Palestinian youths form one of the largest sectors of Palestinian society, a sector that is often overlooked and requires close attention when trying to solve the challenges facing it.

Broadly speaking, young Palestinians face challenges and conflicts on three fronts: "family" conflicts, "social" conflicts and "political" conflicts.

A subject that is rarely broached in Palestinian society is that of family conflicts. There are enough dysfunctional families in society for this to be an issue of serious concern and there is now also a major problem of families that have been separated, especially in the past seven years and as a result of the difficulties imposed on the movement of Palestinians within and between the Palestinian areas.

Youths from such families become victims as their insecurities at home affect behavior. It is clear that young people who suffer conflict within their families face a lack of motivation in school and at work, can become violent and generally lack confidence in themselves.

Another important challenge Palestinian youth face is the "social" conflict, pitting traditional values against modernity, fundamentalism against liberalism. With developments in technology, youths are very exposed to other cultures and traditions. These new ideas and influences often contradict, or seem to contradict, the values they have been brought up with or that they see around them. Often, young people start to make comparisons and contrasts that don't actually help them realize a transition in their thoughts. Consequently, one of two things is likely to happen: they blindly imitate another culture, leaving them alienated from their surroundings; or they totally reject any outside influence, turning away from new ideas and thoughts.

The final and greatest challenge Palestinian youths face is of course the political conflict with Israel. As in so many areas of Palestinian lives, any resolution or progress toward resolution of the many challenges facing young Palestinians will be extremely limited in the absence of a resolution to the one conflict that all Palestinians have to deal with on a daily basis and that affects so many areas of life.

The suffocating occupation affects young people in a multitude of ways, whether directly and in the short term in the form of the absence of decent employment opportunities, the inability to move freely from area to area let alone country to country, and the lack of control over their own political destinies, or in the long term, where psychological factors may inflict more damage insofar as the occupation instills a deep sense of mistrust toward authority and creates enormous anger. Witness how young people identify with the suicide bombers of the intifada. Look at the disruptions to normal life that they have to suffer on a daily basis, whether in terms of curfews, fear of simply walking the streets should a military incursion be under way or the humiliation of waiting in endless lines at checkpoints with not even a guarantee that one can cross. This anger is real, deep and will not go away overnight.

But the political conflict is evolving now to include more than just Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The growing Palestinian-Palestinian conflict, which started in Gaza, is moving slowly but surely, infiltrating other parts of the land, especially between young people because of their misinterpretation of authority and power.

Palestinian youth, like any nation's youth, plays a key role in the development of the country's culture, politics, economy and education. The PA, interested organizations and individuals should work hard to guarantee a peaceful life for active non-violent youths by building their capacities, training them on issues related to society and communication, opening their horizons to other cultures, reinforcing conflict management training courses on a community level and creating a fruitful basis to enable them to achieve their ambitions and improve their skills.- Published 30/7/2007 © bitterlemons.org

I cannot describe the events since the formation of a committee to investigate into the defeat of Fatah in Gaza as anything but a second coup  that is, following the coup Hamas staged against Fatah in Gaza. However this time, the coup was led by President Mahmoud Abbas, the leader accused of having a weak personality and the incapacity to elicit any change.

President Abbas chose the critical time and the appropriate event to finally stage his coup after enduring a long wait since he assumed the presidency in 2004. And thus the most powerful figures in Fatah, including Mohamed Dahlan and Yasser Abd Rabbo, in addition to 60 other senior Fatah officers have either fled or fallen at the first sign that the president meant business. Abu Mazen has abandoned his position as a peaceful leader to become a combatant leader who seems to be leading the new battle himself.

Apart from his hesitant decisions, Abu Mazen remains a Palestinian necessity after the Palestinians were orphaned following the death of Yasser Arafat; a nation without a real leadership that is embroiled in war. The Palestinians had become accustomed to Arafat who was their front in the Diaspora and who governed over them internally for 36 years. Abu Ammar succeeded in overshadowing all those who tried to compete with him for the seat of power, including the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who despite his huge following and popularity still could not take his place, like many others who tried before him.

But Arafat was not simply a leader by virtue of heading the Palestinian Authority and Fatah, but rather for a number of traits he possessed, including his shrewdness, focus, decisiveness, reconciliatory approach and the complex alliances he forged on an Arab and Palestinian level.

As for Abu Mazen, he inherited the leadership of Fatah without any challenges posed from the leadership of the movement by reason of his seniority and the respect he had gained. However, over the past three years, he has shown no signs of leadership qualities. He did nothing to resolve the recurring internal crises in the Palestinian arena, or even within Fatah itself. Abbas was disdained to the point that emboldened his partners in Hamas against him, despite the fact that he was the one responsible for admitting them to power. In turn, they plotted to kill him then turned against him and seized Gaza in a manner that intended to demonstrate their challenge of Abu Mazen’s leadership.

Perhaps this was the last straw that woke the president up, after which he broke his silence and began shooting at his potential opponents.

Nabil Amr’s unexpected proactive statement was met with amazement after he made some announcements, before the Friday prayers, that 60 officers in Fatah will be held accountable and that Dahlan had resigned, and before them was the news of the formation of Salam Fayyad’s two governments. The president commenced with a harsh speech in which he revealed that Hamas had made attempts to assassinate him.

This series of bold steps could mean a new awakening on Abu Mazen’s behalf, one in which he has come to realize that it was not only his power that was targeted, but that there had also been a conspiracy to take his life. Perhaps these developments might indicate a plan in which Abu Mazan has waited for the right moment to attack his adversaries, both at home and abroad.

Should he succeed in his internal coup, Abu Mazen will have taken charge of the full reins of leadership and the absolute right for the Palestinian Authority, especially after shutting the cage on Hamas, which it had willingly backed itself into after seizing Gaza. Hamas put itself on the frontline to face Israeli gunfire and the faces of 1.5 millions Palestinians who require it to provide them with their share of water, electricity, gas, pensions and food.

Today, the aftermath of this ‘counter-coup’ has set the scene for Mahmoud Abbas to take action. He has become obligated to adopt reforms, reorganize the order of power and change the bad image that has come to represent Fatah, and finally, to lead the Palestinian people towards their dream project: the Palestinian state.

Understanding the trends among the younger generation is an important way of predicting the future opinions and direction of any nation. It also gives us an early warning capability of negative trends that may be dealt with before it is too late.

Palestinian youths are different from most nations' youths. They are especially vulnerable to political factors affecting their reality, including their social and economic situations. Indeed, education and later job opportunities, access to decent health and social services, in addition to access to the special needs of youth like places of entertainment and sports, all depend on the political situation. This explains why Palestinian youths are so political.

There are many reasons to believe that the political opinions of Palestinian youths are not average but rather veer to the relatively hard line. First, cross tabulation of poll results conducted in the Palestinian territories since the peace process began show that age is a significant factor in determining answers to political questions such as attitudes to the political process, signed agreements and means of struggle.

Second are the results of the frequently conducted student council elections, which have shown steadily growing student support for political factions and groups that oppose the peace process and signed agreements, support violent means of resistance and promote fanatic ideologies.

We should take these indicators seriously as predictions of a trend of future radicalization in Palestinian society. Half the population, due to high population growth, is at age 16 and below. The question is what can be done in order to counter such trends and change them into more positive ones?

The key word in any answer is "hope". After finishing high school, which is free and compulsory, young Palestinians face great difficulties in finding higher education places because local universities are limited to a few specialties as well as in terms of capacity. Opportunities to study abroad are even more limited, not least because of the expense.

At the same time, job opportunities are even more difficult to come by for both school and university graduates, leaving young people at this critical age unemployed, helpless and hopeless. If we add to this the effect of the humiliation resulting from the treatment meted out to them by Israeli soldiers--mostly of the same age--waiting at checkpoints, seeing Israeli bulldozers uproot trees or demolish houses, having family members thrown in prison and hearing horrible tales of torture, it all adds up to an inevitable radicalization of those youths.

To reverse these trends requires reversing both the practices and consolidation of the occupation and the dire socio-economic situation. The one will not happen without the other. To improve educational and professional opportunities requires a parallel lessening of the impact of the occupation and ultimately its end. Only then can Palestinian youths busy themselves with the normal preoccupations of their counterparts elsewhere, building careers and families.