Executive Summary

The ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip has compounded several humanitarian and legal violations, particularly inrelation to the reproductive rights of Palestinian women. Since the launch of its military offensive in October 2023, Israelhas systematically targeted Palestinian women in ways that undermine their ability to survive, give birth, and raisechildren. More than 12,300 women have been killed, 4,700 women and children are missing, and approximately 800,000women have been forcibly displaced. An estimated one million women and girls now suffer from acute food insecurity.Israel’s actions constitute a deliberate attempt to impair the reproductive capacities of Palestinian women, aimed atdismantling the future of Palestinian society. Through the bombing of shelters, destruction of hospitals, blockading ofmedical and hygiene supplies, and attacks on fertility clinics and maternity wards, Israel’s policy of erasure is notincidental, it is intentional.

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Executive Summary

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is vital inproviding humanitarian aid, education, and health services to Palestinian refugees across Jordan, Lebanon,Syria, and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Beyond its humanitarian role, UNRWA represents aninternational commitment to Palestinian refugees' right of return, as established in UN General AssemblyResolution 194 in 1948. However, Israel has long sought to undermine the agency through financial, political,and military means.Recent Israeli actions have escalated, with the Israeli Knesset passing legislation banning UNRWAoperations in areas under Israeli control, effectively revoking its legal status. Concurrently, Israel hasintensified military attacks on UNRWA facilities. In the Gaza Strip since October 2023, Israeli forces havetargeted 310 UNRWA sites, destroying schools and killing 273 UNRWA employees alongside hundreds ofcivilians sheltering in its facilities. Throughout the occupied West Bank, the Israeli military has been turningUNRWA facilities into military bases and detention centers, and has closed UNRWA’s headquarters in EastJerusalem. These actions violate multiple international legal agreements and aim to erase Palestinian refugeeidentity and their legal rights.

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The shocking human cost that occupation has taken on Palestinian women is laid bare in research published today. Combining research, extensive surveys, and first-hand testimonies from over 40 Palestinian women, Palestinian Women: The Disproportionate Impact of The Israeli Occupation provides new insight into the gendered experience of occupation, looking into four issues in particular:

• women refugees
• the impact of residency revocation on Palestinian women in Jerusalem
• the experience of women prisoners
• Gazans’ access to health

Co-authored by four Palestinian NGOs – the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH), Palestinian Working Woman Society for Development (PWWSD), the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), and Women Media and Development (TAM), the report includes detailed findings that demonstrate how the oppression occupation has permeated women’s daily lives, and the particular impact is has had on women in Palestinian refugee camps, Palestinian women living in Jerusalem, women prisoners, and residents of Gaza who require health services.

The impact on refugee women

Researchers spoke to 500 Palestinian refugee women from 12 Palestinian camps (7 in the West Bank, 5 in Gaza). Their findings included the following:

• A third of women surveyed had been directly exposed to physical assault by Israeli Occupation Forces. 9% had been exposed to threats of being attacked by police dogs during Israeli night raids on their homes.
• Over a third (37%) of respondents had been exposed to detention or interrogation, while 38% said that they or members of their households had been exposed to verbal abuse during Israeli army raids, at checkpoints or while visiting religious places.
• Nearly a quarter (24%) were forced to live in shelters or with extended family. 22% were forced to live under unhealthy conditions. 13% stated that the female and male members of their families were separated as a result of having to live in shelters.
• More than one in five (21%) had been exposed to beatings or tear gas at Israeli checkpoints while they were pregnant. 4% reported that they aborted or gave birth at Israeli checkpoints.
• The majority (64%- 321 cases) had been unable to visit religious or recreational places because of Occupation restrictions.

Jerusalem: Residency Revocation and Family Reunification

According to official figures, 14,595 Palestinians from East Jerusalem had their residency status revoked between 1967 and the end of 2016.

Through residency revocations, Israel has separated husbands from wives, parents from children, and extended families from one another, causing traumatic complications for women attempting to remain with their families in both Jerusalem and the West Bank.

This leads to traumatic fears of separation from children for mothers and an entrenching of patriarchal practices across society. Palestinian women living in Jerusalem lose residency rights if they get divorced or their husbands remarry. Limiting their access to justice, female victims of domestic violence fear reporting abuse to authorities in case they are forcibly transferred away from their children.

Women prisoners

Since the beginning of the Israeli Occupation of Palestine in 1967, approximately 10,000 Palestinian women have been arrested and detained by Israeli military forces. According to the Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs’ 2017 annual report, 1,467 children were arrested last year.

Our researchers spoke to prisoners who experienced physical and psychological torture at arrest and imprisonment, and traumatic, gendered treatment, including:

• Women denied access to menstrual products while detained
• A woman arrested while pregnant who gave birth while chained to a prison hospital bed
• Ex-prisoners who report being subjected to rape and death threats during interrogation, including a girl in of 15-years old threatened with rape
• Women who were subjected to frequent forced and violent strip searches
• A prisoner who reported toothache, only to have the wrong tooth removed

Access to Health in Gaza

Israel exercises strict control Gaza’s borders, a policy of ‘actual authority’, constituting continued occupation, despite the withdrawal of its permanent presence. This control in particular affects those who need medical treatment outside of Gaza’s struggling health system, who require permission to leave. The report shows that the rate of approval applications is falling year-by-year:

• 92.5% of applications were successful in 2012
• 88.7% in 2013
• 82.4% in 2014
• 77.5% in 2015
• 62.1% in 2016

Of the 26,282 permit applications submitted by patients aiming to exit through Erez in 2016, 8,242 (31.4%) were delayed. Many applicants received no response from border authorities, even after lawyers filed formal applications on their behalf. These delays regularly extend months and years beyond medical appointments, worsening already life-threatening diseases and in some cases resulting in death.

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Palestinian Women – The Disproportionate Impact of the Israeli Occupation

Middle East Report N°71
20 December 2007

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Throughout Gaza’s history, its powerful clans and families have played a part whose importance has fluctuated with the nature of central authority but never disappeared. As the Palestinian Authority (PA) gradually collapsed under the weight of almost a decade of renewed confrontation with Israel, they, along with political movements and militias, filled the void. Today they are one of the most significant obstacles Hamas faces in trying to consolidate its authority and reinstate stability in the territory it seized control of in June 2007. Although they probably lack the unity or motivation to become a consistent and effective opposition, either on their own or in alliance with Fatah, they could become more effective should popular dissatisfaction with the situation in Gaza grow. There are some, as yet inconclusive, indications that Hamas understands this and is moderating its approach in an attempt to reach an accommodation.

It has been six months since Hamas took control of Gaza, and, despite recent suggestions of possible reconciliation talks with Fatah, the geographic split of Palestinian territories risks enduring. Israel’s tightening siege and continued conflict between Hamas and the Ramallah-based government have imposed exceptional hardship on Gazans, seriously crippling the Islamists’ ability to govern and fostering popular dissatisfaction. As a result, Hamas is focused on more achievable priorities, including restoring law and order after a period of tremendous chaos.

The role of clans and families is central to this task. Over recent years, their growing influence has been a double-edged sword. By providing a social safety net to numerous needy Gazans in a time of uncertainty, they helped prevent a total collapse, yet they simultaneously contributed to the mounting disorder. Although they have filled the void resulting from the judiciary’s breakdown, they have done more than most to promote lawlessness.

Many observers have likened Gaza to a failed state. A number of powerful clans have formed militias, and some of their leaders have become warlords. The symbiotic relationship between clans and rival movements (Fatah, Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees) escalated conflict among the latter by adding the dimension of family vendetta. In the final years of Fatah’s rule and during the turbulent national unity government from March to June 2007, such clans established near autonomous zones with their own militias and informal justice and welfare systems – a process facilitated by Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in 2005.

Since its takeover, Hamas has dramatically reduced the chaos. It introduced measures designed to restore stability, banning guns, masks and roadblocks. Those steps won praise from much of the population and, under different political circumstances, might even have garnered international support, since donors had strongly urged many of them in the past. The belief by some that the siege somehow will lead to Hamas’s overthrow is an illusion. The Islamists in many ways have consolidated their rule, and the collapse of the private sector has increased dependence on them. They also benefit from a substantial reservoir of popular support.

Still, economic deprivation, Hamas’s virtual monopoly on power and its harsh methods have generated discontent, which, in the absence of alternatives, finds a principal and natural focal point in the clans and families. They provide sustenance, protection, power and patronage and have shown the capacity to resist central authority whenever necessary and fuel conflict whenever needed. In recent months, they have lowered their profile but they have also established red lines: they will neither be disarmed by Hamas nor lose control over their neighbourhoods without putting up a fight.

For Hamas, this presents a straightforward dilemma. Determined to impose order and consolidate its rule, it has sought to crack down on unruly clan- and family-based networks – all the more so since some have rallied to Fatah’s side. But facing popular dissatisfaction as well as an effective boycott from other international, regional and local forces, it cannot afford to risk blowback by pushing core Gazan constituencies to the sidelines. There are signs – early and insufficient – that Hamas is getting the message, recognising it has alienated important segments of the population and acknowledging that families, with arms, numbers and loyalty, are there to stay.

Ultimately, effective governance and any sustainable resolution of the crisis in Gaza will require political reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and territorial unity with the West Bank, as well as a ceasefire with Israel (including an end to the firing of rockets from Gaza and Israeli military operations) and an end to the siege. In the meantime, however, Hamas could do much to preserve order and improve ultimate prospects for stability by taking steps to cease brutal measures, broaden participation in its rule and – beginning by compensating for their losses in vendettas and factional warfare – reach a workable arrangement with Gaza’s families.

Gaza/Jerusalem/Brussels, 20 December 2007

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

If there is a silver lining in the recent succession of catastrophic developments in the Middle East, it is that they may impart renewed momentum to the search for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is, admittedly, a slender hope. Since the collapse of the peace process in late 2000, none of the region’s parties has displayed the requisite capacity or willingness to reach an acceptable compromise, while the international community has shown more fecklessness than resolve. But the Lebanon war must serve as a wake-up call: so long as the political roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict are not addressed, it will remain a bottomless source and pretext for repression, radicalisation and bloodletting, both in the region and beyond. Now is the time for an international push to launch a new peace initiative.

Reasons for scepticism abound. Six years after the last genuine peace effort, whatever modicum of trust existed between the parties has collapsed. The Palestinian polity, battered from without and within and increasingly fragmented, verges on outright disintegration. It is hard to imagine which political forces could negotiate effectively with Israel, with what mandate, and with what capacity to translate any eventual agreement into new realities on the ground. Israel, fresh from its Lebanese trauma, still struggling in Gaza and shaken by a perceived growing trend in the Muslim world that rejects its very existence, hardly seems in the mood for political concessions. Instead, its political class appears torn between a desire to revive Israel’s power of deterrence, which it believes has been seriously eroded, and the inevitable finger-pointing following the war, which threatens to bring the government down. Neither is conducive to grand peace moves.

Israeli-Syrian negotiations came to a grinding halt in 2000, with anticipated ripple effects in Lebanon, Palestine, and elsewhere in the region. Today, Syria is isolated, ostracised by key international players and intent on waiting out the Bush and Chirac presidencies. Arab regimes allied to Washington, many of whom had banked on a quick Israeli victory over Hizbollah and hoped to mobilise their citizens against a so-called Shiite crescent led by Tehran, were doubly wrong: Hizbollah held on, and their Sunni publics rallied around the Shiite Islamist movement, not against it. Today, these regimes’ legitimacy deficit stands as plain as ever. Arab advocates of a diplomatic option increasingly are on the defensive, promoters of armed resistance on the ascent. The U.S. administration, preoccupied by Iraq and Iran, is giving scant sign of reconsidering its approach: no dealings with Hamas until it meets the Quartet conditions; no serious engagement with Syria; and a general lack of interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, with its regional legitimacy and credibility in tatters, some question whether the U.S. would be in a position to lead a renewed effort even if it wanted to.

And yet this desultory state of affairs is an important reason why an urgent, ambitious international effort is required. Years of culpable neglect have crippled forces of pragmatism throughout the region and made the achievement of peace immeasurably more difficult. Another several years of waiting would only make it harder still. Some promising ingredients exist: the possibility of a Palestinian national unity government, Syria’s repeated call for a resumption of negotiations, increased eagerness on the part of Arab regimes for a renewed peace process and even Israel’s search for an alternative way forward after the collapse of its unilateralist experiment.

Moreover, the absence of initiative is itself a policy choice that inevitably will have a significant negative effect. Perpetuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with all the anger it generates, fuels extremist, jihadi movements in the Muslim world; intensifies animosity toward the West and the U.S. in particular; radicalises Muslim populations in Western Europe; discredits pro-Western governments; deepens the damaging divide between the Islamic and Western worlds; and, as both Syrian and Israeli officials have warned, sows the seeds of the next Arab-Israeli war. Resolving the conflict clearly would not be a sufficient condition to tackle such deep-seated problems; but it is, on all available evidence, a necessary one.

American and Israeli reluctance to move, coupled with the extreme fragility of the situation, means that others – the UN, EU and Arab world – must now step forward with fresh ideas and initiatives, optimally to persuade Washington to act, at a minimum not to be held fully hostage to its passivity. The challenge is to devise an initiative or series of initiatives bold enough to alter regional perceptions and realities, yet not so audacious as to provoke U.S. or Israeli obstruction. Many have advanced the notion of an international peace conference; the Arab League has called on the UN Security Council to take the lead in shepherding a comprehensive settlement. Both ideas have merit; at this point, however, neither is likely to materialise due to opposition from Washington and Israel. A conference coinciding with the fifteenth anniversary of the Madrid peace conference and attended by all relevant current players could well be the most visible launching pad for renewed negotiations. The idea is worth pursuing but it could take months to organise and reach agreement on invitees and terms of reference; substantive progress, not a procedural battle, is what the region desperately needs.

In devising a new mechanism, principal lessons of the past must be kept in mind: the need to define early on the endgame, i.e., the shape of a settlement; the importance of an active third party to oversee negotiations and compliance with whatever interim agreements are reached; and the necessity to avoid a discrepancy between lofty talks at the negotiating table and destructive developments on the ground. More concretely, a new mechanism should:

• be comprehensive and inclusive, enabling all parties with a recognised stake in the outcome to participate. As the Lebanese crisis once more illustrated, the problems are closely interconnected. Hizbollah was motivated, at least in part, by intensified conflict in Gaza; Syria’s and Iran’s marginalisation did not give either a reason to restrain the Islamist movement; Hamas and Hizbollah have strong ties to Damascus and Tehran; both the U.S. and Israel saw the Lebanon war as a proxy war with Iran; Lebanon has made clear it would not sign a peace treaty with Israel before Syria does; and, more broadly, Arab normalisation with Israel (a key prize of any peace deal) will require settlement of all outstanding Arab-Israeli disputes. Dealing with Lebanon is an urgent priority but, alone, will not suffice; the Lebanese conflagration is intimately related to broader regional issues which, if not addressed, risk pushing the Middle East over the brink. Likewise, it will be hard to achieve stability in the Middle East without a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear question and a broader U.S./Iranian dialogue;

• provide from the outset a clear political horizon as well as a credible means of getting there. The goal must be unambiguously stated as security and full recognition of the state of Israel within internationally recognised borders, an end to the occupation for the Palestinian people and an independent, sovereign state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, a just resolution of the refugee issue, recovery of lost land by Syria and a fully sovereign and secure Lebanese state;

• be realistic and reflect conditions on the ground, in other words begin with what is achievable: a mutual ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians, coupled with steps to allow the Palestinian government to govern and the Palestinian economy to revive;

• build on existing, accepted instruments, such as the Quartet, but give them a more inclusive character, greater oversight and facilitating role and ensure that European and Arab actors seize the initiative rather than await an increasingly unlikely U.S. reawakening; and

• involve far greater engagement of Arab states, which have both an incentive to reach a settlement (to boost their legitimacy and prove that diplomacy, not armed action, works) and a means to do so (the ill-utilised 2002 Arab League Initiative in Beirut, which calls for full normalisation with Israel in exchange for its full withdrawal).

The Middle East is immersed in its worst crisis in years with no stable resolution in sight. Observers and analysts are quick to point out that circumstances are far from ideal for an Arab-Israeli initiative. They are right. But time for a negotiated settlement is quickly running out.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the United Nations Security Council:

1. Pass a resolution calling on members of the Quartet (UN, represented by the Secretary-General, U.S., EU, and Russia) to work closely with regional partners (the Arab League, Arab countries and Turkey) to implement an initiative aimed at achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), the 2002 Arab League Beirut Initiative and the 2003 Roadmap.

2. Instruct the Quartet and its regional partners to report every 30 days on progress toward this goal.

3. Pass a follow-up resolution to Resolution 1701 calling for:
   1. comprehensive Lebanese security reform with the assistance of outside parties, based on the need to effectively assert the state’s sovereignty and defend its territorial integrity;

   2. sustained and substantial international financial assistance, channelled through the government and focused on the neglected and war-damaged areas of the South and the Bekaa valley; and

   3. intensive efforts to address outstanding Israeli-Lebanese issues, including a prisoner exchange, a halt to Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, and resolution of the status of the contested Shebaa farms, by transferring custody to the UN under UNIFIL supervision, pending Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese peace agreements.

   To the Members of the Quartet (UN, U.S., EU, Russia):

4. In concert with a core group of regional actors (Arab League, key Arab countries, Turkey), pursue the following initiatives:
   1. facilitate an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) entailing an immediate prisoner exchange, a mutual and comprehensive ceasefire, resumption by Israel of Palestinian tax revenue transfers to the PA, a settlements freeze, implementation of the November 2005 Agreement on Monitoring and Access, and gradual withdrawal of Israeli troops, first to the positions they held prior to 28 September 2000, and later from other West Bank areas;

   2. establish a monitoring presence on the ground to verify both sides’ adherence to the ceasefire;

   3. end the financial and diplomatic boycott of the Palestinian Authority based on steps it takes toward a mutual ceasefire;

   4. facilitate discussions between the PLO and Israeli leaderships on the core political issues that stand in the way of achieving a final status agreement;

   5. conduct parallel discussions with Israel, Syria and Lebanon to prepare the ground for a resumption of Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese negotiations on peace agreements;

   6. at the appropriate time, but without unnecessary delay, put forward more detailed parameters of a viable Arab-Israeli peace, in its Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Syrian, and Israeli-Lebanese components; and

   7. report to the Security Council on a monthly basis about progress on these various tracks.

   To the Arab League:

5. Propose direct talks with the Israeli government to describe and discuss the 2002 Beirut Initiative and launch a public diplomacy campaign aimed in particular at the U.S. and Israel to explain that initiative.

   To UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan:

6. Prior to completing his term, deliver a major Middle East speech that states the outlines of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, underscores the need for rapid movement and the risks inherent in delay, points out how close the parties are on the substance of the issues and makes clear that his successor needs to take this issue on.

   To the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, Hamas and Other Relevant Palestinian Organisations:

7. Make every effort to establish a government of national unity on the basis of the Palestinian National Conciliation Document and reform the Palestine Liberation Organisation as provided in March 2005 Cairo agreement.

8. Release Corporal Shalit in the context of a prisoner swap, reinstate the truce and stop all militias from firing rockets.

9. Formally empower the PLO leadership to conduct political discussions with Israel on a longer-term political settlement, announce that any agreement will be put to a national referendum and pledge to adhere to the outcome of such a referendum.

   To the Government of Israel:

10. Release recently jailed Palestinian cabinet members and parliamentarians and begin the release of other Palestinian prisoners (such as those who have not been charged with an offence, have been convicted of minor charges or are seriously ill or under age).

11. Agree to a ceasefire providing for an end to its military operations in the occupied territories while simultaneously opening border crossings in accordance with the Agreement on Movement and Access, lifting the ban on travel imposed on segments of the Palestinian population, removing outposts, halting settlement activity, resuming tax transfers to the PA and gradually withdrawing the IDF from Palestinian population centres.

12. Begin political discussions with the Palestinian leadership on a longer-term political settlement.

13. Agree to talks with the reinforced Quartet on the parameters of Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese deals, as well as the 2002 Arab League peace initiative.

14. Assist in implementation of UNSCR 1701 by:
    1. halting, to the extent Hizbollah refrains from hostile activity, all operations in Lebanese territory, including the capture of militants and civilians in Southern Lebanon, violations of Lebanese waters and airspace and the distribution of propaganda leaflets;

    2. renouncing assassination of Hizbollah officials; and

    3. cooperating with UN efforts to address remaining Israeli-Lebanese issues, including through a prisoner exchange and resolution of the status of the Shebaa Farms.

    To the Government of Syria:

15. Agree to talks with the reinforced Quartet on the parameters of an Israeli-Syrian deal.

16. Support Arab League discussions with the Israeli leadership on the Beirut Initiative and consider its own, symbolic overture to the Israeli people (e.g., a proposed Assad/Olmert meeting) to jump-start negotiations;

17. Engage in an open dialogue with Lebanon aimed at clarifying and addressing both sides’ legitimate interests.

    To the Government of Lebanon:

18. Agree to talks with the reinforced Quartet on the parameters of an Israeli-Lebanese deal.

19. Assist in implementing a follow-on UN resolution by:
    1. undertaking, in cooperation with international partners, thorough security reform aimed at re-establishing and defending the state’s sovereignty over its territory, emphasising defensive capabilities and reinforcing the army as an instrument of national defence;

    2. ensuring that such security reform not be used to further any international or partisan domestic agenda;

    3. concentrating economic assistance on the neglected South and Bekaa valley; and

    4. facilitating Hizbollah’s gradual demilitarisation by addressing outstanding Israeli-Lebanese issues (prisoner exchange, violations of Lebanese sovereignty and Shebaa farms); reforming and democratizing Lebanon’s political system; and more fairly allocating resources.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Hamas, the Islamist movement designated a terrorist organisation by the U.S. and EU and considered a mortal enemy by Israel, will soon join the Palestinian legislature. Riding an unprecedented wave of popularity and having exceeded virtually all expectations in recent municipal contests, it could end up sitting at the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) cabinet table. Consequences would likely be far-reaching: Palestinians are hugely dependent on the West and Israel, and both have threatened to cut ties should Hamas join the PA. So far, the U.S. and EU essentially have opted to ignore the Islamists rather than deal with them upfront – the end result being a movement that feels stronger, more emboldened, and over which the West has precious little leverage. With the prospect as remote as ever of a renewed peace process or a weakened PA cracking down on a strengthened Hamas, the international community’s best remaining option is to maximise the Islamist movement’s incentives to move in a political direction through a policy of gradual, conditional engagement.

Hamas’s electoral participation results from a convergence of disparate interests. For President Abbas, securing the ceasefire, rehabilitating the Palestinians’ international standing, and putting the domestic house in order required a deal with Hamas. In exchange for cooperation, he offered power-sharing through political integration. Abbas’s gambit coincided with Hamas’s calculations: it had experienced a surge in popular support during the uprising, was eager for a respite from Israeli military assaults, and, with both Fatah and the PA in disarray, saw an opportunity to translate its success into institutional power. Though originally scheduled for July 2005, parliamentary elections were postponed by Fatah leaders concerned about Hamas’s strength and convinced that with more time they would recover lost ground.

Fatah’s concerns were not misplaced but its response was plainly misguided. Strong half a year ago, Hamas appears far stronger now. In the intervening months, Fatah has continued to fray, consumed by internal divisions, while Hamas has come of age. Municipal elections, in which they handily won control of most urban areas, including traditional Fatah bastions like Nablus, suggest the Islamists are establishing themselves as the alternative of choice to a PA discredited by corruption, chaos and a failure to realise its political agenda. Today, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians live in localities ruled by Hamas.

The record of the last several months, as Hamas rubbed elbows with issues of local governance and campaigned for national office, offers a preliminary, mixed picture of how political integration might affect its outlook and conduct. In its pragmatism, and even willingness to deal with Israel on day-to-day operational affairs, Hamas rule at the local level has been almost boringly similar to its predecessor. Local politicians emphasise themes of good governance, economic development, and personal and social security, leaving specifically religious issues and the conflict with Israel to the background. With only scant exceptions, they have yet to try to impose their vision of an Islamist society.

Nationally, too, signs of pragmatism can be detected. Far more than Fatah, Hamas has proved a disciplined adherent to the ceasefire, and Israeli military officers readily credit this for the sharp decline in violence. In recent statements, Hamas leaders have not ruled out changing their movement’s charter, negotiating with Israel, or accepting a long-term truce on the basis of an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines. Today, their electoral platform is in these respects closer to Fatah’s outlook than to Hamas’s founding principles.

There is a less encouraging side. Hamas continues to straddle its public and clandestine wings, subject to competing views from different leadership elements, and at least partially susceptible to Syrian and Iranian pressures. Most Israelis, and not a few Palestinians, are worried about its armed potential, and there is widespread suspicion in Israel that the organisation simply is biding its time, waiting for the post-electoral period to launch a new wave of attacks with a replenished and improved arsenal. Perhaps most significantly, it has neither renounced violence, nor accepted Israel’s existence.

All this suggests that integration is a work in progress, neither a sure thing nor the safest of bets. But what is the alternative? The PA is not in a military, let alone a political, position forcibly to disarm Hamas. Since taking office, Abbas has been paralysed by a sclerotic political system, and he has more than once staked his political future on successful, inclusive elections. Without the prospect of political incorporation, and in the absence of a credible diplomatic process, Hamas – and, along with it, most other armed organisations – is likely to resume sustained attacks against Israel. What remains, for now, is the possibility that by incorporating Hamas more deeply into local and national governance, its stake in overall stability and the political costs of a breakdown gradually will steer it away from the military path.

Confronted with the challenge of a newly emerging Palestinian reality, the international community has, for the most part, taken a pass. While there are important differences in policy, both the U.S. and EU avoid (and in the American case, bar) contacts with the Islamist organisation, deny funding to projects with Hamas-run municipalities, and have threatened to halt assistance to the PA if Hamas joins it. This attitude has had several, essentially negative, results: estranging Palestinians from Western donors; losing touch with an increasingly large segment of the population; jeopardising project sustainability; and reducing accountability. Meanwhile, Hamas has gained strength from a nationalist backlash against perceived foreign interference and is participating in elections without having to fulfil any prior condition.

Western countries have not done the one thing that might have had a positive impact: try to shape Hamas’s policies by exploiting its clear desire for international recognition and legitimacy. There is every reason for the West to withhold formal dealings at a national level, at least until it renounces attacks against civilians and drops its opposition to a two-state solution, but the current confused approach – boycotting Hamas while facilitating its electoral participation; facilitating its participation without seeking through some engagement reciprocal concessions – makes no sense at all.

Without conferring immediate legitimacy on Hamas, engaging its national officials or removing it from the terrorism list, the EU in particular – which has more flexibility than the U.S. in this regard – should encourage the Islamists to focus on day-to-day matters and facilitate a process of potential political integration and gradual military decommissioning. With Prime Minister Sharon’s sudden incapacitation, an already impossibly perplexing situation has become more confused still. Using Western economic and political leverage to try to stabilise the Palestinian arena would be far from the worst possible investment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Palestinian Authority:

1. Within 100 days of the formation of the next cabinet, submit the draft Political Parties Law to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) for ratification, providing for the formal registration of all political organisations that pursue their objectives through lawful and peaceful means.

2. Within 100 days of the formation of the next government, submit a Basic Security Law to the PLC, providing for:

• de-politicisation of the Palestinian security sector and full parliamentary supervision of all security forces and intelligence agencies, including their budgets; and
• phased decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, commencing with cessation of the acquisition, development, and testing of new weaponry, and including in subsequent stages decommissioning of weaponry that most threatens an Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire; and integration or demobilisation of members of all armed groups not part of the Palestinian security forces, all in coordination with verifiable international supervision.

3. Ensure the equitable distribution of municipal and reconstruction funds, including donor funds disbursed to PA accounts, so that local authorities are not the subject of discrimination on the basis of the political composition of their governing councils.

To the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas):

4. Renew the unilateral ceasefire (tahdi’a) for six months, and respond positively to efforts by Egypt, the Quartet, and other third parties to achieve a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire.

5. Support ratification by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) of the Political Parties Law, and register the Reform and Change Bloc as a distinct and separate political party.

6. Participate in the drafting and support ratification by the PLC of a Basic Security Law, and declare readiness to cooperate with a newly formed decommissioning authority on gradual implementation of the following measures, in the case of (c) – (e) subject to a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire and independent international verification:

• immediate and unconditional ban on the public display of weapons;
• permanent cessation of attacks against civilian targets;
• cessation of the acquisition, manufacture, and testing of weaponry;
• decommissioning of weaponry that most threatens the ceasefire, including rockets and weapons laboratories; and
• unification of all armed elements under central government authority.

7. State that it will accept and honour a negotiated two-state settlement that is properly endorsed by Palestinian national institutions and the Palestinian people.

To the Government of Israel:

8. Reciprocate an extension of the tahdi’a by Palestinian armed groups by:

• a moratorium on assassinations, incursions into Palestinian population centres, house demolitions, and arrest sweeps where there is no evidence of imminent military necessity; and
• beginning a process of meaningful release of prisoners belonging to groups that are party to the tahdi’a commencing with political leaders, including Islamists, who have not been charged with involvement in armed activities.

9. Respond positively to efforts by third parties to achieve a comprehensive ceasefire.

To the European Union and its Member States:

10. Subject to Hamas extending the tahdi’a,

• resume normal developmental and diplomatic contact with Hamas-run municipalities;
• renew funding of municipalities through the Municipal Development fund, subject to auditing measures that ensure disbursements benefit only intended recipients; and
• agree to engage in relations with any political party, including the Hamas-affiliated Reform and Change Bloc, but only if it is properly registered under the Political Parties Law and verifiably independent of any armed wing.

11. If Hamas violates the truce, suspend contacts both with its parliamentary faction and local officials, and if Hamas-affiliated politicians are part of the cabinet at the time, also suspend contacts with and assistance to the PA.

12. Remove Hamas from their list of proscribed terrorist organisations, subject to Hamas formally renouncing all violence against civilians and taking initial steps in a verifiable process of decommissioning.

13. Undertake normal dialogue with the organisation subject to Hamas dropping its opposition to a two-state solution and indicating it will honour a properly endorsed Israeli-Palestinian agreement.

To the Government of the United States:

14. Give serious consideration to adopting policy responses toward Hamas recommended for the European Union and its member states if they prove effective.

Amman/Brussels, 18 January 2006

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the world focuses on Gaza, the future of Israeli- Palestinian relations in fact may be playing itself out away from the spotlight, in Jerusalem. With recent steps, Israel is attempting to solidify its hold over a wide area in and around the city, creating a far broader Jerusalem. If the international community and specifically the U.S. are serious about preserving and promoting a viable two-state solution, they need to speak far more clearly and insistently to halt actions that directly and immediately jeopardise that goal. And if that solution is ever to be reached, they will need to be clear that changes that have occurred since Israelis and Palestinians last sat down to negotiate in 2000-2001 will have to be reversed.

Since the onset of the Arab-Israeli conflict, control over Jerusalem has fluctuated, as have the city's contours. Speaking of the city today, one refers to substantial areas, some Jewish, others Arab, that were part of the West Bank and that no one would have recognised as Jerusalem prior to 1967. Stretching municipal boundaries, annexing Palestinian land and building new Jewish neighbourhoods/settlements, Israel gradually created a municipal area several times its earlier size. It also established new urban settlements outside the municipal boundary to surround the city, break contiguity between East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and strengthen links between these settlements, West Jerusalem and the rest of Israel.

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