Abir Dandis, the mother of the two girls who were murdered in the Negev town of Al-Fura’a last week, couldn't find a police officer to listen to her warnings, neither in Arad nor in Ma’ale Adumim. Both police stations operate in areas where Israel wants to gather the Bedouin into permanent communities, against their will, in order to clear more land for Jewish communities. The dismissive treatment Dandis received shows how the Bedouin are considered simply to be lawbreakers by their very nature. But as a resident of the West Bank asking for help for her daughters, whose father was Israeli, Dandis faced the legal-bureaucratic maze created by the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinian police is not allowed to arrest Israeli civilians. It must hand suspects over to the Israel Police. The Palestinian police complain that in cases of Israelis suspected of committing crimes against Palestinian residents, the Israel Police tend not to investigate or prosecute them.

In addition, the town of Al-Azaria, where Dandis lives, is in Area B, under Palestinian civilian authority and Israeli security authority. According to the testimony of Palestinian residents, neither the IDF nor the Israel Police has any interest in internal Palestinian crime even though they have both the authority and the obligation to act in Area B.

The Palestinian police are limited in what it can do in Area B. Bringing in reinforcements or carrying weapons in emergency situations requires coordination with, and obtaining permission from, the IDF. If Dandis fears that the man who murdered her daughters is going to attack her as well, she has plenty of reason to fear that she will not receive appropriate, immediate police protection from either the Israelis or the Palestinians.

Dandis told Jack Khoury of Haaretz that the Ma’ale Adumim police referred her to the Palestinian Civil Affairs Coordination and Liaison Committee. Theoretically, this committee (which is subordinate to the Civil Affairs Ministry) is the logical place to go for such matters. Its parallel agency in Israel is the Civilian Liaison Committee (which is part of the Coordination and Liaison Administration - a part of the Civil Administration under the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories).

In their meetings, they are supposed to discuss matters such as settlers’ complaints about the high volume of the loudspeakers at mosques or Palestinians’ complaints about attacks by settlers. But the Palestinians see the Liaison Committee as a place to submit requests for permission to travel to Israel, and get the impression that its clerks do not have much power when faced with their Israeli counterparts. In any case, the coordination process is cumbersome and long.

The Palestinian police has a family welfare unit, and activists in Palestinian women’s organizations say that in recent years, its performance has improved. But, as stated, it has no authority over Israeli civilians and residents. Several non-governmental women’s groups also operate in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, and women in similar situations approach them for help. The manager of one such organization told Haaretz that Dandis also fell victim to this confusing duplication of procedures and laws. Had Dandis approached her, she said, she would have referred her to Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, which has expertise in navigating Israel’s laws and authorities.

John Kerry revealed his long-awaited plan for peace in the Middle East on Sunday, hinging on a $4bn (£2.6bn) investment in the Palestinian private sector.

The US secretary of state, speaking at the World Economic Forum on the Jordanian shores of the Dead Sea, told an audience including Israeli president Shimon Peres and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas that an independent Palestinian economy is essential to achieving a sustainable peace.

Speaking under the conference banner "Breaking the Impasse", Kerry announced a plan that he promised would be "bigger, bolder and more ambitious" than anything since the Oslo accords, more than 20 years ago.

Tony Blair is to lead a group of private sector leaders in devising a plan to release the Palestinian economy from its dependence on international donors. The initial findings of Blair's taskforce, Kerry boasted, were "stunning", predicting a 50% increase in Palestinian GDP over three years, a cut of two-thirds in unemployment rates and almost double the Palestinian median wage. Currently, 40% of the Palestinian economy is supplied by donor aid.

Kerry assured Abbas that the economic plan was not a substitute for a political solution, which remains the US's "top priority".

Peres, who had taken the stage just minutes before, also issued a personal plea to his Palestinian counterpart to return to the negotiations.

"Let me say to my dear friend President Abbas," Peres said, "Should we really dance around the table? Lets sit together. You'll be surprised how much can be achieved in open, direct and organised meetings."

Thick locks hug the front gates of shuttered shops, now covered in graffiti and dust from lack of use. Only a handful of customers pass along the dimly lit road, sometimes stopping to check the ripeness of fruits and vegetables, or ordering meat in near-empty butcher shops.

“All the shops are closed. I’m the only one open. This used to be the best place,” said 64-year-old Mustafa Sunocret, selling vegetables out of a small storefront in the marketplace near his family’s home in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City.

Amidst the brightly coloured scarves, clothes and carpets, ceramic pottery and religious souvenirs filling the shops of Jerusalem’s historic Old City, Palestinian merchants are struggling to keep their businesses alive.

Faced with worsening health problems, Sunocret told IPS that he cannot work outside of the Old City, even as the cost of maintaining his shop, with high electricity, water and municipal tax bills to pay, weighs on him.

“I only have this shop,” he said. “There is no other work. I’m tired.”

Abed Ajloni, the owner of an antiques shop in the Old City, owes the Jerusalem municipality 250,000 Israeli shekels (68,300 U.S. dollars) in taxes. He told IPS that almost every day, the city’s tax collectors come into the Old City, accompanied by Israeli police and soldiers, to pressure people there to pay.

“It feels like they’re coming again to occupy the city, with the soldiers and police,” Ajloni, who has owned the same shop for 35 years, told IPS. “But where can I go? What can I do? All my life I was in this place.”

He added, “Does Jerusalem belong to us, or to someone else? Who’s responsible for Jerusalem? Who?”

Illegal annexation

Israel occupied East Jerusalem, including the Old City, in 1967. In July 1980, it passed a law stating that “Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel”. But Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem and subsequent application of Israeli laws over the entire city remain unrecognised by the international community.

Under international law, East Jerusalem is considered occupied territory – along with the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Syrian Golan Heights – and Palestinian residents of the city are protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Jerusalem has historically been the economic, political and cultural centre of life for the entire Palestinian population. But after decades languishing under destructive Israeli policies meant to isolate the city from the rest of the Occupied Territories and a lack of municipal services and investment, East Jerusalem has slipped into a state of poverty and neglect.

“After some 45 years of occupation, Arab Jerusalemites suffer from political and cultural schizophrenia, simultaneously connected with and isolated from their two hinterlands: Ramallah and the West Bank to their east, West Jerusalem and Israel to the west,” the International Crisis Group recently wrote.

Israeli restrictions on planning and building, home demolitions, lack of investment in education and jobs, construction of an eight-foot-high separation barrier between and around Palestinian neighbourhoods and the creation of a permit system to enter Jerusalem have all contributed to the city’s isolation.

Formal Palestinian political groups have also been banned from the city, and between 2001-2009, Israel closed an estimated 26 organisations, including the former Palestinian Liberation Organisation headquarters in Jerusalem, the Orient House and the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce.

Extreme poverty

Israel’s policies have also led to higher prices for basic goods and services and forced many Palestinian business owners to close shop and move to Ramallah or other Palestinian neighbourhoods on the other side of the wall. Many Palestinian Jerusalemites also prefer to do their shopping in the West Bank, or in West Jerusalem, where prices are lower.

While Palestinians constitute 39 percent of the city’s population today, almost 80 percent of East Jerusalem residents, including 85 percent of children, live below the poverty line.

“How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t control your resources? How could you develop [an] economy if you don’t have any control of your borders?” said Zakaria Odeh, director of the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, of “this kind of fragmentation, checkpoints, closure”.

“Without freedom of movement of goods and human beings, how could you develop an economy?” he asked.

“You can’t talk about independent economy in Jerusalem or the West Bank or in all of Palestine without a political solution. We don’t have a Palestinian economy; we have economic activities. That’s all we have,” Odeh told IPS.

Israel’s separation barrier alone, according to a new report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), has caused a direct loss of over one billion dollars to Palestinians in Jerusalem, and continues to incur 200 million dollars per year in lost opportunities.

Israel’s severing and control over the Jerusalem-Jericho road – the historical trade route that connected Jerusalem to the rest of the West Bank and Middle East – has also contributed to the city’s economic downturn.

Separation of Jerusalem from West Bank

Before the First Intifada (Arabic for “uprising”) began in the late 1980s, East Jerusalem contributed approximately 14 to 15 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the Occupied Palestinian territories (OPT). By 2000, that number had dropped to less than eight percent; in 2010, the East Jerusalem economy, compared to the rest of the OPT, was estimated at only seven percent.

“Economic separation resulted in the contraction in the relative size of the East Jerusalem economy, its detachment from the remaining OPT and the gradual redirection of East Jerusalem employment towards the Israeli labour market,” the U.N. report found.

Decades ago, Israel adopted a policy to maintain a so-called “demographic balance” in Jerusalem and attempt to limit Palestinian residents of the city to 26.5 percent or less of the total population.

To maintain this composition, Israel built numerous Jewish-Israeli settlements inside and in a ring around Jerusalem and changed the municipal boundaries to encompass Jewish neighbourhoods while excluding Palestinian ones.

It is now estimated that 90,000 Palestinians holding Jerusalem residency rights live on the other side of the separation barrier and must cross through Israeli checkpoints in order to reach Jerusalem for school, medical treatment, work, and other services.

“Israel is using all kinds of tools to push the Palestinians to leave; sometimes they are visible, and sometimes invisible tools,” explained Ziad al-Hammouri, director of the Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER).

Al-Hammouri told IPS that at least 25 percent of the 1,000 Palestinian shops in the Old City were closed in recent years as a result of high municipal taxes and a lack of customers. “Taxation is an invisible tool…as dangerous as revoking ID cards and demolishing houses,” he said. “Israel will use this as pressure and as a tool in the future to confiscate these shops and properties.”

In The Washington Post of 10 October, Harold Meyerson observes that if the erosion of individual rights in the US as a result of Bush's war on terror wasn't enough, there is a development that is "even more corrosive to American democracy: the erosion of majority rule". Apparently he's right. A Pew Research Centre poll in September indicated that 54 per cent of Americans supported bringing US forces home immediately, 13 per cent supported a timetable for withdrawal and only 25 per cent favoured keeping troops there and not setting a timetable.

Decision-makers side with the 25 per cent. They want US forces to stay in Iraq for an indefinite period, as they have in South Korea (50 years until now), in the opinion of Defense Secretary Robert Gates, among others. Presidential candidates, on the other hand, tend to be vague on withdrawal even though if the Democrats are elected it will be on the strength of American voters' opposition to the war in Iraq now that it has proven such a disaster.

Not that this is all that surprising. While the peaceful rotation of power is a fundamental component of a democracy, in the opinion of the high priests and savants of political theory, it is not an especially pivotal component. For the most part, power is rotated among people of the same party, or of the two major parties, without bringing a significant change in policy, especially those policies related to the essential nature of the national economy, the Central Bank, the US's central foreign alliances, national security, and the basic principles of the constitution. It is thus difficult to identify the contours of change on the basis of the success of a Republican or Democratic candidate in the US. To a considerable extent, politico-economic circumstances and the expectations of voters at the end of an incumbent's term determine the actions of his successor, leaving only a narrow margin for difference, regardless of the successor's political party affiliation.

In "established democratic systems" parties and presidents follow one another to the helm within the framework of the system's basic principles. In the US, the rivalry between the two major parties takes place within the ruling establishment and, moreover, since statistical considerations compel them to compete over the centre of the spectrum of public opinion, the rhetoric and platforms of rival candidates are often very similar. Little wonder therefore that, to the surprise and dismay of her liberal supporters, Hillary Clinton suddenly espoused conservative views. Not only does she not regret voting in favour of the war on Iraq when the issue came before Congress, she now refuses to rule out prolonging the military option in Iraq just as she refuses to rule out the option of war against Iran.

There are countries in which elections mean a choice between two different worlds, which is to say that the polls can actually result in radical foreign and domestic policy changes. The Ukraine and Lebanon spring to mind. But these are countries that have not yet matured into "established democratic systems".

This is not to say the peaceful rotation of power excludes the possibility of major political turning points in established democracies. The rise of Lincoln, Roosevelt, Thatcher and Reagan, for example, can only be understood as radical shifts in the US's or the UK's domestic or foreign policies arising from the results of national elections. On the other hand, those who subscribe to the theory above can claim that even in these instances the shifts were an inevitable reflection of larger forces, such as changes in the economy, the times, the nature of the forces of production and the like, as opposed to changes in persons and individual temperaments. Moreover, such instances are relatively rare, no more frequent than the sweeping changes similar exigencies compel upon dictatorships, whether these changes occur in the form of peaceful reforms or of coups and non-peaceful means of the rotation of power.

The difference between citizens of a democracy and citizens of a non-democratic government does not reside in their ability or lack of ability to alter policy, but rather in their respective rights and the nature of their citizenship.

Meanwhile, all indications are that the US is irrevocably bent on confrontation in the Arab region, a policy shared to varying degrees by its Arab and European allies and, of course, Israel. Their aim is to expunge such givens as Arab solidarity, the Palestinian cause and even the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to isolate and seal off everything that represents that "past" without resolving any issue unless by settlement with Israeli national consensus.

With the end of the neo-conservatives, the banner of "the spread of democracy" beneath which this clique paraded fell, leaving its less deceptive partner, "the fight against terrorism", in place. The banner that has effectively and flagrantly taken the place of "democracy" is "American hegemony", by which is meant the imposition of a single all- encompassing form of control over the material and mental region located between the preservation of Israel and oil, and the areas adjacent. The fall of "democracy", in turn, removed any vestiges of embarrassment and discomfort among Arab neo-cons and neo-liberals whose regimes, which they served in the days of Washington's neo-conservatives, now feel threatened or at least open to blackmail by America's number one ally. Indeed, gone now is even the slightest compunction at siding with Israel (militarily or non-militarily) in its confrontation against other Arabs.

Putting aside, just for the moment, the various details governing the daily moods and concerns of the people, which are echoing through the Lebanese press, between the lines of various meetings and in official statements, it is possible to capture a general idea. It is actually a pretty obvious one: when caught in a policy of regional confrontation such as that which is currently being engineered it is difficult for those in the crosshairs of that policy to come to an agreement. The rest is detail. This is an analysis, of course, not a value judgement. With regards to the latter, the policy of confrontation is no less than a crime and madness.

If the Lebanese were left to themselves, they would have no alternative but to come to an agreement. But the first to refute such an assessment are the Lebanese "factions" and their pundits. They will tell you that agreement on their presidency is a regional and international affair. "It's always been that way," they say and for proof they show how they've always welcomed international and Arab efforts. Still, one can not help but to believe that if the Lebanese had their say, they would reach a reconciliation, in spite of UN resolution 1559, from which all active players in Lebanon had distanced themselves when it was issued with expressions ranging from opposition to outright condemnation. But such was not to be the case, and now the acceptance of that resolution has become a prerequisite for engagement in any talks over the presidency, thanks to the imposition of the policy of regional confrontation, or to the players' seizing at this policy as an ally in their domestic power plays.

The situation as it stands can be broken down into the following inferential equation: the US is pursuing a confrontationist, anti-conciliatory policy in the region; consensus over the presidency of Lebanon (among other things, we add cautiously) is a regional and international matter; and local reconciliation is an unlikely outcome of international confrontation.

If this is true, then what is all the discussion about in Lebanon? Not, of course, that we want the newspapers there to shut down, depriving their owners of the income they make out of news, official statements and the like. But is it possible that the following holds true: that the US regards developments in Lebanon since the Syrian withdrawal as an accomplishment it seeks to sustain? In this case, it would not want that accomplishment to be jeopardised by an internal conflict with an unpredictable outcome and it would, therefore, want to encourage its allies there to reach a local agreement, so long as the accord remains local, in the sense of a local anaesthetic, which is to say applicable solely to Lebanon so as not to alter its overall policy of regional confrontation.

Of course, the foregoing scenario presumes that all decision-making power rests in Washington's hands alone and that the US is capable of doing what it pleases whenever it pleases. Were this presumption correct then one could accept, in theory, the possibility of that scenario. But even then, we would find that the US regards the implementation of Resolution 1559 an international concern worthy of fighting over. In Lebanon, it is not so much the person of the president that counts, but the makeup of the government he forms after he is elected, and the position of this government on 1559. Indeed, the implementation of the latter was the very issue that Israel had officially declared the aim of its war on Lebanon. It was not in the least interested in internal Lebanese dialogue or concord.

Ultimately, the subject is a political one in the end. National concord, like any political conciliation in the world, is contingent upon domestic parties capable of applying their independent will in realistically assessing their opportunities for achieving their objectives and then upon their willingness to compromise in order to avert hostilities with unforeseeable consequences. Consensus is synonymous with the theory and practice of realism.

On other fronts, Olmert has yet to state in detail his position on the conditions and limitations for a settlement. He uses that old "trial balloon" tactic: he lets others do the talking. Until recently, Olmert had been playing both sides of the fence, with Lieberman's Shas Party on one side and Barak's Labour Party on the other. Then he realised that Barak was not on the other side of the fence, but instead busily trying to outflank him on the right. Barak, for his part, realises that Netanyahu is his most powerful rival and he also believes that the Palestinian Authority (PA) is too week to deliver on Israel's conditions for a settlement.

Olmert has not forgotten that Barak lost his coalition government on the road to Camp David and that Netanyahu's government fell on his way back from Wye River. Olmert, on the other hand, succeeded in regaining some of his ratings and in winning over all the Israeli media in favour of a "peace process" and demographic separation in general. This is what won him over to Sharon, which, in turn, lifted his popularity ratings further.

Undoubtedly, Olmert also bears in mind that what raised his popularity ratings was not peace or his willingness to make concessions, but rather the "process" itself. From his perspective, then, the best option is to keep this process going without making "concessions". This is impossible, of course, which is why he has to offer small tips from time to time so as to strengthen the position of the "Palestinian partner" in Palestinian society.

Therefore, the only thing we can expect from the Annapolis peace meeting is for it to strengthen the peace process. As far as that meeting goes, the Israeli prime minister has only two major concerns. There has to be a prospect of some kind of declaration of understanding so as not to have to face the consequences of a reverberating failure, and there can be no "concessions" which could jeopardise his coalition. What all parties in that coalition share is an ability to realistically appreciate the prospects of the Annapolis meeting. And they can realistically expect that the US president will not pressure Israel.

On the Palestinian side, when some Hamas leaders say that talks are in progress with Fatah in this country or that, they look like unsteady tightrope walkers. More importantly, they are effectively belittling the importance of discussing opposition to the Bush meeting in November and sidelining the need to discuss the behaviour of the PA. The ultimate effect of such statements is to make Hamas appear interested primarily in returning to a power- sharing arrangement with Fatah.

Yet it is not Fatah that is ruling the PA at the moment, but rather a certain political trend, most of whose main figures either came from outside Fatah or had never held key positions in that movement. The only reason this trend freed itself from Hamas was so that it could have the leeway to play out its version of a settlement process to the accompaniment of a lot of international fanfare. It has no interest in going back to Hamas, which is why its response to Hamas statements is that no such talks are in progress and that there will be no dialogue. The proponents of this trend are very persistent and single minded. They have a project and they are determined to subordinate any details, such as dialogue, to the implementation of their project and what they hope to gain out of implementing it.

There are undoubtedly many Fatah members who have no objection to speaking with Hamas. There are also many who oppose the PA presidency's way of handling things. Perhaps these are the people Hamas should be speaking with, without claiming that they are speaking with Fatah in general and in a way that establishes common ground to build on towards the development of a political programme. Surely this is the only way to prevent the imposition on the Palestinians of a political map that features only an unjust settlement on one side and a self-serving PA project on the other, with no politicised opposition with a viable political vision in between.

A Palestinian Intellectual.

If the US proceeds on the basis of the conviction that, after its failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs to score a success in Lebanon by rolling back the opposition through the application of international resolutions, and another success in Palestine by feeding the West Bank and starving Gaza in the hope of compelling the Palestinians to accept anything Israel offers, the only thing it will accomplish will be to propel these two countries to civil war and destruction.

For America's friends and allies in these countries, this is their moment to shine. If they have an ounce of patriotism, they should be able to picture the possibility of national reconciliation and agreements that will spare their countries death and devastation. They can give the Americans some sound advice. They can tell them that no amount of outside support or money will resolve the domestic conflict, that a Hamas desperate enough to initiate resistance in the West Bank, for example, will frustrate the projects dreamed up by various research institutes for a Western-financed social safety net to take the place of the Hamas- run philanthropic societies along with all the economic initiatives conceived in the course of a businessmen's convention in Tel Aviv. They can say that only national reconciliation will work, that local balances of power are one thing and the balance of power in the Security Council another, and that forcing the former to mirror the latter has only succeeded in inflicting on the region an endless train of disasters.

Of course, as useful as this advice is, one pretty much has to don rose-tinted lenses to believe that those friends and allies of America will offer it to Washington; indeed, lenses of a more hallucinogenic quality if those people think that there is still time to turn an impetuous America under the yolk of a reckless president to the advantage of their domestic agendas. Naturally, too, we did not mention here the need for Syria and Iran's friends and allies in these countries to whisper similar advice to Damascus and Tehran, since they have already declared their position with regard to the need for national reconciliation in Palestine and national unity in Lebanon.

It had long been an Arab custom to point the finger abroad or at "certain elements" in order to avert rupture between them. In the post- independence phase, from the time when coups stopped and regimes settled down, until the alienation of the Saddam Hussein regime following the war to liberate Kuwait, there was something of an unwritten agreement between Arab regimes to keep their mutual acrimony from exceeding the bounds of their collective interest and the preservation of stability. Directing blame away from each other was the way to do this. So when they cried out in unison against the "imperialist, Zionist and Arab reactionary" conspiracy, as though it were a three-headed monster, and held this trinity responsible for the latest outbreak of fighting inside Palestine or the latest resumption of gunfire in the backstreets of Beirut, no one blinked an eye. Even Israel shrugged off the accusation and fell in with the universal pretence that this was a form of revolutionary bombast and the Arab regimes' way of sweeping their problems under the carpet.

But the phenomenon goes much further back. It dates at least to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which ordained that there could be no Arab nationalist concern and that domestic conflicts in the Arab world had to reflect or play a part in international conflicts. So when, in that twilight of the Ottoman era, Arab political forces were ranged as for or against the Great Powers and other outside powers, the local categorisers with grudges to bear against certain national forces made no distinction between these, some of which had sided with this or that of the outside powers for various reasons of their own, and actual security breaches, which is to say individuals that were actively acting on behalf of, or conspiring with those powers. Either one was an "Arab in spite of all else," and therefore part of that great Arab family that was summoned to unite against colonialism, or one was a "proxy" or a "spy".

It is not my concern, here, to define who might be categorised as a security breach or an "agent" working on behalf of a foreign power. Suffice it to say that the concept could extend to those individuals we read about in books produced by former US officials (such as Ross and Tenet); individuals who proved to have had a hand in the American decision-making process if only because they were a source of information -- very carefully selected information, it should be added, furnished to the US on the eve of the war against Iraq to show that the Saddam regime was ripe for the plucking, or on the eve of Camp David II to show that Yasser Arafat was ready to accept anything on offer as long as Bill Clinton could work his magic charm. It goes without saying that such information had very disastrous consequences.

What does concern me here is those forces that regard it in their interests to ally themselves with the US and that are currently studying the possibility of an alliance with Israel. These we cannot categorise as a "security breach" because they represent the interests and attitudes of the regime and even some relatively narrow social strata. It is too easy to pass these off as weak or pretending to be weak, or stupid or easily gulled. Such assessments are simplistic and will inevitably lead to folly. The Arab world has a whole new generation of politicians that subscribe to the concept of the sub-regional nation state and the need to place its interests (most often as identified with the interests of the existing regime) above all other considerations. To them, if that requires an alliance with the US, even at the expense of that nation's relations with other Arab countries, then so be it. The Palestinian cause, in their opinion, is simply another national issue, as opposed to an Arab national issue. The Arabs have to help resolve this problem, of course. But a just solution is not necessarily required, not when that problem continues to form a source of trouble and potential instability, because it constantly arms domestic opposition forces with fodder to sustain their anger against the regime and their resentment of its alliance with the West and of never-ending attempts to delegitimise supranational frames of reference such as pan-Arabism or Islam.

Some Arab democrats, especially those with a history of leftist leanings, had pinned their hopes on US interventionism in the name of democratic reform. How deluded they were. Whatever immunity they once had has been swept away by an imperialist policy that they helped to usher in through their strident hostility even towards those modernist elements in Arab nationalism that they equated with prevailing regimes. I suppose they were always this way. In the past they fell into the thrall of the international revolution. More recently they were captivated by globalised democracy. In both cases, outside power always held the key.

But these are not the ones I have in mind when I speak of forces currently allied with the US. Rather, I am talking about various rulers and their coteries of relatives, friends, nouveaux superrich businessmen and "neo-liberal" intellectuals. These have never been anywhere near the left and they never had a warm spot in their hearts for democracy, civil rights and liberalism. Liberalism to them means economic privatisation and deregulation to feed their small circle of the rich and privileged, which is a far cry from what even economic liberalism is supposed to be about. Sadly, this is the only policy that is systematically succeeding amidst the devastation in Iraq. Whereas in the past one pondered such alternatives as democracy, dictatorship and monarchy, today the Arab world should add a new term to its political glossary: "kleptocracy", or rule by a gang of thieves.

These neo-liberal kleptocrats are not puppets on strings; they have become the strongest component in Washington's equations for the Middle East in the wake of its intervention in Iraq. So dependent has the US become on them that it has long since removed the sword of democratisation and political reform from over their heads. They pursue their own agendas and, right now, are working to secure the might of the world's superpower towards the advancement of these agendas, domestically and regionally. And they have their own way of looking at things, which generally involves some unrealistic perception, founded upon smatterings of selective information digested through a maze of prejudice and hand-me- down slogans, of the old Arab order, and upon the media-fed impression that Israel is ready to make peace and the equally propagandistic notion that Arabs had better not let another opportunity slip by.

At some point in the recent past, such concepts as "the battle of Arabism" and the Arab "fight for survival" against Israel have become objects of derision, a kind of adolescent joke among teenagers who have just discovered the signs of puberty and who already show signs of never being able to grow up. The fact is, however, that these were not airy slogans but rather the substance of an actual phase in Arab perception of a peril that is now looming closer than ever. This understanding has eluded those to whom "national liberation" was never more than a slogan, who tout the pragmatism of any settlement with Israel at all, and who blame the Palestinians for holding this up. Regretfully, their reading of reality, their knowledge of Israel as based on this reading, and their total dependence on Israel's good intentions, has only worked to whet Israel's appetite for extorting more. Their take on reality lets them operate on the assumption that the US is prepared to use its influence to get Israel to back down and that Israel is eager to help them save face when needed. It is a take that is certainly not founded on facts, but then facts and information are not this generation's forte. Indeed, I would suggest that the generation of Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the old Baathists were far more informed, far more realistic, and immeasurably less corrupt.

Certain significant Arab quarters are not only happy to be free from US pressures at a time when they are needed to confront opponents to a fictitious peace process; they also relish in the opportunity to lash out at that Arab camp that does not share their assessment of reality and the opinions they espouse accordingly. So their opinion pundits sound the alarm against the "Shia crescent," regardless of the facts and, most likely, indifferent to the truth. Others, at the moment, are taking jabs at Damascus, whose rhetoric about Syria's capabilities and regional role has become a little too much to bear. Syria really must learn its place. It's perfectly okay to want the Golan Heights back, but only so long as Syria neo- liberalises its economy (in the kleptocratic sense, of course). Then they will stand behind Syria, just as they are standing behind the Palestinian leadership after its disengagement from Hamas, and they will help it accomplish both objectives. But if Syria, for a moment, forgets that it has no role to play in Iraq, Lebanon or Palestine, and if it does not transform itself into the type of country that wants to solve its border dispute with Israel, then it will have to be isolated and given a couple of tough lessons. I have no doubt that these quarters are, at this very moment, whispering some very urgent advice into Washington's ear about Syria, just as they had about how to deal with Iraq and how to deal with Arafat.

I would even bet that someone from these quarters volunteered to explain to Condoleezza Rice the story about Syrian-Iranian differences and that she went from there to build a rosy scenario of a complete fall out between the two countries. No doubt too, someone suggested turning off the food, medicine and fuel taps in Gaza, so as to keep Hamas busy supplying Palestinians there with their most essential needs, while showering the West Bank with aid and West Bank leaders with privileges in order to demonstrate the advantages of negotiating over declarations of principle.

But if I were these people, or at least those who listen to them, I would take care. For some reason it always transpires that their analyses, such as they are, are founded on scattered evidence and impressions tailored to suit the hypothesis. And just as Iraq failed to turn into an American satellite and friend of Israel, and just as Hizbullah refused to back down before Israel, so too will such daydreams as the collapse of the Syrian regime turn into fresh nightmares. Nor do I have a shadow of doubt that the only way to avert more nightmares in Lebanon and Palestine is for people there to set their minds on national reconciliation and to resolve their domestic differences.

Azmi Bishara is a Palestinian thinker.

Once it had ascertained that the Palestinians were solidly split right down the middle, Israel reverted to its old ways. It dug into its all too familiar bag of tricks, lies and sleights of hand while sustaining constant prattle about the need to protect its eternal security and to forefend the threat to its democracy, which entails subjecting the lands and welfare of other peoples to its own domestic squabbling, political party rivalries and media sparring. So, once again, the other side, which had agreed to become the other "party", found itself sucked into worrying about Israel's internal affairs and the call for early elections, the identity conflict between Israeli secularists and religious fanatics, and the national obsession over the soul-wrenching "agony" of having to suppress and subjugate another people. No other oppressed or occupied people in the world have ever been forced into such an unnatural, almost "normalized", concern for the internal concerns of the people who occupied their land and usurped their national rights.

Purely for the sake of some additional food for thought, we add here that the Arab spectator (a term that these days is much more apt in the practical and legal sense than the term "citizen") has recently discovered how rich, diverse and intricate the domestic issues are in Lebanon. This surprise is mixed with wonder at the sheer numbers of Lebanese who have something to say and no small admiration for how eloquently they can go on saying it. But the spectator has simultaneously discovered that, as far as Lebanon is concerned, this diversity and these quantities of speakers and words indicate that the strings controlling Lebanon's fate are being pulled from abroad. This realization places delight at discovering the outstanding talents of the Lebanese in another context: Israeli diversity ultimately works to draw outside powers (with the possible exception of the US) into Israel's internal affairs whereas Lebanese diversity serves to render Lebanon malleable to deals between outside powers. The contrast is striking.

In all events, in the midst of negotiations aiming to hammer together some type of consensus preparatory to the "international peace meeting" this autumn (some kind of declaration of principles, for example, to be followed by Palestinian elections that will be portrayed as a Palestinian stamp of approval on this "internationally" supported declaration of principles), and even as Israelis relentlessly attempt to "persuade" the Palestinian people of the advantages of "moderation", Barak made a sudden appearance in a Yediot Aharonot interview. Without a word of forewarning, he proclaimed that Israel would not withdraw from the West Bank before another five years because it would take at least that long to ensure that precautions are in place to fend off Qassam missiles from the West Bank after withdrawal.

But it is not the substance of this curious intervention that is important -- if anyone still believes that Israel will withdraw from the West Bank within the next five years they have only themselves to blame. When Barak called up Rice to assuage her anger at what she took as a deliberate bid to undermine the Olmert-Abbas game, he did not retract his statement, but he did reassure her of his support for the negotiations and for what he termed "the political horizon", which is another word for the "peace process". Both are from that well-known Barakian lexicon that harks back to his heyday in Camp David II. It takes someone who knows the ins and outs of politics in that country to realize that this is not about political horizons but political shenanigans. Barak is furious at Olmert for not trusting him and including him in the decision- making and negotiating processes. It is not just in children's playgrounds that the ultimatum, "If I can't play, you can't play," applies. At the same time, Barak is anticipating Olmert's resignation (or forced resignation if he resists) following the release of the final Winograd report on the war in Lebanon, which may explicitly ask for the prime minister's resignation and which would bring the date of elections forward. So Barak is not just lashing out at Olmert; he is also one-upping Netanyahu, his foremost rival in those elections. Fighting with the right, in Israel, calls into play another set of rules to those that apply to rivalries within the Labour Party itself. Also, in preparation for those elections, Barak is eager to rectify the commonly held impression about him as the author of unilateral withdrawal, as applied in Lebanon in 2000 (unconditional withdrawal, in other words, in the face of an obdurate Lebanese resistance and following his failure in negotiations with Syria, which, had they succeeded, would have purportedly given Israel an honorable exit strategy within the framework of a peace agreement). So this is what Barak's statement about Israel not being able to withdraw from the West Bank for another five years was about.

In reality, the Palestinian negotiator, now "disengaged" from Gaza and Hamas, is pawn to these and other ugly Israeli games. And he hasn't received anything in return; Israel has him in its grips with no other Arabs to worry about. It is a very patient player: it will wring every last drop of advantage it can from his delight at having been rewarded with this long sought after "partnership", and his eagerness to vaunt and display the sprinklings of Israeli "magnanimity". How else can one interpret Tzipi Livni's recent announcement ( Haaretz, 15 August) that Israel has linked progress in negotiations with normalization with the Arab world? Israel has taken Palestinian negotiators hostage and is now blackmailing Arab capitals.

Meanwhile, the eternally young 80-year-old Shimon Peres, who has just embarked on a bright and promising future as president, has not let down people's hopes and expectations. He has come up with some great ideas. We will hear more of these, from his official residence in Talibiya, that elegant quarter in West Jerusalem occupied in 1948 (will Arab delegations recall this as they pass by the historic Arab homes that now house the Israeli upper class on their way to pay homage at court?). Peres is in favor of returning 100 per cent of the West Bank to the Palestinians, on condition that the Palestinians make up for this by relinquishing all claim to East Jerusalem, its immediate surroundings and outlying settlements, that will be annexed to Israel. This is probably just for starters, but what he's getting at is a "land exchange" across the length of the Green Line, which is densely populated by Arabs.

As usual, some Arabs have hailed his idea as a historic opportunity that should not be allowed to slip by. I propose a simpler course: to admit the truth. The truth is that the occupied territories are not real estate open to haggling over the square footage and price, and that the question of Jerusalem, above all, is not one that can be resolved through bartering and tradeoffs. The fact is that Israel must accept the 1949 truce lines and withdraw to pre-June 1967 borders, no more, no less. These principles do not need arguments to back them up so much as strong negotiating resolve.

As for the Palestinians inside Israel, many fear that this talk of a land exchange across the Green Line may be specifically designed for them, and they have voiced tentative and vague objections to the Peres plan. In Israel, this position has been interpreted as an indication of the desire of those Arabs to hold on to Israeli citizenship, with those who reached this conclusion betraying no small degree of smugness. After all, why else would those Arabs object to becoming part of a Palestinian state, especially when that transformation comes complete with the transfer of their villages, full Palestinian sovereignty over that land, and Palestinian citizenship rights? So they argue. But it could equally be pointed out that these Palestinians had never had a choice in the matter. Israeli citizenship had been forced upon them. Has the situation suddenly changed? The fact that some Arabs have opposed the Peres suggestion suggests that it has not, and that this stance is, in fact, a protest in favor of individual choice.

But there is more. Those Arab villages were never statelets annexable by this country or that. They were part of a larger stretch of Palestinian land, most of which Israel confiscated and the minimum amount of which it plans to return in exchange for probably yet a larger stretch of land. Still, something else reeks; and it was when Lieberman rejoiced at how easily the idea was accepted in Israeli public opinion that one could identify the stench. Lieberman has long advocated a "package deal" with the Palestinians that would enable Israel to get rid of the largest possible number of Arabs inside Israel. Now there appears to be a virtual unanimity over this type of solution -- even the Israeli left had no moral problem with population transfer as long as it included their land.

Clearly, Arabs inside Israel should stick to their position. However, this position needs to be clarified and it needs to be formulated in such a way as not to compromise both national identity and individual citizen rights. I propose the following as a reasonable and workable stance.

First, Israel must make a choice. Either it transfers Jericho and the entire triangle to the Palestinian state in accordance with the boundaries defined in the 1947 Partition Plan or it does not transfer anyone. In other words, it has to choose between holding on to post-June 1967 boundaries and continuing to have to sustain the costs of suppressing resistance against Zionism and the fight for freedom and equality, or accepting pre-1967 borders. Second, the transfer of only a portion of Palestinians and their land serves neither their cause nor the cause of the Palestinians as a whole. Indeed, accepting such an exchange vindicates the logic behind compromise on other major issues, of which Jerusalem is just one. Third, it places a big question mark over the fate of Palestinians remaining inside Israel. As Israel defines itself, they can never be fully equal citizens, even though they will be profiled as citizens who chose Israel over their national identity. At the same time, their loyalty to the state will always be suspect and unless they prove themselves "worthy" they will remain vulnerable to the threat of transfer, or to such "solutions" as granting them one set of civil rights applicable to their place of residence and another set of civil rights, such as the right to vote in Palestine, applicable to their national identity. There is no end to the litany of mad ideas that could arise once the precedent of treating the predicament of Palestinians in Israel piecemeal has been set. Therefore, any notion of parceling out the fate of this minority that makes up 20 per cent of the population of Israel should be rejected out of hand.

A Palestinian thinker and a former member of the Israeli Knesset.

I AM A PALESTINIAN from Nazareth, a citizen of Israel and was, until last month, a member of the Israeli parliament.

But now, in an ironic twist reminiscent of France's Dreyfus affair — in which a French Jew was accused of disloyalty to the state — the government of Israel is accusing me of aiding the enemy during Israel's failed war against Lebanon in July.

Israeli police apparently suspect me of passing information to a foreign agent and of receiving money in return. Under Israeli law, anyone — a journalist or a personal friend — can be defined as a "foreign agent" by the Israeli security apparatus. Such charges can lead to life imprisonment or even the death penalty.

The allegations are ridiculous. Needless to say, Hezbollah — Israel's enemy in Lebanon — has independently gathered more security information about Israel than any Arab Knesset member could possibly provide. What's more, unlike those in Israel's parliament who have been involved in acts of violence, I have never used violence or participated in wars. My instruments of persuasion, in contrast, are simply words in books, articles and speeches.

These trumped-up charges, which I firmly reject and deny, are only the latest in a series of attempts to silence me and others involved in the struggle of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel to live in a state of all its citizens, not one that grants rights and privileges to Jews that it denies to non-Jews.

When Israel was established in 1948, more than 700,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled in fear. My family was among the minority that escaped that fate, remaining instead on the land where we had long lived. The Israeli state, established exclusively for Jews, embarked immediately on transforming us into foreigners in our own country.

For the first 18 years of Israeli statehood, we, as Israeli citizens, lived under military rule with pass laws that controlled our every movement. We watched Jewish Israeli towns spring up over destroyed Palestinian villages.

Today we make up 20% of Israel's population. We do not drink at separate water fountains or sit at the back of the bus. We vote and can serve in the parliament. But we face legal, institutional and informal discrimination in all spheres of life.

More than 20 Israeli laws explicitly privilege Jews over non-Jews. The Law of Return, for example, grants automatic citizenship to Jews from anywhere in the world. Yet Palestinian refugees are denied the right to return to the country they were forced to leave in 1948. The Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty — Israel's "Bill of Rights" — defines the state as "Jewish" rather than a state for all its citizens. Thus Israel is more for Jews living in Los Angeles or Paris than it is for native Palestinians.

Israel acknowledges itself to be a state of one particular religious group. Anyone committed to democracy will readily admit that equal citizenship cannot exist under such conditions.

Most of our children attend schools that are separate but unequal. According to recent polls, two-thirds of Israeli Jews would refuse to live next to an Arab and nearly half would not allow a Palestinian into their home.

I have certainly ruffled feathers in Israel. In addition to speaking out on the subjects above, I have also asserted the right of the Lebanese people, and of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to resist Israel's illegal military occupation. I do not see those who fight for freedom as my enemies.

This may discomfort Jewish Israelis, but they cannot deny us our history and identity any more than we can negate the ties that bind them to world Jewry. After all, it is not we, but Israeli Jews who immigrated to this land. Immigrants might be asked to give up their former identity in exchange for equal citizenship, but we are not immigrants.

During my years in the Knesset, the attorney general indicted me for voicing my political opinions (the charges were dropped), lobbied to have my parliamentary immunity revoked and sought unsuccessfully to disqualify my political party from participating in elections — all because I believe Israel should be a state for all its citizens and because I have spoken out against Israeli military occupation. Last year, Cabinet member Avigdor Lieberman — an immigrant from Moldova — declared that Palestinian citizens of Israel "have no place here," that we should "take our bundles and get lost." After I met with a leader of the Palestinian Authority from Hamas, Lieberman called for my execution.

The Israeli authorities are trying to intimidate not just me but all Palestinian citizens of Israel. But we will not be intimidated. We will not bow to permanent servitude in the land of our ancestors or to being severed from our natural connections to the Arab world. Our community leaders joined together recently to issue a blueprint for a state free of ethnic and religious discrimination in all spheres. If we turn back from our path to freedom now, we will consign future generations to the discrimination we have faced for six decades.

Americans know from their own history of institutional discrimination the tactics that have been used against civil rights leaders. These include telephone bugging, police surveillance, political delegitimization and criminalization of dissent through false accusations. Israel is continuing to use these tactics at a time when the world no longer tolerates such practices as compatible with democracy.

Why then does the U.S. government continue to fully support a country whose very identity and institutions are based on ethnic and religious discrimination that victimize its own citizens?