Abir Dandis, the mother of the two girls who were murdered in the Negev town of Al-Fura’a last week, couldn't find a police officer to listen to her warnings, neither in Arad nor in Ma’ale Adumim. Both police stations operate in areas where Israel wants to gather the Bedouin into permanent communities, against their will, in order to clear more land for Jewish communities. The dismissive treatment Dandis received shows how the Bedouin are considered simply to be lawbreakers by their very nature. But as a resident of the West Bank asking for help for her daughters, whose father was Israeli, Dandis faced the legal-bureaucratic maze created by the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinian police is not allowed to arrest Israeli civilians. It must hand suspects over to the Israel Police. The Palestinian police complain that in cases of Israelis suspected of committing crimes against Palestinian residents, the Israel Police tend not to investigate or prosecute them.

In addition, the town of Al-Azaria, where Dandis lives, is in Area B, under Palestinian civilian authority and Israeli security authority. According to the testimony of Palestinian residents, neither the IDF nor the Israel Police has any interest in internal Palestinian crime even though they have both the authority and the obligation to act in Area B.

The Palestinian police are limited in what it can do in Area B. Bringing in reinforcements or carrying weapons in emergency situations requires coordination with, and obtaining permission from, the IDF. If Dandis fears that the man who murdered her daughters is going to attack her as well, she has plenty of reason to fear that she will not receive appropriate, immediate police protection from either the Israelis or the Palestinians.

Dandis told Jack Khoury of Haaretz that the Ma’ale Adumim police referred her to the Palestinian Civil Affairs Coordination and Liaison Committee. Theoretically, this committee (which is subordinate to the Civil Affairs Ministry) is the logical place to go for such matters. Its parallel agency in Israel is the Civilian Liaison Committee (which is part of the Coordination and Liaison Administration - a part of the Civil Administration under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories).

In their meetings, they are supposed to discuss matters such as settlers’ complaints about the high volume of the loudspeakers at mosques or Palestinians’ complaints about attacks by settlers. But the Palestinians see the Liaison Committee as a place to submit requests for permission to travel to Israel, and get the impression that its clerks do not have much power when faced with their Israeli counterparts. In any case, the coordination process is cumbersome and long.

The Palestinian police has a family welfare unit, and activists in Palestinian women’s organizations say that in recent years, its performance has improved. But, as stated, it has no authority over Israeli civilians and residents. Several non-governmental women’s groups also operate in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and women in similar situations approach them for help. The manager of one such organization told Haaretz that Dandis also fell victim to this confusing duplication of procedures and laws. Had Dandis approached her, she said, she would have referred her to Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, which has expertise in navigating Israel’s laws and authorities.

John Kerry revealed his long-awaited plan for peace in the Middle East on Sunday, hinging on a $4bn (£2.6bn) investment in the Palestinian private sector.

The US secretary of state, speaking at the World Economic Forum on the Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea, told an audience including Israeli president Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that an independent Palestinian economy is essential to achieving a sustainable peace.

Speaking under the conference banner "Breaking the Impasse", Kerry announced a plan that he promised would be "bigger, bolder and more ambitious" than anything since the Oslo accords, more than 20 years ago.

Tony Blair is to lead a group of private sector leaders in devising a plan to release the Palestinian economy from its dependence on international donors. The initial findings of Blair's taskforce, Kerry boasted, were "stunning", predicting a 50% increase in Palestinian GDP over three years, a cut of two-thirds in unemployment rates and almost double the Palestinian median wage. Currently, 40% of the Palestinian economy is supplied by donor aid.

Kerry assured Abbas that the economic plan was not a substitute for a political solution, which remains the US's "top priority".

Peres, who had taken the stage just minutes before, also issued a personal plea to his Palestinian counterpart to return to the negotiations.

"Let me say to my dear friend President Abbas," Peres said, "Should we really dance around the table? Lets sit together. You'll be surprised how much can be achieved in open, direct and organised meetings."

Thick locks hug the front gates of shuttered shops, now covered in graffiti and dust from lack of use. Only a handful of customers pass along the dimly lit road, sometimes stopping to check the ripeness of fruits and vegetables, or ordering meat in near-empty butcher shops.

“All the shops are closed. I’m the only one open. This used to be the best place,” said 64-year-old Mustafa Sunocret, selling vegetables out of a small storefront in the marketplace near his family’s home in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City.

Amidst the brightly coloured scarves, clothes and carpets, ceramic pottery and religious souvenirs filling the shops of Jerusalem’s historic Old City, Palestinian merchants are struggling to keep their businesses alive.

Faced with worsening health problems, Sunocret told IPS that he cannot work outside of the Old City, even as the cost of maintaining his shop, with high electricity, water and municipal tax bills to pay, weighs on him.

“I only have this shop,” he said. “There is no other work. I’m tired.”

Abed Ajloni, the owner of an antiques shop in the Old City, owes the Jerusalem municipality 250,000 Israeli shekels (68,300 U.S. dollars) in taxes. He told IPS that almost every day, the city’s tax collectors come into the Old City, accompanied by Israeli police and soldiers, to pressure people there to pay.

“It feels like they’re coming again to occupy the city, with the soldiers and police,” Ajloni, who has owned the same shop for 35 years, told IPS. “But where can I go? What can I do? All my life I was in this place.”

He added, “Does Jerusalem belong to us, or to someone else? Who’s responsible for Jerusalem? Who?”

Illegal annexation

Israel occupied East Jerusalem, including the Old City, in 1967. In July 1980, it passed a law stating that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. But Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and subsequent application of Israeli laws over the entire city remain unrecognised by the international community.

Under international law, East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory – along with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Syrian Golan Heights – and Palestinian residents of the city are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Jerusalem has historically been the economic, political and cultural centre of life for the entire Palestinian population. But after decades languishing under destructive Israeli policies meant to isolate the city from the rest of the Occupied Territories and a lack of municipal services and investment, East Jerusalem has slipped into a state of poverty and neglect.

“After some 45 years of occupation, Arab Jerusalemites suffer from political and cultural schizophrenia, simultaneously connected with and isolated from their two hinterlands: Ramallah and the West Bank to their east, West Jerusalem and Israel to the west,” the International Crisis Group recently wrote.

Israeli restrictions on planning and building, home demolitions, lack of investment in education and jobs, construction of an eight-foot-high separation barrier between and around Palestinian neighbourhoods and the creation of a permit system to enter Jerusalem have all contributed to the city’s isolation.

Formal Palestinian political groups have also been banned from the city, and between 2001-2009, Israel closed an estimated 26 organisations, including the former Palestinian Liberation Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem, the Orient House and the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce.

Extreme poverty

Israel’s policies have also led to higher prices for basic goods and services and forced many Palestinian business owners to close shop and move to Ramallah or other Palestinian neighbourhoods on the other side of the wall. Many Palestinian Jerusalemites also prefer to do their shopping in the West Bank, or in West Jerusalem, where prices are lower.

While Palestinians constitute 39 percent of the city’s population today, almost 80 percent of East Jerusalem residents, including 85 percent of children, live below the poverty line.

“How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t control your resources? How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t have any control of your borders?” said Zakaria Odeh, director of the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, of “this kind of fragmentation, checkpoints, closure”.

“Without freedom of movement of goods and human beings, how could you develop an economy?” he asked.

“You can’t talk about independent economy in Jerusalem or the West Bank or in all of Palestine without a political solution. We don’t have a Palestinian economy; we have economic activities. That’s all we have,” Odeh told IPS.

Israel’s separation barrier alone, according to a new report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), has caused a direct loss of over one billion dollars to Palestinians in Jerusalem, and continues to incur 200 million dollars per year in lost opportunities.

Israel’s severing and control over the Jerusalem-Jericho road – the historical trade route that connected Jerusalem to the rest of the West Bank and Middle East – has also contributed to the city’s economic downturn.

Separation of Jerusalem from West Bank

Before the First Intifada (Arabic for “uprising”) began in the late 1980s, East Jerusalem contributed approximately 14 to 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). By 2000, that number had dropped to less than eight percent; in 2010, the East Jerusalem economy, compared to the rest of the OPT, was estimated at only seven percent.

“Economic separation resulted in the contraction in the relative size of the East Jerusalem economy, its detachment from the remaining OPT and the gradual redirection of East Jerusalem employment towards the Israeli labour market,” the U.N. report found.

Decades ago, Israel adopted a policy to maintain a so-called “demographic balance” in Jerusalem and attempt to limit Palestinian residents of the city to 26.5 percent or less of the total population.

To maintain this composition, Israel built numerous Jewish-Israeli settlements inside and in a ring around Jerusalem and changed the municipal boundaries to encompass Jewish neighbourhoods while excluding Palestinian ones.

It is now estimated that 90,000 Palestinians holding Jerusalem residency rights live on the other side of the separation barrier and must cross through Israeli checkpoints in order to reach Jerusalem for school, medical treatment, work, and other services.

“Israel is using all kinds of tools to push the Palestinians to leave; sometimes they are visible, and sometimes invisible tools,” explained Ziad al-Hammouri, director of the Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER).

Al-Hammouri told IPS that at least 25 percent of the 1,000 Palestinian shops in the Old City were closed in recent years as a result of high municipal taxes and a lack of customers. “Taxation is an invisible tool…as dangerous as revoking ID cards and demolishing houses,” he said. “Israel will use this as pressure and as a tool in the future to confiscate these shops and properties.”

It is difficult to conceive of two more natural enemies than Hamas and the Zionist movement that dominates Israeli politics. In their different ways, each is rhetorically committed to the destruction of the other. However, their relationship is much more complex and symbiotic than a casual observer might expect.

Israel initially turned a blind eye to the activities and expanding influence of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and the Mujamma (the "Islamic Center" and institutional home of the Brotherhood in Gaza). Israel believed the traditionalist, non-violent ideology of the Brotherhood would be a counterweight to the secular, nationalist Palestinian political factions. However, with the outbreak of the first intifada, younger leaders within the Mujamma successfully forced the organization to adopt a "jihad now" policy that led to the founding of Hamas. This marked a stark ideological transition from a movement that sought Islamization through communal and educational reform into one that turned to armed resistance and nationalism to achieve its vision of an Islamic society.

The further transformation of Hamas over only two decades into a party political movement in government would surely have surprised its founders. Its willingness, along with Fateh, to compromise basic health and education services and to engage in technical-legal sophistry in pursuit of hegemony over Palestinian secular government institutions would surely have profoundly unsettled them.

Backed to the hilt by its patrons in the US and European government, Fateh refused to play any part in an orderly transfer of power, fanning the flames of the internal conflict currently engulfing Gaza. However, Hamas' extrapolation that its victory was a mandate from all Palestinians everywhere to seize control of all national institutions is blatant folly. With an increasing number of "hawks" from its military arm gaining political power, Hamas employs its security apparatus not just to tackle criminal groups. It is also brutally suppressing political opponents and curtailing the activities of civil society organizations. This is not the mandate given it by citizens who voted for "change and reform" and an end to Fateh corruption and misrule.

No doubt this transformation from bottom-up social movement to top-down autocracy has surprised Israel's political and security establishments too. Israel often receives far more credit for strategic vision and control over the Palestinian arena than it deserves. But, while not entirely controlled by Israel, Hamas' rise is not without positive consequences for its sworn enemy. Firstly, Hamas has proved to be an able guarantor of security for the residents of Israel's southern communities around Gaza, and has seemingly received very little in return for this service. Secondly, Hamas' links to the so-called "Shi'ite crescent" provide Israel's leaders with ample ammunition to justify their denial of the legal and human rights of Palestinians on the grounds of the ill-conceived and failing "war on terror". Thirdly, Gaza can now, more than ever, be cited as a clear example of Palestinian inability to govern and provide human security for the people.

The internal political situation in Israel is now more fragile than ever. Its society is deeply divided and includes powerful and popular groups implacably opposed to any peace agreement that would be acceptable to even the most "dovish" Palestinians. Should Tzipi Livni be successful in forming a governing coalition it will be a fragile one. Her own reputation is fragile too; grave doubts about her leadership and security experience remain. She will undoubtedly seek to ride out the period until the next elections in the prime minister's seat, letting Israeli voters get used to her occupying the top job. Such a recipe for Livni's and Kadima's survival cannot include open confrontation with the settler movement and the orthodox religious parties.

As has been the case for most of the period since Oslo, the Israeli government will continue to pay lip service to the peace process while maintaining its paralysis, thus postponing indefinitely the awful prospect of internal confrontation. Israel is content to see Hamas rule Gaza, but will not risk its rule extending to the West Bank. A politically and socially divided Palestinian society is critical to the "no credible partner for peace" argument that has served Zionism so well in recent years. The Israeli military, provided it maintains (or increases) its current presence, freedom of action and matrix of control, is perfectly capable of preventing Hamas from seizing power in the West Bank.

This approach is obviously inconsistent with the international community's strategy of advancing the peace process through creating a model of security and economic growth in the West Bank. Israel may be happy to let Salam Fayyad's deployment of Palestinian security forces in parts of the northern West Bank continue. However, in practice, this will remain a controlled experiment that will, under no circumstances, be extended to Hebron. Israel may be willing to move a few checkpoints around, like shuffling the deck chairs on a Tel Aviv beach, but it will not relinquish its grip on the overall situation. Of course, the spin-doctors at the Israeli Ministry of Defense and Prime Minister's office will continue to cite their good intentions to "protect Palestinian moderates" from Hamas in the West Bank--a message crafted to appease the international community whilst driving deeper the wedge between Hamas and the political factions of the PLO.

The divide and rule strategy is as old as the hills of Jerusalem and it continues to work. It will continue to be the cornerstone of Israel's strategy in relation to the Palestinians and will govern its relationship with Hamas. With Israel and most of the global community of nations against it (including the major Arab nations), and with its own internal divisions becoming more pronounced, Hamas' chances of gaining further ground beyond its hollow victory in Gaza seem remote. From a national perspective, with Hamas showing signs of the indiscipline and rampant self-interest that has corroded Fateh, the search continues for a unifying leadership that places the goal of ending the occupation ahead of petty political ambitions.- Published 22/9/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Why is it that all Arab initiatives to bring about dialogue between Fateh and Hamas have failed to produce the intended result? Why is it that even Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' own initiative failed to yield what was expected of it? Is it because behind all the sweet public announcements by Hamas and Fateh about their "readiness to talk" lies a fundamental lack of interest? Or is it because Arab intervention has not been as serious as it should be if it is to replicate the Arab-sponsored Doha mediation between the Lebanese political factions? Is it actually because of an Israeli-American veto on any rapprochement between Fateh and Hamas that would lead once again to the inclusion of the latter in the Palestinian Authority without it unequivocally accepting the conditions laid down by the Quartet?

It would seem that a combination of these three explanations contributes to continued stagnation on the Palestinian scene. Beginning from the end, there is indeed an Israeli-American veto that plays a significant role in influencing the PA and many Arab capitals. It is rather obvious that Israel wants to impose a settlement on the Palestinians. For Israel the real issue is not the Gaza Strip, but East Jerusalem and the West Bank of which it wants to annex a good portion. In line with its policy of "divide and conquer", Israel's interest is best served by a deepening of the internal Palestinian rift. It believes that Abbas (Abu Mazen) is weak, and his party, Fateh, is in a state of disarray. This means Israel can continue negotiating with Abu Mazen while creating facts on the ground through its settlement policy. Israel does not actually care if Hamas is content ruling Gaza; rather it might prefer it as long as a truce holds and rockets are not fired at Israeli towns. Israel might even be entertaining the idea that Hamas is more amenable than Abu Mazen and Fateh to accept a future "interim solution" with a "temporary Palestinian state". The US administration will go along with whatever Israel decides it wants.

With respect to the two Palestinian parties, neither seems to have any interest in compromise. Rather, both want the other to bow to their conditions. Abu Mazen is slowly asphyxiating from the prolonged negotiations with successive Israeli governments that have yielded no other result than the continued expansion of settlements on occupied Palestinian land. Because his only strategic option is to reach a political settlement through negotiations, Abu Mazen's hopes rest with the Americans and Israelis. Thus, not to upset these sources of hope, any dialogue he might undertake with Hamas can not produce tangible results unless Hamas accepts the Israeli-American conditions, a.k.a. the Quartet conditions. Hamas, on the other hand, is also not in a hurry to reach a compromise with Abu Mazen, unless its conditions are accepted in whole. Within the rank and file of Hamas there is a widespread belief that things are going to fall their way since the negotiations with Israel will not produce even the minimal conditions acceptable to the Palestinian people. Meanwhile, Hamas will use the time and the truce, if it holds, to strengthen its hold over Gaza. When 2008 ends, Hamas will be in a better bargaining position, not only with Abu Mazen, but with Israel.

With the above in mind, it should be obvious why Arab mediation in domestic Palestinian affairs is being kept on the back burner. Apart from American influence, no Arab capital wants a repeat of the Mecca agreement. If the Palestinians cannot respect the wishes and good offices of the Saudis, with all their leverage, and uphold an agreement reached in the holiest Islamic site, would they respect it if reached elsewhere? What has changed to convince any Arab capital to put its weight behind a new mediation attempt?

The only current concern for Cairo, which has its hands tied by its good relations with Washington, is not to mend fences between Palestinians but rather to save itself from the embarrassment caused by the continued closure of the Rafah crossing that has left the Gaza Strip suffering a severe siege. The Egyptian priority now is to solidify the truce between Hamas and Israel in order to find a solution to the siege through which the Rafah crossing can start operating again. The Egyptians do not want a repeat of the scenes witnessed in late January when Gazans stormed the border, because Cairo does not want to be forced to shoot at Palestinians should this happen again.

Damascus is busy trying to mend fences with the international community, more specifically with the US and France. Syria is consumed by three key strategic issues, and Hamas is not one of them. First, the Syrians are extremely keen to spare their regime the international investigation into the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri. Second, Damascus wants to get its Golan Heights back from Israel. And third, Syria wants to retain its influence in Lebanon. Therefore, neither Hamas nor even Iran are strategic issues for the Syrians, who are not going to play an active role in Palestinian affairs. Nor will they hinder any progress on that front. They will simply leave events to take their own course.

If the Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians (and also Jordanians) are not actively involved in serious meditation to bring an end to the Palestinian political rift, then it is left to the Arab League to promote a dialogue. This, however, is hardly likely to produce any results.- Published 14/7/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Ali Jarbawi is professor of political science at Birzeit University.

Five years ago, I was the first to advocate dissolving the Palestinian Authority and since then I have been stressing the need for Palestinians to take this suggestion seriously. But the suggestion was faced with immediate rejection from various circles within and connected to the PA. Some considered it the attempt of a critic (thus one who represents the opposition) to destroy the Authority and through it the "national project". Others considered it an academic exercise and were skeptical about what forces would fill the vacuum created by the absence of the Authority and who would guarantee the salaries of public employees. But a majority provided the most astonishing reason for their immediate rejection of the idea: Israel would never accept the resumption of its duties as an occupier.

The idea when I proposed it was not a mere academic fantasy. Nor was it a response to an evolving incompetent and corrupt Authority that had created a stratum of society completely dependent on it and always ready to defend it. Furthermore, the expected Israeli rejection should be considered in favor of the idea rather than against it. Israel, the occupier, could never be expected to accept anything that favors the Palestinians.

Dissolving the Authority would be the most serious step taken by the Palestinians to end this prolonged Israeli occupation. However, it should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a means to achieve an end. It should be viewed as part of a strategic option, rather than being itself the option. It should be considered as a necessary step needed to achieve the one-state solution.

Since the beginning of the conflict, the intention of the Zionist movement was to "remove" Palestinians and take their place: "a land without a people for a people without a land". After numerous attempts, even after successfully establishing a state in 1948 and occupying the remaining part of Palestine in 1967, Israel failed miserably in achieving its objective, however. Palestinians remained in Palestine and have been growing in number. Demography will be the basic determining element of this conflict.

When Israel realized its predicament, it opted for a negotiated settlement with Palestinians for a two-state solution. The PLO had accepted this option since 1988 and has been eager to reach a settlement with Israel on the basis of the 1967 borders (give and take minor alterations). The PLO was ready for a settlement that would end the occupation and result in the establishment of an independent sovereign Palestine which would live in peace with its neighboring countries, including Israel.

Throughout the 15-year long negotiation process, however, Israel has taken the Palestinian Authority for an easy ride. The Authority was, according to the Oslo Accords, supposed to be established for five years as a temporary and transitional measure. But ever since its inception, it has not only been dragged into meaningless negotiations, but also been forced to take full responsibility over the Palestinian "inhabitants" in the occupied territories.

Israel has been using negotiations as a cover to enhance its presence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The ongoing land confiscation policy along with the expansion of the settlement policy and the building of the separation wall are rendering a two-state solution obsolete. Israel wants to have its cake and eat it too: it wants to retain as much land as possible while getting rid of as many Palestinians as possible through the creation of a Palestinian state of leftovers. It will then claim that a two-state solution has been achieved and that therefore the book should be closed on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict forever.

Israel should not be allowed to achieve its goal. It is clear from past negotiations experience that Israel is simply not interested in a proper two-state solution, only one that leads to imprisoning Palestinians into separate cantons that can then be called a state.

The only way Israel might become serious about a two-state solution is if its existence as a Jewish state is threatened. Such a threat cannot come through an everlasting open negotiating process or by launching handmade rockets at Israel's borders. A serious threat is only posed if Palestinians announce to Israel and the world at large that they will pursue a two-state solution through negotiations until the end of 2008 (as US President George W. Bush proposed). If no tangible results are forthcoming, then Palestinians should pay heed to the lesson, close the door on this option and refocus their efforts toward the one-state option. This option requires dissolving the Authority, thus forcing Israel to face up to the real challenge of maintaining its existence as a Jewish state.

Instead of currently continuing the pursuit of independence, the Palestinian strategy should begin to aim at total integration within the state of Israel. It has become clear that a sovereign and independent Palestinian state cannot be established without going through the path of a one-state solution.

It is a rather interesting proposition. How would Israel and the international community react to a people saying they want to continue living under occupation?- Published 10/3/2008 © bitterlemons.org

Ali Jarbawi is professor of political science at Birzeit University.

Finally, after a long wait and tough discussions before and after the Mecca agreement, the Palestinian national unity government has been formed. It is a broad-based coalition government that primarily includes Hamas and Fateh but also representatives from other Palestinian factions.

The formation came basically as a response to pressing internal Palestinian considerations more than escalating external pressures and demands. Over the past year, the Palestinians have endured a difficult crisis that brought them to the brink of a devastating civil war. This was in addition to being subjected to a severe and suffocating political and economic siege imposed by Israel and the international community.

That siege came because after years of a political process during which the Palestinians were coerced into accepting a number of Israeli conditions, Hamas won the Legislative Council elections and formed a government on the basis of a refusal to recognize Israel or any agreement signed with it. Rather, it called for armed resistance against it.

This raised the ire of Israel and its western allies, the United States in particular. A harsh siege was imposed on the Hamas government with the aim of changing its political platform. The impact of that siege was magnified as a result of the internal strife between the Hamas government and members and supporters of Fateh.

Meanwhile, the civil servants strike did not just harm the public interest by closing schools, hospitals and other public institutions, it served to escalate the tension between armed elements in Fateh and Hamas. Armed clashes between the two sides ensued, which only worsened with time until they threatened open armed struggle. The situation reached a crossroads: either Hamas would be coerced into entering a political settlement according to Israeli conditions--which have also become international conditions--or it would be ousted from power by external pressures and internal strife.

The course of events, however, did not proceed as Israel and its allies hoped it would. Neither scenario materialized. Instead, chaos prevailed in the occupied Palestinian territories and the feelings of frustration and subjugation increased among Palestinians. As a result, they rallied around the Hamas government.

In addition, Arab unease over events rose, especially as they were coupled with other burning issues in the region concerning Iraq, Iranian nuclear ambitions and the Syrian-Lebanese file. It became imperative to address the Palestinian situation, thus resulting in Arab intervention. The climax was the signing of the Mecca agreement that led to the formation of the Palestinian national unity government and a breakthrough in the Palestinian arena.

This breakthrough was unwanted by the Israelis. Israel has always promoted instability on the internal Palestinian front. It benefits from a lack of Palestinian consensus on a unified strategy to confront Israel on the one hand, and uses this lack of agreement as a pretext for claiming that there is no Palestinian partner with whom to negotiate, on the other. This way, Israel can continue its comfortable occupation of the Palestinians and its unilateral measures aimed at imposing the settlement it wants on the Palestinians.

The formation of the Palestinian national government strikes at the heart of Israel's plans. To escape a looming civil war, Hamas and Fateh were forced to agree on a mutual partnership, even if on the lowest common denominators. Israel does not want to see the positive aspects of this agreement, most importantly that Hamas has budged from its previous position and now accepts the establishment of a Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967 and agrees to hand over negotiations with Israel to the PLO, represented by its chairman, Mahmoud Abbas.

This is a substantial change in Hamas' position. But Israel is paying it no heed, because it does not want a political settlement based on the principle of a complete end to the occupation and the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on all occupied land, in addition to a solution to the refugee issue according to international resolutions.

This is why Israel expressed its dissatisfaction with the Mecca agreement and later with the formation of the national unity government, announcing it would not recognize this government or deal with it if it did not accept the Quartet conditions--recognition of Israel and agreements signed with it in addition to the renunciation of "terror". Israel even added the condition of releasing the captive Israeli prisoner Gilad Shalit.

Indeed, since the signing of the Mecca agreement, Israel has been waging a vigorous campaign at the international level to turn western capitals against the Palestinians and their government. Now that the government has been formed, Israel has doubled its efforts and wants to force the Quartet parties to abide by its understanding of the three conditions. In other words, Israel does not want to allow the parties of the Quartet to interpret their conditions in the manner they feel appropriate and necessary to move the political process forward. Rather, Israel wants to force them to abide by the Israeli interpretation of their conditions.

Why all this pressure from Israel? Israel feels it may now be subjected to pressures it does not want to face. In past months, there have been changes in the overall atmosphere. Because of the consequences of its blunders in Iraq, the American administration has been subjected to internal and external pressures to reconsider its policy in the Middle East. At the center of this pressure, which is growing because of the possible ramifications of Iran's emergence at the regional level, is the insistence of Arab countries allied with the US on the necessity to resolve the Palestinian issue according to the Arab peace initiative.

In addition, Russia is resisting the America's tyrannical grasp over international policy, especially in the Middle East. We should also not forget the EU's ambition for a more effective role in this region given its proximity. Due to all these factors, there are tangible Arab and international ambitions to find a solution to the conflict based on the Arab peace initiative of 2002. The existence of a Palestinian national unity government and internal Palestinian harmony reinforces and strengthens this trend.

Israel will continue to pressure the American administration and, directly and through the US, the Quartet not to deal with the Palestinian government. By doing so, Israel is hoping to divert attention away from its obstinacy and blame the Palestinians. Israel also aims to pressure Arab countries to amend the Arab peace initiative to strip it of its fundamental content, i.e., a complete withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories and the need to reach a solution to the refugee problem according to UN Resolution 194. Israel will do everything necessary to achieve this goal, including waging a wide-scale military campaign in the Gaza Strip.

Israel's success or failure in its current endeavors depends on the ability of the Palestinian government and the upcoming Arab summit to stand firm. If the Palestinians and the Arabs succeed in holding on to the Arab peace initiative as it is, and if the Arabs lift the siege on the Palestinian government, the Israeli pressure will fail and be directed toward Israel instead.

However, if the Palestinian and Arab position shows any sign of weakness, the situation will lean toward a settlement on Israeli terms. The result of that will be a Palestinian statelet inside the wall, divided between the West Bank and Gaza, without the right of return for refugees. That will be the ultimate disaster.