Executive Summary

The ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip has compounded several humanitarian and legal violations, particularly inrelation to the reproductive rights of Palestinian women. Since the launch of its military offensive in October 2023, Israelhas systematically targeted Palestinian women in ways that undermine their ability to survive, give birth, and raisechildren. More than 12,300 women have been killed, 4,700 women and children are missing, and approximately 800,000women have been forcibly displaced. An estimated one million women and girls now suffer from acute food insecurity.Israel’s actions constitute a deliberate attempt to impair the reproductive capacities of Palestinian women, aimed atdismantling the future of Palestinian society. Through the bombing of shelters, destruction of hospitals, blockading ofmedical and hygiene supplies, and attacks on fertility clinics and maternity wards, Israel’s policy of erasure is notincidental, it is intentional.

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Executive Summary

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is vital inproviding humanitarian aid, education, and health services to Palestinian refugees across Jordan, Lebanon,Syria, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Beyond its humanitarian role, UNRWA represents aninternational commitment to Palestinian refugees' right of return, as established in UN General AssemblyResolution 194 in 1948. However, Israel has long sought to undermine the agency through financial, political,and military means.Recent Israeli actions have escalated, with the Israeli Knesset passing legislation banning UNRWAoperations in areas under Israeli control, effectively revoking its legal status. Concurrently, Israel hasintensified military attacks on UNRWA facilities. In the Gaza Strip since October 2023, Israeli forces havetargeted 310 UNRWA sites, destroying schools and killing 273 UNRWA employees alongside hundreds ofcivilians sheltering in its facilities. Throughout the occupied West Bank, the Israeli military has been turningUNRWA facilities into military bases and detention centers, and has closed UNRWA’s headquarters in EastJerusalem. These actions violate multiple international legal agreements and aim to erase Palestinian refugeeidentity and their legal rights.

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The shocking human cost that occupation has taken on Palestinian women is laid bare in research published today. Combining research, extensive surveys, and first-hand testimonies from over 40 Palestinian women, Palestinian Women: The Disproportionate Impact of The Israeli Occupation provides new insight into the gendered experience of occupation, looking into four issues in particular:

• women refugees
• the impact of residency revocation on Palestinian women in Jerusalem
• the experience of women prisoners
• Gazans’ access to health

Co-authored by four Palestinian NGOs – the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH), Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD), the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), and Women Media and Development (TAM), the report includes detailed findings that demonstrate how the oppression occupation has permeated women’s daily lives, and the particular impact is has had on women in Palestinian refugee camps, Palestinian women living in Jerusalem, women prisoners, and residents of Gaza who require health services.

The impact on refugee women

Researchers spoke to 500 Palestinian refugee women from 12 Palestinian camps (7 in the West Bank, 5 in Gaza). Their findings included the following:

• A third of women surveyed had been directly exposed to physical assault by Israeli Occupation Forces. 9% had been exposed to threats of being attacked by police dogs during Israeli night raids on their homes.
• Over a third (37%) of respondents had been exposed to detention or interrogation, while 38% said that they or members of their households had been exposed to verbal abuse during Israeli army raids, at checkpoints or while visiting religious places.
• Nearly a quarter (24%) were forced to live in shelters or with extended family. 22% were forced to live under unhealthy conditions. 13% stated that the female and male members of their families were separated as a result of having to live in shelters.
• More than one in five (21%) had been exposed to beatings or tear gas at Israeli checkpoints while they were pregnant. 4% reported that they aborted or gave birth at Israeli checkpoints.
• The majority (64%- 321 cases) had been unable to visit religious or recreational places because of Occupation restrictions.

Jerusalem: Residency Revocation and Family Reunification

According to official figures, 14,595 Palestinians from East Jerusalem had their residency status revoked between 1967 and the end of 2016.

Through residency revocations, Israel has separated husbands from wives, parents from children, and extended families from one another, causing traumatic complications for women attempting to remain with their families in both Jerusalem and the West Bank.

This leads to traumatic fears of separation from children for mothers and an entrenching of patriarchal practices across society. Palestinian women living in Jerusalem lose residency rights if they get divorced or their husbands remarry. Limiting their access to justice, female victims of domestic violence fear reporting abuse to authorities in case they are forcibly transferred away from their children.

Women prisoners

Since the beginning of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine in 1967, approximately 10,000 Palestinian women have been arrested and detained by Israeli military forces. According to the Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs’ 2017 annual report, 1,467 children were arrested last year.

Our researchers spoke to prisoners who experienced physical and psychological torture at arrest and imprisonment, and traumatic, gendered treatment, including:

• Women denied access to menstrual products while detained
• A woman arrested while pregnant who gave birth while chained to a prison hospital bed
• Ex-prisoners who report being subjected to rape and death threats during interrogation, including a girl in of 15-years old threatened with rape
• Women who were subjected to frequent forced and violent strip searches
• A prisoner who reported toothache, only to have the wrong tooth removed

Access to Health in Gaza

Israel exercises strict control Gaza’s borders, a policy of ‘actual authority’, constituting continued occupation, despite the withdrawal of its permanent presence. This control in particular affects those who need medical treatment outside of Gaza’s struggling health system, who require permission to leave. The report shows that the rate of approval applications is falling year-by-year:

• 92.5% of applications were successful in 2012
• 88.7% in 2013
• 82.4% in 2014
• 77.5% in 2015
• 62.1% in 2016

Of the 26,282 permit applications submitted by patients aiming to exit through Erez in 2016, 8,242 (31.4%) were delayed. Many applicants received no response from border authorities, even after lawyers filed formal applications on their behalf. These delays regularly extend months and years beyond medical appointments, worsening already life-threatening diseases and in some cases resulting in death.

Read the full report here, or download it here:

Palestinian Women – The Disproportionate Impact of the Israeli Occupation

Israel is changing its definition of vital interests. Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip with its 1.3 million Palestinians, regardless of the immediate motivation, fit well into Israel's desire to remain Jewish and democratic. But instead of negotiating the conditions of its withdrawal with the Palestinian Authority (PA) - thereby paying a heavy price in the West Bank - it was willing to withdraw unilaterally. In doing so, it was ready to abandon long-term demands, such as a presence along the external borders and at the Palestinian international border crossings. The new Egyptian-Israeli security arrangement along the Rafah border has made it easier for Israel to make the change. In doing so, it also served Palestinian and Egyptian interests, a true non-zero-sum bargain.

With the new security arrangements, Israel seeks to reduce its risks as it unilaterally separates from the Palestinian demographic and other "threats." The option of deploying Egyptian forces along the Egyptian side of the border with the Gaza Strip is the least costly for Israel. The alternative, inviting a third party such as an international or multilateral force, with deployment on the Palestinian side of the border, would have required negotiations with the Palestinians and would have reduced Israel's room for maneuver by restricting its freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip after withdrawal.

In contrast, since the Egyptian deployment is on Egyptian rather than Palestinian soil, Israel can still maintain its ability to enter the Gaza Strip whenever it wishes. The other alternative - asking Palestinians to provide for border security - requires a much greater level of Israeli-Palestinian trust and security cooperation than currently exists. Moreover, Palestinians lack the capacity to do the job and Israel refuses to allow them to acquire that capacity. For now, the Egyptian role serves a stopgap function until Palestinian capacity is acquired and trust restored.

For the PA, the Egyptian deployment along its southern border makes a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip more likely. As importantly, it provides an important precedent for its eastern borders with Jordan. Soon, Israel will face a West Bank situation similar to the one it faced in Gaza. In the absence of permanent-status negotiations - a most likely scenario - it could find it to its advantage to make similar arrangements with Jordan along the Jordanian-Palestinian borders and its border crossings, instead of inviting a third-party role. Negotiations with the PA might not be an option as Israel will not agree to withdraw completely from the West Bank and the PA will most likely refuse to negotiate provisional borders.

Moreover, a greater security role for Egypt at this time helps the PA meet its own security obligations while providing it time to rebuild its own capacity. Egypt will now have a greater stake in preserving the existing calm by working closely with all armed factions in Gaza. It will have a similar interest in helping reform and rebuild Palestinian security services so that they can assume their own border responsibilities.

For its part, Egypt gains a greater security presence in Sinai. It also gains a greater role in the Arab-Israel peace process and in domestic Palestinian politics. Egypt's success in securing the borders with the Gaza Strip improves its regional standing and its relations with Israel and the United States.

There are risks. Continued violence and settlement construction in the West Bank could create greater motivation to smuggle arms across the border. If successful in preventing the smuggling, Egypt would be seen as a state that protects Israeli interests. If it turns a blind eye or if smuggling continues despite its efforts, Egypt's relations with Israel and the U.S. would most likely deteriorate. If Egypt were made to pay for lack of enforcement, it might blame the PA for that. The PA might lose a friend as well as the opportunity to present the Egyptian deployment as a viable model to employ on its eastern borders.

The Israeli unilateral disengagement policy represents a major turning point in the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But it is not without a precedent.

In May 2000, the Israeli government ordered its forces out of south Lebanon without an agreement with Lebanon or Syria. The Lebanese government, public and Hizbullah celebrated victory: forcing Israel to disengage from occupied Lebanese territory, unilaterally, at no cost to Lebanon. Hizbullah did not have to disarm even though the occupation was fully ended; a weak Lebanese government had to acquiesce to its continued armed presence at the country's most sensitive borders.

While conditions may not necessarily be the same in the case of the Gaza disengagement, the net outcome could be the same, or worse.

Let us first look at the only crucial difference between the two disengagements: in the south Lebanon case, none of the Lebanese actors - government, public, or Hizbullah - wanted to coordinate, let alone negotiate, the Israeli withdrawal. In the case of Gaza, while Hamas is delighted with Sharon's unilateralism and views it as a victory for armed struggle, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and public are decidedly against Israeli unilateralism and insist on negotiations, or at least coordination.

If Israel fails to negotiate or coordinate the aftermath of its withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas will most likely own Sharon's disengagement. Such a victory for violence, as seen by almost three quarters of the Palestinian public, could assure Hamas of a respectable achievement at the upcoming Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006.

Polling findings of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah show that if conducted today, elections could give nationalist Fatah 44% of the seats, Hamas 33%, others 15%, while 8% remain undecided. If Hamas succeeds in writing the narrative of disengagement, a sure thing if it remains unilateral, the balance will shift, favoring the Islamists.

In the context of such a Hamas victory a PA attempt to disarm Hamas, and indeed to turn Gaza into a success story after elections, is doomed to fail. In this case the Palestinians will fail to address the one issue that has proven most impossible to resolve during the last four years of Yasser Arafat's era: to effectively deal, once and for all, with the question of the role of violence in their relationship with Israel.

The alternative is full coordination of the withdrawal's aftermath with the PA - including addressing vital Palestinian needs such as control over the Rafah crossing, renewal of West Bank-Gaza links, a functioning airport and sea port, and Gaza trade relations with Israel and the West Bank.

In this case the PA, not Hamas, would own disengagement and write its narrative.

Such a PA victory, if accompanied by a freeze in West Bank settlement building, could have highly positive consequences for Palestinians and Israelis. Two in particular are worth mentioning: It could have a positive impact on the outcome of the next Palestinian parliamentary elections, allowing nationalist and moderate forces to win a majority, and it could make it possible for the PA to collect arms from armed groups, a PA commitment in the first phase of the road map.

The Palestinian public not only supports negotiating the disengagement but, more importantly, it is fully supportive of the current cease- fire with Israel and would fully support total cessation of violence from the Gaza Strip once a full Israeli withdrawal is carried out.

In fact a majority of Hamas supporters favors the ending of hostilities between Israel and Gaza in the context of a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. But the demand clearly rejected by a Palestinian majority is the collection of arms from the various militias now operating in the Palestinian territories.

Given the clear weaknesses of the Palestinian security services, as recently exposed by the report issued by the Strategic Assessment Initiative, it would be suicidal for the PA leadership to order the disarming of the militias without first ensuring clear public support.

A freeze in West Bank settlement construction could play a central role in facilitating collection of arms by generating public support for such a step. Findings of a June 2005 joint PSR-Hebrew University survey clearly show that those Palestinians who expect West Bank settlements to expand in the post-disengagement period tend to be highly opposed to the collection of arms. But a clear majority of those who expect to see no growth in West Bank settlements fully supports collection of arms by the PA.

In order to ensure that such disarming is done peacefully, the PA must do its best to minimize miscalculation on the part of its potential domestic rivals; the PA must be seen as a credible threat. Israel's stubborn refusal to allow the rearming of the PA forces, as recommended by Egypt and US envoy General William Ward, reduces the motivation of security forces while emboldening the militias.

Recent Israeli political developments seem to preclude the possibility of a positive Israeli response to Palestinian needs, even if such a response could prove highly beneficial to Israeli well being. With Sharon's rival, Binyamin Netanyahu, starting his election campaign by pressing Israel's nightmarish fear buttons, Sharon may become even tougher on his definition of Israel's security needs in the context of disengagement.

Palestinian-Israeli coordination of economic, civil and security matters may become untenable. Following disengagement, Sharon's electoral imperatives may force him to turn to the right, advocating more settlement construction in Arab East Jerusalem and the West Bank in an attempt to justify his disengagement gamble.

This would be a shame, because successful coordination might not only facilitate the dismantling of the infrastructure of violence, but as importantly, a return to meaningful negotiations. Moreover, for the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, successful coordination promises stronger hands in defeating their domestic foes by delivering economic prosperity and improved security.

Khalil Shikaki is the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

Even before I revealed that my organization's latest opinion poll on the Palestinian presidential race showed a statistical tie between the imprisoned firebrand Marwan Barghouti and the conciliatory elder Mahmoud Abbas, Barghouti's emissary was unequivocal. He had come to my hectic office in Ramallah to assure me that, regardless of the level of Barghouti's current popularity, the jailed leader had no option but to run because Palestinians needed a genuine choice.

That notion may sound mundane in the United States, but it's a novel one here. Palestinians haven't had a genuine choice for quite some time; open challenges to the established leadership have been practically unheard of. Until his death last month, Yasser Arafat had ruled the Palestinian Liberation Organization for 35 years. It has been eight years since Arafat ran virtually unopposed for the presidency of the Palestinian Authority, created after the Oslo accords. And at no point during earth-shaking peace talks with Israel in the 1990s or the bone-shattering intifada of the past four years have ordinary Palestinians been asked to approve a referendum; most decisions have been made by a handful of leaders of Hamas, its militant secular rival Al Aqsa Brigades, or the central committee of Arafat's Fatah movement.

In the wake of Arafat's funeral, however, the Palestinian body politic has come alive. That's why the message from Barghouti's emissary was noteworthy. Despite pressure from senior PLO leaders, I was told, Barghouti believes that Palestinians should be able to choose between continuing and ending the four-year-old intifada, which he helped instigate.

The Palestinian presidential elections are inextricably tied to the peace process. Abbas, who has criticized the intifada, is viewed by almost two-thirds of Palestinians as the candidate most able to reach a peace agreement with Israel; Barghouti, who earlier this year was given five life sentences by a Tel Aviv court for murder, is viewed by most Palestinians as the candidate most likely to keep the intifada going.

Barghouti's decision to run, reversing his initial pronouncement, has consequences far beyond the fate of the intifada. His candidacy has become a vehicle for young guard nationalists who want to seize the moment and shake up the Palestinian political system. A true contest will help the young guard to displace the old, if not today, then tomorrow. With policies being challenged and power openly contested, a transition to democracy is underway.

The desire for democracy is pervasive among Palestinians, according to a poll our center conducted early this month. Even though the Islamists, who represent a major force in Palestinian politics, have decided to boycott the elections, an overwhelming 90 percent of Palestinians say that they were determined to vote. Moreover, the Islamists themselves are asserting that they will participate in local and parliamentary elections, tentatively scheduled to take place over the next few months. After four years of political paralysis, people are not willing to miss the opportunity to determine their future.

The decision by the Islamists to boycott the presidential race might help explain the rapid slide in the popularity of Hamas and other Islamists, from 32 percent in September to 24 percent today. Meanwhile the excitement generated by election campaigning might, in part, explain the sharp rise in support for Fatah, from 29 percent to 40 percent during the same period.

Winning a contested race would be the best outcome for Abbas, who has long been in Arafat's shadow. A victory over Barghouti could give Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) the legitimacy he needs to combat violence and to deliver on any pledges he makes in negotiations with Israel. If Barghouti pulls out of the race, as he has discussed, and Abbas were to win unopposed, he would end up with a weaker hand.

This new post-Arafat era commences with rising optimism and hope among the Palestinian public. A majority believes that Arafat's death has increased the chances for a political settlement with Israel, and more than 80 percent support a mutual cessation of violence and an immediate return to negotiations. The level of support for reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis has never been higher. The hope is being generated by a smooth transition of power in the Palestinian Authority and the public perception that the chances for success in the peace process are now greater due to Arafat's departure.

Abbas benefits from this development because he is viewed as the candidate most likely to bring about peace and the one most able to improve economic conditions. Barghouti's chances are best when fear and pessimism prevail. (It is not surprising that most of the young Fatah members in prison have rallied behind Abbas; they believe that he, not their fellow prisoner Barghouti, is the one most likely to secure their release.) The current decline in support for Islamists is highly correlated with reduced pessimism. Support for Hamas is the public response to fears and threats imposed by Israeli collective punishment measures.

The next few weeks will be critical. Ironically, the more successful Hamas's election boycott is, the more likely it will be that Abbas will win. Most Hamas supporters back Barghouti.

Meanwhile Israel can choose one of two approaches. It could maintain the status quo -- the checkpoints, the closures, the assassinations and the strangulation -- claiming that it does not want to interfere in Palestinian internal affairs; it could even escalate violence and retaliation. By doing so, it would engender greater fear and drive voters to Barghouti. Alternatively, it could deliver on its promise to facilitate elections by quickly pulling out of Palestinian cities in the West Bank, removing checkpoints and closures, and ceasing all military initiatives in order to allow free and fair campaigning.

Israel could even capitalize on the relative calm to release prisoners and allow armed Palestinian police to maintain law and order and provide security for the election process. Doing so would maximize hope and optimism and thereby reduce the appeal of violence. It is ironic that the release of Barghouti, while freeing him to campaign, might damage his candidacy by reinforcing a sense of normality.

A genuinely contested presidential election will set a unique precedent in the Arab world. It will open the door wide for Palestinian democracy.

Abbas's weakness could actually help keep that door open. Abbas will need to reach out constantly to all constituencies for support. After all, he is not the choice of most young nationalistic Palestinians or Islamists. Nor is he much liked by members of the old guard, who felt he was quick to abandon them in favor of the young guard during his short term as prime minister back in mid-2003. (At that time, Abbas actually resigned his position in the Fatah Central Committee.) The Palestinian power structure will be more diffuse, insuring better governance.

Even if Abbas wins the elections, he will only be a transitional leader. With the passing of Arafat, the days of the old guard -- the leaders who spent years in exile -- are coming to a close. The future of Palestine will be shaped by nationalist, Islamist and moderate liberal leaders -- all of whom went through their formative experiences under Israeli occupation.

Still, it will be an important transition. Abbas could undercut support for the Islamists by making progress in the peace process and improving economic conditions. He could also buttress the institutions of Palestinian democracy, institutions that have been smashed or worn down in recent years. These institutions must outlast Abbas if democracy is to survive.

And if Barghouti wins, the cause of democracy will still be served. True, Barghouti's imprisonment and his call for prolonging the intifada will ensure the continued paralysis of the Palestinian Authority, just as happened under Arafat. But in this case, the Palestinians will have the opportunity to rectify the situation by going immediately to long overdue parliamentary elections. Last year, the current parliament amended the Palestinian Basic Law transferring significant powers from the office of the president to the cabinet and the prime minister. The new parliament, which would still have a solid Fatah presence, will have a good reason to turn the Palestinian system into a truly parliamentarian one by making the office of the presidency ceremonial. Democracy would be strengthened while paralysis would be removed.

The eruption of popular violence against Palestinian Authority (PA) officials in the Gaza Strip in July reflected both popular discontent with the PA and a power struggle between "young guard" nationalists and their "old guard" rivals who dominate the Palestinian leadership. Members of the young guard seeking to gain a leading role in Gaza after Israel's anticipated withdrawal in 2005 have mounted a new push for reform to weaken the old guard's control.

Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) are trying to capitalize on the turmoil to push their own reform agenda. Together, reformers call for strengthening PA institutions, affirming the primacy of the temporary constitution, or Basic Law, and expediting elections within Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and at the local and national Palestinian levels. Reformers also demand the replacement of many of President Yasser Arafat's loyalists in the security services and bureaucracy with young guard members.

The young guards recognize that Arafat will do his best to impede their agenda. Yet the unprecedented public enthusiasm for democratic change has emboldened young reformers to come out in the open, even if this means a direct confrontation with the man who symbolizes their national aspirations.

Organized calls for reform in the Palestinian political system date back to 1997, when a PLC committee issued an exceedingly critical report on corruption and mismanagement among Arafat's closest PA associates. The current intifada, triggered in September 2000, in part by young reformers, unleashed sociopolitical changes that led the young guard, and their supporters in the refugee camps and poor urban areas, to become weary of corruption and paralysis of the PA and its lack of popular legitimacy.

A large section of the middle class also came to share these frustrations. The largest campaign for reform, spurred by the dismal performance of PA institutions during the Israeli reoccupation of West Bank cities in March-April 2002, forced Arafat to agree, albeit reluctantly, to some changes. Soon after the incursion, he signed the Basic Law (which the PLC had passed in 1997), approved the unification of national finances under an account controlled by a new finance minister, and set a date for national elections.

The Bush administration's June 2002 announcement of its policy of Palestinian regime change and the Israeli siege against Arafat a few months later tarnished the reform agenda by associating it with Israeli and American demands. The external political and military pressure emboldened Arafat and his allies and dampened calls for reform, since no patriotic young guard reformer wanted to be linked to Bush and Sharon.

In March 2003, a new phase was triggered by the international effort to push for the implementation of the "road map" for peace, backed by the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia. The plan explicitly links Palestinian reform to progress in the peace process. Combined international and domestic pressures led the PLC to approve amendments to the Basic Law that transferred most of the administrative, financial and internal security powers of the president to the Cabinet and created the position of prime minister.

Mahmoud Abbas, who was asked to head the Palestinian government in May 2003, failed to translate these amendments into real change. Arafat and his loyalists undermined his authority and usurped many of his constitutionally granted powers. Abbas, himself a member of the old guard and weak to begin with, could not gain enough public support to mount a successful challenge to Arafat. To do so would have required him to deliver where Arafat could not - in the peace process. Israel's failure to take steps that would have bolstered Abbas - removing checkpoints, releasing prisoners, freezing settlement expansion and ending its occupation of West Bank cities - and the failure of the United States to push Israel to take these risks, denied Abbas the opportunity to build domestic credibility and move reform forward. Abbas resigned after four months. Reforms were stalled and elections postponed.

The PLC is trying to build on the overwhelming public support for reform expressed in the aftermath of the Gaza upheaval in July, by forcing Arafat to end his blatant violations of the Basic Law and to sign laws the PLC has already passed. The PLC also wants Arafat to take tangible steps toward unifying the security services and fighting corruption, and to set a new date for national elections. So far, Arafat has managed to resist these pressures. The PLC announced in frustration on September 1 that it was suspending its sessions for one month. Arafat will probably make limited concessions eventually, but will fight to protect his loyalists in the old guard, thereby frustrating efforts to accomplish deeper reforms.

The conclusion is obvious: only national elections that allow the public to remove the old guard will empower reformers to bring about the necessary changes. For this reason, Arafat will continue to oppose such elections. In this, he has unlikely allies: the United States and Israel. Afraid that Arafat will be reelected, they refuse to allow elections to take place in the Palestinian territories.