Executive Summary

The ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip has compounded several humanitarian and legal violations, particularly inrelation to the reproductive rights of Palestinian women. Since the launch of its military offensive in October 2023, Israelhas systematically targeted Palestinian women in ways that undermine their ability to survive, give birth, and raisechildren. More than 12,300 women have been killed, 4,700 women and children are missing, and approximately 800,000women have been forcibly displaced. An estimated one million women and girls now suffer from acute food insecurity.Israel’s actions constitute a deliberate attempt to impair the reproductive capacities of Palestinian women, aimed atdismantling the future of Palestinian society. Through the bombing of shelters, destruction of hospitals, blockading ofmedical and hygiene supplies, and attacks on fertility clinics and maternity wards, Israel’s policy of erasure is notincidental, it is intentional.

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Executive Summary

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is vital inproviding humanitarian aid, education, and health services to Palestinian refugees across Jordan, Lebanon,Syria, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Beyond its humanitarian role, UNRWA represents aninternational commitment to Palestinian refugees' right of return, as established in UN General AssemblyResolution 194 in 1948. However, Israel has long sought to undermine the agency through financial, political,and military means.Recent Israeli actions have escalated, with the Israeli Knesset passing legislation banning UNRWAoperations in areas under Israeli control, effectively revoking its legal status. Concurrently, Israel hasintensified military attacks on UNRWA facilities. In the Gaza Strip since October 2023, Israeli forces havetargeted 310 UNRWA sites, destroying schools and killing 273 UNRWA employees alongside hundreds ofcivilians sheltering in its facilities. Throughout the occupied West Bank, the Israeli military has been turningUNRWA facilities into military bases and detention centers, and has closed UNRWA’s headquarters in EastJerusalem. These actions violate multiple international legal agreements and aim to erase Palestinian refugeeidentity and their legal rights.

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The shocking human cost that occupation has taken on Palestinian women is laid bare in research published today. Combining research, extensive surveys, and first-hand testimonies from over 40 Palestinian women, Palestinian Women: The Disproportionate Impact of The Israeli Occupation provides new insight into the gendered experience of occupation, looking into four issues in particular:

• women refugees
• the impact of residency revocation on Palestinian women in Jerusalem
• the experience of women prisoners
• Gazans’ access to health

Co-authored by four Palestinian NGOs – the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH), Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD), the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), and Women Media and Development (TAM), the report includes detailed findings that demonstrate how the oppression occupation has permeated women’s daily lives, and the particular impact is has had on women in Palestinian refugee camps, Palestinian women living in Jerusalem, women prisoners, and residents of Gaza who require health services.

The impact on refugee women

Researchers spoke to 500 Palestinian refugee women from 12 Palestinian camps (7 in the West Bank, 5 in Gaza). Their findings included the following:

• A third of women surveyed had been directly exposed to physical assault by Israeli Occupation Forces. 9% had been exposed to threats of being attacked by police dogs during Israeli night raids on their homes.
• Over a third (37%) of respondents had been exposed to detention or interrogation, while 38% said that they or members of their households had been exposed to verbal abuse during Israeli army raids, at checkpoints or while visiting religious places.
• Nearly a quarter (24%) were forced to live in shelters or with extended family. 22% were forced to live under unhealthy conditions. 13% stated that the female and male members of their families were separated as a result of having to live in shelters.
• More than one in five (21%) had been exposed to beatings or tear gas at Israeli checkpoints while they were pregnant. 4% reported that they aborted or gave birth at Israeli checkpoints.
• The majority (64%- 321 cases) had been unable to visit religious or recreational places because of Occupation restrictions.

Jerusalem: Residency Revocation and Family Reunification

According to official figures, 14,595 Palestinians from East Jerusalem had their residency status revoked between 1967 and the end of 2016.

Through residency revocations, Israel has separated husbands from wives, parents from children, and extended families from one another, causing traumatic complications for women attempting to remain with their families in both Jerusalem and the West Bank.

This leads to traumatic fears of separation from children for mothers and an entrenching of patriarchal practices across society. Palestinian women living in Jerusalem lose residency rights if they get divorced or their husbands remarry. Limiting their access to justice, female victims of domestic violence fear reporting abuse to authorities in case they are forcibly transferred away from their children.

Women prisoners

Since the beginning of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine in 1967, approximately 10,000 Palestinian women have been arrested and detained by Israeli military forces. According to the Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs’ 2017 annual report, 1,467 children were arrested last year.

Our researchers spoke to prisoners who experienced physical and psychological torture at arrest and imprisonment, and traumatic, gendered treatment, including:

• Women denied access to menstrual products while detained
• A woman arrested while pregnant who gave birth while chained to a prison hospital bed
• Ex-prisoners who report being subjected to rape and death threats during interrogation, including a girl in of 15-years old threatened with rape
• Women who were subjected to frequent forced and violent strip searches
• A prisoner who reported toothache, only to have the wrong tooth removed

Access to Health in Gaza

Israel exercises strict control Gaza’s borders, a policy of ‘actual authority’, constituting continued occupation, despite the withdrawal of its permanent presence. This control in particular affects those who need medical treatment outside of Gaza’s struggling health system, who require permission to leave. The report shows that the rate of approval applications is falling year-by-year:

• 92.5% of applications were successful in 2012
• 88.7% in 2013
• 82.4% in 2014
• 77.5% in 2015
• 62.1% in 2016

Of the 26,282 permit applications submitted by patients aiming to exit through Erez in 2016, 8,242 (31.4%) were delayed. Many applicants received no response from border authorities, even after lawyers filed formal applications on their behalf. These delays regularly extend months and years beyond medical appointments, worsening already life-threatening diseases and in some cases resulting in death.

Read the full report here, or download it here:

Palestinian Women – The Disproportionate Impact of the Israeli Occupation

Section 1: Headlines:

The Mecca Agreement re-kindles hope, with increasing optimism and positive evaluation of leaders.

• Of the respondents, 47 percent state that they are optimistic about the future; 54 percent of Gazans feel optimistic.
• About 40 percent of the respondents view that Palestinian society is heading in the right direction, while 55 percent view that it is going in the wrong direction.
• Of the respondents, 59 percent of the respondents say that they feel insecure.
• As much as 44 percent believe that the Mecca Agreement will lead to an end in the factional in-fighting, while 45 percent believe that it will only lead to a temporary halt in hostilities.
• The results show that 68 percent of the respondents have no information on the substance of the Mecca Agreement, 9 percent of them have never heard of the agreement.
• Of the respondents, 56 percent are optimistic about the potential for forming a unity government.
• Around 27 percent believe that a unity government will proceed with peace negotiations, 34 percent believe it will be able to end the international boycott, and 43 percent believe that it will be able to bring about order and rule of law.
• When asked individually about issue concerns, 98 percent of the respondents said they view ending the security chaos, improving living conditions and promoting international relations as top priorities.
• Thirty-nine percent of the respondents believe that combining armed struggle with negotiations is the best means to end the occupation; 22 percent believe that the best means is to combine civil peaceful resistance with negotiations, and 21 percent said that only negotiations is the best means. Fifeteen percent of the respondents said that the best means is armed resistance.
• Of the respondents, 40 percent give President Mahmoud Abbas positive approval ratings (good), while 46 percent give Prime Minister Ismael Hanneyya positive marks (good).
• Seventy-one percent of respondents feel that Fateh and Hamas push all other factions outside of the political arena.
• Of the respondents, 22 percent are members of a political party or faction.
• If elections take place today, Fateh would win 45 percent of the overall votes, Hamas 33 percent, and independents and leftist parties, 13 percent.

Section 2: Analysis of Results

1. Living conditions: Cautious Optimism

• Forty-four percent of the respondents describe the living conditions of their families as bad or very bad. This is compared with 51 percent during December 2006. In contrast, 20 percent describe their living conditions as good or very good, and 36 percent describe them as average.
• Of the respondents, 47 percent say that they are optimistic about the future, 25 percent are neither optimistic nor pessimistic, while 27 percent are pessimistic. This compares with 35 percent of the population rating their mood as pessimistic last December.
• Of the respondents, 59 percent say that they don’t feel secure about their own safety or the safety of their family and property. In addition, 22 percent feel somewhat secure, while 19 percent feel secure.
• Of the respondents, 59 percent feel that Palestinian society is heading in the wrong direction; this is compared with 77 percent in December 2006. In contrast, 40 percent believe that society is heading in the right direction, representing an increase of 23 points in the last two months.

• There is a 9 point increase in the positive evaluation of President Mahmoud Abbas – 40 percent evaluate his performance as good, compared with 31 percent last December. Thirty percent evaluate his performance as average; while another 30 percent evaluate it as weak.
• Prime Minister Ismael Hanniya’s positive evaluation increased five percent, rising from 41 to 46 percent positive marks (good) since last December. In addition, 29 percent of the respondents evaluate his performance as average, and 25 percent evaluate it as weak.
• Of the respondents, 50 percent believe that the actions and positions of Mr. Abbas are based on the best interests of the Palestinian people. In contrast, 43 percent believe that his actions and positions represent the best interests of his political party, Fateh.
• Fifty percent of the respondents believe that the actions and positions of Mr. Hanneyya are based on the best interests of the Palestinian people, while 44 percent believe that his actions and positions represent the best interests of his political party, Hamas.

3. The Mecca Agreement and Unity Government

• Of the respondents, 44 percent believe that the Mecca Agreement will stop factional infighting, while 45 percent believe that it will lead only to a temporary halt in the fighting.
• Fifty-nine percent have heard about the Agreement, but have no information on its details. An additional nine percent of the respondents have never heard about the Agreement. In contrast, 25 percent of the respondents say that they are familiar with the basic points of the Agreement, while 7 percent say that they know the details.
• Of the respondents, 73 percent feel that there is a real potential to form a unity government, while 23 percent feel that is impossible.
• Fifty-six percent of the respondents are optimistic about the success of the anticipated unity government, 25 percent are somewhat optimistic, and 18 percent are pessimistic. Expectations are higher on internal issues concerning the potential impact of the unity government in solving the problems that are faced by Palestinian society:
• Of the respondents, 50 percent feel that the unity government will be able to bring about reform and uproot corruption, while 46 percent feel that it will improve living conditions, represent all groups, and reinforce democracy and freedoms.
• Forty-three percent of the respondents believe that the unity government will bring about order and rule of law.
• Lower percentages of the respondents are optimistic that the unity government will bring about positive changes concerning the Israeli Occupation. Thirty-five percent say that the anticipated government will be able to organize effective resistance against the Wall and the settlements; only 34 percent believe that the unity government will end the closure.
• When asked if the following international actors will place obstacles in the way of the unity government, 88 percent believe that the United States will do so, 87 percent believe Israel will obstruct its functioning, and 52 percent believe the EU will do so. Fifty-five percent, however, believe internal obstacles will block the unity government.

4. Elections and Political Support

• Of the respondents, 65 percent state that they will participate in any upcoming elections.
• Of those who state that they will participate, and after taking into account undecided voters and their potential leanings, if an election were held, Fateh would garner 45 percent of the overall vote, Hamas 33 percent, while independents and leftist parties would capture 13 percent of the total votes cast.
• Twenty-one percent of the respondents say that they are members of a civil society institution – union, syndicate, or society.
• Of the respondents, 22 percent say that they are members of a political party or faction.
• Respondents (as opposed to voters) declared their support for all political groups as follows: Fateh 31 percent; Hamas 22 percent; PFLP 3 percent, Islamic Jihad 2 percent. All other parties receive 1 percent or less. Nine percent of the respondents say that they lean towards one of the listed parties or another, while 29 percent say that they don’t support any of these parties. These results confirm yet again that political support or affiliation does not necessarily translate into likely voter support on the day of the elections.

5. Best Means to End the Occupation When asked about their views on the best means to end the occupation, respondents answered in the following direction:

• 21 percent believe that negotiations are the best means to end the occupation.
• 22 percent believe that combining peaceful resistance with negotiations is the best means.
• 39 percent believe that a combination of armed resistance with negotiations is the best means to end occupation.
• About 15 percent believe that armed resistance is the best alternative.

6. Priorities for the coming 3 Years

• When asked to rate individual concerns, respondents rated nearly all issues as important priorities; the following issues were viewed of utmost priority by over 90 percent of the respondents:
  • Ending the security chaos
  • Improving economic conditions
  • Uprooting corruption
  • Consolidating national unity
  • Enforcing international relations and securing funds
  • Ending the occupation and achieving independence

• The following issues were perceived by the respondents as priorities, rated important by 80 - 90 percent of the respondents:
  • Preserving values and tradition
  • Achieving democracy and protecting freedoms
  • Proceeding with negotiations to achieve lasting peace
  • Improving the status of women

• Of the respondents, 82 percent believe that civil society and private sector could play a vital role in overcoming the ongoing tension.
• Seventy-one percent of the respondents feel that Hamas and Fateh are pushing all other political and civil society forces outside of the political arena.
• Of the respondents, 67percent agree that social services need to be transferred to civil society organizations to avoid influences of political positions.
• Fifty-three percent of the respondents believe that it is necessary to form an alternative democratic option to Fateh and Hamas.
• Half of the respondents (50 percent) opined that NGOs didn’t play a significant role throughout the ongoing crisis.

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Executive Summary

The Human Development Report ≠ Palestine (PHDR) covers the years 2003 and 2004. As it was being prepared, the Palestinian situation suffered numerous political, social, and economic setbacks that reflected two contradictory phenomena. The first was seen in systematic destruction and severe deterioration on virtually all levels, inflicted mainly by the practices of the occupation but magnified by internal structural faults in the political and institutional spheres. On the other hand, Palestinians have displayed hope, steadfastness, and perseverance throughout these difficult times, qualities which found expression in many creative initiatives that bore testament to the eternal endurance of hope for a better life characterized by liberty, equality, and peace.

The Palestinian people have been engaged for decades in dual endeavors: the work of national liberation on the one hand, and furthering development on the other. Within the framework of these endeavors, it is essential to activate and strengthen the role of the Palestinian people, who are at the same time the creators of the strategies to achieve these goals and the target of the goals. Therefore, the present report focuses on the empowerment of Palestinians as the basis for strengthening Palestinian society building, with all that this entails in terms of possessing moral strength as well as quantitative abilities, as two necessary components that are indispensable for reviving the spirit of human initiative and action.

The late President Yasser Arafat served as both symbol and leader of the Palestinian experience, with all of its achievements and differences. In his absence, there are new challenges for uniting Palestinians in action for national liberation and development. Perhaps the upcoming elections and the completion of the reform agenda are the most important opportunities to prove the collective Palestinian ability to safeguard their national aspirations and to ready them to achieve independence and freedom. This will require establishing internal Palestinian relationships based on the principles of institutionalization and the rule of law, complementary relations between governmental organizations and NGOs, and the synchronization of political, cultural, educational, and development visions and methods. In the Palestinian context, these foundations must be built upon first, as they are central to any empowerment effort.

The 2004 PHDR is an attempt to assess the various aspects of the Palestinian condition as a first step toward an integrated approach to the development of Palestinian individuals and society and to strengthen the social fabric needed to support our national liberation and development activities. To this end, each section of the report addresses these aspects from two perspectives. From the first perspective, the general Palestinian condition is assessed in order to gain an understanding of what exists, what is hoped for, and what is possible given internal and contextual challenges. The second perspective analyzes major forces influencing independence and development, such as occupation, external factors (especially international funding), and the role of Palestinian governmental organizations and NGOs. These lead to general and sector-specific recommendations for how efforts can be channeled in the most productive way possible.

The PHDR poses a set of essential questions. The answers to these questions—not only in academic terms, but also in terms of changes in attitude and behavior on the ground—can serve to move society from a state of fragmentation and disintegration to a state of empowerment that will preserve the Palestinian social fabric and consolidate its abilities and potential to achieve humanitarian and national goals. The PHDR poses the following questions for both Palestinian and international institutions:

• What is the role of institutions in empowering Palestinian society to achieve its legitimate rights as stipulated in United Nations conventions?
• How can institutions help strengthen the fabric of Palestinian society in order to preserve unity and commitment in the face of challenges?
• What is their role in attaining true empowerment of the individual, as well as groups that represent the individual and serve as advocates for individual human rights?
• What structural changes have development institutions achieved to further integrate marginalized groups into society and to allow them to participate fully in the development process and enjoy its benefits?

One of the most significant messages of the PHDR is that in order to answer these questions, local and international institutions will need to radically change the way in which they view their past and future roles in advancing the Palestinian agenda. Therefore, the PHDR aims to:

• Provide an objective Palestinian perspective of empowerment as a basis for achieving development and independence based on the cumulative experience of Palestinian society.
• Expand and deepen internal Palestinian dialogue on vital issues affecting the Palestinian present and future on a scientific and systematic basis and within the framework of the analyses put forth by a number of Palestinian experts.
• Establish an organic, studied, and evidence-based relationship between the tasks of national liberation and development-based institution building which fully incorporates an awareness of the Palestinian context.
• Increase active participation in policy- and decision-making at all levels of Palestinian society, starting with the approach adopted in preparing this report, which involved many Palestinian experts, institutions, and grassroots community members. Chances for success are increased by widening the framework of participation and the sharing of responsibility.
• Highlight Palestinian development initiatives by presenting experiences within the 101 Points of Light project and, in so doing, demonstrate the success of Palestinian development efforts and initiatives at the project level, affirming the necessity of strengthening that work and of development coordination to bring about the desired development changes on a general level.
• Offer a number of recommendations that may benefit decision-makers, such as general guidelines on future Palestinian work as well as program-specific policies. These recommendations must encompass work on two levels: the macro level, to include all parties concerned with the issue of Palestinian development, as well as the sector level, involving governmental institutions, civil society organizations, and others.

Perhaps the most important conclusion of the PHDR is that empowerment as defined in the Palestinian context means promoting the vast potential within Palestinian society so that it can maintain its presence on Palestinian land and evolve into a viable society, capable of preserving its cultural and national identity and of developing all its resources. This requires the activation of all of society’s dormant energies —residing in its individuals, institutions, and system of values—and developing them in order to accomplish its historic endeavor of self-determination and building an independent state. Therefore, the PHDR presents a number of general recommendations, which provide the basis for additional, more detailed recommendations. These general recommendations include:

• The need, in the work of Palestinian institutions, to link the national liberation dimension and the human dimension. The first dimension requires mobilizing resources and abilities to bolster people’s steadfastness, to enable them to stay on their land, to coalesce in the face of the policies of fragmentation and disintegration imposed by the occupation, and to validate and shore up the resistance while also negotiating political issues with Israel successfully and effectively. The human dimension requires mobilizing all resources at our disposal in order to create a climate conducive to the generation and restoration individualsß capabilities and skills, promoting a collective spirit of initiative, and protecting the basic rights and freedoms of all citizens. This will require the involvement of all society’s institutions, supported by a broad and organized grassroots base to keep them strong and to protect all achievements in the areas of empowerment and resistance.
• The need for the empowerment vision to arise from recognition of the negative effects of Israeli occupation, along with the need to seriously address internal obstacles and challenges.
• Ensuring the readiness of political will and necessary resources to convert development-empowerment visions into clear and specific goals.
• Aligning the development agenda with the priorities of Palestinian society by involving all sectors of society, especially the private and NGO sectors, in setting this agenda. The empowerment process is based primarily on the perspectives and interests of the general population as established through free and uninhibited public discourse.
  Encouragement of public debate will restore faith in the Palestinian individual’s role in the development process, not as a powerless and visionless recipient of aid and assistance, but as a proactive part of the empowerment process through intellectual and practical involvement.
• Viewing empowerment as cumulative and sustainable process linked to every sector of society rather than a temporary, separate, and independent process.
  The purpose of holding a public conference to launch the publication of the Human Development Report was to invite feedback from the greatest possible number of groups, organizations and individuals, thereby increasing the numbers of those who have contributed to its development, and enriching its contents with the views, suggestions, and recommendations of concerned local and international experts and institutions.

The conference also served as an additional guarantee of the report’s objectivity, neutrality, and richness in its quest to examine the Palestinian condition and striving to change it for the better. To this end, the discussions, suggestions, and recommendations of conference participants were incorporated into the final version of the report. Participants were drawn from local and international governmental organizations and NGOs, and the conference was held simultaneously in Ramallah and Gaza, thereby ensuring full participation representatives from all geographic areas within Palestine.

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Date of Publication: 05 October, 2004 Field Research: 9-11September, 2004

The Results

1. Living Conditions: Economic conditions in the Palestinian Territories continue to deteriorate.

- The income of 42% of Palestinian households in the poll was less than $160 a month, and of these 8% had no source of income at all.

- In general, 78% of Palestinian households in the poll reported an income less than $385 a month. The results indicate that the economic situation is worse in Gaza , with the percentage reaching 89% for households in the Gaza Strip and 71% for those in the West Bank.

- 38% of the respondents described the economic conditions in their households as bad or very bad, 44% described them as average and 19% as good or very good.

2. Migration: Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza seek permanent or temporary opportunities abroad as a result of deteriorating conditions.

- 5% of polled households declared a member of their household had left the Palestinian Territories as permanent migrants during the period of the second Intifada.

- 11% declared that a member of their household had left the Palestinian Territories for work or study purposes during the years of the Intifada.

- A solid majority of those polled, 82%, declared that they would not leave the Palestinian Territories for permanent residence abroad, even if they were given the opportunity to do so. Yet 37% declared that they have the desire to leave temporarily for work and/or study outside the Palestinian Territories .

- The results indicate that those polled in the Gaza Strip demonstrated a higher readiness for permanent or temporary emigration than those polled in the West Bank .

- The desire for permanent emigration is highest among youth ages 18-27 (25%) and men are more willing to emigrate (24%), compared with women (12%).

3. Education: High satisfaction with performance of educational institutions, but concern about high costs

3-1: Assessment of Palestinian Education

- 52% of those polled expressed their satisfaction as to the educational process in Palestine , 29% said they are somewhat satisfied, while 18% expressed dissatisfaction.

- 58% of those polled believed that schools in Palestine perform the role required of them, and 59% of those polled said that Palestinian universities also perform the role required of them.

- 56% of those polled declared that they have some knowledge about school curricula, while only 49% of those who have some knowledge considered them to be good curricula.

- 70% of those polled believed that education in Palestine is developing in a good manner.

3-2: Material Resources and Education

- 55% of those polled declared that their households are unable financially to provide for the appropriate education needed for their children.

- 62% of those polled agreed to the following opinion: "The costs of school education are heavy for their households".

- 74% of those polled supported the same opinion regarding university education.

3-3: Attitudes Regarding the Educational Process

- 93% of the Palestinian households polled considered education to be a main priority for their households.

- 72% of them expressed their agreement to the directives issued by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education prohibiting corporal punishment in schools.

- 66% agreed to the following opinion: "Had I the material capability, I would have sent my children to private schools".

- 77% considered university education to be expensive.

- 78% of those polled disagreed with the opinion that schooling for boys is preferred over schooling for girls.

- 54% of those polled declared they do not desire to educate their children in universities outside Palestine .

4. Performance of the Palestinian Government: Negative Public Evaluation

The general attitude of those polled regarding Mr. Ahmad Qurei and his government was generally negative, with respondents citing major shortcomings on a number of issues. They also indicated that the government has limited powers, and expressed their aspiration to have changes among government members and senior officials at the helm of government authorities.

- 40% of those polled evaluated the performance of Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei as poor, representing a tangible increase in dissatisfaction (of about 7%) compared to those who evaluated his performance three months earlier in the June 7th, 2004 poll. In this round, 24% of those polled evaluated his performance as average, and 20% evaluated it as good.

- 47% of those polled evaluated the performance of the current government as poor (compared to 36% three months earlier, which means an increase in negative evaluation of 11%), 24% evaluated it as average, and 16% evaluated it to be good.

- When specific issues were raised, the results reflected an additional drop in the evaluation of the Palestinian public as to government performance, with the majority of those polled evaluating such performance to be poor.

- A government with no powers: About 55% of those polled believed that the current government does not have sufficient powers to solve the above problems, while 19% believed that it has sufficient powers to do so.

- The need to introduce changes in senior posts in the PNA: The majority of the Palestinian public (71%) believed there is a need to carry out changes in ministerial positions and among those at the helm of main government authorities.

- The PA is not serious in its anti-corruption measures: 68% of those polled believed that the PA is not doing all it could do to address the problem of corruption in its institutions.

5. Priorities

- The poll indicated that the main priority for the current government should be "improving the economic situation", as declared by 35% of those polled, followed by 18% "providing internal security", and 8% for "reducing unemployment". The results also pointed to other priorities.

6. Palestinian Internal Conditions: Lack of Security and Demands for Reform

6-1 : Attitudes of the Palestinian public on recent calls for reform : High support among the Palestinian public for demands for reform, despite suspicions as to how sincere the advocates may be.

- Wide-scale popular support for demands for reform: 72% of those polled support the calls for reform, launched by persons from the ranks of the PA, while 21% of those polled rejected these calls. Support for these demands increased in the Gaza Strip to reach 80%, compared to 72% in the West Bank .

- Concern as to the sincerity of such positions coming from personalities and forces from the ranks of the PA. The views of the Palestinian public are divided as to how serious the advocates of reform from inside the ranks of the PA are, as 38% of those polled believed in the sincerity of these calls, while 40% did not believe in their sincerity, and 22% did not express an opinion.

- 57% of those polled stated that the real motive behind the calls for reform launched from among the ranks of the PA reflect their personal interests, while 27% of those polled believed that these demands were in the service of the public good.

- The PA is not serious in its measures to introduce reforms: 52% of those polled said the PA is not serious in its reforms, while 37% believed otherwise.

- Within the same context, 40% of those polled believed that President Arafat is serious in the commitment he made before the PLC in August 2004 to implement comprehensive reforms, while 27% believed he was somewhat sincere, and 28% believed he was not sincere.

6-2 The attitudes of the Palestinian public towards the methods used to express the demands for reform : The majority of the Palestinian public opposed any resort to force to express demands or protests, and expressed the greatest opposition to any attempts to kidnap foreigners. On the other hand, peaceful demonstrations were the most acceptable method of protest. Those polled expressed their concerns over the dangers of resorting to force as an expression of differences within Palestinian society.

- The highest opposition was expressed to any form of injury to foreigners in Palestinian territories, with 85% opposing the kidnapping of foreigners working in Palestinian territories.

- 82% of those polled regarded the kidnapping of Palestinians close to PA circles to be an unacceptable method.

- 80% of those polled opposed any harm to public property or PA offices.

- 77% of those polled opposed armed demonstrations as a method of protest.

- The greatest support (90%) was for peaceful demonstrations as a method acceptable to express the demands for reforms.

- The majority of the Palestinian public believed that recent events pointed to internal strife: 68% of those polled said that recent inter-Palestinian events point to internal strife, while 27% believed these events can not be regarded as an indication of potential internal strife.

7. The Peace Process: Increased Support for Negotiations with Israel

Substantial increase in the rate of support for resumption of negotiations with Israel : The majority of those polled (63%) supported the resumption of negotiations, while 34% opposed it. It should be noted that there is a substantial increase in the percentage of those supporting the resumption of negotiations with Israel , compared to 45% of those polled in June 2004.

For more details, please see Poll # 19 at: http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp/opinionpolls/poll19/

Or contact Dr. Nader Said , Director, mobile # 059-204527, Mr. Ayman Abdelmajeed, Research coordinator at the listed numbers: Tel: (972)-2-2959250 Fax: (972)-2-2958117 Ramallah P.O.Box 1878 Homepage: http://home.birzeit.edu/dsp e-mail: dsp@birzeit.edu