings or in permit applications.

• Ensure Israeli compliance with the clear IHL obligation to allow humanitarian access to Gaza.

• End the blockade of the Gaza Strip. Facilitate the free movement of infrastructure and energy supplies. Grant Gazans the opportunity to rebuild their lives after the 2014 war.

Efforts of the international community

Israel’s actions against Palestinian women refugees, women living in Jerusalem, female prisoners, and women living in Gaza, as stressed in the report, are discriminating and in clear violation of International Law and the International Human Rights and are a clear result of the gravity of Israeli officials impunity. The policies outlined in this report contextualized by, wider systems of discrimination against Palestinians. Free movement is being curtailed, individuals are being coerced off their land, and individual rights are being removed. These are fundamental breaches of international law, and must be recognized as ethnic discrimination.

The international community has again and again urged Israel to allow the return of the Palestinian refugees, stop the forced eviction and forcible transfer of Jerusalemites, respect the international standards of treatment of women prisoners and let Gazans have access to basic healthcare but the international community’s effort to make Israel change its policies has been ignored and they have failed in holding Israel accountable for its actions.

Women’s rights, enshrined in conventions such as CEDAW, Israel and its violent occupation, creeping annexation and ethnic cleansing is bolstered by the failure of the international community to hold Israel to account. Israel and the international community are responsible for the suffering of the various groups of women discussed in this report, as well as the subjugation and suffering of Palestinians. More broadly, Israel will continue to force Palestinians to live as second class citizens without civil, political, economic, social nor cultural rights.

The Right to Freedom of Movement

The right to freedom of movement is enshrined in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. It states that everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State and that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. The right to freedom of movement is furthermore reiterated in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightswhich entered into force in 1976 and was ratified by Israel in 1991. The Covenant asserts that all individuals within the territory of a State have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose their residence, everyone shall be free to leave any country and no one should be deprived of the right to enter his own country. These rights shall not be subjected to any restrictions, except those provided by law and still consistent with the other rights recognized in the Covenant .

Since its military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, Israel has been in continuous violation of international law and international humanitarian law. The latter applies to situations of armed conflict and foreign occupation and is mainly based on rules defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. In the context of Palestine particular relevance is given to the Fourth Geneva Convention which deals specifically with the protection of civilians during war or under foreign occupation. The Convention addresses a number of issues pertaining to the reality of Palestineand clearly defines the duties and responsibilities of foreign powers towards the population of the territories they occupy. Among others, it prohibits forcible population transfer, systematic demographic change in the occupied territory, measures of collective punishment and acts of retaliation towards the occupied population. The Convention also affirms the responsibility of the occupying state to protect the occupied population, ensure family unity, give adequate medical care and food supply, securing freedom of movement and preventing deportation.

This paper will provide an overview of the restrictions on freedom of movement imposed by Israel on the Palestinian population in the occupied territories and the scale of their gender specific impact on women; it will focus on two examples pertaining right to health and protection from gender-based violence. It is imperative to highlightthat women and girls endure specific gender-based violations which are often overlooked or summarized under the general umbrella of human rights breaches by the occupying forces. Yet, the prolonged military occupation has had a particularly negative impact on women, exacerbating the pressure and constraints imposed upon them by traditional patriarchal structures within their own society.The spiral of violence and frustration generated by the occupation has severe consequences on family life, seeping in and destroying the fabric of Palestinian society.Continuous policies of settlements expansion, land confiscation, arbitrary detentions and large scale military aggressions are not onlymeans of psychological and physical terror, but also of economic strangulation. Palestinian women losing their male counterparts as a result of the above mentioned policies are often required to become income providers without having the necessary skills and means to do so.

The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) states that:

“Theeradication of apartheid, all forms of racism, racial discrimination, colonialism, neo-colonialism, aggression, foreign occupation and domination and interference in the internal affairs of States is essential to the full enjoyment of the rights of men and women”

and

“that the strengthening of international peace and security, the relaxation of international tension, mutual co-operation among all States irrespective of their social and economic systems, general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, the affirmation of the principles of justice, equality and mutual benefit in relations among countries and the realization of the right of peoples under alien and colonial domination and foreign occupation to self-determination and independence, as well as respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, will promote social progress and development and as a consequence will contribute to the attainment of full equality between men and women”.

In line with MIFTAH’scommitment to this vision, it is essential to document the gender specific struggle of women under occupation and how restriction of movement obstruct their access to a range of civil and political rights such as education, health, employment and family unity.

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Working in Israel

Every year around 40,000 Palestinians cross over to Israel to work; about half of this number does so illegally. Because wages in Israel are double, even three times more than wages in the West Bank or Gaza, Palestinians go through the hassle of acquiring work permits and or they take the risk of crossing over to Israel illegally. While wages in Israel might be attractive, working in Israel is no bed of roses for Palestinians. Starting from the bureaucratic and “security” procedures they have to pass through to get the permit, to actually crossing through checkpoints and getting to work on time, to receiving the proper social benefits at the end of their work contract, Palestinians face challenges.

For those who work in Israel illegally, the challenges are even greater. Their “illegal” status makes them vulnerable to exploitation by their employees. Often times, Israeli employers deny illegal Palestinian workers the minimum wage and under write their working days which later affects the employment benefits and insurance they are entitled to. Legally speaking, the Israeli labor law that regulates workers’ rights, wages, benefits etc. is applicable to Palestinian workers legally or illegally working in Israel. Employment benefits, minimum wage, work insurance and other rights and benefits the law ensures for Israeli workers is also applicable to anyone working in Israel, regardless of nationality or the legality of his/her presence in Israel.

Further, 15,000 out of the 20,000 Palestinians who cross over to Israel illegally are detained by Israeli officials. While the detention is meant to deter others from attempting to cross illegally, Israeli officials often mistreat and abuse detainees while in their custody. They also use it to threaten and to try to coerce people to “collaborate” with them on security matters. Oftentimes such abuses and threats are not well investigated and happen without proper legal redress for the detainees.

Working in Israel: over the years

Right after the 1967 war, the West Bank and Gaza were considered closed military zones and whether or not Palestinians from these territories could enter Israel was disputed. It was only settled by the Ministerial Committee for Economic matters in 1968 when it decided to allow Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to work in Israel . As a result, a significant number of the Palestinian labor force started working in Israel and unemployment rate went down to almost five percent .

After the first intifada in the late 80s and early 90s, Israel started restricting the number of Palestinians seeking work in Israel and introduced a stricter permit system. It made a distinction between “green card” ID holders (residents of the West Bank and Gaza) and “blue card” ID holders or permanent residents of Jerusalem. After the Gulf war of 1991 and the end of the first intifada, the general entry permit of 1972 ended and a new one was to start. As B’tselem - an Israeli human rights organization put it “if past procedure had been to allow entry into Israel except in extraordinary cases, now the rule was that Palestinians were not allowed to leave the occupied territory except in extraordinary cases in which the applicant met stringent conditions and received an individual permit” . Accordingly, Green card holders are required to have “magnetic cards” which are issued based on Israel’s “security” criteria. This significantly reduced the number of Palestinians who could legally seek work in Israel as can be seen in the graph below.

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Introduction

The Israeli occupation of Palestine creates a situation where everything is a question of belonging. Every day Palestinians have to deal with a system that claims that they do not belong. They are not able to move freely in their own country and need special permissions if the are to travel outside the West Bank or to Jerusalem. Even if they have a permit, traveling the 16 kilometres from Ramallah to Jerusalem can take more than two hours because of the Israeli checkpoints and the wall surrounding the West Bank. Traveling in Palestine you are constantly reminded of the segregation system that attempts to force the Palestinians out of their homes and away from their land. Roadblocks, checkpoints and the wall confine and control the Palestinian population while there are special roads for the Israelis.

Belonging somewhere situates a person in relations to the rest of the world; it is a sense of attachment to a place and often to the people in it. It is a reciprocal process between the person who belong and what she belongs to, a process of inclusion and exclusion. In Palestine everything is a question of belonging, and a question of what to belong to. Palestinians do not, for one second in their lives doubt that they belong to Palestine. But the complex political situation, where most Palestinians have little faith in the ability of their leadership as well as the international community to better their circumstances, they do question what is this Palestine that they belong to.

Palestinian women are caught in an intersection of oppressions. As Palestinians they live in a state of occupation, constantly restricted in their mobility, opportunities and thoughts. As women they are subject to limited rights and opportunities inside Palestine, where society’s view on gender roles are often very conservative. They are second-¬‐class citizens as Palestinians occupied by Israel and as women in a patriarchal society.

Therefore I find it interesting to explore the ways in which Palestinian women assert and sustain their political belonging to Palestine. The motivation behind this interest is the strong national community and the perseverance of the Palestinian women as I experienced it during my stay. I wondered why the loud voices of all the political aware women I met were not being heard in the setting of the formal political system, and what these women did to make up for this exclusion.

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Introduction

The political context surrounding the Palestinian bid for statehood makes it a complicated question, and the UN procedures on the matter are unclear in spite of the fact that the international community has already accepted the political basis for the vote. The following study will focus on the legal ramifications of the recognition of a Palestinian state. At the time of publication, it is still unclear whether Palestine will be recognized as a full UN member state or a non-member observer state, the latter being the most likely outcome. Taking this uncertainty into account, the study will mainly focus on the consequences of statehood, UN membership or a rejection of either option. The legal ramifications of recognition of a Palestinian state, however, will differ according to which statehood status Palestine achieves at the UN, all of which will be addressed in the study.

Further, given that much is still unclear with experts disagreeing on the important legal aspects of the statehood bid, this study is in part based on expectations and assumptions about what will happen when Palestinian statehood is recognized at the UN in the near future.

Background

The premises for a Palestinian state were created with UN Resolution 181, which was the result of the UN partition plan of 1947 to secure both the state of Israel and the state of Palestine. Furthermore, after 1967 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242 demanding that Israel withdraw from the territory occupied in 1967. The resolution highlights the respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states.

In 1988 the Palestine National Council unilaterally declared independence, and has since then received bilateral recognition from some 120 states.

After Palestinian–Israeli negotiations broke down a year ago in September 2010, the Palestinians adopted a new diplomatic strategy. Asking individual states to recognize a Palestinian state based on the pre-1967 borders, officials started working towards the bid for statehood now handed in to the UN. This led to bilateral recognition from 128 of the 193 UN-member-states.

In addition to strengthening diplomatic relations, efforts have been made to support the Palestinian private sector and implement institutional reforms as preparation for statehood. Two years ago, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a Palestinian state-building plan. The deadline for the plan coincides with the application for statehood recognition at the UN. The past two years of state-building have led to a well-functioning state with the institutions and economic policies required by the World Bank and the IMF. The latest reports on the economic situation in the Palestinian territory, however, show a lower economic growth and a drop in financial aid compared to previous years. Praising the PA for its efforts on creating the foundation of a state, the World Bank report highlights the weakening economy and deteriorating public finances.

With the foundation for a state in place in time for the UN bid, the political circumstances in the region create another important frame for the application for a Palestinian state. Palestinian-Israeli negotiations have been at a standstill for more than a year because of the Israeli government’s refusal to stop expanding the settlements in east Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Becoming a state

Up until now, Palestine has held the status as an entity with observer-status in the UN; a non-member, non-state in other words. The Palestinian people have been represented in the UN by the PLO, which was granted observer-status in 1974. The PLO was henceforth invited to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly as well as all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly and other UN organs, all in the capacity of observer.

Statehood, membership in the UN and the recognition of Palestine as a state are three different things: Creating a state is neither conditioned by UN membership nor by recognition. Recognition is a political and often bilateral process, and it is therefore not a legal condition in creating a state under the auspices of the UN. This means that each individual state decides if they are going to recognize the Palestinian state or not. Parallel with the application for statehood in the UN, the Palestinians apply for bilateral recognition from as many countries as possible.

Adopting a resolution that recognizes Palestine as a state within the 1967 borders only requires a simple majority of the votes in the General Assembly. However, such a resolution will not be legally binding. The question of recognizing Palestine as a state is more about strengthening the political basis of international legitimacy for the Palestinians rather than anything tangible on the ground. Such a resolution will not contribute to anything significantly new to international customary law and the already existing resolutions. In other words, the Palestinians can choose to apply for membership in other UN institutions such as the WHO and UNESCO where the US does not have the right to veto but where the political significance is much smaller. This has already proven to work as Palestine has been admitted as a full member of UNESCO with 107 member states voting in favor of Palestine, 14 states voting against and with 52 abstentions.

Further, in regards to the General Assembly, the Palestinians also have the opportunity to apply for recognition as a non-member observer state and thereby go from being an ‘entity’ to being a state in UN terms. This will however only give them the status of an observer. The PLO already has an observer status in the UN, but that is as a representative of the Palestinian people, not as a state. This means that getting recognized as an observer state is an upgrade; however the goal is full recognition.

When it comes to membership in the UN, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations states that membership “is open to all peace-loving States that accept the obligations contained in the United Nations Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able to carry out these obligations”. Membership is admitted to the UN by decision of the General Assembly, (with a two-thirds majority, 129 member states) upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Nine of the 15 members of the Security Council must vote for the membership and none of the permanent members can use their veto if the application is to reach the General Assembly.

Outcomes

Terminology – what does it mean to be a state?

If Palestine, in UN terminology, is a state, it will strengthen the arguments of the Palestinians against Israel as an occupying power according to international law. There would no longer be any doubt as to the law governing the relations between Israel and Palestine. The Palestinian territory remaining under Israeli control would be occupied for the purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention. With the status of a state, Palestine would become party to international conventions and international courts. This would give the Palestinians new tools to uphold their rights in line with all other recognized states.

Access to international institutions, organizations and courts

Applying for recognition as a state can enhance Palestine’s prospects for becoming member of various international organizations, institutions, courts, trade agreements and UN bodies. Further, Palestine could get the opportunity to accede to international treaties and human rights instruments.

An internationally recognized Palestinian state (through the UN General Assembly) would be able to join international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, become a signatory party to important multilateral treaties, especially those protective of human rights, have standing in the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and domestic courts of countries that recognized the Palestinian state.

The International Court of Justice is the primary judicial organ of the UN. The ICJ has been involved in UN membership issues in the past (most recently in Kosovo, 2010). The ICJ only deals with member state disputes, but has already accepted jurisdiction of certain Palestinian issues. UN member states and specialized agencies could make a series of referrals to the ICJ that could help move along the Palestinian case. With the involvement of the ICJ the internationalization of the conflict as a legal matter would increase which would further help enable the Palestinian leadership to pursue claims against Israel in human rights treaty bodies and the International Criminal Court.

Unlike the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court is legally and functionally independent from the UN; however, the Security Council has certain powers in some instances. As a recognized state (full UN member or non-member observer state that has ratified the Rome Statute), Palestine will have the right to become a member of, and appeal to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. This will make the Palestinians able to accuse central persons from the Israeli military of violations of international law during military operations on Palestinian territory. Evidence proves numerous present and past Israeli officials liable for crimes of war and against humanity, as well as other offenses. This jurisdiction, however, can most likely not be extended to the period prior to the state’s existence. Nevertheless this may have far-reaching implications for the Israelis; in addition to exposing members of the Israeli military to investigation and prosecution it could raise the issue of the settlement project which constitutes a war crime under the ICC Statue. This would implicate not only the military but tens of thousands of civilians.

Important to bear in mind is that with statehood comes obligations to respect human rights and other international conventions. This means that as a state, the responsibilities of Palestine towards its citizens, other states and their citizens will also change.

As a part of the path to statehood, Palestine has gained and is expected to gain membership in the following organizations and institutions (among others):

• UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
• Council of Europe
• WTO – World Trade Organization
• IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
• WHO – World Health Organization
• The World Bank
• IMF – International Monetary Fund

Recognition as a state will further allow Palestine to become party to various international conventions. Main human rights conventions do not require UN membership as a condition for becoming party to them, and many are open to any state invited by the UN General Assembly. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights do not require UN membership as a condition for ratification, but do require an invitation from the General Assembly.

Other conventions allow states to become party to them on easier terms (without invitations from the General Assembly), such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention Against Torture (CAT); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and the Geneva Conventions and additional Protocols.

Becoming party to these conventions would impose certain obligations on the Palestinian state in relation to the people under its authority. Further, the Palestinian state would become subject to UN monitoring mechanisms, such as the committees that monitor implementation of these conventions. In addition, it could affect the relations between the Palestinian state and Israel and West Bank settlers.

None of this will solve conflicts with Israel over security, violence and borders. But it will give the Palestinians more leverage in the UN and in eventual peace talks.

Representation of the Palestinian people

Representation of the Palestinian people on the international arena and the role of the PLO, the PA and the future Palestinian State is an important and much discussed issue when it comes to the legal ramifications of the statehood bid. The question is (and it is still unclear): In establishing a Palestinian state, would the representation of the Palestinians be limited to those who are under the effective jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority, that is, living on Palestinian territory? In that case the majority of the Palestinians would be unrepresented and their inalienable rights to “self-determination”, “national independence” and “right of return” might be seriously compromised. It is to be assumed, however, that all measures that secure representation of all Palestinians will be taken, and all protections and safeguards of inalienable rights of all Palestinians will be put in place.

In international law, the representational scope and capacities of a body can vary. This will depend on the purpose (why) and the institutional context (where) in which the body seeks to present claims. International law is as such not concerned with the legitimacy of the representation of a state’s nationals. It does, however, differentiate between the representative capacities of different types of bodies, be it a state or a non-state actor like the PLO. This means that states can only represent their nationals. In the Palestinian case, this could limit the Palestinian state’s ability to make claims on behalf of Palestinians living outside of Palestine, a role currently held by the PLO in the UN. On the other hand, this is only relevant when it comes to representation of such claims before international tribunals and in bilateral relations with other states. The state is still able to bring forward human rights claims on behalf of those who are not nationals through participation in the UN system. Under international law, every state has the right to invoke the responsibility of another state for violations of human rights. This means that the State of Palestine could raise international claims with regards to serious human rights violations committed against any Palestinian, beyond nationality or citizenship.

If the Palestinian state was to take a seat in the UN either as an ‘observer state’ or a full member state, it would replace the PLO which, up until now has been the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in the UN. This would without doubt mean that the status and the role of the PLO in the UN would be radically altered. The PLO will, however, most likely be able to continue to fully exercise its mandate outside the UN system, while also ensuring the representation of its claims on behalf of all the Palestinian people through the States position in the UN. The PLO is internationally recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and its mandate is based on the will of the people. Hence, the dissolution can only happen in accordance with its own structures and the will of the Palestinian people whom it represents. The emergence of a Palestinian state on the international level does not annul other elements of the PLO’s mandate, such as the pursuit of means to exercise the right to self-determination by all Palestinians and the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.

With the admission of the State of Palestine to the UN, the PLO would continue to function as the State’s representative in external relations. Further, the PLO would continue to act in its other capacities as the internationally recognized representative of all the Palestinian people in exercising their right to self-determination.

The Refugees

A main concern in the debate leading up to the Palestinian statehood application has been what this will mean for the rights of the some five million Palestinian refugees in the Middle East. A durable and peaceful solution to the conflict will not be obtainable without addressing these rights. The statehood bid does not, however, deal directly with the question of the refugees.

There have been questions of whether the rights of the refugees will continue to be effective after the establishment of a Palestinian state and what that would mean for UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency) that has provided emergency assistance and services to the Palestinian refugees since 1949.

A Palestinian UN membership or observer status would not change the right of return or any other rights of the Palestinian refugees, as these are personal rights and not determined by the status of the Palestinian state. UN General Assembly Resolution 194 from 1948 maintains the right of return of the Palestinian refugees.

The Geneva Conventions – prisoners

Palestinian combatants who are apprehended by Israeli soldiers are at present treated as if they are civilians unlawfully engaged in combat. They are detained or imprisoned by Israel in a criminal proceeding in the framework of administrative detention or the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law. With a Palestinian state being party to the Geneva Conventions, Israel could be obligated to modify its treatment of Palestinian combatants who are part of the regular forces or acting in the name of the state, and to recognize them as entitled to prisoner-of-war status according to the Third Geneva Convention. This provides the prisoners with various protections, above all legal immunity from criminal charges because of their participation in combat.

The settlements

If the Palestinian state becomes party to the International Criminal Court, Article 8 of the Statute of the Court is of particular interest in relation to the Israeli occupation. This article states that transfer, direct or indirect, of the population of the occupying power into occupied territory constitutes a war crime. This could make the settlement issue a matter for an international criminal tribunal, which would create opportunities to prosecute Israelis responsible for establishing or expanding settlements.

Further, the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the Separation Barrier (Wall) states that, as an act that strengthens the settlements and makes them permanent, the construction of the wall in areas where it surrounds settlements constitutes an illegal act and violates the Geneva Convention.

Jerusalem

If Palestine is recognized as a state according to the 1967 borders, the area will include east Jerusalem. As distinct from other parts of the West Bank, east Jerusalem was unilaterally annexed by Israel, which since has applied its law, jurisdiction and administration to the area. Although internal Israeli law defines east Jerusalem as part of the Israeli state, this has been rejected by the international community, which views it as part of the area held by Israel as an occupying power. From an international perspective, the laws that apply to the rest of the West Bank also apply to east Jerusalem. This means that the authority of the International Criminal Court would also extend to Israel’s actions here, to constructions of new, Israeli settlements in the eastern sector of the city for example.

The Occupation

When determining whether a territory is occupied or not, according to international law, statehood is irrelevant. This means that the recognition of a Palestinian state would not affect Israel’s standing as an occupying power per se. According to international law, a territory can be classified as occupied if a foreign military force is able to exercise effective control over the lives of the local population. Occupation is therefore not a function of a permanent military presence, but of the ability to control the territory. Israel controls the territory of the West Bank and many aspects of life in the Gaza Strip.

Conclusion

While any outcome of the Palestinians’ bid for statehood will not have an impact on the presence of the Israeli occupation itself, it could make a significant difference in terms of access to international courts and institutions. Status as a state would mean that Palestine has a lot more leverage and many more arenas to fight the occupation. Being recognized as a state in the UN will not have any immediate impact for the average Palestinian in Gaza, the West Bank or for the refugees and Palestinians in the diaspora. However, the strengthened political position could potentially create the international support and political will needed to create a durable solution for everyone involved.

Sources:

• Al-Haq: Al-Haq’s Questions & Answers on Palestine’s September Initiatives at the United Nations, 20 July 2011
• Anne Suciu and Limor Yehuda (The Association for Civil Rights in Israel): Human Rights in the Occupied Territories: Possible Implications of the Recognition of Palestinian Statehood, September 2011
• John Quigley: The Statehood of Palestine. International Law in the Middle East Conflict, 2010, Cambridge University Press
• Quaker United Nations Office: Palestinian Statehood at the United Nations: A Resource, 18 August 2011

Julie Holm is a Writer for the Media and Information Department at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH). She can be contacted at mid@miftah.org.

For the past few decades, negotiations and attempts at the “peace process” have been occurring intermittently. The asymmetrical relationship that exists between Israel and Palestine, occupier and occupied, has allowed for numerous unilateral decisions to be made by Israel. Having the upper hand, Israel has benefited from stalling the peace process in many ways. Perhaps the most damaging blow to any attempt at negotiations is the proliferation of Israeli settlements on occupied Palestinian territory, compromising the future of a viable Palestinian state. In just the past two decades, for example, the number of settlers has grown from 241,500 in 1992 to 490,000 in 2010, which includes east Jerusalem.

It is notable to look at when the settlement construction occurs, and when it is announced. It has often been the case that new construction or additional construction occurs during these times of negotiations or attempts at the “peace process”. During the 1990s, at the height of the Oslo Accords, which was a time of unprecedented hope for Palestinians especially, the number of settlers was growing at an incredible rate and compromising the process.

Judging from events that have happened in the past, it is obvious that settlements are a source of extreme frustration for Palestinians, and they create a volatile situation which is dangerous for both Israelis and Palestinians alike. Ultimately, the settlements damage the possibility of a contiguous Palestinian state. This report will look at the growth of Jewish settlements throughout history, when and why they have occurred, and the dangers they present today.

Settlements Under International Law

The issue of settlements is important because they not only usurp private Palestinian land, but they steal vital resources from the Palestinians as well. Under international law, all settlements are illegal. However, Israel has thus far been successful at using the settlements as a bargaining tool in negotiations, rather than being held accountable for their illegality.

On November 22, 1967, UN Resolution 242 was unanimously approved. It came in response to the 1967 War when Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, which includes east Jerusalem. The resolution is based on the idea of “Land for Peace” as it states:

(i)Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii)Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

Resolution 242 has been used as a basis for talks in many subsequent agreements, but has yet to be implemented.

Under the Fourth Geneva Convention and The Hague Relations, Israeli settlements in the West Bank are a clear violation of international law. Article 49 of the Geneva Convention prohibits occupying powers from transferring citizens of their own state into occupied territory while The Hague Regulations prohibit an occupying power to make any changes in the land of an occupied territory unless they are for military purposes and the benefit of the local population.

Other resolutions pertaining to the illegality of settlements include UN Resolutions 446, 452, 465, 471 and 476. All claim Israeli settlements to have no legality and unanimously terming them all illegal under international law.

Seeing that Israel has ignored international law and their obligations under these resolutions, along with actively creating a volatile situation, it is important to understand the belief system and reasoning behind the creation and continuous proliferation of settlements.

Zionism and the Jewish Claim to the Land

The idea of settlements and settling the land is grounded in Zionism. Zionism holds the belief that the land of Israel must be redeemed and that it is the “natural and historic right” for the Jewish people to establish a homeland in the region that is now known as Israel and Palestine. The 22% of Palestine, to Zionists, is referred to by the biblical names of Judea and Samaria. This choice of titles is revealing in and of itself, especially in political contexts, in which the land that the Palestinians live and desire for their homeland is not even referred to as Palestine.

One of the precepts of Zionism is to have a Jewish majority in the region. Judging from historical events, such as the 1948 war and the subsequent barring of refugees from returning to their homes, it is argued that Zionism directly relied on a mass displacement of non-Jews. It also depended on preventing refugees to return to their homes of which the effects are still seen today, in violation of UN Resolution 194, as Palestinian refugees still reside in overpopulated and under resourced camps. In contrast, under the Israeli Law of Return, Jews from anywhere in the world can come to Israel and gain citizenship. When the UN decided in 1947 that the land was to be partitioned into two different countries, Israel and Palestine, the Jews accepted the offer, yet were not completely satisfied. David Ben-Gurion, the founder of Zionism stated that:

“The Jewish state now being offered to us is not the Zionist objective...But it can serve as a decisive stage along the path to greater Zionist implementation. It will consolidate in Palestine, within the shortest possible time, the real Jewish force, which will lead us to our historic goal.”

The historic goal that he spoke of was to settle all of the land from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. This goal is still being carried out as settlements are still actively being constructed and have been since the occupation of these territories in 1967.

The settlements that began in the years following the 1967 War presented a dilemma from the very beginning that would inevitably have far-reaching consequences. Even though Zionism is a driving force behind settling the land, not all settlers were uniform in their reasoning.

“Some [Jews] believed that settling territories on all the fronts would serve as a political card in negotiations with the Arab states, if and when this happened in some unknown future. Others saw the settlements as a way to tie the government’s hands in any such negotiations, and there were some who conceived of the settlements as an infrastructure for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. The official government line, particularly for international purposes, was that Israel’s military presence in the territories was not an end in itself and that the territories were a deposit—an asset for political bargaining in peace negotiations”

Settlements After the 1967 War

After the 1967 War, the Labor governments (1967-1970) began to establish agricultural villages and kibbutzim in the Jordan Valley. This went along with the proposed Allon Plan which sought to annex 35-40% of the territories and create a security barrier with Jordan. The remaining land, according to the plan, would go to Jordan on which the Palestinians would be confined. However, the plan was rejected by Jordan, but the Israelis proceeded to establish their security barrier in the east regardless.

During the same years, shortly after 1967, settlements in areas such as Hebron sprung up because settlers infiltrated the area, sans government permission, and refused to leave. The government of Israel eventually coalesced to the settler demands, even though Hebron is the only city in the West Bank that Jewish settlers live in the heart of a majority Palestinian population. Hebron is now home to some of the worst settler violence.

Other settlements began under the guise of military bases or yeshivas (religious schools). The short-term living arrangements would eventually grow into huge settlements as years passed. Outposts were, and still are, set up on hilltops and often retroactively receive authorization from the government.

It was not until around 1977 that the mountaintop settlements began in full force. They were mainly promoted by a national-religious organization, Gush Emunim, which did not believe in making any territorial concessions with the Palestinians. Instead, it sought to create more and more settlements in and around Palestinian cities. Most of the religious and nationalist settlers reside in the mountaintop settlements.

In addition to the settlements on the eastern border as well as the mountaintop settlements, there is a third category which consists of the settlements that are closest to the Green Line. Many Israelis choose to live in these settlements because of lower prices and a higher quality of life. The residents who live in these settlements are often referred to as ‘economic settlers’.

Regardless of their reasons, all of the settlements take land from a future Palestinian state and ruin the possibility of contiguity.

All Israeli governments since the birth of the settlement industry have directly aided or turned a blind eye to the construction of settlements on Palestinian land. One of the most avid supporters of the settlers, former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, encouraged ideological and religious settlers to ‘move, run and grab as many hilltops as you can to enlarge the Jewish settlements because everything we take now will stay ours…everything we don’t grab will go to them’. Rabbis and other influential figures echoed these calls and encouraged young settlers to help establish ‘facts on the ground’.

Whereas extreme ideological Jews that settle in the heart of the West Bank may wholeheartedly believe the land is theirs biblically, the government of Israel has used them and positioned them strategically as to break up Palestinian communities and keep watch over the Palestinians from their hilltop enclaves. Throughout the years, Israel has turned the landscape into “a system of domination and control, which is operated to a large degree by the civilian population”.

A group of Israeli architects who studied the plans behind the settlement enterprise have stated that even though the actual built-up areas of settlements in the West Bank is relatively small, the “settlements, strategically placed, managed to generate complete territorial control…according to the regional plans of politicians, suburban homes, industrial zones, infrastructure and roads designed and built with the self-proclaimed aim of bisecting, disturbing and squeezing out Palestinian communities”. Furthermore, “settlement forms and locations are manipulated for the bisection of a Palestinian traffic artery, for surrounding a village, for supervision of a major city or strategic crossroad.”

Current Situation

Currently, there are 121 settlements in the West Bank that are officially recognized by Israel, and by its Interior Ministry which refers to them as “communities”. There are around 100 settler outposts in addition to the “official” settlements. The outposts are not formally recognized, yet they are built with assistance from government ministries. Moreover, there are 12 settlements in east Jerusalem, some of which are in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods where families have been forcefully evicted from their homes.

Settlements that are set up without approval are often retroactively recognized, which gives the green light for others to do the same. Ironically, the army is sometimes forced to dismantle “illegal” outposts in the West Bank which gives the impression that the other settlements are somehow legal. However, evacuations rarely occur (not a single one in 2009), and on the rare occasion that they do, the settlers have been known to react violently to both soldiers or to Palestinians as part of their “price-tag” policy. This policy seeks to “exact a price” on Palestinians for every outpost dismantled which comes in the form of property destruction or violence toward Palestinians.

Recently, Israelis have been taking to the streets to protest the high cost of housing within Israel. However, Israelis who live in the settlements receive massive subsidies and benefits. This shows just how important the settlement industry is to the Israeli government in that they prioritize the settlers over regular Israeli civilians wanting to live in Tel Aviv, Haifa, or west Jerusalem, for example. Most of the settlements are not built because of demand-- they are built as state policy even if that means houses within settlements remain uninhabited. Israeli architects Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman argue that “the civilian occupation relies on the presence of civilian architecture to demonstrate a Jewish presence across the landscape…the question of whether there are a pair of eyes looking out of the windows of settlement homes becomes irrelevant as the effect of domination is achieved by the mere presence of these buildings”.

Settlements and the Peace Process

The Oslo Accords was the first bilateral agreement between Palestinians and Israelis. This marked a huge turning point in relations between the two sides, yet still one of profound asymmetry. Under the Declaration of Principles of the Oslo Accords it was stated that “The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period”. It also included the clause “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations”.

Despite these clauses, settlements were not explicitly addressed, and the issue was left up to interpretation by the Israelis. Settlements were saved as a permanent status issue to be decided on at a later time. This was a failure of Oslo because as negotiations were in process to establish a Palestinian state, steps were simultaneously underway to make the Palestinian state smaller and smaller by the construction of settlements. Each new settlement and bypass road that was developed directly impacted Palestinian freedom of movement. The settlements, by their very nature and the infrastructure that holds them together, are antithetical to Palestinian freedom.

In 2003, under the US Administration’s Road Map, all settlement expansion was to stop and all outposts that were established after March 2001 were to be dismantled in line with the Mitchell Report that came about during the failed Camp David Summit of 2000. The Mitchell Report was published on April 30, 2001, stemming from an American fact-finding committee led by former US Senator George J. Mitchell. One of its main findings was that all settlement activity should be frozen. However, Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, rejected the Road Map requirements in practice, and settlement expansion continued.

In 2007, the Israelis and Palestinians took part in the Annapolis Conference where commitments were renewed under the Road Map. Ceasing settlement construction remained a key Israeli obligation stated as “[freezing] all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements)” as well as “immediately [dismantling] settlement outposts erected since March 2001”.

However, settlement construction, growth, and planning did not stop. In the six months that followed the Annapolis Conference, tenders for construction which totaled 847 housing units were issued. Ironically, during the 12 months that lead up to Annapolis, only 138 housing units were tendered.

The United States on Israeli Settlements

Because the United States of America has consistently had a stake in negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, acting as mediator, their position on the settlements should be understood. The position of the U.S. government regarding settlements has been fairly consistent throughout the years, at least in rhetoric. President Ronald Reagan reversed the former position of his predecessors regarding the illegality of settlements. He decided that settlements were not illegal, in contrast to international law, but he agreed that they were in fact, an obstacle to peace.

Since then, every president has stated in some form, that the settlements do nothing to help the peace process, and they damage any hopes that the Palestinians may have, increasing their chances of turning to other, possibly violent, alternatives. The position has consistently been that a halt of settlement construction could create the confidence needed for an agreement.

Before the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the US Secretary of State at the time, James Baker, complained to Congress that, “Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy”.

U.S. President Barack Obama started a hard-line approach to Israel when he demanded a settlement freeze in 2010. Although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu complied in public, there were many loopholes around the agreement that allowed ‘natural growth’ of settlements and the continuation of settlements in east Jerusalem. During a visit to Israel during the same year, US Vice President Joe Biden was met with the announcement that Israel was to construct 16,000 new housing units in east Jerusalem.

The Obama administration’s attempt at renewing the settlement moratorium failed, and negotiations came to a close.

Conclusion

Judging from these instances, it can be assumed that Israel has chosen settlements over peace. The religious and nationalist claims, as well as an armed civilian presence that is used to control the Palestinians within the West Bank have been chosen over a lasting peace and an end to hostilities in the region.

The settlements impede Palestinian freedom of movement, steal resources, stifle Palestinian development and expansion, and put Palestinians at risk of violent settlers who act with impunity and receive protection from the Israeli army.

The settlements, their infrastructure, and the military presence that must protect and guard them, ruin the plausibility of a viable Palestinian state—and judging from the evidence, this is Israel’s purpose.

Meg Walsh is a Writer for the Media and Information Department at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH). She can be contacted at mid@miftah.org.

The power of image is important to anyone who is concerned about how others view them. The way one is perceived, especially on first impression, is integral to the opinion of the outside world and their reaction/action towards them. This, it seems, is no different for a government or a whole nation. Politicians strive to perfect their image on behalf of their party in order to secure more votes, and whole countries put across a global image in order to attract people to their shores and boost their tourism industry. But the global image of a country is significant in other, more politically-driven, ways. This essay will look at how Israel understands the importance of its’ image in shaping other countries’ foreign policy towards it and how it manipulates the media in order to refine and justify the actions of the military in news reports, focusing particularly on the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid coverage.

Background: Propaganda, public diplomacy and soft power

In order to disseminate such an image, a government can employ what was originally labeled as propaganda. Following the harmful yet effective propaganda that was in circulation throughout the Second World War and the following Cold War, such image-shaping efforts have now been renamed in order to avoid the negative connotations. Governments now talk about ‘public diplomacy’.

Public diplomacy can affect the foreign policy of another country and thus influence their treatment towards one’s own country. While this can be done through diplomatic, economic and military means, it can also be achieved through ‘soft power’. Therefore governments target civilian audiences whose opinion has a bearing on the government’s policy. As the academic Manheim points out ‘public relations are more likely to have effect in foreign affairs than in domestic affairs because there is less knowledge and experience on part of the citizens’, therefore the coverage of foreign affairs becomes tantamount. In this way, outside governments began to realize that they can have a positive effect on the opinion of civilians and, in turn, on that country’s foreign policy through carefully grooming their public image and explaining their actions to the rest of the world through information.

As governments acknowledged the importance of such ‘information activities’, they began to devote more and more resources to the endeavor. The United States has the Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs which is dedicated to ‘supporting the achievement of US foreign policy goals and objectives, advance national interests, and enhance national security by informing and influencing foreign publics…’ The British government also employs their own methods of public diplomacy through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which undertakes ‘a process of achieving the UK’s international strategic priorities through engaging and forming partnerships with like-minded organizations and individuals in the public arena.’ According to the FCO, ‘it’s not just about delivering messages but holding a two-way dialogue, listening to and learning from audiences around the world, in order to get a better understanding of the changing perceptions of the UK and its policies.’

Following suit, the Israeli government takes the role of public diplomacy very seriously and as such devotes a number of resources to educating and influencing foreign audiences, particularly those in the United States. The Israeli government has its own word that has been used since the 1970s in relation to their own public diplomacy work. Hasbara is roughly translated as ‘explanation’ and is used under the context of Israeli policy and actions. Along with the work undertaken by the Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs, the government has created other ways in which the image of Israel can be explained and promoted around the world, from person to person.

Public diplomacy and hasbara are employed as tactics of ‘soft power’. When Hilary Clinton became Secretary of State, she remarked on the importance of a ‘smart power’ strategy, that being the attention to both hard and soft power. While hard power concerns military prowess and financial coercions, soft power deals more with development and education.

For example, the Hasbara fellowships bring young people from the US to Israel to learn more about the country so that they may become ‘effective pro-Israel advocates on their campuses’.

Perhaps, one of the most challenging obstacles to the image of Israel is the action of its military in respect of the occupation. For this reason, the Israeli Defense has its own department which deals with media relations concerning their own actions. The IF Spokesperson’s Unit is organized into a number of branches ranging from international media, strategies, public affairs and film. The last mentioned produces films and footage about the Israeli military and will be looked at more closely further on in this essay.

Such efforts of public diplomacy have been developed and stream lined so that, following Israeli military action, the appropriate process of ‘explanation’ and justification can be put into place. In order to show how the Israeli public diplomacy or ‘PR’ machine works, I will look at the media coverage following the Gaza flotilla incident in May 2010.

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Harriet Straughen is a Writer for the Media and Information Department at the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH). She can be contacted at mid@miftah.org.

In order to understand the current dilemmas of Palestinian political leadership and the continuing statelessness of the Palestinians, it is helpful to examine how British policy influenced institutional development and power dynamics during the mandate era, the remnants of which are still clearly visible today. British policies toward the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine during the British Mandate period greatly influenced the defeat of the Palestinians, and the emergence of the state of Israel in 1948. Although the British attempted to maintain an appearance of balance and neutrality in which they proclaimed, “that Arabs and Jews would live in harmony together,” and in which they publicly denied Zionist aims for statehood, their policy was far from even-handed between the two parties. While the British did adjust their policy according to events unfolding on the ground over time, and did sometimes display pragmatism and sympathy to Palestinian grievances, British policies largely favored Zionist goals and aims. This was particularly true of British policy regarding the creation of para-state mechanisms and institution building during the Mandate.

In fact, British policy from 1917 through 1939 greatly enabled the organization and establishment of Jewish para-state institutions. For purposes of this paper, I will focus primarily on the Jewish Agency (the Zionist Executive), which prepared the Jewish community for eventual statehood. I will compare and contrast this with British policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians, which actively prevented them from establishing a political institution of the same magnitude and power, and instead favored the centralization of Palestinian authority in political-religious structures, utilizing the old Ottoman framework for local governance that allowed for a minimal amount of autonomy over their own affairs. While this alone cannot sufficiently explain the inability of Palestinians to organize themselves effectively in the face of British and Zionist power, it undoubtedly placed them in a subordinate and much weaker position than the Jewish community in Mandate Palestine. This aspect of British policy presented challenges to the Palestinians as they struggled for statehood and self-determination that they were unable to overcome in the years leading up to 1948, and one could argue, that they are still struggling to overcome today.

To fully understand the implications of British policy regarding institution building in relation to the Palestinian and Jewish communities in Mandate Palestine, it is first necessary to examine the mandate system and the language written into the Mandate for Palestine itself. The mandate system emerged after World War I to temporarily allow world powers to administer Ottoman territories, with the understanding “that it would encourage the development of political, economic, and social institutions to the point that self-government would result and that the mandatory power would withdraw.” In The Iron Cage, Rashid Khalidi asserts that it can be argued the Mandate for Palestine was intentionally written by the British to exclude national self-determination for the Palestinians, which at the time constituted an overwhelming majority of the population. However, regardless of the intention, the language of the Mandate is quite telling. As Rashid Khalidi pointed out, the Palestinians are never mentioned by name as a people, nor is their right to self-determination specifically addressed and acknowledged in the text of the Mandate. Palestinians were merely referred to as ‘inhabitants,’ ‘non-Jewish communities’ and ‘other sections of the population.’ Yet, the language of the Mandate goes deeper than neglecting to acknowledge the Palestinians as a people. It specifically addresses responsibility for fostering the development of self-governing institutions solely for the Jewish national home. Article Two of the Mandate states:

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home… and the development of self-governing institutions.

What follows that section references “safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.” This contradictory and problematic addition attempts to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinians, but does not specifically address them as a people deserving of self-determination, nor does it declare any such responsibility for helping to secure the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine, or more importantly, Palestinian self-governing institutions. Yet the Mandate does specifically recognize a nascent Jewish governing body, and its commitment to cooperate with it in working towards the establishment of a Jewish national home.

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