MIFTAH
Saturday, 18 May. 2024
 
Your Key to Palestine
The Palestinian Initiatives for The Promotoion of Global Dialogue and Democracy
 
 
 

Expectations, conjecture, and conflicting projections mark the political discourse preceding the scheduled meeting between US President Clinton and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Geneva on Sunday, March 26.

One assessment remains constant: Neither leader would commit to such a meeting unless he was confident of a successful outcome, or at least of an outcome that would not be branded as a failure.

Reports of ongoing contacts and mediation, including US position papers and even “deposited” Israeli assurances, abound.

It stands to logic that without sufficient preparations and a reasonable assurance of progress, the meeting would not have been arranged or agreed to in the first place.

A steady flow of envoys, intermediaries, and well-meaning meddlers has characterized the political pilgrimage between Damascus and Tel Aviv (with American blessings and even participation) to affect a resumption (or a resurrection) of Syrian-Israeli negotiations and to remove the obstacles along the way.

Neither president will go to this rendezvous without having completed his homework first.

Both understand that the physical absence of Israeli PM Barak does not translate into a political vacuum.

Whether in spirit or by proxy, the Israeli component is a very real part of this bilateral meeting.

Separately, but simultaneously, Barak and Assad have begun preparing their respective public opinions for the probability of the advent of peace.

Posters in Damascus depict President Assad with open arms (metaphorically) welcoming peace and declaring his (and Syria’s) commitment to this worthy endeavor.

The formation of a new government in Syria is a clear preparatory step in this direction ushering in a new political era.

Public declarations and the very visible grooming of Dr. Bashar for the succession are not only statements of intent but also of a timeframe that is not open-ended.

Barak as well has been involved in public opinion diplomacy by announcing that all previous Israeli prime ministers had committed themselves to withdrawal from the Golan as part of a peace treaty with Syria. Vehement protests from both Likud and Labor leaders could not eradicate the initial impact of Barak’s statements or negate the impression that Barak is preparing for a decisive move using the full weight of the past to garner support for future “concessions.”

Accompanied by promises of a future referendum, Barak is also allaying fears and neutralizing opposition simultaneously.

The referendum is also a very convenient and effective vehicle for maneuver to be used by Barak in strengthening his negotiating hand with the Syrians.

So is the “threat” of a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon.

Actually, Barak has taken very concrete steps in that direction, the latest of which were two phone calls he made on Wednesday, March 22, to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and French President Jacques Chirac to declare his readiness to implement UN Resolution 425 and to ask for French and UN participation in peace keeping by stationing observers at the Lebanese-Israeli borders.

Barak is also indicating to his army generals that he is prepared to withdraw to the “international boundaries” with Lebanon.

The boundaries with Syria remain “problematic.”

No longer able to claim the boundaries of mandatory Palestine (see Key Issues, “Historical Chutzpah,” Jan. 8, 2000) as those of Israel, and still insisting that the June 4, 1967 borders do not form internationally recognized boundaries, Israel is now proposing alternatives that would leave Syria meters away from Lake Tiberias and with no control over the Lake’s tributaries and major sources of fresh water. In effect, these would be new borders that would neither conform to the 1949 ceasefire or to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 (in accordance with UN R. 242).

It must be noted in this context that Israel still has no recognized or legal boundaries beyond those of the Partition Plan of 1947 (UN R. 181) that Israel has expanded unilaterally, and has refrained from designating its final borders while continuing to annex occupied Palestinian land.

Security considerations also dominate Israeli moves on the Syrian negotiating track.

It is doubtful whether Syria would accept any arrangements that are not mutual or reciprocal, including early warning stations or multinational forces.

Territoriality as a basis of security has become obsolete, many claim, in the context of modern warfare technology and long-range missiles. Thus annexing any part of the Golan is no guarantee of security—rather the opposite, as it would prevent reaching a stable and binding agreement with Syria. Internationally guaranteed security arrangements and binding Syrian commitments (with a dash of American satellite surveillance) would be more in the service of Israeli interests and security than land.

The security of northern Israel also cannot be guaranteed by a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon.

While Hizballah’s resistance to Israel’s occupation of Lebanese land has served Syria in its negotiating strategies, it is not certain that Hizballah will view itself as subject to any Syrian-Israeli agreements in the future.

Recently, the Palestinian refugee presence has been pointed out by Lebanon and Syria as a source of instability and a threat to regional security.

It is predicted that Syria will try to use both to strengthen its hand in negotiations, although both are expected to declare a separate will of their own and might not be amenable to the “cards” in a game strategy.

All players are quite conscious of the element of time as a decisive factor in negotiations.

Barak is coming to the end of his “honeymoon “ or “grace period” with the Israeli public.

His tenuous coalition is strained and beginning to show signs of disintegration (particularly with the latest Shas-Meretz confrontation).

The polls show decreasing support for the necessary territorial withdrawal, and the promise of a referendum is beginning to show signs of a boomerang effect.

Even the “peace camp” that was largely responsible for his election victory is beginning to express its disappointment and disenchantment in a more public and vocal manner.

Barak’s policy of playing off the Palestinian and Syrian track against each other is also backfiring, particularly in view of its devastating effect on Palestinian domestic realities and on the atmosphere of confidence or trust that became its first victim.

Palestinian volatility may destroy any chances of peace on all fronts and lay to rest all of Barak’s “best laid plans” for manipulating Palestinian weakness or dictating an Israeli version of final status.

Arab public opinion as a whole is also becoming increasingly distrustful, and even hostile, which is liable to scuttle any peace with isolated regimes but with no constituency.

On the American front, time is indeed running out—as all parties would agree.

The Clinton era is rapidly drawing to a close, and his personal involvement in the Syrian track might not last should he write off these negotiations as being incapable of delivering his international coup as a global peacemaker.

More importantly, a lame-duck presidency will be entirely useless for the talks themselves as the presidential election campaigns are already turning inwards and avoiding international policy issues.

A new presidency in the White House would require a period of adjustment and a longer period of domestic preoccupation before it attempts to engage in a foreign policy issue, particularly one as thorny as the Middle East peace process. Education on the particulars would also require more time.

Moreover, serious decisions have to be taken now in the US pertaining to the necessary “package” to be delivered to Syria and Israel as part of the “inducements” and guarantees for peace.

This includes outright financial aid to fund Israeli withdrawal, security arrangements, and Syrian economic reconstruction. Other forms of military cooperation, even deployment of troops, and the removal of Syria from the US “terrorist list” are also among the requirements that the current US administration will be called upon to fulfill, and that a new administration might not be able to bring about.

It is in the nature of all peace processes not to lend themselves to a holding pattern—they either fly or crash. And given the realities of the region, a crash is the more likely outcome.

It is also in the nature of things that no major player will last forever—whether due to the force of biology or democracy.

New players on all sides may have a different view of things, a different mandate to effect things, or a different reality to cope with.

With all this in mind, it is doubtful that the US-Syria summit will be allowed to “fail” in the conventional sense.

However, one must also caution against flawed, partial, or unjust agreements—or even the empty show of progress—for the sake short-term gains or self-interest.

The last thing the region and its peoples need is another media spectacle with no substance or applicability.

Repeated let downs have a cumulative effect on the credibility of the process and its participants as well as on the stability of the region as a whole.

 
 
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